Financial Innovation of the Day: E*Trade’s Springing Lien Notes

Peter

Eavis has dug up E*Trade’s

8K relating to the Citadel

investment, and has discovered something rather weird. Citadel’s E*Trade

bonds mature in 2017. And it seems that they are pari passu with all

the rest of E*Trade’s debt until 2011, at which point the 2017 notes become

senior to all the other debt.

From the filing, it appears that Citadel’s debt has been given seniority

over two other debt issues, which are scheduled to mature in 2013 and 2015

— before Citadel’s notes, which mature in 2017.

But the filing indicates that Citadel doesn’t get seniority on its debt until

notes maturing in 2011 mature in that year or are paid off by the company

earlier than 2011. What if E*Trade were to go bankrupt before 2011 — would

the deal allow Citadel’s debt to gain seniority over the 2013 and 2105 debt?

No, says a person familiar with the deal. Citadel’s debt is on equal standing

with the 2011, 2013 and 2015 debt until 2011 or until those 2011 notes are

paid back before 2011, this person says.

The name that the 8K gives this rather peculiar structure is a "Springing

Lien Note". And of course the legalese is borderline incomprehensible:

The Springing Lien Notes rank equal in right of payment with all of the Company’s

existing and future unsubordinated indebtedness, and rank senior in right

of payment to all of the Company’s existing and future subordinated

indebtedness. The Indenture will require the Company to secure the Springing

Lien Notes in the future, up to the maximum amount of indebtedness as would

not require any of the Company’s existing senior notes due 2011, 2013

or 2015 becoming secured equally and ratably with the Springing Lien Notes,

on the property and assets of the Company and certain of its subsidiaries

as set forth in the Indenture. The Company will also be required to cause

its restricted subsidiaries to guarantee the notes on the date on which the

Company is first required to secure the Springing Lien Notes or on the date

on which such restricted subsidiaries guarantee other indebtedness of the

Company.

I have a feeling that what’s really going on here is that there’s some kind

of language in the 2011 notes which prevents them from being subordinated by

the issuance of new, more-senior debt. Once that obstacle is out of the way,

when the 2011 notes mature, the new 2017 notes automatically become secured

and therefore senior to all the existing unsecured debt. Or, to put it another

way, Citadel’s E*Trade bonds are as senior as they could be, short of calling

the 2011s immediately.

Why is all this legal arcana germane? Eavis explains:

If Citadel has taken steps to gain an advantage under a bankruptcy, its investment

objectives are in no way aligned with investors holding E*Trade stock, who’d

be wiped out in a bankruptcy.

Questions about the seniority of debt only become really important in the case

of bankruptcy proceedings, when senior debt holders get first dibs on all the

company’s assets. In this case, it’s doubly important because Citadel appears

to have paid essentially nothing for its 20% equity stake in E*Trade.

So I’m inclined to disagree with Eavis when he says this:

E*Trade stock has fallen by 29% since the deal was announced, which is a

rude awakening for Citadel, because it indicates that investors disagree with

Citadel’s apparent view that E*Trade can recover.

My feeling is that the fall in the share price merely reflects the degree to

which existing shareholders are being diluted by the Citadel deal, as well as

the fact that Citadel’s bonds are likely to eat up a large amount of the cashflow

which shareholders had previously hoped to keep for themselves. The 29% drop

looks big, but in fact it represents a fall of only about $500 million in market

capitalization – much less than the amount of money Citadel is injecting

into E*Trade.

On the other hand, if investors really were confident that Citadel’s cash injection

was capable of turning E*Trade around, then I do agree with Eavis that one would

expect the stock to be trading much higher than it is now. At $4 a share it’s

trading on a price-to-book ratio of about 0.4, which is indubitably a highly

distressed level.

Posted in bonds and loans, stocks | Comments Off on Financial Innovation of the Day: E*Trade’s Springing Lien Notes

The Subprime Plan: Now, It’s Political

The Paulson subprime mortgage plan, it would seem, is now the Bush subprime

mortgage plan.

According to the WSJ, the plan "includes" a non-binding agreement

by servicers and investors to freeze the teaser rate on some loans for five

years. That’s the main plank of the policy, and is the part that most of the

media, including the NYT,

concentrates on. The plan explicitly excludes anybody who’s delinquent on their

payments, which removes the potential moral

hazard problems.

But wait, there’s more! This is the bit which is still extremely unclear to

me:

For other borrowers who are in somewhat better shape, the White House also

wants to speed up refinancings, through the Federal Housing Administration

and other sources. For example, the administration wants to allow state and

local governments to use more tax-exempt-bond programs to fund refinancings,

a move that Congress would have to approve through a change in tax law.

This is not being reported by most news outlets covering the plan, so it counts

as something of a WSJ scoop*, although details are obviously very hazy. The

idea that the White House would want to dragoon state and local governments

into funding refis seems – well, let’s just say that it seems like a complicated

solution to an ill-defined problem.

In any case, the whole subprime football has now been punted squarely from

Treasury to the White House, where it’s rapidly transmogrifying into a political

punching bag. Given the fact that we’re in the middle of a presidential

election campaign, expect much more heat than light on this issue from here

on in. For real economic analysis of the plan, I’d stay away from anything smelling

of campaign reporting, and stick to the likes of Dean

Baker.

*Update: It turns out that by "scoop",

I mean "ability to read Treasury

press releases". Here’s the relevant part of Paulson’s speech on Monday:

Today, we are proposing to allow state and local governments to temporarily

broaden their tax-exempt bond programs to include mortgage refinancings; if

enacted, this will reduce the cost of innovative mortgage programs and allow

these programs to reach more struggling homeowners.

I have no idea what Paulson is referring to when he talks about these "innovative

mortgage programs" – can anybody elaborate at all?

