How Important is it to Jail Insider Traders?

An interesting discussion about regulators with teeth cropped up during John Gapper’s panel on financial centers. Gapper noted that the SEC was much better at jailing white-collar criminals than any of London’s financial regulators, to which Guy Saxton, the CEO First London Securities, essentially said so much the better for London.

Saxton’s argument was that jailing criminals doesn’t achieve very much in terms of changing future behavior. In the London system, he said, where brokers can be effectively ostracized and wiped out by the rest of the market if they violate the written and unwritten principles, has a much more salutary effect on the market as a whole.

The other side of the argument came from Magnus Böcker, the president of Nasdaq OMX Group, who said that having regulators with real teeth does increase investors’ trust and faith in the markets.

My feeling is that when it comes to financial markets, it’s unrealistic to hope that criminal behavior will be punished by the local civil prosecutors rather than specialized regulators. I also feel that in a world where the vast majority of insider trades go unprosecuted (just look at the behavior of credit default swaps ahead of big M&A deals), the real fear of going to jail if you’re found out is one of the few things that can meaningfully decrease such activity.

Posted in law, milken 2008 | Comments Off on How Important is it to Jail Insider Traders?

Cities: The Least Bad Part of US Real Estate

As a general rule, if you get the opportunity to hear Sam Zell speak, you should take it. He was on the real estate panel today, and he didn’t disappoint.

The moderator was Lew Feldman, a real-estate lawyer, who started by talking about the "debt and equity markets" in real estate capital, except his accent managed to make it sound like "dead-end equity markets". Thus was the tone set.

Zell started off by blaming the government, at least in part, for the current housing crunch. Every time over the past 40 years that the government decided that they wanted to increase homeownership over 62%, he said, there’s been a disaster. This time round seems to be no exception: homeownership went from 62% to 69%, and those new home buyers turned out to be much less creditworthy than most, and also turned out to be the suckers who bought at the top.

Even so, said Zell,

I think it’s all overstated. I’d buy all the subprime debt I could find at 40 cents on the dollar, in terms of recovery, and there are subprime CDOs out there which are trading for a nickel.

Zell also pointed out that if a bank tells an underwater borrower to sell his house, the borrower has no incentive to show or sell that house. But when the bank forecloses, it has every incentive to sell. So as foreclosures rise, we might well see even more of an increase in home sales. But that would not necessarily be good news.

Zell then got into an intersting conversation with Bobby Turner, of Canyon Capital Advisors, about demographics and urbanization. Turner, channeling the likes of Ryan Avent and Richard Florida, said that consumer prefences are going to move away from the suburban lifestyle as transportation costs soar.

Zell agreed, pointing to enormous growth of housing in what he called "24/7 cities", putting a lot of that growth down to the societal deferral of marriage.

But as cities become ever more expensive and the suburbs become ever cheaper, he was asked, won’t corporations move out to the suburbs? No. Motorola rented 200,000 square feet of office space in downtown Chicago last year, he said, even as they have over half a million vacant square feet not far away in McHenry county. If the employees are moving to the cities, then the companies are going to have to follow suit.

Generally, the panelists were downbeat on all US assets, with Zell reserving most of his zeal for Brazil. But if there is a growth market in the US, it’s the big gateway cities: both hotels, which can benefit enormously from the weak dollar, and lower-end rental properties, which will benefit over the long term from immigration and population growth.

Posted in housing, milken 2008 | Comments Off on Cities: The Least Bad Part of US Real Estate

The State of Credit

The Milken Global Conference kicked off this morning with a panel moderated by Mike Milken on the only possible subject: credit. It was a high-level panel, with some high-level discourse: one of the most sophisticated conversations I’ve ever tried to follow at 8 o’clock in the morning.

Wes Edens, the CEO of Fortress Investment Group, kicked things off by pointing out how much worse this credit cycle is than were previous downturns in 1998 or the beginning of 2002: rather than widening out to 70bp or 80bp over Treasuries, investment-grade bonds are now trading at 1200bp over. And a lot of that, he said, isn’t necessarily credit risk: "the bulk of it has been due to a tremendous liquidity crisis". Think for instance of the effect of SIVs unwinding: that’s $300 billion or more being sold into a market with precious few buyers, with the obvious effect on prices. "It’s what happens when the buyers of the assets all become sellers of the assets," said Edens.

Rajeev Misra, head of credit trading at Deutsche Bank, agreed, and said that the reason emerging market debt has been the best performer of late is simply because of the lack of leverage in the asset class. He’s also convinced that there’s an enormous cash/CDS arbitrage in the investment-grade space, where cash bonds yield 70-80bp more than the yield on the CDS. There’s no default or credit risk in this trade, he says, and those bonds are going to mature in 5 years: the spread is a pure liquidity premium. When massive spreads like that don’t get arbitraged away almost immediately, you know that financial markets are going through unusual times.

