Adventures in Structured Credit, Ratings Edition

Take a bunch of AA-rated securities. Boring, I know. So instead of just buying

them, buy them with leverage, to boost their returns. Now, take that bundle

of leveraged AA-rated debt, and tranche it, so that there’s a super-senior AAA-rated

tranche, and presumably at the bottom of the waterfall an insanely volatile

piece of equity. Sell off the AAA-rated tranche at a low yield to investors

who require rock-solid investments, and make lots of money!

Or, alternatively, see the

whole thing blow up in your face.

Floyd Norris has discovered a curious animal called a “variable leveraged

super senior certificate”, issued by an Irish vehicle known as Foraois

Funding Limited. Somehow this certificate managed to get itself a AAA credit

rating, despite the fact that the issuing entity had shedloads of leverage,

and was exposed to the mark-to-market price of the underlying AA-rated securites.

The upshot is that the underlying AA-rated securities are still

AA-rated: they’re just as creditworthy as they always were, at least in

the eyes of Moody’s. But the variable leveraged super senior certificates have

had their rating cut from AAA to – get this – Caa2. A C

rating: that’s not just junk, that’s nuclear waste.

Norris actually spoke to Moody’s group managing director for US derivatives,

Yuri Yoshizawa. And whaddya know, she started blaming the market.

The ratings were based on 10 to 15 years of experience with securities such

as these. She tells me that the moves in price seen in recent weeks are many

times greater than anything ever seen before.

If I may, I’d like to introduce Ms Yoshizawa to JP

Morgan’s Michael Cembalest. He’s mainly upset at fund managers, but his

sentiments can be applied equally to ratings agencies:

Advice to portfolio managers around the globe: please stop referring to

"7-standard deviation events" when describing performance.

Whether it’s the decline in home prices in real terms, a sudden widening of

credit spreads, the impact of too much leverage on previously uncorrelated

hedge fund strategies, a sudden shift in liquidity, a selloff in riskier emerging

market stocks and bonds despite no change in fundamentals, unexpected outflows

from fund investors, problems with credit derivatives or declines in bank

credit lines, this has all happened before.

The smartest managers had prepared for volatility.

The good ones will learn from what’s happened and make adjustments.

Those that spend too much time explaining why it wasn’t likely in the first

place fall into the bottom category.

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on Adventures in Structured Credit, Ratings Edition

Fred Wilson Can’t get a Prepaid iPhone

If you buy an iPhone, you have to sign up for a two-year contract with AT&T.

Your bill comes every month, and then you pay it. Because you’re paying the

bill after you make the phone calls, this is a form of credit, so AT&T runs

a credit check on you when you sign up for the plan. But here’s the problem:

what happens if you fail the credit check? The iPhone isn’t activated in-store:

it’s activated at home, unwrapped, and plugged into your iTunes-running computer.

You’ve been sold a phone, and you have every right to use it as a phone.

So for the people who fail a credit check, AT&T has quietly waived the

mandatory two-year contract, allowing them to sign up for prepaid service instead.

Naturally, as soon as they found out about this, techy types like multimillionaire

Fred Wilson, who will not about to fail any credit check, decided that they

wanted a prepaid iPhone too, which they could play with and try

to unlock.

I want to activate with a prepaid plan. I’ve read that the best way to do

that is activate via iTunes and then type in 999-99-9999 when asked for a

SS#, and that will fail the credit check and lead to a prepaid option.

Evidently that

didn’t work out so well, and Fred’s not happy:

I would be happy to join a class action suit against AT&T.

Last night I tried to activate the iPhone that I recieved as a gift with a

pre-paid plan… I talked to a very nice customer service rep who told me

that I could not get an iPhone without giving them my social security number…

After about five minutes, the manager got on the line… it was AT&T policy

to only issue pre-paid plans to people with valid social security numbers

who fail a credit check.

So there it is. You cannot get a prepaid plan from AT&T unless you are

a deadbeat. That’s discrimination in my book. And I suspect its illegal at

some level.

I will never, ever, use an AT&T service again.

Now if Fred was complaining about the mandatory two-year contract, I would

have some sympathy with him. But he’s not. He’s complaining that AT&T won’t

treat him as though he has bad credit when in fact he has excellent credit,

and he reckons that this is a form of "discrimination".

Doesn’t your heart just bleed?

The only real problem here is that AT&T has been altogether far too quiet

about the prepaid option. They should be touting it loudly, as a special outreach

program to immigrants, holders of defaulted subprime mortgages, and other people

who for whatever reason have difficulty passing a credit test. If they just

made it clear that the prepaid program was for this select group only, then

Fred Wilson might not be quite as upset.

Posted in technology | Comments Off on Fred Wilson Can’t get a Prepaid iPhone

Metaphor of the Day

Justin Urquhart-Stewart of Seven Investment Management, quoted

by the BBC:

"You have to look at all these bad loans as a bit like a blancmange

that’s been hit very heavily by a spade and it’s gone everywhere."

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Metaphor of the Day

Banks’ Capital in the Era of Re-Intermediation

Charles Goodhart says in the FT today that there’s loads of money sloshing

around the banking system; what’s missing is not liquidity, but capital. He

explains:

Just as the central bank is lender of last resort to banks, so banks are

lenders of last resort to capital markets, especially to their own clients

in such markets. When those markets seize up, whether private equity deals

or asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), contingent claims on banks become

transformed into huge loan obligations. Such sudden extensions of credit can

cause banks to reach prudent lending limits quickly.