Posted in housing, Politics | Comments Off on The Subprime Plan: Now, It’s Political

NYT Revisits Goldman’s Mortgage Underwriting, Sensibly

If I was an editor at the New York Times, the first thing I’d do after Chris

Dodd started waving a Ben Stein column around would be to wonder if there

was anything in it at all which could be substantiated. Most of Stein’s

column is muddled

beyond repair, of course. But there is a germ of truth buried within the

craziness, as Justin

Fox notes. Goldman Sachs was underwriting crappy mortgage-backed bonds,

and in hindsight it can’t be very proud of the issues that it underwrote –

especially considering that Goldman itself was short mortgages for nearly all

of 2007. And there is a sober-minded and unassailable article to be written

simply laying out those facts, without launching into ill-informed calls for

the Treasury secretary to be investigated.

Today, Jenny Anderson and Vikas Bajaj provide exactly

that article.

They show that Goldman’s mortgage business was not particularly egregious,

by Wall Street standards – but they also show that Wall Street standards,

in this particular case, are pretty dreadful. Goldman underwrote about $29 billion

of mortgage bonds in 2006, which placed it somewhere between Credit Suisse and

Merrill Lynch in the league tables, and of those bonds about

20% of the loans underlying those bonds are now in default, which seems to be

roughly average – the range goes from 16% to 24%.

Anderson and Bajaj do more than that: they go on, in the words of Dean

Baker, to "lay out some of the nuts and bolts of the subprime splurge

that led to the subprime bust". They explain what the bankers were doing,

and how much they got paid for doing it:

The average total compensation for managing directors in the mortgage divisions

of investment banks was $2.52 million in 2006, compared with $1.75 million

for managing directors in other areas, according to Johnson Associates, a

compensation consulting firm. This year, mortgage officials will probably

earn $1.01 million, while other managing directors are expected to earn $1.75

million.

This is good reporting. There are more than enough facts here to digust the

anti-Goldman types, and, more importantly, there’s none of the risible conspiracy

theories of which Stein seems so fond. If there’s anything in this article which

warrants Paulson’s investigation, then have at him. But really, of course, there

isn’t.

Posted in housing | Comments Off on NYT Revisits Goldman’s Mortgage Underwriting, Sensibly

Google Battles the France-Microsoft Alliance

Jonathan Last has an

entertaining attack on Google Book Search in the latest Weekly Standard.

Last starts off well, but he does rather disappears off the deep end by the

time he finishes, alleging that "Google is trying mightily to deny"

the value of books and that it poses "very real" dangers, without

ever really saying what those dangers are. He also never asks the obvious question,

which is what would happen to Google’s web search business model if his preferred

view of the book search business is upheld. After all, the copyright questions

in both cases are more similar than different. But one can forgive a lot from

an article which contains gems like this:

Google has, as they say, all the right enemies. Anytime the ALA, Microsoft,

France, a trade guild, and a bunch of trial lawyers are lined up on one side

of an argument, the other side is going to look extremely attractive.

(Via TIR)

Posted in technology | Comments Off on Google Battles the France-Microsoft Alliance

Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

Looking

for the Weaknesses in United Rental’s Lawsuit

Spiky

America

I lost my appetite: How come risk

appetite seems to be so volatile?

Peter Orszag: blogging!

Fake

it until you make it: A housing flipper saga

Productivity

Is Revised Higher, But Gains Could Be Temporary: Q3 productivity growth

was 6.3%.

Too

big to fail? Not this ship, sister

Big

Portraits of Big Names at Art Miami: Commissioning a Martin Schoeller portrait

will cost you $40,000.

Continental: Crap.

Virgin America: Great!

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

Subprime Datapoint of the Day, Auto Loan Edition

And you thought subprime mortgages had high default rates. William Adams, Liran

Einav, and Jonathan Levin examine

subprime auto loans:

The average purchaser finances around 90 percent of the price of the automobile,

with the average loan size being around $11,000. Repayment is highly uncertain:

more than half of the loans default, and the majority of these default within

the first year of repayment. Interest rates reflect the high probability of

default: a typical loan in the authors’ dataset has an annual interest rate

on the order of 25-30 percent.

This has nothing whatsoever to do with the housing market, of course. But these

are borrowers who are 15% more likely to default for every $1,000 that’s tacked

on to the size of the loan. Which does make you think twice about the companies

which were lending them hundreds of thousands of dollars to buy houses.

(Via Thoma)

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on Subprime Datapoint of the Day, Auto Loan Edition

Cost Inflation in Hollywood

Tyler Cowen has high

praise for the

FT’s coverage of the Hollywood writers’ strike, and for this passage in

particular:

While broadcasters have more rights, they also have to fund production, which

is increasingly expensive. The cost of a one-hour scripted drama has tripled

from about $1m in the early 1990s to $2.7m, according to some executives.

The cost of a 30-minute comedy has doubled to around $1.5m.

This, together with competition from cable channels, explains why the broadcasters

are taking such a hard line, says Garth Ancier, president of BBC Worldwide

America, the BBC’s commercial arm. “They are fighting for their

lives. They need every last piece to come together, every last revenue stream.”

I, on the other hand, find such passive-voice constructions highly annoying.

The cost of a drama "has tripled"? The cost of a comedy "has

doubled"? Did this just happen in a vacuum? The studios, as the FT makes

very clear, control pretty much all aspects of the production process these

days – which means that the increase in costs would seem to be of their

own doing.

I have very little sympathy for studios who can’t keep a lid on their own

costs and who then attempt to turn around and get their writers to eat the overruns.

On the other hand, if it’s the writers themselves who are partially responsible

for those cost overruns, the FT should tell us that. How much do writers on

dramas and comedies earn today, compared to what they earned in the early 1990s?

I’d also point out that if by "early 1990s" the FT means 15 years

ago, then a doubling over the course of 15 years corresponds to an average annual

increase of less than 5%, while the jump from $1 million to $2.7 million corresponds

to an inflation rate of about 6.8%. These numbers are higher than inflation,

to be sure, but they’re hardly stratospheric.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on Cost Inflation in Hollywood

Second Thoughts on Malawi’s Fertilizer Subsidies

When the word "simply" appears in a headline about development issues,

be very, very cautious. That’s what happened in story that the NYT splashed

on its front page Sunday: "Ending

Famine, Simply by Ignoring the Experts", by Celia Dugger. The thesis

of the story is basically that by doing the opposite of what the World Bank

advised and subsidizing fertilizer, Malawi has managed to find itself in a world

of agricultural plenty.

