Bear Stearns Needs English Lessons

What is it about banks that they find it impossible to write in English? Here’s

a crucial part of the letter

Bear Stearns sent to investors yesterday:

On June 26th, Bear Stearns committed $1.6 billion in a collateralized repo

line to the High-Grade Fund. At this time, approximately $1.4 billion remains

outstanding on this line and we continue to believe there are sufficient assets

available in the High-Grade Fund to fully collateralize the repo facility.

On reading this, you might think that so far Bear Stearns has only actually

spent $200 million of the $1.6 billion which it said it was willing to spend.

It committed $1.6 billion, and there’s still $1.4 billion remaining, right?

Think again. Here’s Bloomberg’s Yalman

Onaran:

The second fund still has "sufficient assets" to cover the $1.4

billion it owes Bear Stearns, which as a creditor gets paid back first, according

to the letter, obtained yesterday by Bloomberg News from a person involved

in the matter.

Back in June, I pleaded

for more transparency from Bear Stearns on this matter. In fact, Bear just seems

to be getting increasingly obfuscatory: not only was the letter not released

to the press (it had to be forwarded on from its recipients), but it was also

worded in such a way as to make it very difficult to understand.

I can guarantee you that within Bear Stearns, people don’t talk about "fully

collateralizing the repo facility". They speak English there: they wonder

if the hedge fund is good for the $1.4 billion lent to it by Bear Stearns. But

the minute they have to communicate with the outside world, they fall back onto

gobbledegook. For no reason whatsoever.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Bear Stearns Needs English Lessons

NYT Economics Coverage Shrinks

The New York Times, until now, has had three economics columns. Economic Scene

was written by economists: it rotated between Tyler Cowen,

Austan Goolsbee, Robert Frank, and Hal

Varian. Economic View was written by journalists, including Daniel

Altman, Dan Gross, and Louis Uchitelle.

Finally, Times staffer David Leonhardt had his own Wednesday

column, Economix.

Today, all that changed.

Leonhardt’s column is still there, but it is now called Economic Scene. And

so the question arises: if Economix has become Economic Scene, what has happened

to the Economic Scene of old? Leonhardt answered

that at the end of his column: it has become Economic View. All the old

Scene columnists bar Varian will be squeezed into View, along with new columnists

Greg Mankiw, Alan Blinder, Judith

Chevalier, Robert Shiller, and Lester Thurow.

(Varian apparently doesn’t have the time to continue to write for newspapers,

now he’s working for Google.)

For those of you keeping count at home, that’s eight high-profile

economists sharing one slot in the Sunday newspaper.

And what’s happened to Economic View? Leonhardt doesn’t come right out and

say so, but it seems to have been killed off entirely.

Was there too much economics in the NYT, which is literally shrinking

in August and might need to make cuts? Elsewhere in the NYT there’s Paul

Krugman, of course, with his own op-ed columns, but those are rarely

particularly economics-based these days. And every so often the Levitt

‘n’ Dubner team writes a Freakonomics column in the Sunday magazine

– there have been four of those so far this year.

This is not good news for economic discourse in the mainstream press. One column

every two months is not much of a platform: it will take years for readers to

get a decent feel for where each of the columnists stands. And while the Economic

View column was not always scintillating, it was a million times better than

the half page of undigested tripe filed every week by the dreadful Ben

Stein. To kill View but to keep Stein alive betrays a sense of priorities

which can’t bode well for the NYT Business section.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on NYT Economics Coverage Shrinks

Bancroft Minority Can’t Block a Dow Jones Sale

Back at the beginning of June, Floyd Norris mused

about whether a minority of Bancrofts could block a sale of Dow Jones to Rupert

Murdoch, and John Carney whipped out his Casio and

calculated

that "Bancrofts holding slightly less than 4.3 million Class B shares—or

just 26% of the family’s total Class B holdings—could successfully

resist a takeover by tender offer even we assume all the shares of common stock

tendered into the acquisition".

Turns out, that’s not going to happen.

The WSJ clarifies

the situation this morning, saying that "only 51% of the voting power is

required for approval" of the deal sealed by the Dow Jones board yesterday.

What’s more, Michael Elefante, the Dow Jones board member who

voted in favor of the deal, "can deliver a little less than half of the

family’s 64% stake," according to the paper. It’s theoretically possible,

but in practice vanishingly unlikely, that Elefante qua Dow Jones board

member would vote in favor of the deal, while Elefante qua family trustee

would vote against.

All of which means that Christopher Bancroft, James

Ottaway, and other important shareholders will be able to vote their

shares against a deal without actually scuttling it. They’ll sleep better at

night, knowing that they did their utmost to prevent a sale to Murdoch, while

also knowing that their bank accounts will be significantly fatter once the

deal, against their objections, goes through.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on Bancroft Minority Can’t Block a Dow Jones Sale

Management-Speak, Mixed Metaphors Edition

Joseph Giannone, of Reuters, has a Q&A with UBS investment

bank CEO Huw Jenkins up on the web today. There are excerpts

at the Reuters blog, but if you want to read the whole thing you’ll need to

download

a Word file. Most peculiar.

Jenkins is smart enough not to commit any news in the interview, but he does

demonstrate a fine taste for mixed metaphors:

"We haven’t been as lucky at backing the winning horse as we might have

wished but like a lot of people in this business, you need a lot of at-bats

before you actually get a hit."

"We don’t want to lead with our chins and try to do too much in one

bite."

By my count, that’s four sports in two metaphors: horse racing, baseball, boxing,

and, er, competitive eating? I’m just disappointed the Welsh Jenkins didn’t

get rugby in there somehow.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Management-Speak, Mixed Metaphors Edition

Both Bear Stearns Hedge Funds Have Positive Valuations

That seems to be what

the WSJ is reporting this afternoon, at least:

The assets in Bear’s more-levered fund, the High-Grade Structured Credit

Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund, are worth virtually nothing, according

to people familiar with the matter. The assets in the larger, less-levered

fund are worth roughly 9% of the value since the end of April, these people

said.