Misra also pointed out an enormous asymmetry in the world of subprime credit default swaps. Hundreds of billions of dollars of BBB-rated subprime CDS were bundled into synthetic CDOs, he said, despite the fact that the BBB slice of a subprime RMBS is only about 2% of the total. If total subprime bond issuance was $700 billion, then all of those credit default swaps – which were then structured into hundreds of billions of dollars of AAA paper – were based on maybe $15 billion of actual bonds. And that’s how a tiny number of very risky bonds can, through the magic of structured finance, underpin huge quantities of nominally risk-free debt.

Noel Kirnon, of Moody’s structured finance group, seemed a little more slippery. He said that historically structured finance ratings have been more stable than corporate ratings, and that even today structured finance in 2007 has been much less volatile than corporate debt was in 1986 – a period of time I’m sure that Milken remembers very well indeed, and never thought he’d end up reliving.

I suspect, however, that the lack of ratings volatility that Kirnon referenced is a product of the fact that corporates have to be continually re-rated because they are continually issuing. Structured products, by contrast, generally get rated only once, and it takes a lot for a ratings agency to re-rate them without any new issuance from that specific entity.

Steven Tananbaum, the CEO GoldenTree Asset Management, was reasonably constructive. One thing he pointed out is that there’s no difference between mean and median bank-loan prices, in stark contrast to the last credit downturn. Back then, most credits performed, while a few plunged in price. Today, there’s no differentiation between credits – probably because so far default rates have remained extremely low. Inevitably a large number of credits are not going to default: if you think you know which they are, there are some very attractive yields out there right now.

That said, however, spreads are still narrower than they normally are when default rates pick up, which means we’re still early in the credit cycle and spreads are going to widen further when companies start to default. When the default rate does rise, there might well be further spread widening, even on the good credits which ultimately will continue to perform.

One interesting datapoint Tananbaum did come up with was that implied default rates on double-A loans are actually higher than implied default rates on single-A loans. That, he said, is a result of the deleveraging going on: the purchasers of AA tranches were all levered 10x, and are now being forced to unwind. On the other hand, you can only calculate implied default rates by assuming recovery values, and Tananbaum assumed higher recoveries on AA than on A loans. That might well not be the case, this time around.

Posted in bonds and loans, milken 2008 | Comments Off on The State of Credit

Airline Datapoint of the Day

David Robertson, on Eos shutting down:

Rising oil prices are causing havoc in the airline industry and Eos is the seventh carrier in two weeks to seek bankruptcy protection or go bust.

I guess that ballyhooed service from London to Dubai ain’t gonna happen now. And let’s hope all of Eos’s passengers paid with a credit card!

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The Problems of Congestion Pricing in LA

Tim Rutten objects to congestion pricing on LA freeways, and I, like Mark Thoma, am sympathetic. Since I was such a strong advocate of congestion pricing in New York City, however, it’s worth teasing out the main reason why something which makes sense in New York doesn’t necessarily make sense in LA. Here’s Rutten:

It takes unconventional and courageous thinking to come up with a plan that clears a highway lane for the well-off, while the middle class and working poor are left to inhale each other’s $5-a-gallon exhaust fumes… making the daily lives of the hundreds of thousands of moderate-income commuters … even more intolerable…

In Southern California, the middle class and working poor have no choice but to use the freeways to get back and forth to work and school because, decade after decade, public officials have encouraged urban sprawl while neglecting public transit. For most commuters today, the highway is the only way.

This is the big difference between NY and LA. In NY, it’s the rich who drive personal vehicles during the working day in midtown: the poor don’t. The other big difference is that in New York there are alternatives to driving, including public transport and bicycling. While there are indeed areas of New York City which are not well served by public transport, the residents of those areas generally don’t commute to Manhattan.

In New York, congestion pricing forces well-off drivers to pay for – and help ameliorate – the negative externalities which they impose on the population as a whole. On the LA freeways, there’s a good chance that it would only serve to exacerbate those negative externalities for most local residents.

All the same, there are probably ways to make congestion pricing work in LA, and to redirect the revenues from it to those who would be hardest hit. I’m going to be at the Milken Global Conference for the next three days, and I’ll definitely be keeping an eye out for commentary on this issue.

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Blogonomics: Going Pro

Megan McArdle reckons that econoblogging has become professionalized:

All of the high-traffic economics bloggers I read are either professors, in some similarly rewarding profession, or already tied up by a media organization…

I’m not sure what this means for the blogging world. It’s still largely an amateur medium, but it’s hard to see how many new bloggers can compete with someone who gets paid to do it, unless they are independently wealthy or have a job, like journalism or academia, that routinely throws them a lot of bloggable material. Will it become as hard to break into blogging as it is to break into print?

I think this misses two big points. Firstly, bloggers don’t "compete with" each other. Sure, some bloggers get more traffic than others, but increasing the number of blogs only serves to increase the total amount of traffic. I welcome every new entrant into the econoblogosphere, largely out of purely selfish reasons: it broadens the conversation and gives me more to blog about; and it also, at the margin, means more traffic and attention for me.

What’s more, as the number of econobloggers increases, the number of people able to discover a new blogger increases as well. The barriers to entry are as low as they’ve ever been: blogging is still basically free. And as McArdle herself recognises, the demand for econobloggers is constantly growing – she and I are regularly asked to recommend people for paid positions, and neither of us has a lot of bright ideas on that front. Just starting an econoblog is pretty much enough, these days, to get you onto most shortlists.