One problem is that the article didn’t come with hyperlinks: it does things

like quote "an independent evaluation financed by the United States and

Britain" without giving us any idea of where to find it. What’s more, the

only people the article quotes are people who support its thesis. All this meant

that Brad DeLong was immediately suspicious: "it’s very hard to assess

what is going on," he wrote,

noting that Dugger doesn’t even say where the subsidies are coming from.

Nevertheless, it was clear to Mark Thoma who would embrace the article wholeheartedly:

"This is very Rodrikian," he wrote.

"It’s also Sachsian".

Turns out, Thoma’s batting .500 on that one. Sachs is quoted in the article,

and loves the fertilizer-subsidy program. But Dani Rodrik today gives his blog

over to Maggie McMillan, who has some

extremely pointed words for Dugger:

Low fertilizer use is indeed one of the Africa’s most vexing challenges.

But subsidizing is only a band-aid, masking its high cost and low productivity

without sustaining growth…

Dr. Masters and his colleagues at Purdue University did one of the first studies

of Malawi’s fertilizer subsidy program, when it was first introduced.

They predicted the high payoff reported in the NYT article, but found that

it had little to do with the fertilizer subsidy as such. Most of the effect

comes from the improved seed that accompanied the fertilizer, and from overcoming

Malawian farmers’ credit constraints.

Without underlying change, warns Dr. Dick Sserunkuuma, an economist at Makerere

University in Kampala, farmers do not benefit enough from the fertilizer to

make the subsidy an effective development strategy. The article makes it sound

like farmers in Malawi can achieve international levels of competitiveness

simply by applying fertilizer. This is simply not true…

The World Bank has given out lots of loans to African governments for fertilizer

and it has good reason to be cautious. For example, in an effort to stave

off famine and reduce Ethiopia’s dependence on food aid, in 1995 the

World Bank gave two loans to the government of Ethiopia totaling $164 million

to support fertilizer use. Fertilizer use increased quite a bit, and with

good rains in 2000/2001 there was a record harvest and maize prices plummeted.

I was there that year and the sad joke was that farmers had come all the way

to Addis to beg on the streets for money to repay their fertilizer loans.

Inputs can be productive without being profitable…

More fertilizer use is clearly an important part of poverty-alleviation success

stories around the world, driven by the spread of improved seed and favorable

market conditions. Subsidized fertilizer can raise output only temporarily.

So there is certainly scope for increased fertilizer use in Africa, but it

is not the magic bullet that the NYT headline would have us believe.

Many thanks to McMillan for moving the story forward in a smart and non-truculent

manner. Now, what are the chances, do you think, that Celia Dugger will respond?

Posted in development | Comments Off on Second Thoughts on Malawi’s Fertilizer Subsidies

What’s a CDO?

I could tell you, but it’s more fun to show

you.

Posted in bonds and loans, housing | Comments Off on What’s a CDO?

Subprime: It Never Did Help Homeownership

Student of the Tao goes

mythbusting, after reading the Seattle

Times:

Myth 1: Sub-prime mortgages allow bad credit risks to buy homes.

Locally and nationally, nearly all of Ameriquest’s loans went to people

who already owned homes, The Times found.

In 2004, the year Taylor obtained her final subprime mortgage, only two

Ameriquest mortgages helped people buy houses in King County — far

less than 1 percent of the total. The remaining 1,286 loans that year were

nearly all refinances for borrowers who already owned their homes.

Likewise, nationally, less than 1 percent of Ameriquest’s loans that year

helped people buy homes. The next year, less than 3 percent of Ameriquest

loans nationally were for home purchases. Ameriquest declined to discuss

The Times’ findings, as did other industry representatives.

Myth 2: Sub-prime mortgages help young people buy houses.

More than one in three borrowers in King County who got loans from the

same lender that foreclosed on Taylor were 50 or older, and one in seven

was 60 or older.

The study was of Ameriquest mortgages, and Ameriquest by all accounts was one

of the most egregious lenders. But one certainly hears much less these days

about how "on the whole the subprime boom appears to have created more

winners than losers". Surowiecki?

Have you changed your mind on that one yet?

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Subprime: It Never Did Help Homeownership

Subprime Prescience at MetLife

Lavonne

Kuykendall quotes Steven Kandarian, MetLife’s CIO:

Mr. Kandarian said MetLife identified the risk from subprime loans early

and stopped buying subprime mortgage-backed securities rated single-A and

below in late 2004.

Note that MetLife’s fund managers aren’t the kind of people who get huge bonuses

for outperforming by a few basis points in a quarter, or who get fired if they

don’t. They’re real-money, long-term investors who buy and hold securities they’ve

looked closely at and believe in. Here endeth the lesson.

Posted in bonds and loans, housing, investing | Comments Off on Subprime Prescience at MetLife

Cuomo Stalks Wall Street, Mortgage Edition

Andrew

Cuomo is on a fishing expedition for mortgage-related malfeasance on Wall

Street, specifically sins of omission:

The inquiry raises questions about the extent to which securities firms are

obligated to dig into the mortgages before slicing them up to sell to investors.

Many securities firms rely on third-party vendors to do this work; among the

questions is whether this effort was adequate, or if securities firms had

a duty to do further due diligence. Securities firms that underwrite securities

have an obligation to make sure that statements included in offering documents

are accurate.

Patrick Rucker of Reuters had an important article at the beginning of August

which is well worth reading in this context. The problem isn’t that due diligence

wasn’t done, or that it wasn’t diligent enough. The problem is that it was

done, it was often done very well, and then

it was ignored:

Investment banks that bundle and sell home mortgages often commissioned reports

showing growing risks in subprime loans to less creditworthy borrowers but

did not pass on much of the information to credit rating agencies or investors,

according to some of those who prepared the reports.