"Virtually nothing" means a small positive sum. And the larger fund

seems to be clearly in the black.

This is a big piece of good news for the market, which, judging by the activity

in the ABX indices yesterday, was worried that Bear would come out with

some nasty figures indeed.

As it is, investors in the funds will have lost their money. But the banks

which lent money to the funds will get it all back, and neither Barclays nor

anybody else is going to have to suffer hundreds of millions of dollars in loan

losses.

This is much better news than anybody had any reason to expect. After all,

if Bear had to bail out the less-leveraged fund to the tune of $1.6 billion,

what were the chances that the more-leveraged fund would still have some money

left over after being liquidated? The danger of leverage, always, is that you

stand to lose more – sometimes a lot more – than your initial investment.

But that danger, in this case, seems to have been narrowly avoided.

Posted in hedge funds | Comments Off on Both Bear Stearns Hedge Funds Have Positive Valuations

John Mackey Still Hasn’t Resigned

Whole Foods CEO John Mackey wants

me to forgive him. (I shop at Whole Foods on the Bowery – great sausage

selection – so I count as a "stakeholder" in the company.) Well,

I don’t forgive him. Not at all. And I don’t want his sincere apology. I want

him to resign.

The Whole Foods board, late to the game, has now acted formed

a Special Committee. Weak. What is an "independent internal

investigation," anyway? Sounds suspiciously oxymoronic to me. Whole Foods

is built on being an ethical company. Mackey has now admitted to seriously unethical

behavior. Really there’s nothing to investigate, except for why Mackey hasn’t

resigned already.

Posted in defenestrations, stocks | Comments Off on John Mackey Still Hasn’t Resigned

Does Pregnancy Prevent Women Getting MBAs?

Elissa Ellis-Sangster is one of those women who use phrases

like "move the needle" – someone who talks about "putting

value and importance on diverse leadership" when she could just say "promoting

women". And so I wasn’t sure what she was talking about when she was quoted

in today’s WSJ on the subject of female enrollment in MBA programmes:

When schools raised the work experience level to five years or more, it became

a big issue for women who wanted to go back for their M.B.A. soon after college,

before they started thinking about having a family.

Thankfully, Dana Cimilluca was there to translate:

One of the big challenges to increasing female enrollment in M.B.A. programs

is pregnancy. The five years or so of experience that many

business schools want their students to have before enrolling is a tall order

for a woman planning a family.

Which is slightly clearer, even if it still doesn’t make a huge amount of sense.

Do they mean that women often have babies within the first five years of entering

the workforce, and that therefore it takes them longer to get five years’ experience?

Or is it that women with small children are less likely to want to take an MBA,

because at that point they have a child to support? In that case, women would

be less likely to enroll in MBA programmes requiring five years’ experience

just because they’re more likely to be mothers at that point. Or is it just

that women don’t want to be pregnant during their MBA, and that six years after

joining the workforce is a time when they often are pregnant?

If it’s the first, I think it’s no big deal: it really doesn’t matter if the

women in an MBA programme are slighly older than the men. But if it’s one of

the latter two, then the problem isn’t the five-years-experience rule, so much

as it is the hesitance on the part of pregnant women and mothers to go to business

school. Ellis-Sangster thinks the solution to the problem is for business schools

to require less experience of their MBA students. Maybe it would be easier and

more effective to simply make more of an effort to accommodate mothers, as well

as the childless.

Update: Megan McArdle weighs

in.

Posted in leadership | Comments Off on Does Pregnancy Prevent Women Getting MBAs?

Corrupt Finance Minister Watch: Miceli Goes, Patino Stays

If you had to guess, a few weeks ago, which Latin finance minister would be

forced to resign in the wake of a corruption scandal, your answer would be very

easy: Ricardo Patiño of Ecuador, who was censured by

his own congress on Friday for insider dealing in his own country’s debt –

a deal which reportedly

netted investors more than $150 million, while Ecuador itself made a healthy

$50 million. (As for Patiño’s personal take? No one knows.)

In the event, however, it was Argentina’s Felisa Miceli who

went

first, after investigators found $60,000 in banknotes stashed in a brown

paper bag in her office bathroom.

Miceli’s antics stand in stark contrast to the reputation of her predecessor,

Roberto Lavagna, who, although he treated international capital

markets with high-handedness and calculated aggression, was, I believe, clean.

He’s running for president in the upcoming elections, although he has no chance

of beating Cristina Kirchner, the wife of current president

Nestor Kirchner.

In a way, however, I am heartened by Miceli’s ouster: it means that if you

get caught, in Argentina, you can expect to be punished. In Ecuador, by contrast,

Patiño is, it

seems, deliberately manipulating the market all over again, despite being

caught red-handed the first time. Now that’s a country where ministers

can act with real impunity.

Posted in defenestrations, emerging markets, governance | Comments Off on Corrupt Finance Minister Watch: Miceli Goes, Patino Stays

Why Highly-Rated CDO Tranches are a Bad Bet

Lets’s say you are given a choice between two AAA-rated bonds. Both have the

same probability of default, which is very low. But Bond X defaults pretty randomly,

while Bond Y defaults only during times of economic catastrophe. Which would

you prefer? There is a right answer, and it’s Bond X. Here’s how Joshua

Coval, Jakub Jurek, and Erik Stafford

put it in a new paper:

Securities that fail to deliver their promised payments in the "worst"

economic states will have low values, because these are precisely the states

where a dollar is most valuable. Consequently, securities resembling economic

catastrophe bonds should offer a large risk premium to compensate for their

systematic risk.

One of the perennial debates in the credit markets is whether asset-backed

securities with strong credit ratings can really be considered just as safe

as single-name unsecured credits. The answer depends to some extent on the asset-backed

security in question. But if you look at the highest tranches of CDOs, especially

synthetic CDOs, they often default only in extreme economic circumstances, when

a lot of companies all default at once. Which is exactly the kind of

circumstance when you want your triple-A paper not to default. For

this reason, such CDOs really do resemble "economic catastrophe bonds,"

which pay out a steady coupon unless and until catastrophe hits, at which point

they tend to lose all their value.