More encouragingly still, demand for econobloggers is not from people who want to buy existing traffic, but rather from people who want to buy talent. You don’t need to be a "high-traffic econoblogger" to be attractive to the kind of people who are looking to hire these days: you just need to be good at blogging. For the first time, bloggers (McArdle and myself included) can get major corporate backing for their blogs – something which gives us the money to be able to do it full-time, and which is also a built-in source of traffic.

So is it getting harder to break into blogging? Actually, I suspect it’s getting easier. My guess is that John Jansen, of Across the Curve, will be snapped up pretty soon by someone wanting to publish intelligent bond-market commentary of the kind that very few journalists would ever be able to write. He hasn’t been blogging for long, but people like him don’t need to blog for long before their abilities become clear. And he doesn’t need a big readership to get that kind of job, he just needs to come to the attention of the kind of people whose job it is to keep an eye on the blogosphere, looking for talent. Yes, econoblogging is increasingly a paid job. But that doesn’t make it tough to break into, if you have the ability.

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Did Hedge Funds Help Stabilize the Mortgage Market?

Brad DeLong approvingly quotes a correspondent:

The fact that there was an ABX index and thus an easy way for people to bet that the mortage-backed securities market would crash probably cut short the bubble–the true hedge funds were stabilizing speculators; the destabilizing speculators were (i) the funds that were long CDOs and (ii) the banks and other issuers who retained the CDOs because their portfolio managers believed their marketeers. A world without derivatives but with mortgage-backed securities would probably be a world in which we have a bigger problem than we have now.

I’ve heard this argument made before, by Sebastian Mallaby; I didn’t buy it then, and I don’t buy it now.

It’s easy to be awed by the sums of money made by John Paulson and the Goldman Sachs mortgage desk. But compared to the amount of money tied up in RMBS, the profits made by shorting mortgage-backed securities have been tiny. For Paulson to have played a significant role in stopping the mortgage-backed credit bubble from continuing to exapand, he would have had to have been orders of magnitude larger than he was.

But more to the point, the ABX index is an index of CDS spreads referencing subprime RMBS. The chain of arbitrage which would lead from shorting the ABX to RMBS prices falling is long and convoluted: first any drop in the ABX would have to be arbitraged by buying the ABX whilst selling buying protection on the underlying CDS contracts. Then any widening in those underlying CDS contracts would have to be arbitraged by selling protection on the RMBS while at the same time shorting the underlying bonds. (Good luck trying to do that. And of course this isn’t a risk-free arbitrage, since CDS and bonds have been behaving in idiosyncratic and dissimilar manners of late.) Then any drop in the price of the specific RMBS which underlie the CDS which underlie the ABX would have to be arbitraged by buying up those bonds while selling the broad mass of other RMBS, creating generalized downward pressure on the secondary-market prices of subprime RMBS. Then a drop in secondary-market RMBS prices would have to be arbitraged by investors buying up secondary-market securities rather than the primary-market securities being offered to them by the investment banks structuring the RMBS deals, and this would have to be a common enough occurrence that the yields on primary-market RMBS deals would rise as a consequence. Finally – as if all that wasn’t improbable enough – the higher yields on these RMBS deals would have to somehow feed through into fewer of those deals being done, and less demand from investment banks for securitizable mortgages.

I’m quite sure that’s not what happened in reality. Yes, the people who shorted the ABX made a lot of money, but they made money because the RMBS market imploded for reasons utterly unrelated to – and not even precipitated by – the fact that a few hedge funds and prop desks were shorting the ABX. In other words, a world without derivatives but with mortgage-backed securities would probably be a world in which the RMBS market would still lie in tatters, and the only real difference is that John Paulson would be a great deal less wealthy than he is now.

Posted in hedge funds, housing | Comments Off on Did Hedge Funds Help Stabilize the Mortgage Market?

Sales Pitch of the Day, Realtors Edition

Watching the television on the plane over to LA, I saw this ad for the National Association of Realtors telling people that buying a house "is a good move" using the grounds that the average homeowner has 60% of his net worth tied up in home equity. Huh?

Right now, one might think that people had every desire to minimize their exposure to the housing market, not to mention the percentage of their net worth that could be wiped out if house prices continue to fall. But evidently that’s not the way that the NAR sees things.

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Extra Credit, Bonus Edition

Economics is funny: Cowen vs Rodrik. Related: Summers.

Recession? It Doesn’t Add Up: "When the government prints its estimate of first-quarter GDP next Wednesday, it’s highly unlikely the number will be negative… with the government’s tax rebate checks getting into Americans’ hands next month, most economists had previously considered that to be enough of a stimulus to keep GDP in positive territory during the second quarter."

Kernels From AAA Show Ethanol’s Costs To Drivers: Yet another downside to ethanol.

Gin, Television, and Social Surplus: All the time that’s ever been put into Wikipedia is roughly the amount of time spent looking at TV ads in one weekend.

“What business is that of yours, friendo?” One of the weirdest earnings presentations ever. This really is one of the slides.

slide.jpg

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Extra Credit, Sunday Edition

MyFICO, Myself: Why you shouldn’t worry about your credit score.