This is the process dubbed

"re-intermediation" by Nigel Myer of Dresdner Kleinwort, and it’s

not necessarily a bad thing in the long term. Regulators, for one, will be happy

that they can go back to worrying about banks – which they know and understand

– rather than a vast and shadowy world of hedge funds and structured products

where huge amounts of money change hands without ever going anywhere near a

bank.

In the short term, however, banks are going to run into capital constraints:

they might not have enough in the way of shareholders’ equity to be able to

lend money to everyone who wants it, no matter how creditworthy they are. Says

Myer:

As banks balance sheets are forced to take on more assets, there is a real

potential for capital stretch. Nothing to breach regulatory ratios, we think,

but enough to be noticeable.

Goodhart adds to this worry the fact that the new Basel II regulatory regime

for banks comes into effect in 2008. Up until now, banks’ capital adequacy has

been judged on the basis of how many loans they have outstanding – which

means that if banks suddenly start bringing a lot of new loans onto their balance

sheets, they might have to start worrying about how much capital they have.

As of next year, however, it’s worse than that, since Basel II capital adequacy

requirements are based not only on the sheer quantity of loans outstanding,

but also on the basis of how risky those loans are.

Worsening risk raises capital adequacy requirements, and lower profits and

higher write-offs reduce the capital base. The Basel II framework for regulating

banks’ risk capital will raise the sensitivity of capital adequacy ratios

to risk. When it is introduced in Europe at the start of 2008, many banks

will find their prior cushions of capital, above the required limit, eroding

fast. That could extend and amplify the crisis.

Several of my colleagues at the financial markets group foresaw the dangerous

pro-cyclicality of Basel II. Our foreboding may turn into reality sooner than

we expected.

In other words, just as banks start lending more to their clients, the amount

of capital they have to allocate per dollar lent out will be rising –

bringing the banks rapidly towards their capital limits.

My take is that this is a problem, but probably not a huge one. The big, liquid

banks are solvent and profitable, which means they should be able to raise capital

in the form of either equity or subordinated debt without too much difficulty.

What’s more, if that funding source dries up my feeling is that global central

banks will have a certain amount of regulatory forbearance in the early days

of Basel II. If banks stay within Basel I standards, and are clearly providing

an important source of liquidity during turbulent times in the capital markets,

then I think Europe’s central banks might downplay the importance of the new

Basel II regime.

(HT: Alea)

Posted in banking, regulation | Comments Off on Banks’ Capital in the Era of Re-Intermediation

Pimco’s Endowments

Jenny Anderson moves

the El-Erian story forwards today, talking to a number of former endowment

chiefs about how tough the job is, and finding one startling statistic:

Nationally, more than 40 percent of the top investment executives within

universities and endowments left in 2005 and 2006, according to a 2007 compensation

survey by Mercer Human Resource Consulting (now Mercer) that excluded Harvard

and Yale.

Now 2005 and 2006 were admittedly exceptional years, the height of the hedge-fund

bubble, when anybody with experience in the alternative-investments space became

incredibly valuable. So I’m sure the 40% number will fall in the near future.

But Anderson also notes that a lot of endowment managers are now setting up

companies which seek to pool and manage endowments specifically. Given that

El-Erian knows

all about endowments at this point, and that he is helping to move Pimco

into the alternative-investments space, it stands to reason that he’ll be going

after the smaller-endowment market himself.

Eventually, he could end up running just as much endowment money at Pimco as

he was at Harvard.

Posted in investing | Comments Off on Pimco’s Endowments

ATM Fees as Bully Tactic

In the literature, the question

of ATM fees is generally considered to be a regulatory problem: should they

be banned? In the real world, Bank of America has raised

its ATM fee to $3. Which is the kind of thing banks can do when they get

to be the size of Bank of America: it essentially bullies people into opening

an account with you, rather than attracting them with high interest rates on

deposits, low interest rates on loans, or good customer service. The ABA comes

right out and says as much:

Transaction fees, especially at large banks with ATMs in convenient locations,

should compel users to open accounts at those banks to avoid fees, said American

Bankers Association spokesman John Hall.

I wonder how many bank accounts John Hall has.

Update: Andrew Leonard has a very

enjoyable rant on this subject.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on ATM Fees as Bully Tactic

The Economics of Economist.com

Last week, when hunting

for an article about geobrowsers, Stefan Geens discovered that the most

recent issue of the Economist was available for free at economist.com. And this

week, the same thing seems to be true. He emails me:

For the second week now, the Economist onlne edition appears to be entirely

free. I haven’t read anything about this, so I’m wondering if this isn’t a

stealth campaign to start building online credibility through linkability?

The Economist is in a sticky position, here. On the one hand, there are many

people who have paid good money for online subscriptions – something which

costs as much as $24.95 per month. On the other hand, the Economist is arguably

the world’s most genuinely international publication, which means that the opportunities

of fully embracing the web are enormous. Of course, fully embracing the web

means people linking to you, and people tend only to link to you if you’re free

– a problem the Wall Street Journal knows full well.

Over the past year or so I’ve noticed more and more of the Economist’s material

being free online. The problem is that being free is not enough: you also have

to be known to be free. Many people don’t visit economist.com because

they think that it’s for subscribers only. And bloggers will be hesitant about

linking to economist.com articles if those articles can disappear behind a subscriber

firewall at any moment, as happens at the Economist’s sibling FT.com.