The interesting thing is that if you want an economic catastrophe bond, you

can construct one just as easily by writing something known as a "deep

out-of-the-money put spread" on the S&P 500. If you write an out-of-the-money

put, you’re offering to buy the index at a level far below its present value

at some point in the future. A put becomes a put spread when you hedge that

exposure by buying an even deeper out-of-the-money put, thereby putting a cap

on your possible losses.

In the vast majority of situations, the index will not have crashed to well

below its present level by the time your put expires, and you get to keep the

money you got from writing it. If there’s an economic catastrophe, however,

you can lose a large chunk of money. So deep out-of-the-money put spreads act

like economic catastrophe bonds – but, according to the new paper, they

are much, much more lucrative.

An investor willing to assume the economic risks inherent in senior CDO tranches

can, with equivalent economic exposure, earn roughly 3 times more compensation

by writing out-of-the-money put spreads on the market.

I wonder: is there some kind of ETF whose strategy is simply to write such

puts? It sounds like an attractive alternative to some of the fixed-income investments

which are presently being offered.

(Via Alea)

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on Why Highly-Rated CDO Tranches are a Bad Bet

A Brief History of Chinese Industrial Policy

The most impressive economic success story of the past 30 years has been the

astonishing resurgence of China, which is likely to become the world’s third-largest

economy this year. The length of time that the country has managed to grow

at double-digit rates has astonished even the biggest China bulls, and the transformation

which has been effected in the country – including, by the way, the largest

and fastest decrease in poverty that the world has ever seen – has been

nothing short of breathtaking.

Brad DeLong’s story

of China since 1978, told in response to a blog

entry by Dani Rodrik, is an encapsulation of the Great

Man theory of history:

In 1978 China had its first piece of great good luck in a long, long time–perhaps

the first time some important chance broke right for China since the end of

the Sung dynasty. China acquired as its paramount ruler one of the most devious

and effective politicians of this or indeed any age, a man who was quite possibly

the greatest human hero of the twentieth century: Deng Xiaoping.

Tyler Cowen Alex Tabarrok says the whole

post is "superb,"

and "one of Brad’s best ever". I like it too, although, apropos Brad’s

conclusion, I’m still a bit confused as to exactly what the crucial difference

was between Deng and Juan Peron, that the former’s policies were so successful

and the latter’s were so disastrous. In any case, if you want a summary of Chinese

industrial policy in a thousand words or less, as well as an object lesson in

the high level of debate that often occurs in the econoblogosphere, this is

a great piece to read.

Posted in development, economics | Comments Off on A Brief History of Chinese Industrial Policy

CNBC Has A Winner

Mary Sue Williams has

won the CNBC Million Dollar Portfolio Challenge. Congratulations, Mary Sue.

But don’t expect $1 million. Instead, you’ll get $100,000 up front, plus $36,000

per year for the next 25 years.

Mary Sue won the contest by managing to get a 29%

gain over the space of two weeks. Which is about 75,000% per year. The present

value of Mary Sue’s actual prize, discounted at 75,000%, is, roughly, $100,000

– one-tenth of the million dollars she’s nominally winning.

Then again, given how idiotic

the whole challenge was from the start, I’m glad that the prize is going to

someone who seems likely to use it well. At least some good is coming out of

this meretricious debacle.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on CNBC Has A Winner

Fundamental Analysis Is Useless

Barry Ritholtz reads Mark Hulbert, and saves

the rest of us a Barron’s subscription. Apparently Hulbert has learned four

big lessons over the past 27 years following investment newsletters. Number

two is the one which astonishes me:

Lesson #2: There is more than one road to riches

Hulbert looks at these intractable investment questions:

• Is fundamental analysis better than technical analysis?

• Is successful market timing possible?

• Is buy-and-hold better than in-and-out trading?

If someone asked me these "intractable investment questions", it

would take me about, oh, two seconds to answer "yes, no, and yes".

Hulbert, however, isn’t so sure:

After studying Newsletter writers for twenty-seven, he notes he is "no

closer to answering these questions" than when he started. However, he

did discover the following:

Over the last 27 years, the top performing newsletter advocates the long-term

buying and holding of good quality stocks. No surprise, considering that 20

of the 27 years were a bull market.

But consider that the second-place newsletter involves a combination of both

fundamental and technical analysis, as well as market timing. The average

holding period of its recommended stocks is less than six months. And in third

and fourth place are newsletters whose approaches are based exclusively on

technical analysis.

I find this fascinating, and from it I draw one main conclusion: that fundamental

analysis is about as useful as technical analysis, i.e. not at all.

You can look at fundamentals and minimize your trading costs all you like, but

ultimately the market is smarter than you are, or else the market just doesn’t

respond to fundamentals in the way you think it should.

Or, in three words: buy the index.

Posted in stocks | Comments Off on Fundamental Analysis Is Useless

When Banks Diversify Internationally

Bloomberg is running a 2,000-word

story today on how Bank of America and other banks with little in the way

of international diversification are likely to underperform the multinational

US banks this earnings season.

Demand for financial services is increasing three times as fast outside the

U.S., fueled by companies and investors in Brazil, China, India and Russia…

With Europe and Asia accounting for more than half of the world’s economic

output and home to six of every 10 millionaires, the banks and securities

firms that expanded internationally stand to benefit most…

Analysts surveyed by Bloomberg estimate that New York-based Citigroup, led

by CEO Charles Prince, increased earnings by 7.7 percent, and JPMorgan, which

gets a quarter of revenue from outside the U.S., had a 6.4 percent gain. Bank

of America may post a 2 percent profit drop, its first decline since 2005,

the survey shows.

The situation is already playing out on Wall Street, with Lehman Brothers

Holdings Inc. generating almost all of its $1.1 billion increase in second-quarter

revenue from international markets. Lehman, the fourth-largest securities

firm, said profit increased 27 percent in the three months ended in May.