Damn Latte-Drinking Obama Supporters

Merrill Lynch, slackers: Why can’t Merrill wire funds from a 401(k)?

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Did the CBOT Strongarm Bob Rubin?

Are you in the mood for 4,000 carefully-balanced words on the subject of Bob Rubin and the degree to which he may or may not be responsible for Citigroup’s recent woes? Well, here you go. The article’s good, but it’s easy to miss the bit picked up on by Dean Baker:

Shortly before leaving Goldman to head up President Clinton’s National Economic Council, Mr. Rubin says, he met with Richard B. Fisher, the chairman of Morgan Stanley, to discuss the idea of imposing stricter margin requirements on futures trading. Mr. Rubin says the idea died after the Chicago Board of Trade told him “we will make sure Goldman Sachs never trades another future on the C.B.O.T. if this went ahead.”

Baker is shocked:

This is an incredibly important news story. The implication is that a top official in the Clinton administration, who subsequently became Treasury Secretary, altered regulatory policy based on a threat made against his former firm.

If such a threat was actually made, then it should have been reported to the F.B.I. and some people connected with the C.B.O.T. should be sitting in jail right now. If Mr. Rubin was actually prepared to alter regulatory policy to serve his former firm, then he clearly had conflicts of interest that made him unqualified to hold a top government position.

I do think that Rubin should clarify exactly what he and Fisher were talking about, and when. Were the conversations explicitly about what Rubin could or might do when he entered public service? What was the CBOT’s role in those conversations? And did Rubin take the CBOT’s threats seriously?

Baker says that "the company that now owns the C.B.O.T. denies that any such threat was ever made," but in fact it’s more of a non-denial denial:

A spokeswoman for the CME Group, which now owns the Chicago Board, contends that “Goldman was and continues to be a valued customer and we would never deny access to our markets.”

The NYT might have almost inadvertently stumbled across a juicy little scandal here; I do hope they follow up.

Posted in banking, regulation | Comments Off on Did the CBOT Strongarm Bob Rubin?

Ben Stein Watch: April 27, 2008

Ben Stein’s column this week is the first since the NYT kicked off its formal review of his film thusly:

One of the sleaziest documentaries to arrive in a very long time, “Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed” is a conspiracy-theory rant masquerading as investigative inquiry.

Stein is maybe a little bit chastened, since he seems to have given up on trying to impart his own ideas in his column. Instead, he gives himself a reading-comprehension test, taking a widely-circulated speech by David Einhorn and trying to boil it down to its most salient points.

Naturally, Stein fails the test.

Einhorn’s speech is worth reading, but Stein’s self-described "CliffsNotes version of it" isn’t. For instance, Einhorn makes the point that since employee compensation is a function of revenues, investment-bank employees are incentivized to maximize those revenues by adding leverage:

The managements of the investment banks did exactly

what they were incentivized to do: maximize employee compensation. Investment banks

pay out 50% of revenues as compensation. So, more leverage means more revenues,

which means more compensation.

Clear and simple, right? Here’s the SteinNotes version:

The fellows who run big investment banks have a strong incentive to maximize their assets and leverage themselves into deep trouble because their pay is a function of how much debt they can pile on. If they can use relatively low-interest debt to generate slightly higher returns, the firm earns more revenue and executive pay increases. Often, an astonishing 50 percent of total revenue goes to employee compensation at Wall Street firms.

Longer, more convoluted, and – in the last sentence – utterly missing the point.

There’s nothing "astonishing" about the 50% figure, in an industry which relies on human capital. Stein calls himself a lawyer, so he probably knows that the employee-compensation-to-revenue ratio at law firms is closer to 100%. And in any case, the 50% figure is well known to anybody who follows the investment banking industry, and long predates the credit crunch. That Stein is astonished by it only goes to show how ill-qualified he is to write about this stuff.

Stein also has no idea what "capital" is in the banking industry. Banks ‘can hold some scary “assets”,’ he says, making sure to put the word "assets" in scare quotes just to reinforce just how scary it is. He then continues:

What do they hold as capital against such risks? You would think it would be cash or Treasury bonds, wouldn’t you? But no…

The S.E.C. — acting as one of Wall Street’s chief regulators, mind you — also allowed such things as “hybrid capital instruments” (much riskier than cash or Treasuries), subordinated debt (ditto) and even deferred return of taxes, to be counted as capital.

Once again, Stein has managed to mangle one of Einhorn’s points. Here’s Einhorn’s clear English:

Only tangible equity, not subordinated debt should count as

capital.

How Stein managed to read that bit about "tangible equity" and decide that it referred to "cash or Treasury bonds" is beyond me. Stein is clearly too dim to realise that cash and Treasuries are assets, which means that they can hardly be used as capital to hold against assets. The point about cash and Treasuries, of course, is entirely Stein’s, it’s never made by Einhorn.

But Stein isn’t really trying to channel Einhorn, he’s just using Einhorn as an excuse to bash the same old drum all over again. This is 100% Stein, for instance, and appears nowhere in Einhorn’s speech:

Henry M. Paulson Jr., the Treasury secretary, is calling for merging the S.E.C. with the easygoing Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in the financial equivalent of setting off a Doomsday Device.