So should the Economist simply come out and announce with great fanfare that

all of its articles will be availble for free on its website in perpetuity?

Yes. Print subscriptions would not suffer too much: people really love the print

product. And the website would become a much more highly-trafficked resource

than it presently is.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on The Economics of Economist.com

The Northern Rock Bailout

What to make of the Northern

Rock bailout? To me, it looks like textbook central banking on the part

of the Bank of England. Mervyn King, the BofE’s chief, has no particular interest

in cutting interest rates or otherwise bailing out the UK financial system as

a whole if it lent recklessly. On the other hand, UK mortgage lenders also take

deposits, and it’s in no one’s interest for a bank to fail outright. So King

will lend the Northern Rock money at punitive interest rates, watching the value

of its equity plunge, and trying to ensure that no one else attempts the moral

hazard play.

For it certainly looks like that’s what Northern Rock was playing at: while

everybody else was tightening their underwriting standards, Northern Rock kept

on lending, capturing 19% of all new UK mortgages in the first half of this

year. The problem is that the Northern Rock didn’t have any money to lend, and

when they tried to borrow the money on the capital markets, the capital markets

were closed.

So now Northern Rock is having to borrow the money from the Bank of England

instead – at rates which I’m sure are higher than the mortgages they were

writing. That’ll learn’em, as they say up north.

Update: Richard

Lander, in the comments, notes Willem

Buiter’s fine blog entry on this subject, where he says that letting Northern

Rock fail – and imposing a haircut on even relatively small depositors

is – is actually a good idea. Buiter’s forgotten a hell of a lot more

about how the Bank of England works than I’ll ever learn, and the whole thing

is well worth reading, if only to get an example of how hawkish policymakers

really can be when it comes to the regulatory side of things.

Posted in banking, housing | Comments Off on The Northern Rock Bailout

Why Bjorn Lomborg is Wrong

Mark Thoma has an excerpt of Partha

Dasgupta’s review of Bjorn Lomborg’s new book today. It took me a while

to get Dasgupta’s point, so let me try and rephrase it in a slightly simpler

manner, since it was pretty opaque to me on a first reading.

Lomborg’s argument is the easy bit. Look at all the money that Plan A –

implementing Kyoto – would cost, and look at what benefits we would get

in return for that cost. Now, look at Lomborg’s Plan B. It costs a fraction

of the cost of implementing Kyoto, and the benefits are much higher. So if we

want to maximize the planet’s welfare, we should do things like build infrastructure

to protect against floods and hurricanes, while keeping the amount of carbon

in the atmosphere to a maximum of 560 parts per million. The cost is lower,

and the benefits are higher.

Hang on a second, says Dasgupta. The problem with Lomborg’s argument is that

he thinks he knows what the costs and benefits of a world with atmospheric carbon

concentrations of 560 parts per million are. But he doesn’t: nobody does. You

can’t just extrapolate from what we’re seeing at current concentrations of 380

parts per million, because the climate is a non-linear system:

The transition to Lomborg’s recommended concentration of 560 p.p.m. would

involve crossing an unknown number of tipping points (or separatrices) in

the global climate system. We have no data on the consequences if Earth were

to cross those tipping points.

So run Lomborg’s numbers again. Only instead of using Lomborg’s best guess

as to the costs and benefits of his Plan B, use a more reasonable range of probabilities.

You can even say that Lomborg’s best guess is the most likely outcome –

but you also have to assign some kind of probability to much worse outcomes.

If you do that, then Lomborg’s numbers cease to be nearly as compelling. Even

a small probability of a catastrophic outcome during the move from here to 560

parts per million sends the costs associated with Lomborg’s Plan B skyrocketing.

On the other hand, the costs associated with Plan A – call it Kyoto, or

anything else which stabilises atmospheric carbon at much lower levels than

560 parts per million – don’t rise nearly a much. The known, up-front

costs in terms of dollar expenditures are higher, to be sure. But the unknown,

contingent costs of irreversible future catastrophes? Those are lower.

There are two visions of the world at war with each other here. In the first

vision, the planet is on its way to environmental catastrophe, and we should

do anything and everything we can in an attempt to insure against that catastrophe

from occurring. In the second vision, climate change is a relatively gradual,

non-catastrophic phenomenon, which has consequences (floods, hurricanes and

the like) which we can protect ourselves against with infrastructure investment.

In the second vision, Lomborg is right: it’s a lot cheaper to build a hurricane-proof

house than it is to change the composition of the atmosphere in an attempt to

prevent that hurricane from occurring in the first place. But in the first vision,

Lomborg is wrong: all the hurricane-proof houses in the world will do precious

little good if the population of the planet is decimated by freak weather patterns,

food shortages, and a rapidly-increasing proportion of the Earth’s landmass

becoming uninhabitable because it’s too hot or too wet or otherwise impossible

to live on.

To put it another way, Lomborg’s choice between Plan A and Plan B is a false

one. He makes it sound like the costs of Plan B are low, while the benefits

are the same. But that’s a bit like saying that homeownership is always profitable

over the long run: in order to make such a statement you have to ignore the

possibility of catastrophe (or foreclosure). When you consider all

the possible downsides, and not just the most likely ones, it makes sense to

plump for Plan A instead.

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on Why Bjorn Lomborg is Wrong

Art Blogging

Portfolio.com launched its new art blog, Figure

Painting, last month, and I’ve been an occasional contributor there ever

since. (Which is one reason why you’re not going to find much art-related content

in Market Movers any more.) My contributions can be found here,

and here’s a quick list of what I’ve put up there so far. A lot of it is related

to my recent time in Italy and Germany. More to come tomorrow – all requests

accepted!