It was a different story for Bear Stearns Cos., which relied on the U.S. for

87 percent of last year’s business. Chief Executive Officer James E. “Jimmy”

Cayne, who resisted the pressure to expand in investment banking and trading

overseas, reported a 10 percent drop in profit as mounting home-loan defaults

in the U.S. hurt trading.

It’s true that the rest of the world is seeing more growth in demand for financial

services than the US is. It’s true that there are lots of global millionaires

these days (and that the world’s richest man is Mexican). But would it be too

much to note, in the course of such a long article, that the dollar is incredibly

weak these days?

Any US bank reporting in dollars but earning in pounds or euros or just about

anything else will see a spike in income as the dollar falls. Yes, most large

financial institutions have sophisticated FX hedging strategies. But over the

long term, exchange rates matter.

I have some sympathy for Bank of America CEO Kenneth Lewis,

who is quoted as saying that "we do better when we play to our strengths,

and our strengths are in the U.S." No company can diversify nearly as easily

as an investor, so if investors want international exposure, it’s just as easy

to buy a combination of Bank of America stock along with, say, Spain’s Santander

as it is to buy a single international stock such as Citigroup or HSBC.

On the other hand, Bank of America has let a lot of strong international franchises

wither on the vine, especially those of BankBoston and the legacy BofA, before

it got bought by Nationsbank. If it had spent a bit of effort understanding

and nurturing those businesses, rather than cutting them off because it didn’t

understand them, it would be in better shape right now.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on When Banks Diversify Internationally

The Ethics of Markets

Steve Waldman continues

the debate

about short-selling by looking at markets in ethical terms:

For a capital market to be "good", in a strong normative sense,

it ought to compensate predominantly those who make wise judgments about the

application of capital to real world enterprises, and to punish those who

make poor judgments… What distinguishes a good capital markets from a bad

capital market is how well it does the economy’s thinking.

I’m sure Steve is a paid-up utilitarian. But even still, I think "good"

is a bit of a strong word to use here, if you’re really using it "in a

strong normative sense". Because what he’s describing isn’t a good

market, so much as an efficient market.

Steve continues:

Bondholders absolutely do not "deserve" to get paid, any more than

stockholders, or holders of derivatives, or any other financial position.

A bondholder who lends to profligates to fund consumption, for example, absolutely

deserves to lose, coupon and principal. And an investor who finds a firm that

needs capital, and who correctly judges the firm’s activities and management

as being of the sort that could put capital to good real world use, absolutely

deserves to be paid, regardless of whether that payment comes in the form

of capital appreciation, dividends, or interest. The purpose of capital markets

is to compensate managers of capital for putting scarce resources to good

use, and to punish managers who squander what is precious.

This is an interesting take on markets. Bondholders do have a contractual

right to be paid, which is much more than stockholders. If they’re not

paid, they can take the debtor to court in order to enforce that right. When

I said that bondholders deserve to be paid, that’s what I meant. Similarly,

if a stockholder owns 10% of a company which is sold for $10 million, then that

stockholder deserves – and has a legal right to – $1 million. Without

these legal rights, markets could not exist.

What Steve’s doing is layering a separate set of moral rights on top of the

legal rights which underpin the market. Just as a good man deserves to go to

heaven and a bad man deserves to be punished, an efficient allocator of capital

deserves positive returns while someone who allocates capital badly deserves

to lose money.

On a purely descriptive level, there is truth here. A bondholder might have

a legal right to money, but if he lent money to a profligate who spent it all

and has nothing left, then that legal right and $1.50 will buy him a cup of

coffee. Meanwhile, an investor whose capital was used to generate high returns

will reap the benefit of those returns.

But such determinations can only ever be made ex post. A lucrative

investment is a good investment, and an investment where the portfolio

manager loses all his money is a bad investment. The question of who

deserves what never arises. There are surely lots of companies with solid managements

who can put capital to good real world use. Some of them will return a lot of

money to their investors; others won’t. It’s silly to say that all those investors,

ex ante, "deserve" to make money.

The genius of markets is that they’re emergent

systems. On a tick-by-tick level, they’re completely random. But as you

take steps back in terms of timeframes and sectors and the markets as a whole,

they look less and less random, and start exhibiting describable behavior. Investors

are people who believe that behavior is predictable enough that they can make

money from it. Sometimes they’re right, and sometimes they’re wrong. But there’s

no normative function whereby an investor can deserve to make money and yet

still lose it. There’s simply an emergent function whereby certain behaviors

(such as allocating capital in a way we now consider to be "efficient")

are, in aggregate if not individually, rewarded financially.

Steve, on the other hand, sees a difference between actions which deserve to

be rewarded, on the one hand, and actions which are rewarded, on the other.

I believe that well-designed markets generally are the best way to make most

large-scale economic allocation decisions, and that market-like systems could

be productively employed in a variety of other contexts as well. But current

capital markets are frankly off the rails, in a manner that most people not

subject to ideological blinders are perfectly capable of seeing.

The problem here is that in order to make a determination the capital markets

are "off the rails", you need to have some non-market-based idea of

what rails you’re talking about. Steve does actually get specific:

If I am right about bad things down the road, good capital markets should,

on average, compensate me if I trade on my superior-to-market knowledge of

future bad outcomes. The repricing brought about by my trading and the trading

of many others who see what I see should work to make those bad outcomes less

likely and less damaging… But markets that are systematically biased towards

integrating positive information and ignoring negative information (until

sudden "Wile E. Coyote" moments), that have institutional biases

against short-selling or that delay price declines because some actors have

more at stake in market prices than real-world referents, may, on average,

fail to compensate shorts. If so, then rational people won’t short, prices

far higher than reasonable economic value will be stable for long periods

of time, "greater fool" strategies of investment will be profitable,

and "adjustments" will come sharp, large, and painful when underlying

economic realities can no longer be papered over. Markets compensate next-to-last

fools in preference to wise allocators of capital, and leave everyone else

with a mess. That, unfortunately, is the world we live in today.