A Doomsday Device? It would be great if Stein could tone down his language just a tiny bit, because while merging the SEC with the CFTC may or may not be a good idea, I don’t think anybody (except perhaps for Stein) considers it to be tantamount to the End of the World. But then again, as the NYT itself pointed out, Stein is something of a master when it comes to such cheap rhetorical devices:

Blithely ignoring the vital distinction between social and scientific Darwinism, the film links evolution theory to fascism (as well as abortion, euthanasia and eugenics), shamelessly invoking the Holocaust with black-and-white film of Nazi gas chambers and mass graves.

No doubt Stein would do the same to Hank Paulson if he were allowed to incorporate B-roll into his columns. Let’s just be thankful the NYT’s multimedia push hasn’t gone that far.

Posted in ben stein watch | Comments Off on Ben Stein Watch: April 27, 2008

The Negative Correlation Between Wine Price and Quality

Back in November I held a Pinot contest which concluded that there was really no correlation between price and quality – or if there was, it was negative. Of course, there was nothing really scientific about a drunken night in the East Village. But now along comes Robin Goldstein, who held more than 6,000 blind tastings of wines ranging from less than $2 a bottle to more than $150. His results?

Individuals who are unaware of the price do not derive more enjoyment

from more expensive wine. In a sample of more than 6,000 blind tastings,

we find that the correlation between price and overall rating is small and

negative, suggesting that individuals on average enjoy more expensive

wines slightly less.

This effect is strongest if you ignore the most expensive 10% and cheapest 10% of wines, but even if you include the outliers, it’s still there:

In terms of

a 100 point scale (such as that used by Wine Spectator), the extended model

predicts that for a wine that costs ten times more than another wine, non-experts will on average assign an overall rating that is about four points lower.

Of course, this effect definitively does not hold if you know how much the wine costs. If you buy an expensive bottle of wine and take it to a restaurant, you’re very likely to enjoy it a lot, even if you might have rated that wine relatively lowly in a blind tasting without food. But for the vast majority of people, the best thing you can do in a wine shop is ignore the prices completely. Even if you can tell the difference between two different wines, you’re just as likely to prefer the cheaper as the more expensive:

Weil finds that even when tasters can distinguish between the

vintages, they are about as likely to prefer the good one as the bad one. And

among those that can distinguish the reserve bottling from the regular bottling,

only half prefer the reserve. In both cases, the wines differ in price by an order

of magnitude.

Eric Asimov thinks that wine is like film or literature: the good might not be popular, and the popular might not be good. Which may or may not be true – but no one tries to charge higher prices for better films or better books. He does however make another good point: that the real finds in the wine world aren’t the expensive famous wines or even the cheap famous wines but rather the tiny artisanal wines which have a personality and uniqueness which defies pricing. If you find a wine you really love, then it’s likely to be worth spending money on. But if you find a wine which everybody loves (Dom Perignon is the example in the book), then it’s almost certainly overpriced.

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When Trichet Met Bernanke

euro_dollar_black_cherry_2.jpg

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Extra Credit, Friday Edition

The NYT Discovers High-Priced Textbooks, but Misses Cause Baker responds to the NYT editorial board; so does Krugman.

The science of buying a home: "We picked a neighborhood that we liked a lot, we found the house that we liked the most within this neighborhood, then we offered to buy it for $10,000 less than the asking price. I think that the owners of that house could have asked for $100,000 more or $100,000 less than their current price and we would have still offered them just a bit less than their asking price."

McCain and His Money: "The McCains are a stellar portrait of Republican wealth: They’ve inherited money and managed it well while generating commissions for stock brokers and real-estate agents."

Our Take: Not Fade Away: Advice for people wanting a job as a Wall Street analyst: they should ask themselves "Am I as vigorous, as emotionally engaged, and as technically proficient and comfortable in my professional specialty, as Jagger, Richards, Wood and Watts?". On second thoughts, who wants to be a Wall Street analyst, anyway?

Markets in Everything? Why it’s hard to set up a secondary market in auction-rate securities.

Oxymoron du Jour: Gung-ho Risk Manager

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The Snipes Sentence: Three Years and 65 Words

Chuck Norris can divide by zero. Chuck Norris can split the atom with his bare hands. But even Chuck Norris can’t keep Wesley Snipes out of jail.

This is an acutal letter written to the judge who recently sentenced Snipes to three years for not paying taxes:

Chuck Norris admires and respects Wesley Snipes which is why he has used him in two of his Total gym infomercials. We, in the martial arts, say making mistakes is how you learn to go forward and be a better person.

The rest of the letters are well worth reading too. My favorite is the beginning of the letter from Judge Joe Brown:

First, as a public figure with a television program and a retired criminal court judge for the state of Tennessee, I wish to disclaim any intention to convey the impression that my current and prior professional status in anyway [sic] be thought submitted for the purpose of enhancing the impact of my advocacy of merciful consideration for the petition of leniency advanced by your defendant…

He might be advocating for leniency, but clearly Judge Joe Brown is simply incapable of delivering a short sentence.