Relative

Value in Art

Estimate

Upon Request

The Other

Pavilions

Venice and

Kassel

Expensive Art

Bringing

the Funny

Modern

Art on Villas

Pinault

in Venice

Modern

Art in Villas

The Byblos

Art Hotel

Waiting

for the Fall

Villa Panza

Posted in art | Comments Off on Art Blogging

Fed Funds Update

Just before I went on holiday on August, I offered

up a cheeky chart of the Fed funds rate, suggesting that the Fed had stealthily

cut rates between meetings. (This was before it actually cut the discount rate.)

Greg Mankiw resurrects

the meme today, noting that the Fed funds rate for August as a whole was

5.02% – essentially a quarter-point lower than the official target rate

of 5.25%.

So here’s an updated version of the chart, showing what’s really been happening

to the Fed

funds rate of late.

funds.jpg

Messy, eh?

It seems to me that the Fed has much more important things to do right now

than fiddle about in the overnight markets trying to ensure that the Fed funds

rate always ends the day within a basis point or two of the target rate. And

given the general screwiness at the short end of the curve, a bit of volatility

here is only to be expected: trying to keep this number in a very narrow range

would probably be impossible in any event.

It almost seems to obvious to mention, but the target Fed funds rate is vastly

more important, especially at a time like this, than the actual Fed funds rate.

If and when credit markets calm down a little, then we can start worrying

about whether the Fed is hitting its target.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on Fed Funds Update

Prepayment Penalties

The NYT’s Geraldine Fabrikant reports

today on moves to abolish prepayment penalties in the mortgage market. I

think this is a good idea, although it would have been a much better idea a

few years ago, when loans with teaser rates and high prepayment penalties started

fuelling the housing bubble.

As with much of the US financial system, a lot of the problem is regulatory:

prepayment penalties are banned on a state-by-state basis, which means that

anybody can impose a prepayment penalty in any state if they’re a mortgage company

or a national bank and therefore not subject to state supervision.

I can only really think of one conceivable justification for prepayment penalties.

Buying a house entails a lot of expenses, over and above the cost of the house:

moving, furnishing, buying appliances, and so on and so forth. Many of those

expenses are not up-front, necessarily, but continue for a year or so after

the home has been bought. And so a low initial interest rate, or teaser rate,

can help the new homeowner cover those extraordinary initial expenses; when

the rate resets to a higher level, the homeowner should have got over that difficult

hump and be in a better position to make the full mortgage payments.

But of course in practice mortgages were sold almost entirely on the low level

of the teaser rate. It wasn’t presented as a temporary discount on the eventual

interest rate; it was presented rather as the monthly cost of the new loan –

with the higher eventual cost being played down as much as possible by lenders

keen to originate as many mortgages as possible.

Besides, there are other ways to help homeowners deal with unusually high expenses

in the first year or so beyond teaser rates and prepayment penalties. A simple

second-lien loan is one, or even a first-lien loan: the homeowner can just borrow

more up-front and use that money on things like appliances.

Tanta, for once, has

some good news: the prepayment penalty, in its most egregious form as detailed

by Fabrikant, is already dead, killed off by the Fed’s new Nontraditional

Mortgage Guidance. So even if Dodd’s bill doesn’t go through, the worst-offending

products are almost certainly behind us at this point.

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Prepayment Penalties

Getting Your Priorities Straight

Investing

advice for the ages, from Russian billionaire Vladimir Yevtushenkov, when

asked what he would do with $50 million to invest:

"If we are talking about up to $50 million, it’s better to spend it

on yourself."

Posted in investing | Comments Off on Getting Your Priorities Straight

Distressed Debt Starts to go Mainstream

I mentioned

on Monday that retail investors have a hard time buying up structured debt products

which look very much as though they’re being underpriced in the present credit

crunch. Today comes

the news that in the wake of TCW closing its new $1.56 billion distressed-debt

fund to investors, Pimco is launching a new $2 billion distressed-debt fund

of its own.

Now it’s not clear whether either of these funds will be all that accessible

to retail investors either. But this is clearly a move in the right direction.

The perfect investor in distressed debt is one who has a very long-term time

horizon and who doesn’t much care about marking to market in the interim. And

a retail investor who isn’t going to need his money until he retires in some

decades’ time is a prime example of such an investor.

What this kind of fund doesn’t want is investors who are trying to

call a bottom to the market, and will be upset by volatility or further illiquidity.

Such investors really shouldn’t be in distressed debt in the first place: it’s

an asset class for investors with strong stomachs. So I’m puzzled by the final

line of the WSJ article:

These vulture funds also face considerable risks if the debt markets remain

depressed and hard to trade for longer periods than the fund companies anticipate.

I don’t get it: it’s not like these distressed debt funds are like private

equity funds, and have to exit their positions before a certain date. In fact,

the longer that the debt markets remain depressed, the more opportunities will

present themselves to these funds. If was launching a distressed-debt fund today,

I’m not at all sure I’d want the market to rebound tomorrow.

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on Distressed Debt Starts to go Mainstream

The Central Banking Confidence Game

Monetary policy, at heart, is largely about confidence. Yes, the main tool

that a central bank has at its disposal is the level of overnight interest rates,

but the level of overnight interest rates, in and of itself, has relatively

little direct impact on an economy. Two things are more important: liquidity

(how easy it is to borrow money), and longer-term interest rates. And both of

them are essentially a function of confidence – specficically, confidence

in the long-term health of the economy.