What Steve seems to be saying here is that he has in his mind the Platonic

ideal of a perfect market, which reflects economic realities with some great

accuracy. In such a market, there are no sudden and catastrophic crashes, which

means less pain in aggregate. In such a market, people who buy overvalued assets

will always suffer, since those assets will simply go down, rather than going

up first.

But it’s also worth wondering how an asset could ever be overvalued in the

first place, in such a market.

If you have infinite time and patience and money, and some faith that over

the long term markets will reflect economic realities, then it’s possible to

play the markets as though they behaved in accordance with Steve’s Platonic

ideal. But none of those criteria obtains, in this world. In this world,

the markets can stay irrational longer than you can remain solvent. (If Steve

can quote Keynes, so can I.) And there aren’t any Market Gods who are capriciously

punishing the wise and ill-timed. There’s just an emergent system, which sometimes

goes up and sometimes goes down. I wish you all luck in working out what’s coming

next.

Posted in economics | Comments Off on The Ethics of Markets

Do Portfolio Managers Model the Illiquidity Discount?

Neil Shah of Reuters brings up the perennial

debate about "mark to model" behavior among fund managers. Such

behavior is dangerous, because it gives those managers an incentive to be lazy.

If the model gives them profits and the associated performance fees, then they

have no incentive to start worrying about problems with it.

On the other hand, there are good reasons to "mark to model", and

foremost among them is the fact that most of the instruments so marked are highly

illiquid, which means that a "mark to market" system might well be

even worse.

Shah, and Tanta,

concentrate on one big weakness of the "mark to model" system, which

is that the models can break. Either the data which got put into the model was

internally flawed, or the model itself was flawed. Either way, you end up with

a broken model, which can be very dangerous.

But I have a more basic question about these systems. "Mark to model"

is, at heart, a replacement for a "mark to market" system, wherein

the value of a portfolio is calculated every day. Losses can’t be easily hidden

in a "mark to market" system, because they show up as soon as the

market falls. So my question is this: How much does the output of a "mark

to model" system vary on a day-to-day basis?

Yes, I am worried about models breaking. But I’m also worried that a "mark

to model" system might be really bad at reflecting many changes in the

market, whether they’re sudden and unexpected or not. The value of a CDO tranche

is basically the present value of its future cashflows, discounted three times:

once for the probability that those cashflows will not materialize (credit risk);

once for the fact that it can’t be sold (the illiquidity discount); and once

for the possibility that those cashflows will materialize too soon (prepayment

risk). On top of that is model risk – which is basically the chance that

the model got one of those risks wrong.

What I’d like to know is how the markets model the illiquidity discount. If

you’re marking to model, it’s easy to change the present value of your holdings

according to changes in the Treasury yield curve, or even according to prepayment

statistics. But how can you work out how much of a discount the market is requiring

before it will buy illiquid paper? That discount changes over time, and should

be modelled somehow.

In recent months and years, illiquid paper has traded at a much smaller discount

than ever before. Clearly there’s a risk that discount will widen out. Is that

modelled? How? Do portfolio managers who "mark to model" take losses

if the illiquidity discount goes up? Or do they simply declare that they’re

holding their investments to maturity, and therefore don’t care what the illiquidity

discount is? That would be intellectually dishonest, at best – because

there’s an opportunity cost to buying a security with a low illiquidity discount,

in that you might be able to buy the same security at a higher illiquidity discount

in the future. It’s the kind of thing which really should be part of the model.

Is it?

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on Do Portfolio Managers Model the Illiquidity Discount?

M&A Trial Balloons Move to the Web

Paul Murphy had a kindasorta

scoop today:

Mobile phone group Vodafone has been considering a $160bn takeover bid for

its American peer and partner, Verizon Communications — a deal that,

if consummated, would rival AOL’s takeover of Time Warner and Vodafone’s

earlier acquisition of Germany’s Mannesmann as one of the largest M&A

transactions on record, FT Alphaville has learned.

That’s a huge scoop, no? So why am I downplaying it? Because it’s nowhere near

the front page of the FT, where one might expect to normally find such things.

In fact, it’s not in the print version of the FT at all. It’s on the website,

and on the website only.

In fact, this story is proof positive that the FT will publish market-moving

stories on the web that it won’t print in its paper. It’s an interesting double

standard, and even a justifiable one. But it also plays right into the hands

of investment bankers. Says the Epicurean

Dealmaker:

Given what I know of such deals—and past experience—this story

itself is part of a carefully orchestrated plan by Vodafone’s bankers to test

equity and credit markets for their receptivity to such a deal.

Interestingly, Vodafone denied

the story as soon as it appeared (but after Verizon shares had risen by

$1.10 apiece), prompting a follow-up

posting at Alphaville which eventually gets around to saying that "we

now know that the whole takeover plan was subsequently dropped."

Why would bankers would leak the story to the FT if they knew that the plan

had already been dropped? A couple of possibilities spring to mind: maybe they

were annoyed that Vodafone had dropped the plan, and were trying to inject some

semblance of life back into it by making it public. Or maybe they didn’t

know that Vodafone had dropped the plan, and were actually not nearly as close

to the company’s decision-making nexus as they thought they were.

In any event, the editors of the print edition of the FT are looking reasonably

smart this morning for not touching this story. And Paul Murphy isn’t looking

too shabby either: he’s clearly a well-connected journalist who is good at passing

on what he learns, which is his job. It seems that the web really does have

a role to play in these kind of situations. Which will be good for volatility,

at least, going forwards.

Posted in M&A, Media | 1 Comment

Mackey’s Sock-Puppetry is No Joke

The Wall Street Journal’s editorial page weighs

in today on the subject of John Mackey and his sock-puppetry.

"Apparently U.S. financial regulators don’t get the joke," says the

leader-writer, although I can’t see anyone else smiling in here.

That’ll teach Mr. Mackey to flog the virtues of his company on the Web…

we can’t see how any reasonable person could conclude that Rahodeb’s opinions

were going to have any appreciable effect on the Whole Foods share price.