Tanta explained the

realities of the mortgage-securitization industry at the time:

I’ll confirm that yes, there’s tons of information that falls under the general

heading of "due diligence" that nobody paid any attention to…

I’d flip open the file to see, right on top, page after page of worksheets,

printouts, and memos from everyone else who had handled the thing so far indicating

some serious problems with it. Discovering what’s wrong with these loans involved

using the reading skills Miss Buttkicker taught me in the third grade. But

the loans were still in the deal, even though three or four people before

me had noticed something wrong.

During the credit boom enough people got lazy enough and greedy enough that

I daresay Cuomo will be able to put together a scary indictment or two should

he be so inclined. Which would be at least a little cathartic for the millions

of people burned by the housing bust, since then they’ll be able to point their

fingers at (alleged) criminals and lay the blame squarely at the doors of the

named institutions. But they’ll be deluding themselves, really. Everyone

was to blame in this mess, not just the people who will end up getting prosecuted.

Posted in bonds and loans, housing, law | 1 Comment

Silvio Berlusconi for Citigroup CEO!

In the wake of Saturday’s NYT story that Vikram

Pandit looks set to take over Citigroup, a bit of color is emerging: essentially

that he’s the best man for the job only insofar as he’s the only person willing

to take it. Bloomberg’s reporting that Deutsche Bank’s Josef Ackerman turned

down the opportunity, while the FT has a

long list of other candidates who have ruled themselves out, including Dick

Kovacevich of Wells Fargo, Fred Goodwin of RBS, Jay Fishman of Travelers, and

even Hank Paulson. They didn’t bother mentioning Jamie Dimon of JP Morgan.

And who does buy-side giant Bill

Miller think should pilot this supertanker?

"I would like someone to run Citi like the way that [Mark] Hurd saw

HP – someone to come in and simplify the processes. That’s key. Someone who

would approach Citi that way would be great," he said. "Citi doesn’t

need a major strategic overhaul."

It’s a nice dream, but nice dreams tend not to make for successful stock picks.

Citigroup simply isn’t amenable to simplification. It was a mess under Prince,

and it will be a mess under his successor. Maybe what’s really needed is someone

who’s proved himself capable of running something sprawling and messy. How about

Silvio Berlusconi?

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Silvio Berlusconi for Citigroup CEO!

Blogonomics: The Gulf Between Bloggers and Professional Journalists

John Gapper says that he sees "a

sort of consensus" emerging between blogs and newspapers.

The boundary between old media and new is falling and the distinction between

blogs and print publications is eroding…

I imagine the two sides will eventually meet in the middle, even if it is

not clear where the meeting-point will be.

In the wonderful world of In Theory, I daresay this is true. In the day-to-day

world of In Practice, however, it isn’t. And with your indulgence I shall now

embark upon some epic financial-media navel-gazing. I won’t be offended if you

stop reading here, I promise.

First, it’s worth emphasizing that finance, as a subject, is not easy to write

about for a general audience. In fact, I can’t think of a single news organization

which has consistently managed to write about finance in a manner which is neither

incomprehensible to the layman nor condescending to financial professionals.

It’s a rare and precious skill, and interestingly one person who I think does

it better than almost anybody else is a blogger: Tanta, at Calculated

Risk.

Now I’ve written

glowingly about Tanta in the past, and she definitely has her enemies. Some

think she’s biased when it comes to the mortgage industry; I don’t agree. The

NYT’s Gretchen Morgenson (a frequent target of Tanta) is more biased than Tanta

is, more prone to thinking the worst of mortgage bankers. Others complain that

Tanta is intemperate, and in that they are correct. Read one of Tanta’s blog

entries on Morgenson, and you almost want to go dashing over to 43rd

Street 8th Avenue with some bandages and a nice cup of tea. When she

gets her teeth into a newspaper article she thinks very little of, Tanta pulls

no punches – and, I assure you, those punches land square, and hard.

Now Tanta’s actually been blogging at CR for less than a year, and her first

media post – which was about Morgenson, natch – came on March

5. What’s interesting about it, aside from its content, is that fact that

although she drips a bit of sarcasm here and there, she doesn’t have the take-no-prisoners

approach she later

perfected.

Meanwhile, she was and is happy to heap

glowing praise on other reporters when it’s deserved.

Tanta has written about many different journalists, by name, over the months.

Some she’s been ruder about than others. But I have a feeling that not one of

those journalists has actually engaged her, thanked her for her insights, defended

their reporting, or in any way tried to collaborate with a woman who clearly

knows an enormous amount about the industry and who is equally clearly dedicated

to really uncovering the truth of what is going on out there.

I use the word "collaborate" deliberately, because it’s the word

that New York Times executive editor uses in an

email to Jeff Jarvis:

My respect for blogs as a tool of journalism is not the least bit grudging,

and my conviction that professional journalists should collaborate with their

audience is heartfelt. That’s especially true when you have an audience

as educated and engaged as ours.

You just can’t get more educated and engaged than Tanta. So why isn’t

the NYT collaborating with her? (I must admit that I don’t know that the NYT

hasn’t reached out at all. I don’t read all Tanta’s comments, and I certainly

don’t read her private email. But I doubt that there’s very much in there from

gretchen@nytimes.com.

Keller also says, in the speech

which prompted the email to Jarvis, this:

We get things wrong. The history of our craft is tarnished down the centuries

by episodes of partisanship, gullibility, and blind ignorance on the part

of major news organisations. (My own paper pretty much decided to overlook

the Holocaust as it was happening.) And so there is a corollary to this first

principle: when we get it wrong, we correct ourselves as quickly and forthrightly

as possible.

I can hear Tanta’s hollow laugh from here. No impartial observer, looking over

Tanta’s history with Morgenson columns, would say that Morgenson never "got

it wrong" – but as far as I know, no corrections have been forthcoming.

The NYT is great at correcting small things like misspelled names, and every

so often Keller himself will write what he calls "mea culpas for my paper

after we let down our readers in more important ways". In between those

two poles, however, if there isn’t an aggrieved subject agitating for a correction,

nothing tends to appear.

Interestingly, Keller actually diagnoses one of the problems with Morgenson:

I think you are more likely to present a full and fair-minded story if your

objective is not to bolster an argument, but to search out the evidence without

a predisposition – including evidence that might contradict your own beliefs.