Now it’s true that central bankers alone can’t guarantee the long-term health

of the economy. There are a myriad of other factors over which they have little

if any control and which also help determine the health of the economy, including

fiscal policy and geopolitical decision-making both in their own country and

in other countries. But the general idea is that central bankers look at the

net effect of all those factors and then make their own, final adjustment on

the interest rate front to bring the economy to its optimum level.

It’s an almost impossible job, and very smart and able central bankers like

Paul Volcker have failed at it. Weirdly, however, in recent years central bankers

worldwide seem to have become vastly more successful at their jobs. And it’s

not because they all discovered the Secret Potion of Monetary Policy, or sold

their souls to the devil in exchange for long-term sustainable growth with low

inflation. Rather, the Great Moderation helped to keep growth up and inflation

down, and in turn helped to convince the financial world that central bankers

knew what they were doing. And if the financial world thinks that you

know what you are doing, that turns out to be at least as important as actually

knowing what you’re doing.

If the financial world thinks that you know what you’re doing, that means that

it thinks that you and your successors are going to be able to keep inflation

under control for the next 30 years. In turn, that means long-term interest

rates will be nice and low. Furthermore, if long-term interest rates are low,

and inflation is under control, and the prospects for the economy look rosy,

then people will be much more willing to lend money than if they fear recession

and/or inflation. So liquidity improves, as well.

Which brings me, finally, to Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke. There’s a lot

of Greenspan

revisionism going on right now, with people changing their minds and deciding

that the Maestro wasn’t nearly as good as they thought he was. They’re right,

and not only because no one could have been as good as they thought

he was. But the fact remains that while Greenspan was chairman of the Fed –

at least until his final years – he did an absolutely magnificent job

of persuading everybody that he knew what he was doing. Which, of course, is

often as important, or more important, than actually knowing what you’re doing.

There’s good reason to believe that Bernanke is the other way around: he’s

good at what he does, but he’s bad at persuading the markets that he’s good

at what he does. As Yves

Smith says:

That’s the real difference between Greenspan and Bernanke. Greenspan wasn’t

a very good Fed chairman (I am permitted to say that, since I first publicly

got on his case in 2000), but he had the media eating out of his hand. He

may have stumbled into his Wizard of Oz act, but the impenetrable statements

and the aura he created that he alone could read the economic tea leaves was

a brilliant bit of showmanship. I can’t help but think that his girlfriend,

later wife Andrea Mitchell was instrumental in his success. Bernanke, by contrast,

is concerned with the substance of his role, and less attentive to the theatrics.

That will impair his effectiveness, particularly if he takes an unpopular

course.

There’s one problem with all this, however. The best way to become a popular

central banker is to cut rates. What happens if you do that and it turns out

that you cut to much? You end up with temporary popularity even as you bequeath

nasty bubbles to your successor. In turn, your successor could cut rates as

well, and become just as popular, but at the risk of compounding your error.

It’s not easy, being Ben Bernanke.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on The Central Banking Confidence Game

Burning Water

This story seems

to be doing the rounds, with the implication that a chap named John Kanzius

seems to have invented a perpetual-motion machine. Of course, he doesn’t quite

come out and say so, but here, see for yourself:

An Erie cancer researcher has found a way to burn salt water, a novel invention

that is being touted by one chemist as the "most remarkable" water

science discovery in a century.

John Kanzius happened upon the discovery accidentally when he tried to desalinate

seawater with a radio-frequency generator he developed to treat cancer. He

discovered that as long as the salt water was exposed to the radio frequencies,

it would burn.

The discovery has scientists excited by the prospect of using salt water,

the most abundant resource on earth, as a fuel.

Obviously, if salt water really could be used as a fuel, then you have a perpetual-motion

machine. You just burn the fuel, run a turbine, and generate (presumably) more

than enough electricity to power the little radio transmitter you need to make

it all happen.

Except, well, it ain’t gonna happen. For one thing, they’re not burning water,

they’re burning hydrogen. And they’re using salt water. How do you get hydrogen

out of salt water? Electrolysis.

And I’m pretty sure that some kind of electrolysis is what’s happening here.

The thing is, the energy output of electrolysis, from the burning of hydrogen,

is lower than the energy input of electrolysis. And I’m quite sure that the

same thing is going on here: the energy needed to run the radio is greater than

the energy one could generate from burning the hydrogen.

Anyway, if you really needed proof that this whole idea is going nowhere fast,

just read down a bit further:

Roy will meet this week with officials from the Department of Energy and

the Department of Defense to try to obtain research funding.

If research funding were coming from Silicon Valley, home of the Green Bubble,

I might just take this seriously. If no one in the private sector is interested,

and the researchers are trying to get Defense to pay for it instead, you know

nothing’s going to come of this.

(By the way, the idea of burning water reminded me of Greek

fire. No one knows exactly how the Greeks managed to make this awesome weapon

which only burned harder when it came in contact with water, but I’m pretty

sure that radio waves were not involved.)

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on Burning Water

Homeownership is an Investment, not a Moral Good

How can I have forgotten to mention John

Leland’s piece in the New York Times this morning, when I was responding

to Matt Cooper? I blame a lack of coffee. Leland cites the Census Bureau as

saying that housing costs are hitting new highs, and then gets this spot-on

quotation:

“Maybe it all means that housing is not as smart an investment for

as many people as we thought,” said Matt Fellowes, a scholar in metropolitan

policy at the Brookings Institution. “Stocks perform better than houses

over time. Maybe the American dream should be building wealth in general,

not building a certain type of wealth, which we see is narrow and dangerous.”