The fact that they weren’t was precisely the point: At a time when corporate

execs are often accused of being isolated, Mr. Mackey seems to have enjoyed

the Web engagement and used the semi-informed opinions voiced on a Yahoo message

board as his own sounding board to sample the mood of his customers.

The straitjacket that has descended on CEOs, including Sarbanes-Oxley and

the SEC’s Regulation FD ("Fair Disclosure"), has often had the perverse

effect of restricting the flow of information — and thus preventing informed

corporate insiders from participating in the market’s increasingly democratic

information free-for-all. In some cases, these prohibitions only keep news

and informed views under wraps, leading to volatility and "surprises"

that can themselves create incentives for insider trading.

All this is predictable enough, coming as it does from an editorial page which

will always oppose any kind of SEC regulation at all. But it’s worth spelling

out exactly why it’s wrong, and noting that SEC chairman Christopher Cox is

actually extremely blog-friendly:

On his blog, [Jonathan] Schwartz, chief executive of Sun Microsystems, challenged

the commission to clarify that the use of blogs like his could be consistent

with our regulations requiring public companies to share news with the public

at the same time they give it to market professionals. As a result of that

exchange, the SEC is moving forward on that initiative, aided by thoughtful

commentary from outside our own cathedral, some of it found on blogs.

The fact is that Mackey, or any other executive, is more than welcome to "flog

the virtues of his company on the Web", whether doing so has "any

appreciable effect on the Whole Foods share price" or not. Mackey has his

own blog, which accepts

comments, and which other bloggers are more than welcome to link to. He doesn’t

post there very often – certainly not nearly as often as he posted to

the Yahoo message boards. But if he simply moved his Yahoo postings to his personal

blog, and used his own name to invite the particpants on the Yahoo boards to

join him over at wholefoodsmarket.com, then no one would have any problem with

what he did.

It is true that compliance types tend to be scared of Reg FD, and would rather

err on the side of saying nothing rather than risk falling foul of it. And frankly

I’ve been unimpressed

at criticism of Mackey which has concentrated on Reg FD, rather than the simple

ethics of what the CEO of a public company should and shouldn’t do. But Reg

FD can and will be clarified so that blog posts count as public disclosure,

at which point no blog post, by definition, can run afoul of it. And I very

much doubt that Cox’s SEC would go after a CEO who posted about his own company

on his own blog.

"The market’s increasingly democratic information free-for-all" is

here to stay, and that’s a good thing, which has been embraced by the SEC. What

Mackey did is a bad thing, and the SEC is investigating it. Let’s not get the

two confused.

Posted in governance, stocks | 1 Comment

Christopher Bancroft’s Foil-Rupert Scheme: Doomed to Fail

Christopher Bancroft doesn’t want to sell Dow Jones to Rupert

Murdoch, but at this point it’s clear that if no one else is willing

to pay $60 a share, then Rupert’s going to get his trophy. Mr Bancroft’s proposed

solution to this problem? Buying up a 51% blocking vote himself. The WSJ reports:

he has spent recent weeks approaching hedge funds, private-equity firms and

others in a quest to buy enough voting shares of Dow Jones to give him the

power to torpedo a sale.

It’s true that between the shares he already controls and the shares controlled

by James Ottaway, Bancroft wouldn’t need to buy all that much

in the way of other family members’ stakes to block a deal. But here’s the thing:

"hedge funds, private-equity firms and others" aren’t charged with

helping old media dinosaurs fight quixotically against the inevitable. They’re

charged with making money. And if they invest $60 a share today, they’re going

to want to get back significantly more than $60 a share tomorrow. Bancroft,

I’m pretty sure, has no coherent idea as to how to do that. Which is why this

attempted Murdoch spoiler, just like the attempted Murdoch spoiler of Brad

Greenspan, is doomed to fail.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on Christopher Bancroft’s Foil-Rupert Scheme: Doomed to Fail

Go Sis!

Much, much more here.

Posted in Not economics | 4 Comments

Why Raising Taxes on Private Equity Won’t Increase Tax Revenues

Tennille Tracy does

her sums over at DealJournal today, and comes to the conclusion that the

private-equity tax increase would raise maybe $2 billion a year for the US fisc:

"almost like pocket change" in comparison to the $1.65 trillion in

total tax receipts in 2003.

In fact, the chances are that the net amount raised would actually be much

lower than $2 billion.

One of Paul Krugman’s readers explained why, in some hard-to-follow

language on Krugman’s Money Talks page.

Don’t worry if you don’t follow, I’ll try to explain after the quote.

Michael Plouf, Essex, Conn.: I have invested in hedge funds

for 15 years, and I agree with everything you wrote

about taxation of hedge fund carried interests. It is a subject which industry

spokesmen have fairly successfully obfuscated.

However, you may be unaware of a tax policy complication that applies to this

issue. As a matter of general tax principle, one party’s income is another

party’s expense. I now get a tax deduction subject to a double haircut on

Schedule A for the 2 percent management fee. The carried interest portion

of the fee merely reduces my long- and short-term capital gains by 20 percent.

If the hedge fund manager is taxed at the ordinary income rate for the 20

percent carried interest, I should be entitled to take that as an investment

expense deduction, just like the 2 percent fee. Given the high marginal tax

rate of most hedge fund investors, the net benefit to the Treasury of taxing

carried interests at ordinary rates is likely to be insignificant if the income

equals expense principal is maintained. If that principal is ignored, I think

it’s fair to argue that it would constitute a sort of double taxation.

It is not true that the carried interest unfairly gets favorable capital gains

tax rates without there being capital at risk. Rather, hedge fund managers

take a slice of the return, taxed accordingly, on their investors’ capital

at risk.

Paul Krugman: OK, I’ll try to digest that.

Never mind the "tax deduction subject to a double haircut on Schedule

A" and all that. The key thing to realize is this: private equity managers’

2-and-20 fee structure is split into a 2% management fee and a 20% performance

fee. The principals pay income tax on the 2% management fee, but they only pay

15% capital gains tax on the 20% performance fee, which is known as "carried

interest".