Once you have proclaimed an opinion, you feel compelled to defend it, and

that creates a natural human temptation to overlook inconvenient facts or,

if I may borrow a phrase from the famous Downing Street memo, fix the facts

to the policy.

Tanta probably couldn’t have put it better herself.

But the thing which really bothers me is that while Gapper sees professional

journalists and bloggers converging, I look at the short history of Tanta’s

blogging and see them moving further apart. She’s become increasingly shrill:

when she finds a piece of journalism she thinks very little of, even when it’s

by a respected journalist such as Peter

Eavis, she tends to shout, and should loudly.

The shrillness of Tanta’s tone then gives her victims every reason not to respond.

Everybody knows there’s no reasoning with readers as rude and truculent as Tanta.

(Although this line of argument would be more convincing if journalists at places

like the NYT and Fortune ever responded to blog entries about them:

in fact, however, they tend to ignore even the very polite ones.) In turn, Tanta

feels increasingly like a voice in the wilderness: shouting is what people

do when they think they’re not being heard.

This gulf is not easily bridged. I don’t expect for a minute that Ben Stein

will stop by here and respond to my posts about him: he probably lumps me in,

if he thinks about me at all, with the green-ink

brigade. Hell, I don’t even expect my colleagues at Portfolio magazine to

respond when I write about their articles, with the noble exception of Jesse

Eisinger. And I’m a professional journalist, blogging under my own name, for

the website of a mainstream publication. Imagine how much harder it is to get

a response if you’re a media outsider, blogging under a pseudonym, at a blogspot.com

address.

Meanwhile, although I am quite sure that I’m taken much more seriously by financial

professionals than Ben Stein is, it’s Stein, with his pulpit at the NYT, who

seems to be able to have the

chairman of the Senate Banking Committee at his beck and call. That’s nothing

to do with Stein, and everything to do with the power of the New York Times:

it’s unthinkable that Dodd would have done what he did had Stein been writing

for any other publication. (And indeed Stein did precious little reporting for

his column: he relied mostly on an

Allan Sloan piece from mid-October, which got no traction at all on the

Senate floor.)

If you have that sort of influence with the truly powerful, your incentive

to slum it in the blogosphere is much reduced – unless that’s something

you actively enjoy. And some big-name journalists love it here: Paul Krugman,

for one, loves mixing it up with econobloggers and is generous too about linking

to them.

(It’s worth noting that Krugman writes for the NYT editorial page, which means

that he is not part of Keller’s domain; he can criticize

Stein with impunity. The business section’s DealBook blog, on the other

hand, excused

Stein’s column on the grounds that he was "half joking" –

try telling that to Chris Dodd. It also said that Stein had "attracted

much criticism" while somehow managing to link to none of it. While Keller

is proud of his website’s blogs, most of them are still far from being really

bloggy – they’re edited, for one, and they almost never allow themselves

to get involved in debates or conversations with other blogs.)

It’s true that blogs are capable of bringing down politicians, just like newspapers.

But financial blogs don’t have anything like the same kind of influence that

the big political blogs have, and as a result newspapers find it easy to ignore

them – that’s going to change very slowly indeed. But it will happen,

as increasing numbers of financially-literate professionals realize that there’s

a whole world of information and analysis out there on the web, and that much

of it is of objectively higher quality than the stuff they read in their daily

newspaper.

As I say, writing about finance is hard – and bloggers have a huge home-team

advantage over most mainstream media in that they don’t feel the need to spell

everything out for the sake of readers who might have no idea what a bond is.

What’s more, many of them are financial professionals themselves, and know exactly

what they’re talking about. Journalists, by contrast, tend to be arts graduates;

many of them are positively petrified every time they see a number. As a result,

as any financial news outlet will tell you, it’s really hard to find good financial

journalists.

But the biggest gap between professional journalists and bloggers hasn’t even

begun to start narrowing. It’s this: professional journalists tend to

think of their article as the end of a process of reporting, while

bloggers tend to think of their entries as the beginning of a process

of commenting.

Once a journalist’s story has been edited and published, he or she is on to

the next thing. By the end of the day, the story is lining a cat’s litter-box

somewhere. It’s over, and the journalist is hitting the phones, getting the

next scoop. There’s no equity in revisiting old pieces, especially given the

"no sooner does the ink dry than it revolts me" syndrome – something

coined by Jesse Eisinger, paraphrasing Samuel Beckett.

A blog, by contrast, is nothing without reactions – from commenters,

from other blogs, even, occasionally, from the mainstream media. Professional

journalists simply don’t view their own work in the light of how it’s received

by others in the way that bloggers do. They therefore have little interest in

using web technology to artificially extend the natural life of any given story.

I am not a columnist. A columnist’s entries must be self-contained, while blog

entries can be much more open-ended. Yesterday, I wrote something about marking

subprime bonds to market; most of my best points ended up getting made in

conversation, in the comments, rather than in the blog entry itself, which made

a silly mistake in its opening two paragraphs. The idea that you can go back

and refine and improve what you’ve already written – that is still nowhere

to be found in most professional journalism. The idea that a blogger can just

write a blank entry and say "open thread", and get hundreds or even

thousands of comments, is equally alien to anything in the mainstream media

– as is the idea that doing so is genuinely valuable and even counts as

journalism.

Yes, bloggers – including Tanta – are doing more reporting these

days. And of course it’s hard to find a newspaper or magazine which doesn’t

have blogs these days. But let’s not kid ourselves that we’re anywhere near

meeting each other in the middle.

Posted in blogonomics | Comments Off on Blogonomics: The Gulf Between Bloggers and Professional Journalists

Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

US

house price index only now indicating depth of crisis

Small-town

America: The new Bangalore?

Homeowners

With Negative Equity

The

Samwick Family Fund: Giving stock to charity, made easy.

Subsidising

rootedness: "When people speak of ‘putting down roots’, they generally

have house-buying in mind. But roots are for vegetables."