Clever man, this Fellowes chap.

Seriously, stocks do perform better than housees over time: the only

reason that people might make lower returns on stocks than on houses is that

their stock-market investments aren’t highly leveraged.

And before Matt starts beating me over the head again with the societal benefits

of homeownership, let’s just stop to consider the societal benefits of stock

ownership as well. I’m sure, if you reran the studies, that areas with high

levels of stock ownership would turn out to be safer and nicer than areas where

people don’t own stocks. And I’m sure that if you look at what happens after

people buy stocks, they become less likely to go to jail and more likely to

stay married, etc etc.

Yes, it’s nice to own your own home, although it can be a right pain as well

sometimes. But it’s not the kind of thing which is ever and always a good idea.

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Homeownership is an Investment, not a Moral Good

iPhone Sales: Not Dreadful, Not Spectacular Either

Jeff Matthews is getting a lot of blogosphere linkage for his piece

saying that iPhone sales are much lower than the likes of Gene

Munster would like to think. But here’s how Matthews’ logic works:

The 10,000-a-day consensus among Wall Street’s Finest assumes that iPhone

sales, which averaged 135,000 in the first two days after launch, collapsed

the very next day to 10,000 a day, and stayed there through September

9.

That is, of course, unlikely.

Assuming a more gradual drop-off from the feeding frenzy of the first week’s

activity, iPhone sales could be half that rate or less.

Let’s, for example, assume sales averaged 135,000 for the first three

days, then dropped in half every three days thereafter until settling out

in the middle of July at whatever pace got them to 1 million on September

9th.

That would imply a 4,200 a day run-rate, which is less than half the consensus.

The problem is that yes, iPhone sales genuinely did collapse on the

third day the unit was on sale. The iPhone went on sale Friday June 29, on which

day pretty much every AT&T store in the country sold out of its quota, and

a lot of the Apple stores did as well. The next day, Saturday June 30, was the

day that the Apple stores sold out of their inventory. And the one datapoint

which we know for sure is that between Friday and Saturday, 270,000 units were

sold.

The third day was Sunday July 1. What are the chances that iPhone sales collapsed

to 10,000 units on that day? Very high! Because everyone was sold out of iPhones

at that point, and, it being a Sunday, no one was making any deliveries either.

Over the course of the following week, iPhone sales will have picked up, as

deliveries started to get made to both AT&T and iPhone stores. And I’m sure

that sales for much of July were volatile, driven as much by supply as by demand.

But the fact is that between July 1 and September 8, Apple managed to sell

730,000 iPhones. What that works out at on a per-day-in-September basis is not

particularly interesting, really.

The key point is that Apple saw what happened to iPod sales when iPods came

down in price. Consumers, it turns out, are reasonably price-sensitive when

it comes to shelling out hundreds of dollars on electronic gizmos. And so Apple

slashed the price of the iPhone in order to drive sales. Remember, too, that

the amount Apple receives per iPhone has not fallen by 33%, since Apple also

gets large payments from AT&T for every iPhone sold.

On the other hand, it’s worth comparing iPhone sales in the US to sales of

Nokia’s ultra-high-end N95 phone, primarily in Europe. According to someone

who knows such things, Nokia sold 1.4 million N95s in the second quarter,

and is likely to sell over 2 million more in the third quarter. The much-vaunted

figure of 1 million iPhones sold might sound impressive on its own, but by cellphone

standards it’s really nothing all that special.

Posted in technocrats | Comments Off on iPhone Sales: Not Dreadful, Not Spectacular Either

Carbon Taxes vs Cap-and-Trade in the WSJ

Deborah Solomon today has a

good primer on one of my pet subjects, carbon taxes vs cap-and-trade. She

says that it’s "the biggest political battle in Washington over climate

change," however, which is over-egging the pudding a lot: the economists

who support a carbon tax would, I’m sure, be perfectly fine with an cap-and-trade

system which auctioned rather than allotted carbon-emission rights. And in any

case, no one in Washington is seriously proposing a carbon tax as opposed to

a cap-and-trade system in the first place.

Naturally, as a cap-and-trade partisan, I think that Solomon is too nice to

the carbon-tax crowd.

Both cap and trade and a carbon tax attempt to use market incentives to get

businesses and consumers to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, which is a

gas produced by burning fossil fuels and, according to scientists, is a contributor

to global warming.

Imposing a tax or fee on each ton of carbon emitted would encourage technologies

that produce less carbon, advocates say. It would raise the price to consumers

of activities that burn carbon, such as driving. "If there’s an iron

law in economics, it’s that if you raise the price, you lower demand. And

so if you raise the price of burning fuels, you’ll lower demand for them,"

says Mr. Green."

First, and most important, a cap-and-trade system does not rely on "market

incentives" to reduce carbon emissions. It uses hard regulation: it caps

carbon emissions at a certain level, and the market just has to deal. It’s the

carbon tax, not cap-and-trade, which has to rely on that "iron law in economics"

which predicts that demand for carbon will fall if the price rises. (By the

way, "Mr Green" is Kenneth Green, of the AEI, an avowed carbon-tax

advocate.)

But I also need to tweak Solomon for the utterly unnecessary "according

to scientists" which she felt compelled to add into the first sentence.