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Learning from Amex

It’s very long (8,500 words!) but if you have some time I’d recommend reading the transcript of yesterday’s American Express earnings call. American Express is a very interesting company to watch at times like this: it’s a borrower, and a lender, and has a better idea of exactly how consumers are spending and defaulting than just about anybody else.

The big-picture result was positive. Revenues were up by 11%, and while earnings were down that was largely because of one-time profits taken this time last year. But it’s the smaller things which stood out for me:

  • You know how the securitization market has ground to a halt? Turns out, not so much. "Liquidity has been there for us and also there’s plenty of liquidity in the securitization market," said CFO Dan Henry. "The credit spreads above LIBOR in the first quarter were higher than we’ve seen historically. But, there’s plenty of liquidity, you have to pay up a little bit."
  • Amex was however hit by Libor gapping out. It borrows floating-rate funds at a spread over Libor, but it lends floating-rate funds at a spread over Prime – and while Libor has widened out against Fed funds, Prime hasn’t.
  • While the slowdown in spending is happening across the country, delinquencies seem to be entirely a product of the mortgage meltdown. Meanwhile, small businesses are actually doing better than you might expect. Here’s Henry:

On the spending side we’ve really seen in the US the slowdown really across all products, all vintages, and all geographies. On the credit side it’s been different, where we’ve seen the greatest impact are in geographies where the housing market has really dropped more than 5% or more than 10%. So, when we look at our data and we look at geographies that really have not had a drop in housing there really hasn’t been that much deterioration and where there’s been a greater drop, the greater the drop in housing prices the greater the change or deterioration in credit metrics.

The other key thing that we’ve looked at is look at where people stand in terms of their mortgage. So, if you look at folks that are either renters or people who have had a mortgage that is older than 2003 again, it’s been relatively modest change in terms of credit behavior. On the other hand, if you look at folks who have a mortgage that is more recent than that or people where we don’t have mortgage information that’s where we’re seeing the greatest increase in delinquencies. That’s to give you an idea of how it’s different but it’s really different on the credit side as opposed to on the spend side…

In some prior periods we’ve said small business was a leading indicator that credit was going to deteriorate. That wasn’t the case this time.

I’ve also had the idea in the back of my mind that as people stop being able to borrow against their houses, they’ll borrow more against their credit cards. But for people with Amex cards, at least, that doesn’t seem to be happening:

Utilization rates are curious. Customers self regulate themselves. Customers generally only like to take their line to 50%, 60%, and 70% of their total line. I think they always like to keep some for a rainy day…

I don’t know that we’ve seen a marked change in the utilization percentage.

Finally, Henry weighed in on the issue of those airline holdbacks:

We evaluate all airlines on an individual basis. They are very big customers of ours. We have exposure because to the extent a card member buys a ticket that card member pays us, we pay the airline and to the extent they’re not going to fly for a week or two months during that time we basically have frankly a receivable from that airline but if they were to liquidate we wouldn’t collect it.

Over the years we’ve been very focused on this. When appropriate we do hold back to mitigate whatever exposure we have. Over the years, from time to time, we’ve had small losses, but we’ve never had any large significant losses in the airline industry. We don’t have a blanket policy, it’s airline by airline.

The general impression I got from the call was one of a company which was a very long way from panic. Commentators such as Mohamed El-Erian are very worried that the slowdown in the real economy is going to make the recent financial crisis seem like just the first shoe dropping. But if American Express is anything to go by, the slowdown might well be more gradual than that, and the economy could have a bit of time to adjust.

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Heloc Securitization Datapoint of the Day

The biggest losses in the mortgage world have generally been taken on second liens – what in the real world are generally known as home equity lines. If you have a mortgage and a home equity line, and you default on your underwater mortgage, then the chances of the home equity lender getting anything at all are slim indeed.

So it’s not uncommon for bonds backed by home-equity lines to have recovery rates of zero when there is a default. But in one case, a bond known as Bear Stearns 2007-01, closed in April 2007, it’s not just the recovery rates which are dreadful, it’s the default rates, too. According to an Ambac presentation (Ambac was an insurer on the bond) losses have already reached 9.9%, which is pretty bad. But just look at projected losses, over the life of the bond: 81.8%!

As David Wallis, Ambac’s chief risk officer, explains, this means that 81 of every 100 borrowers in that pool will simply walk away from their loans. Which, he says, "sounds pretty bad to me". And that’s assuming a sharp drop-off in default rates going forwards:

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On the other hand, notes Wallis, you have to assume a sharp drop-off in default rates going forward:

It is true, it is a fairly sharp diminution. However, it has to be because if it is not, you end up with more than 100% of collateral loss, which does not make any sense either.

Here we have asset-backed bonds which are essentially backed by no assets. Remember that the whole point of an asset-backed bond is that you don’t need to worry so much about credit risk, because you’ve always got collateral. Oops.