Economists’

Chanuka: "Akerlof’s part jewish, Herb Simon’s part too/

Bundle them together, what a fine econ jew"

And finally (Andrew Leonard has

the rebuttal):

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Chris Dodd Has Lost His Mind

Dennis Kucinich, maybe, I could understand. Even John Edwards, with his populist

streak. But Chris Dodd? I know the chap’s presidential campaign is

struggling, but has he forgotten that he’s chairman of the Senate Banking Committee?

It

would seem so.

Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd said on Tuesday that U.S. Treasury

Secretary Henry Paulson needs to clear up questions about his former employer’s

role in originating securities related to subprime mortgages.

Dodd, who also is a contender for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination,

said he was concerned about issues raised in a New York Times column on Sunday,

December 2, about the activities of Goldman Sachs in reportedly selling collateralized

mortgage obligations (CMOs) while Paulson led the Wall Street firm…

The article, by columnist Ben Stein, said Goldman also was selling the securities

short…

Dodd said he was concerned because it appeared that Goldman Sachs was "aggressively

pushing subprime mortgages that they knew to be of concern while simultaneously

shorting collateralized mortgage obligations."

If so, it could raise suspicions why the Bush administration’s waited until

recently to begin initiating a plan to help homeowners who took out subprime

mortgages and now face losing their homes because their mortgage loans are

due to reset at higher rates, driving up their payments.

Dodd said Paulson should "address the concerns" raised by the New

York Times article and added a warning: "Failure to do so may be cause

for a formal investigation."

(There’s similar coverage at Bloomberg

and Dow

Jones.)

I swear that just reading this makes me feel nauseous. This is worse than a

common-or-garden abuse of political power. The Senate is meant to be the more

statesmanlike and deliberative of the two houses of Congress. And the Banking

Committee, especially at a fraught time like now, is not the place

to be launching a distracting, polarizing, and cowardly attack on a Treasury

secretary who’s finally waking up to the need to do something about the housing

crisis.

I am going to try my hardest to keep Ben

Stein out of this. He’s a newspaper columnist who is good at pushing bloggers’

buttons, my own included. Dodd’s initiative has nothing to do with Stein, and

everything to do with creating a sideshow which can’t help but hurt Paulson’s

attempts to get to grips with the subprime crisis. I sincerely hope that all

the other Democrats running for president will quickly and publicly distance

themselves from this complete and utter idiocy.

But for no end of detailed explanations why Dodd’s thesis is insane, you might

as well start

here.

(Thanks to Colin Barr

and Alea for the heads-up.)

Update: Dealbreaker has the

Dodd statement in full:

"I am deeply concerned about the questions raised by Mr. Stein’s story

in the New York Times yesterday about the activity of Goldman Sachs in aggressively

pushing sub-prime mortgages that they knew to be of concern while simultaneously

shorting collateralized mortgage obligations. If these facts are indeed true,

the Administration’s inaction when this crisis began to emerge earlier this

year, is increasingly suspect. It is in the best interest of resolving this

crisis if Secretary Paulson, who was leading Goldman at the time in question,

addresses the concerns raised by Mr. Stein’s article. Failure to do so may

be cause for a more formal investigation."

Posted in ben stein watch, Politics | 2 Comments

A Chinese Bid for Rio Tinto?

It makes sense all the sense in the world that China, broadly defined, should

make a bid for Rio Tinto. If it doesn’t, there’s a very good chance that the

BHP-Rio merger will go through – a merger which would be unambiguously

bad for Chinese iron-ore importers. Given that China’s sovereign-wealth fund

seems unlikely to make a bid, a strategic bid from China’s private sector has

to be a strong possibility.

Bloomberg’s

Helen Yuan says that a number of Chinese steelmakers are interested, although

one in particular, Shougang, has repudiated

the story. And a Reuters

report saying that Baosteel might pay as much as $200 billion for Rio Tinto

has been "taken with a grain of rice," according to the WSJ’s Chris

Kaufman.

I can’t remember any Chinese company getting into a bidding war in the international

M&A arena, but it’s inevitable that sooner or later that will happen. And

Rio Tinto is a big enough prize that it might just be the company to make such

an aggressive bid worthwhile.

One big unknown: How the new left-leaning Australian government would react

to such a bid. The new prime minister, Kevin Rudd, is famously fluent in Mandarin.

But that doesn’t make him more or less likely to object to a Chinese takeover

of a large swathe of Australia’s natural resources.

Posted in commodities, M&A | Comments Off on A Chinese Bid for Rio Tinto?

Subprime Paper of the Day

Kristopher Gerardi,

Adam Hale Shapiro, and Paul Willen of the Boston Fed:

This paper provides the first rigorous assessment of the homeownership experiences

of subprime borrowers… We present two main findings. First, homeownerships

that begin with a subprime purchase mortgage end up in foreclosure almost

20 percent of the time, or more than 6 times as often as experiences that

begin with prime purchase mortgages. Second, house price appreciation plays

a dominant role in generating foreclosures.

(Via Research

Recap)

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Subprime Paper of the Day

The Weakness of Marking Subprime Bonds to Market

There’s something a bit weird about the ABX prices. Let’s assume, for the sake

of argument, that the value of an ABX contract is related to the value of a

typical mortgage-backed bond with that rating. (It

isn’t, but let’s leave that to one side.) If you look at the current

indices, the AAA contract is trading at about 66 cents on the dollar, the

AA contract at about 35 cents, and the BBB- contract at about 19 cents.

Now remember that the bonds are structured on a waterfall basis. If there’s

any loss on a given contract, that means that all the tranches below

it have been wiped out completely. If a AAA tranche is trading at distressed

levels, that means there’s a good chance it will see losses. In order for that

to happen the AA tranche would have to get no money at all, and the same goes

for all the A tranches and all the BBB tranches. But you can go all the way

down the waterfall and still see significant non-zero value even in the BBB-

tranches. So the weird thing is this: looking at the valuation of the AAA contracts,

you’d think the BBB- contracts would be utterly worthless. But they’re not.

(Update: As ABSGuy points out in the comments, this

analysis is flawed. Doomed lower tranches will still get some cashflow between

now and the time they default, even if the AAA-rated tranches eventually suffer

losses as well. But it’s not flawed in a way which really damages the rest of

my argument.)