Carbon dioxide is a contributor to global warming. That is a fact. Qualifying

it with reference to anonymous "scientists" merely makes it seem more

contentious than it is.

Posted in climate change | 1 Comment

Freddie Mac vs AHM

What

a clusterfuck. When American Home Mortgage went bankrupt, Freddie Mac seized

$7 million in payments that homeowners had made, some of which was for insurance

payments and property taxes. But American Home refused to give Freddie Mac the

files saying who should be paid what. "Therefore, there is the imminent

risk that borrowers’ insurance policies may lapse for nonpayment, subjecting

the borrowers to a risk of loss of their mortgaged properties," Freddie

Mac now says.

The amount of ill-will and incompetence here is staggering. Freddie is trying

to become a loan servicer overnight, despite the fact that it has no abilities

in that area. AHM is perfectly happy hanging its borrowers out to dry in its

attempt to sell its loan-servicing operation for the maximum amount of money.

The result is physical confrontations:

In court documents, American Home said Ginnie Mae representatives "stood

in a line in front of the doors and sat on the stairs, preventing AHM Servicing

employees from entering the office." Freddie Mac said American Home "had

its security personnel escort the Freddie Mac representatives out."

Oh, for a powerful regulator who could really bang some heads together here.

The harder the better.

(Via Tanta)

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Freddie Mac vs AHM

Does Paulson Really Think the Credit Crunch Will Last a Decade?

How long does Hank Paulson think this credit crunch will last? According

to the FT, it could be a decade:

The crisis of confidence in credit markets is likely to last longer than

previous financial shocks of the past two decades, Hank Paulson, Treasury

secretary, warned on Tuesday.

He said the uncertainty in credit markets would last longer than the turmoil

that followed the Asian crisis and the Russian default of the 1990s or the

Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s.

The turmoil that followed the Asian crisis and Russian default of the 1990s

we know about. It started in late 1997, and it continued until about 1999. Call

it 18 months.

But the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s was much more prolonged. That

started with Mexico’s default in 1982, and didn’t really end until the Brady

Plan, which was launched in 1989 and didn’t really get moving until well into

the early 1990s.

But is the Latin American "lost decade" really what Paulson was referring

to? Here’s the quote in the FT:

Mr Paulson said he had been an investment banker at Goldman Sachs during

the “Russian default, Asian crisis . . . and Latin American credit crisis”

and expected this bout of uncertainty in credit markets was “going to

take longer” to resolve.

The thing about Latin America is that it’s never very far from a credit crisis.

It’s entirely possible that Paulson here was referring not to the 1980s but

rather to the period from 2001 to 2002, in which Argentina and Uruguay both

defaulted and political worries sent Brazilian bonds tumbling to severely distressed

levels. That crisis lasted two years, not ten years: a big difference.

Posted in bonds and loans | 3 Comments

The Downside of Homeownership, Part 2

A short response to Matt

Cooper, on the subject of homeownership, since I’ve basically said

my piece at this point.

  1. Matt says that "the social advantages to home ownership seem well documented".

    I say that a society with high levels of homeownership will be a divided and

    unequal society. Yes, areas where people own their homes will be more stable

    and prosperous. But the flipside of that is that the areas where people don’t

    own their homes will be pretty gruesome. Homeownership, on this view, is essentially

    an inequality perpetuation device.

  2. Matt has "found it hard to come up with a scenario where, over a lifetime,

    you’d be better off never having owned a home". Er, bankruptcy and foreclosure?

  3. Matt says that house-price appreciation "over a lifetime, seems inevitable

    even if there are long periods of stagnant or falling home prices". Tell

    that to people in Detroit or Flint or Baltimore, the value of whose homes

    have gone nowhere even during the biggest housing bubble in the history of

    the USA. Now think of the prospects for people who bought during the subprime

    boom, right at the top of the bubble. They’re not pretty.

Matt might be right that buying a home is often a good idea if the chances

of losing that house to foreclosure are zero, and if you intend to live

in that house for the rest of your life. But those conditions are actually pretty

rare.

Posted in housing | Comments Off on The Downside of Homeownership, Part 2

Greenspan’s New Fiscal Worries

John Cassidy rightly eviscerates

Alan Greenspan in the October issue of Portfolio. Cassidy concentrates on

Greenspan’s role in inflating the credit bubble which is currently bursting:

"For a Fed chairman to have one speculative bubble inflate during his tenure

is an indictment; to have two of them qualifies him as a serial bubble blower,"

he writes.

But the bit which made me do a double-take is where Cassidy reports that Greenspan

worries at some length in his new book about "the grave fiscal challenges

facing the country".

Now Greenspan has fiscal worries? This is the man who testified to

Congress at the beginning of the first Bush administration, saying that sweeping

tax cuts were a jolly good idea because otherwise the government would run a

fiscal surplus for so long that it would pay down the entire national debt and

then what would it do with the money?

There were many low point in Greenspan’s tenure, but that was surely the lowest.

I wonder if Greenspan even mentions it in his book.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on Greenspan’s New Fiscal Worries

How to Break a CPDO

CPDOs, or Constant Proportion Debt Obligations, were briefly popular at the

end of 2006 as a way of getting high returns on AAA-rated paper. At the time,

many commentators (notably excluding myself) said that CPDOs were too good to

be true, and that the ratings agencies who gave them a AAA rating were, in a

word, wrong. Those commentators are feeling a bit smug right now, since CPDOs

look very much as though they are getting close to breaking point.