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Reporting on Stock Moves

Many thanks to Colin Barr, who joined in the conversation after I called him out for his reporting on Merrill yesterday. My problem was with Barr saying that "shares of Merrill Lynch rose 8% after CEO John Thain said he won’t entertain talk of a breakup of the brokerage firm". Barr replied:

While I’m as happy as anyone to mock the ridiculous conventions of journalism, I’m not sure that saying the stock rose "after" Thain said something really amounts to "looking for causality." The alternative as I see it is to admit what everyone knows to be true, that rarely do any of us ever have a real lock on what causes a stock to move. Among other things, this coud result in riveting constructions like "Merrill shares rose 8%. Earlier, in a development that may well have been totally unrelated, CEO John Thain said he wouldn’t entertain a breakup of the brokerage firm."

As a general rule, if there’s something which everyone knows to be true, then it’s not a bad idea to admit it. And if the "after" construction doesn’t involve "looking for causality", then it would be OK to write that "shares of Merrill Lynch rose 8% after Hugo Lord, of Penge, in south-east London, decided that his herbaceous borders could use a bit of pruning".

The problem here is the uncritical internalization of three assumptions:

  1. When shares move, they move for a reason;
  2. If there is a reason for a move in share price then it is possible to know the reason for a move in share price;
  3. The reason for a move in share price will be related to news about the company in question.

None of these assumptions turns out to be very true in the real world, even if they hold in the world of stock-market theory. And it does a disservice to readers of the financial press when journalists pretend that they’re true when they’re not.

The way I see it, there are two different kinds of news that financial journalists can report. The first is real-world news: something happened, like a Merrill Lynch annual meeting, or the fact (weirdly ignored by most of the financial press) that Merrill Lynch has just raised $2.55 billion of new capital at an interest rate of 8.625%.

Buried inside such a story, it’s perfectly fine to insert a sentence like this one:

Merrill shares rose 7.1%, or $3.18, to $48.09 as of 4 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading.

When many people read about the company, they’re often interested in where the share price is, and what it did that day: there’s no reason not to tell them. But the story is very much about the news, and the share-price information is simply added in as a public service.

There’s a different kind of story, which is generally only of use to dedicated stock-market watchers, and that’s a market report about stocks which went up and stocks which went down. On any given day there are bound to be a few big movers on the stock market, and some people are interested in which stocks those might be. Once again, it’s fine to report that fact; it’s often a good idea to do so in the context of the stock market as a whole. The index did this, financials did that, MER went up 7.1%.

In such a story there’s no harm in mentioning any news about the company: it’s germane that the rise in Merrill shares happened on the same day as the annual meeting. But it’s clear that the focus of the story is not the real-world news but rather the market movement.

The thing which bothers me is when the two different types of story get conflated, and a market-news story is presented as though it’s a real-news story. It often starts with a journalist or editor looking at a big stock-market move and asking why it happened. There’s then a search for news, and whatever news about the company happened to come out that day automatically becomes the presumed reason for the change in the stock price. It’s lazy and unhelpful journalism, but it’s also endemic, so I’ll admit it was a bit unfair of me to pick on Colin Barr specifically. Even if his purported reason for the stock move was more unlikely than most.

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The Nascent Secondary Market in Auction-Rate Securities

The Restricted Securities Trading Network in auction-rate securities has been up and running now since March, with 7-10 transactions taking place per day. That’s not an enormous number of trades, but it’s enough to see pretty clearly what the clearing price is that the market puts on these things. And the numbers aren’t pretty.

Municipal auction-rate securities trade at a discount of between 0% and 10%; auction-rate preferred securities trade between 10% and 20% below par; and student loan auction-rate securities are changing hands with a discount of 25% and upwards.

When any fixed-income prouct starts trading in the low 70s, that counts as distressed. And clearly there’s a correlation between price and perceived credit risk here. But it’s not simply the normal, obvious correlation, where the price simply falls so that the investor can be paid to take on credit risk. Rather, auction-rate securities with non-zero credit risk are the last auction-rate securities that anybody really wants to buy. And if you do buy them, you have no idea when or whether you’ll ever be able to sell them. The interest rates might be attractive, but without an exit, you need to be brave indeed to enter this market.

As a result, a small amount of credit risk can have a huge effect on price, and it makes sense for prices to drop to a level where the investor would be comfortable buying a perpetual bond from that issuer. The securities were designed, of course, not to behave as perpetuals but rather to behave almost like cash, with incredibly short maturities. What’s more, they were never designed to trade, per se: why would you ever need to sell one on the secondary market, when you can simply not bid at the next auction? The idea that everybody would stop bidding at once didn’t seem to occur to the designers.

As a result, the market in these things is thin indeed. If I held a portfolio of them, I wouldn’t be particularly happy marking to the RSTN prices, but then again they’re probably the closest thing that the market has to public marks, so I might not have much choice.

I also worry about the brokers who put their clients into auction-rate securities, and who until now have at least offered to lend against the "cash-like" investments which have been "temporarily" tied up. If those investments are now trading hands at 80 cents on the dollar or lower, I can’t imagine many brokers lending much more than that. Do they still claim to be "scrambling" to solve this problem? I still haven’t seen any evidence of that.

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Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

Bondholders Lucky to Get 10 Cents in Looming Defaults

R.I.P. Bond Rally, 2005-2008

How Murdoch Cheated ‘WSJ’ Independence Pact

Is Wall Street ‘Full of Bull’? Yes, if you’re an individual investor taking sell-side research at face value.