In his

Fortune column today, Peter Eavis goes into some detail about the value

of AAA-rated subprime bonds:

A Wall Street bank that trades AAA-rated subprime bonds is currently quoting

prices for such bonds of around 88 cents on the dollar, or a 12% discount,

for loans made in 2006, and 78 cents on the dollar, or a 22% discount, for

loans made in 2007.

If Fannie Mae marked its AAA-rated subprime bonds to market, then, says Eavis,

it would have to take a loss of well over $4 billion.

But I have a feeling that in this particular instance marking to market is

a pretty crappy way of working out how much these bonds are worth. And to get

an idea why, it’s worth taking a look at the Paulson plan for modifying subprime

mortgages. Everybody agrees that the best solution for homeowners and bondholders

alike would be for smart and careful loan servicers to look at each mortgage

in detail on a case-by-case basis. But everybody also agrees that the mortgage

servicing industry simply doesn’t have the capacity to do that.

A similar problem obtains with subprime bonds. A smart and careful buyer with

a lot of expertise and a lot of time can look closely at the pool of mortgages

underlying any given AAA-rated bond and determine just how likely it is to suffer

impairment. But the problem is that the pool of such smart and careful buyers

is small indeed, and it certainly doesn’t include the mortgage-trading desks

of large sell-side investment banks, who are trading in and out of thousands

of different bonds and can’t be expected to be up to speed on the idiosyncracies

of each one.

What does mean for the market price of AAA-rated bonds? Let’s say that most

AAA-rated bonds really are safe and really will be paid in full, as the residual

value in BBB-rated tranches would tend to imply. The problem is that no one

knows which AAA-rated bonds are the bad apples which won’t be paid

in full. And because of that uncertainty, the market price of the bonds falls.

(There’s nothing the market hates more than uncertainty, especially when it

surrounds a product which is meant to be risk-free.)

The mark-to-market price of AAA-rated subprime bonds, then, does not

represent the market’s best guess as to the present value of those bonds’ future

cashflows. Rather, it represents an ignorance discount. If you can do your due

diligence and work out exactly which AAA-rated bonds are kosher, and if you

can then find some of those bonds being offered for sale on the open market,

then you can probably make out very well for yourself. But both of those ifs

are very large: poring over mortgage portfolios is hard work, and then finding

a specific tranche of a specific bond is harder still.

What all this means for Fannie Mae is that it might have to take a large hit

to earnings in order to reflect the mark-to-market value of bonds it has zero

intention of ever selling. As a result, it might bump up against the unhelpful

OFHEO capital constraints, and be forced to sell high-quality assets when

it should by rights be a buyer. A bit of regulatory forbearance would not go

amiss here, although I doubt that Peter Eavis sees it that way.

Posted in bonds and loans, housing | Comments Off on The Weakness of Marking Subprime Bonds to Market

Which Bondholders Benefit From the Paulson Plan?

Last week, when the Sheila Bair subprime-modification plan became the Hank

Paulson subprime-modification plan, I tentatively

suggested that junior bondholders might be winners, while senior bondholders

could lose out:

In reality, it’s almost certain that some bondholders would benefit from

this scheme, while others would lose out. My intuition is that the plan would

help out junior bondholders at the expense of senior bondholders, although

it probably differs on a case-by-case basis.

Steve

Waldman disagrees. He has a long post explaining his reasoning, but here’s

his conclusion:

The proposal effectively represents a transfer of wealth from junior to senior

trancheholders.

Is he right? Caroline

Baum doesn’t think so. She quotes Josh Rosner approvingly:

The way these CDO structures are set up, defaults in underlying mortgages

trip certain triggers that serve to protect senior noteholders. If the plan

inhibits defaults, "the cash flows that should be reserved for the AAA

holders will end up going to the residual owners," Rosner said.

So according to Waldman, the Pauslon plan moves money from junior to senior

trancheholders, while according to Rosner the flow is in the opposite direction.

Maybe someone at Treasury could step in and clear this issue up once and for

all?

Posted in bonds and loans, housing | Comments Off on Which Bondholders Benefit From the Paulson Plan?

David Woo Defends the Oil Price Denomination Fallacy

David Woo, global head of foreign exchange strategy at Barclays, knows a hell

of a lot more about the FX market than I do. And it turns out that Woo doesn’t

dismiss the

oil-price denomination fallacy out of hand. In fact, he thinks there’s something

to it. Here he is in a Q&A

with FT readers:

What would be the effect if commodities including oil were priced in

a currency other than the dollar? William McMurray

David Woo: The impact on the US dollar would be negative.

The fact that the dollar is the main transactional currency for global trade

means that the world has to maintain minimum dollar balances to facilitate

international payments. If these dollar balances are no longer required, it

will be clearly harmful for the dollar. That said, we think the risk that

the pricing of Opec oil will soon move to a system based on a basket of currencies

is low.

I’m not convinced.

FX movements are the result of FX flows, not FX stocks. If

Fred has a trillion dollars under his mattress, that doesn’t affect the value

of the dollar at all. If he sells that trillion dollars for euros, however,

then the dollar will fall. Yes, there are trading accounts with large dollar

balances in them, although "large" is relative – I doubt they

have more than a couple of billion dollars in them at any given time. If all

those balances were converted into euros in one day, that might (or

might not) have a small one-off, one-day effect on the dollar-euro exchange

rate. If the move was into a basket of currencies, which would include the dollar,

then any effect would be even smaller. But such effects would in any event be

minuscule in the context of the trillions of dollars of FX flows which get traded

every day.

Now Woo is right that "the dollar is the main transactional currency for

global trade" – and, I might add, for the FX markets as well. There

really isn’t any such thing, for instance, as a euro-yen exchange rate: there’s

a euro-dollar exchange rate and a dollar-yen exchange rate, and the euro-yen

"cross rate" is computed from those two component rates. If global

trade and the global FX market moved out of dollars as the basic global reference

currency, that really would reduce demand for dollar liquidity, and

could hit the value of the dollar. But if the chances of oil being denominated

in anything other than dollars are slim, then the chances of the dollar losing

its reference-currency status in world trade more generally are infinitesimal.