From the point of view of an investor in the funds, the 2% management fee is

an expense of the funds, and can be deducted against taxes. The 20% performance

fee, however, because it’s structured as "carried interest", is not

treated as a fund expense, and so is not deductible.

If Congress enacted a law which treated the 20% performance fee as income for

the fund managers, then that fee would overnight become an expense of the fund.

But don’t take my word for it. Let Peter Orszag, director of

the Congressional Budget Office, explain:

Tax Carried Interest as Ordinary Income When Realized. A

second option would be to continue to allow deferral but to view carried interest

as a fee for services provided and therefore tax the income distributed to

the general partner as ordinary income. Carried interest would thus be taxable

to the general partner as ordinary income and deductible as an expense incurred

to earn investment income to the limited partners.

This is worth repeating. Carried interest thus be taxable to the general partner,

yes. But it would also be deductible – as an expense incurred to earn

investment income – to the limited partners, who are the investors in

the fund.

What this means is that the net revenue to the US from implementing this policy

would be tiny: what you gain in taxes on general partners, you lose in taxes

on limited partners. Net-net, there would probably be a gain, since private-equity

principals pay high rates of income tax, and many limited partners are endowments

and foundations and other entities which don’t pay tax anyway. But the gain

would likely be much smaller than Tracy’s $2 billion a year.

On the other hand, it means that anybody claiming that this change to the tax

code would reduce returns to private-equity investors actually has things completely

wrong: it would, rather, increase the after-tax returns to tax-paying

private-equity investors.

(By the way, none of this posting would have been possible without the invaluable

help of DealBreaker’s John Carney,

via instant message. But I’m not even going to attempt to explain his

idea about carried interest being replaced by non-recource zero-interest loans

from the limited partners to the general partners.)

Posted in private equity, taxes | Comments Off on Why Raising Taxes on Private Equity Won’t Increase Tax Revenues

Between the Cracks: Today’s $2 Billion Brazilian IPO

Did you know that a $10 billion credit-card issuer just went public today?

It’s received precious little news coverage, but a consortium of three banks

in Brazil, including Citigroup, has just sold a

22% stake in Redecard, the Brazilian credit-card network, for $2.15 billion.

The offering was ten times oversubscribed, and the shares priced at 27 Brazilian

reais per share, well above initial guidance.

A $2.15 billion IPO is huge by any standards: the second largest IPO in the

US, over the past 12

months, was Spirit AeroSystems, which raised just $1.43 billion. (The largest,

of course, was Blackstone, at $4.13 billion.) Fortress Investment Group, the

high-profile hedge fund, raised just $634 million.

If nothing else, this shows how far Brazil has come in the past five years

– from an emerging-market basket-case with almost no access to capital

market, to a major economic powerhouse where $2 billion IPOs are almost not

newsworthy outside the country.

Alternatively, it shows how parochial and insular capital markets still are

in this supposedly globalized world of free international capital flows. I’m

sure lots of US money managers have placed orders for Redecard stock. But the

general reaction to the IPO in the press seems to be that it is too far away

to worry about, and not particularly interesting or relevant to a US audience.

That’s what happens, I guess, when you opt not to have a dual listing in New

York.

Posted in emerging markets, stocks | Comments Off on Between the Cracks: Today’s $2 Billion Brazilian IPO

How to Start a Hedge Fund Without Having to Run It

As everybody knows very well indeed at this point, hedge fund principals can

make eye-popping sums of money. But as Nassim Taleb discovered

when he ran his own fund, it can be very hard

on the soul.

Mr. Taleb says it was the daily grind of trading in a low-volatility market

that motivated him to quit. "I burned out," he says. "If I

go three or four years without a big bang [in the market], I start having

battle fatigue."

Taleb wasn’t making lots of money anyway, since his strategy didn’t work very

well at the height of the Great Moderation. Then again, most of his investors

didn’t want him to make lots of money. They didn’t invest most of their

money with him; instead, they used him as more of an insurance policy. If all

the rest of their investments suddenly went down, there’s a good chance that

their investments with Taleb would go up.

So how come Taleb is setting up a new hedge fund, Universa

Investments? Because although he’s an owner of the fund, he’s not the fund

manager.

Mr. Taleb won’t be directly involved in day-to-day trading at Universa. Instead,

he will be an adviser and will have a large stake in it. Mark Spitznagel,

a former Empirica trader, will manage the fund’s daily activities.

Nice work, if you can get it. All the upside of owning a hedge fund, with none

of the downside.

Posted in hedge funds | Comments Off on How to Start a Hedge Fund Without Having to Run It

When Issuers, Not Investors, Drive Rates Higher

Justin Lahart says that if you buy a high-return investment,

you ought

to know it’s likely to be high-risk as well. He’s talking about CDOs, of

course:

Anyone buying these debt investments, which had become increasingly popular

in the past few years, should have known full well they were riskier than

they appeared to be at first blush. All they had to do was look at the price…

[Investors have] long demanded that CDOs offer higher returns than similarly

rated bonds. One year ago, for example, investors in CDOs with an investment-grade

triple-B credit rating demanded roughly two percentage points more on their

investments than did investors in more plain-vanilla mortgage-backed securities

with the same rating, according to J.P. Morgan data. Their demands for returns

were even great when compared with similarly rated corporate debt.

Lots of investors understood what they were getting into. They demanded more

return because they saw there was more risk, regardless of the ratings.

This is true, but I’d add a caveat. Most debt obligations are designed to minimize

the cost to the issuer. No company would issue a bond at 200bp over Treasuries

if it could issue the same bond at 100bp over Treasuries. The same goes for

the issuers of mortgage-backed securities, who buy up a pool of mortgages at

one price and then sell it off to the capital markets for a larger price. The

tighter the spread they can achieve, the more money they make.