CPDOs certainly seemed to be very hard to break. You could model a credit crunch,

or a whole series of defaults, or massive spread widening, and the CPDOs really

didn’t mind all that much: when spreads go up, their value goes down, but their

income goes up.

There was one other possible thing which could harm a CPDO, however, and it

was a known issue right from the start. CPDOs "roll" every six months:

they unwind the credit protection they wrote half a year ago, and write new

protection on the current index. Because the current index is longer-dated than

the old index, it normally trades wider than the old index, which gives the

CPDO extra income. If the new index trades inside the old index, there can be

a problem. This is what

Citigroup said in a November report:

Change of composition is another downside factor that plays into the roll

dynamics. By construction, “blown up” or downgraded credits are

removed from the new basket and replaced with “average” spread

names. As the result the new basket tends to be less risky and have less carry.

For CPDOs that means that when spreads widen idiosyncratically the MTM losses

on the old series may not be fully compensated for by the increased carry

on the new series. For example, the GM and Ford downgrade has resulted in

large MTM losses in CDX4. These names were subsequently removed from CDX5

and it was issued at a lower spread. Although clearly a factor, we found this

“loss of carry” to have a relatively weak influence on CPDO final

value unless happening under extreme conditions.

Well, guess what? It seems that this "loss of carry" is

happening "under extreme conditions". "It

will be painful," says Alea of the CPDO roll today: rather than seeing

spreads on the new index about 7bp wide of spreads on the old index, the new

index will actually be tighter than the old index by as much as 15bp. And that’s

the kind of thing which can

really hurt a CPDO which is already suffering from capital losses.

The culprits are mainly companies which used to be investment-grade but which

have been leveraged up in private-equity takeovers and are now rated as junk:

Alliance Boots, Alltel, Boston Scientific, Expedia, and ResCap. According to

a report by David Watts of CreditSights, these downgrades have happened at exactly

the wrong time for CPDOs, and many of them now risk being unable to repay their

principal in full at maturity. In some CPDOs, the chance of breakage might be

as high as 20% or more, which is definitely not something which becomes an AAA-rated

instrument.

Of course, the fact that CPDOs can break does not mean that they will

break. And the good news, from the CPDOs’ point of view, is that the credit

crunch has made future LBO-driven downgrades much less likely, which in turn

means that this roll problem is unlikely to be repeated.

In any case, it seems that the sequence of events needed to break a CPDO is

now clear. First you need a lot of liquidity and very tight credit markets,

which make junk-fueled LBOs attractive. Then, while the CPDO is still highly

levered at the beginning of its life, you need a massive credit crunch, which

sends spreads gapping outwards and which hits the asset value of the CPDO. When

the roll comes – bingo, the CPDO becomes risky enough that the credit

rating agencies, at this point, are going to have to embark on some multi-notch

downgrades.

So was I wrong about CPDOs? In a word, yes. I did say that they could fall

dramatically in asset value, and I even said that they could get downgraded.

But when I said that, I was imagining a downgrade to maybe single-A, not a downgrade

to junk, which now seems to be a serious possibility. It turns out that CPDOs

were, in fact, more fragile than I thought. Although if anybody wants to sell

me one at today’s distressed prices, I’d still be a buyer.

Posted in derivatives | 1 Comment

El-Erian to Head Pimco Push into Alternative Investments

A bit more information on the

El-Erian front this morning, with Pimco’s Bill Gross talking

to the Wall Street Journal. The big news is that Pimco seems to be interested

in getting into the alternative investments:

In his newly created role, Mr. El-Erian will help expand the firm’s product

line and increase the role of alternative investments such as hedge funds,

according to Mr. Gross.

This is a massive development for Pimco, which could quite conceivably become

the largest player in the world in the fund-of-funds space. Funds of hedge funds

have historically suffered from the problem that picking a single fund-of-funds

manager is no easier than picking a single hedge fund manager. But if Mohamed

El-Erian is picking funds, and he’s backed up with all the institutional capabilities

of Pimco, then he almost automatically gets onto the shortlist of any potential

investor.

There’s also some new information on El-Erian’s remuneration:

Pimco declined to specify Mr. El-Erian’s pay package, though Mr. Gross said

it would be on par with the compensation he enjoyed during his initial time

there…

Mr. Gross said that Mr. El-Erian’s experience at Harvard, where he was president

and CEO of Harvard Management, "filled in his resume" in a way that

made the new position at Pimco possible.

I don’t really understand this. El-Erian was first and foremost a fund manager

when he was at Pimco; he had very little in the way of the kind of operational

responsibility that he had as CEO of Harvard Management Corporation. That experience

has now qualified him for the co-CEO job. What’s more, his stellar returns in

the non-fixed-income space have qualified him to lead Pimco’s push into that

market, and have served as a proof-of-concept that bond-fund managers can successfully

invest in other asset classes as well.

In other words, El-Erian is now vastly more valuable to Pimco than he was when

he left, and has a much more important job title. So I’m not entirely convinced

that his pay package won’t have gone up substantially. Maybe it’s just very

back-loaded with a percentage of alternative funds under management if and when

they arrive.

El-Erian didn’t talk to the WSJ, but he did apparently talk to Latin Finance,

which reports in its daily email that he told them he made the move "to

rejoin my personal and professional families." Is that a hint that he felt

more at home at Pimco than he does at Harvard?

Posted in investing | Comments Off on El-Erian to Head Pimco Push into Alternative Investments