(Thanks to Jesse Eisinger for the heads-up.)

Posted in foreign exchange | Comments Off on David Woo Defends the Oil Price Denomination Fallacy

Optimism in Bali

UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon marked the beginning of the huge climate conference

in Bali yesterday with an excellent

and upbeat op-ed in the Washington Post. "Largely lost in the debate

is the good news," he wrote: "We can do something — more easily,

and at far less cost, than most of us imagine." And he noted some encouraging

datapoints, which didn’t even include the wonderful ratification

of Kyoto by Australia’s new prime minister.

Much is made of the fact that China is poised to surpass the United States

as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. Less well known, however,

are its more recent efforts to confront grave environmental problems. China

is on track to invest $10 billion in renewable energy this year, second only

to Germany. It has become a world leader in solar and wind power. At a recent

summit of East Asian leaders, Premier Wen Jiabao pledged to reduce energy

consumption (per unit of gross domestic product) by 20 percent over five years

— not far removed, in spirit, from Europe’s commitment to a 20 percent reduction

in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020…

Growth need not suffer and, in fact, may accelerate. Research by the University

of California at Berkeley indicates that the United States could create 300,000

jobs if 20 percent of electricity needs were met by renewables.

Of course, the big you-go-first-no-you-go-first between China and

the US is ongoing,

and unhelpful. But Peter

Dorman makes the good point that the multilateral actions being negotiated

in Bali neither can nor should preclude sensible unilateral actions. If one

thing is achieved in Bali, he says, it should be a framework which allows countries

to slap carbon tariffs on imported fossil fuels.

I’m hopeful that from Bali will emerge something better and stronger than Kyoto.

But even if that doesn’t happen, global popular opinion, which was largely apathetic

during Kyoto in most countries outside western Europe, is now if anything one

step ahead of where the negotiators stand in Bali. And that’s got to be an encouraging

thing.

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on Optimism in Bali

Scenes From the Credit Crunch, UK Edition

It’s really bad out there right now. If you took a snapshot of financial conditions,

especially in London, you’d have to conclude it’s now much worse than during

the worst days of the summer – the only thing missing is the sense of

panic.

But how’s

this for a datapoint:

The sterling interbank market has collapsed at the fastest rate in modern

history.

Office for National Statistics data sourced to the Bank of England shows the

volume of market loans in the banking system plunged from £640bn at

the onset of the credit crunch in August to £249bn by the end of September.

The LSE’s Tim Congdon is quoted

thusly:

“A market that has taken 30 years to build has completely imploded

in a matter of months. Lenders have been squeezed savagely. We’ve moved

into a different era,” he said.

You know there’s more. Banks, foremost among them Citigroup, are asking their

corporate clients not

to draw on lending facilities to which they are entitled. Here’s the quote:

A Citigroup spokesman said: "Citigroup honors its commitments to its

clients but, as part of our normal business, we discuss with clients the potential

use of our balance sheet. This is standard industry practice."

Giving clients credit lines and then asking them not to use them is now standard

industry practice? And it’s been standard for how long? As Yves

Smith says,

There appears to be an element of window dressing, of banks trying to avoid

having audited year end balance sheets that spook regulators and investors.

Not a pretty picture at all.

Oh, and did I mention? Sterling

Libor is now at a nine-year high, and the ABCP market, says

Sam Jones, "has been all but wiped out".

And all this is happening before the inevitable collapse in UK property

prices, where the bubble was literally twice the magnitude of that in the US.

Someone, give me some good news, please!

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on Scenes From the Credit Crunch, UK Edition

Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

Conversations

with the Trading Desk: Rick Bookstaber on the trader’s mindset.

Editorialists

Gone Wild: The Post on Nafta

CRUSHING

BEAR HUG FOR HEDGE HONCHO: Ralph Cioffi failed at running hedge funds, now

he’s failing at starting them.

How

to save Mother Earth without breaking the bank

And finally, Tanta

makes a rare appearance in the Market Movers comments section. Here’s a

snippet:

This, to me, is just a fairly extreme example of "Post-Enron" reporting

I see all the time. Morgenson does it a lot: find a fact that surprises you

(possibly no one else, but at least you) and go immediately to accusations

of fraud.

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

Ben Stein Watch: The Aftermath

Dear God what hath Ben Stein wrought? His latest

column was as dreadful as most, but it seems to have touched one hell of

a nerve.

I have a weekly Ben

Stein Watch; I had to respond

to it. But I was far from alone. I’ve already mentioned Paul

Krugman, Dean

Baker, Yves

Smith, Roger

Ehrenberg, and athenian_abroad;

to that list should now be added numerous posts at DealBreaker (1,

2,

3,

4,

5,

6),

as well as posts by Fake

Ben Bernanke, Brad

DeLong, Calculated

Risk, Chew

Your Grouse, Ryan Avent,

Talking Biz News,

John Gapper,

Mark

Thoma, and many others. (Update: Add Herb

Greenberg to the list.)

In the friends-of-Stein camp (it does exist), we have Daniel

Altman, Howard Lindzon, Donald

Luskin, and Charlie Gasparino (1,

2),

as well as a bunch of strange

bedfellows who would normally repudiate Stein’s Republican views in a heartbeat

but who now think he might be on to something, seeing as how he’s bashing Goldman

Sachs.

The reaction was so intense, indeed, that Henry

Blodget and New York magazine (1,2)

were able to turn the whole thing into a media story. Gapper nodded in that

direction too, saying in Stein’s defense that "a columnist ought to be

provocative and entertaining".

Which makes Andrew

Leonard’s response seem all the more sensible: can’t we all just stop

reading the guy? Stein’s an archetypal troll, and the best way to respond

to a troll is to ignore him. But I have to say it would be a lot easier to ignore

him if the NYT stopped giving the chap one of the most valuable soap-boxes in

the land.

Posted in ben stein watch | Comments Off on Ben Stein Watch: The Aftermath