Structured products like CDOs, on the other hand, are different. They’re designed

to maximize the returns to the investor, rather than to minimize the costs to

the issuer. If I issue a CDO, the way I make my money is by charging a management

fee. I may also retain some of the equity in the CDO, in which case I would

have some incentive to issue the CDO tranches at the highest possible price.

But I might not retain some of the equity, or I might take a longer view and

try to structure the CDO so that the investors get as high a return as possible

– which would increase the chances that they would come back and invest

even more of their money with me.

So rather than investors demanding higher returns, this might well

have been a case of CDO managers offering higher returns. When CDO

managers compete against each other in terms of structuring products which will

generate the highest returns, it’s the people issuing the paper who are driving

returns up – it’s not the investors, worried about risk.

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on When Issuers, Not Investors, Drive Rates Higher

Mackey Should Resign, Regardless of What the Law Says

There seems to be a meme doing the rounds with respect to John Mackey’s message

board antics: that what we should really be looking at here, to borrow a

concept from the regulatory world, is rules rather than principles.

Roger

Ehrenberg:

Reg FD was imposed in October 2000, a full six years before Mr. Mackey ended

his message board posting career. Did it ever occur to him that maybe, just

maybe, his postings using a pseudonym were in violation of a pretty important

securities law?

John Harmon, in a comment

on a blog here:

That Mackey’s behavior was irresponsible is without a doubt. Whether it was

also criminal is the issue. Mackey deliberately used his anonymous attacks

to hurt his competitor, and likely to drive down the value of a stock Whole

Foods would try to acquire.

The WSJ, in a story

today about blogging executives:

While many bloggers criticized his actions, legal experts yesterday said

it was unclear whether he had violated securities law by touting Whole Foods’

stock and denigrating that of Wild Oats Markets Inc., a rival that Whole Foods

now wants to buy.

I’m perfectly happy to accept that if Mackey broke the law, then he should

face criminal prosecution. But that’s a matter for the SEC and US attorneys

to decide. As far as Whole Foods’ board shareholders are concerned, it’s Mackey’s

behavior which should be the crucial thing here, not the letter of the law.

If Boeing CEO Harry Stonecipher can be fired

after having a legal, consensual affair with a co-worker, then it beggars belief

that Mackey, whose behavior was much more damaging to his company, should retain

his corner office. Yes, I understand that he’s the founder of the company and

that he therefore is harder to fire. But really, he should have resigned already,

making the whole issue moot.

Posted in defenestrations, stocks | Comments Off on Mackey Should Resign, Regardless of What the Law Says

No Sympathy for Short Sellers

Steve Waldman unleashes

a heartfelt cry in the face of uncaring markets – a cry for the short

seller, a breed among which he counts himself. He’s responding to my blog

entry saying that there’s no legal case on behalf of short sellers against

investment banks and the like, and he’s not convinced:

Bears who were right deserve to get paid just as much as bulls who were right,

and justice delayed is justice denied for shorts. Similarly, investment banks

who knowingly overpay for assets in order to prevent larger losses on derivative

positions are market-manipulators, and should face consequences for that.

As should central banks and sovereign wealth funds, if their trading in markets

other than their own debt is driven by anything other than direct return maximization

as ordinary price-takers. There is no theory that lets us give real-world

meaning to market prices when price-setters are driven by second-order side

effects rather than direct valuation of the assets being traded. We have no

reason other than blind faith or ideology to believe that anything resembling

efficient allocation of real resources would occur in an economy driven by

capital markets with bizarre feedback loops. I think we are watching capital

market failure happen all around us, and it will work out badly.

I feel for Steve, but I don’t agree with him. For one thing, there’s only one

species of investor who "deserves to get paid", and that’s an investor

with a contract which guarantees him money. I think they’re called bondholders.

If you buy a security in the hope that its price will rise, or sell a security

in the hope that its price will fall, you don’t "deserve to get paid"

anything, whether you’re right or whether you’re wrong. Markets are not some

kind of primary-school sports day where prizes get awarded to the most deserving.

In the words of parents worldwide, "life’s not fair".

Secondly, no one is accusing invvestment banks of knowingly overpaying for

assets. The only real accusation is that they might be knowingly holding onto

assets for which they overpaid in the past, rather than selling them and revealing

their real market value. The only time an investment bank will knowingly overpay

for an asset is when it knows that there’s a buyer in the future who will pay

even more for it. (Think Nigerian barges, here.) That might well be fraud, but

it’s not market manipulation.

Thirdly, central banks and sovereign wealth funds and other international institutions

such as the IMF have lots of motivations beyond "direct return maximization"

in terms of how they invest their money. They always have, and they always will.

Traders and investors know this, which is why they can make lots of money buy

buying Mexican debt in 1994 on the true grounds that Mexico won’t be allowed

to default. (They can also, of course, lose lots of money buy buying Russian

debt in 1998 on the false grounds that Russia won’t be allowed to default. That’s

markets, that is.) If China or Norway wants to be long Treasuries or short Wal-Mart

for non-economic reasons such as supporting exports or punishing union-bashers,

that’s entirely their prerogative.

Steve is living in cloud cuckoo land if he believes in the "real-world

meaning of market prices on the basis of direct valuation of the assets being

traded". If that was really the case, then there would never be any price

difference between voting shares and non-voting shares, for starters. Capital

markets, in this sense, have been failing for as long as they have existed.

And a lot of smart, long-term investors have made a lot of money by arbitraging

those failures. On the other hand, a lot of smart, long-term investors have

also lost a lot of money by attempting to arbitrage those failures.

Being smart and right is not enough to make you rich.

If Steve is really punting his life savings on a belief in "efficient

allocation of real resources," he’s got much bigger problems than market

manipulation which may or may not be going on in some dark corner of the CDO

world. Yes, Adam Smith’s invisible hand has been surprisingly effective over

the past couple of hundred years. But the surprising thing is precisely that

there is some efficient allocation of real resources – not that

there is inefficient allocation of real resources. Real resources have always

been allocated inefficiently, and they always will be. Just look at the fashion

industry.

Posted in economics | Comments Off on No Sympathy for Short Sellers