More on the Airline Industry’s Woes: "When the price of an input rises, then of course less of the output will be produced. This is one of the least subtle lessons in introductory economics. But when it’s the airlines, we’re now ‘slashing’ and ‘cutting.’ It’s a supply curve shifting. Chill."

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Causality Watch, Merrill Lynch Edition

Colin Barr:

Shares of Merrill Lynch rose 8% after CEO John Thain said he won’t entertain talk of a breakup of the brokerage firm, which has been hit hard since last summer by heavy losses on mortgage-related securities.

Why do journalists insist on looking for causality like this? I mean, if Thain had announced he was thinking about breaking up Merrill, does Barr really think that the stock would have fallen?

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Selling Funds to Institutions and Individuals

I had a lovely lunch with Roger Ehrenberg this afternoon, and we talked among other things about the big buy-side firms such as Warburg Pincus, Fortress, and the like – companies who seem to be able to raise huge amounts of money irrespective of their investment performance. The trick, I think, is becoming big enough to build a large institutional sales team, which is charged with doing whatever it takes to make huge institutional investors comfortable writing those nine-figure checks.

Such investors aren’t looking for the kind of home runs that John Paulson, say, has been delivering, although Roger did say that even Paulson has recently got into bed with Investec Investcorp. Rather, they’re looking for customized solutions, lots of history and hand-holding, and lots of clear and credible risk management. Once you start being able to offer that, you can become truly enormous very quickly, almost regardless of your annual returns.

Retail-facing fund management, by contrast, is a much harder sell. Individuals tend to look at performance first and foremost, and a single star fund manager with a strong record is often the main reason why billions of dollars have been invested with that firm rather than some other.

All of which spells trouble for Legg Mason, which has a market capitalization of just $8 billion despite having $1 trillion of assets under management. That 0.8% ratio, notes Evan Newmark, is less than half the 2% ratio at rival Blackrock. And much of the reason for the depressed valuation is the underperformance of star fund manager Bill Miller:

Miller may not be the CEO or on the board, but he is the face of Legg Mason, faithfully followed by investors. And Legg Mason has ridden his performance for years in marketing the firm.

Lately, that has been a very, very rough ride. Since the streak ended in 2006, Miller’s Value Trust has been one of the worst performing large-cap funds in the U.S. According to Lipper and Morningstar, Value Trust is ranked last out of more than 500 peer funds over a three-year period. Year to date, the fund is down more than 17%. Assets in Value Trust have fallen to a little more than $12 billion from more than $20 billion in 2006…

The most dangerous thing for [CEO Mark] Fetting may be to leave Miller and several of the other poorly performing fund managers in place. If he doesn’t move them, perhaps outsiders will force him to.

I don’t see the point in ousting Miller. The individual investors who have invested in Value Trust have invested specifically in Miller, and the ones who remain are the Miller loyalists. Why piss them off unnecessarily by firing Miller? If they want to invest under a different fund manager, there’s no shortage of opportunities both inside and outside Legg Mason where they can do so.

Still, if Miller continues to underperform, a retail-facing shop like Legg Mason might want to start going on the lookout for a new star fund manager. Bill Millers and Peter Lynches are hard to find, but when they do come along, the retail billions aren’t far behind.

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Why Index Investing Isn’t Passive Investing

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In the debate over active vs passive investing, the base-case assumption is that a passive investment involves tracking a stock-market index, normally the S&P 500. But of course stock-market indices are actively managed, with listing requirements and changing components and survivorship bias and that kind of thing. And according to a fascinating paper by Angelo Ranaldo and

Rainer Häberle, actively-managed indices significantly outperform a genuinely passive buy-and-hold strategy.

More precisely, actively-managed indices outperform a passive buy-and-hold approach in up markets, and they underperform in down markets. But since the whole point of investing in stocks is that they tend to go up over long periods of time, one can conclude that there is a real outperformance here over the long term.

I’m not sure how the efficient markets hypothesis deals with this: as you can see from the table above, the degree of outperformance is large. And I don’t think it’s a self-fulfilling phenomenon, either, where the very fact of being included in an index causes a stock to outperform: the same phenomenon is seen in relatively unpopular indices which aren’t benchmarked.

But this is yet another reason to buy index funds rather than individual stocks. If you buy and hold your stocks like any good long-term investor should, you have to outperform substantially just to keep up with the index, let alone beat it.

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Why the NYT Shouldn’t Attack the WSJ

Barry Ritholtz thinks that as the WSJ becomes newsier and more like the NYT, the NYT should beef up its business coverage and try "to go after the Journal’s audience" of executives who expense their subscriptions.

I don’t think this is a good idea. The NYT’s business coverage is a fraction of the WSJ’s, and the investment needed in bringing it up to WSJ levels would be better spent elsewhere. What’s more, there already is a national business-focused newspaper trying to compete with the WSJ: it’s called the Financial Times, and it’s losing a lot of money in the US. Why does Barry think the NYT can succeed where the FT has failed even with its single-minded focus on business news?

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