The Perils of Construction in the US

Did Goldman Sachs know this when it started construction on its new headquarters?

According to Department of Labor statistics, more than three construction workers died per day in 2006, the latest available figures.

So far, thankfully, no one has been killed on the Goldman Sachs construction site. But that’s not because Goldman is particularly good at construction: the banks chief administrative officer readily admits that the bank is "not expert in the ways of construction". Instead, the best it can do is accept assurances from people who are expert in the ways of construction, such as its contractor, Tishman Construction Corp.

The problem is that Tishman is, necessarily, a US contractor, and US construction sites are simply very unsafe places to work. It’s only sheer luck which has prevented deaths at the Goldman site: one architect suffered paralyzing injuries when seven tons of aluminum wall studs fell from the building and crushed a trailer he was in, and on another occasion a 30-inch-by-30-inch aluminum plate fell 18 stories and "landed like a knife" in the active playing fields adjacent to the site.

New York’s construction sites are death traps, in stark contrast to construction sites in other financial centers. Can you imagine these sort of stories coming out of Japan?

It’s not a question of cost-cutting: construction costs in the US are enormous. It’s more of a cultural thing, I think: contractors simply don’t have the zero-accident mindset hardwired into them in the way that they do elsewhere. And as a result, their clients, like Goldman Sachs, are going to have to suffer through occasional nasty publicity. Because safety refresher courses and full-time safety officers can’t, won’t, change a 110-year-old corporate culture overnight, much as Goldman and Tishman might like them to.

Posted in architecture | Comments Off on The Perils of Construction in the US

The Sorry Story of Jefferson County’s Sewer Bonds

One of Andrew Clavell’s best posts is the one where he was giving advice, retrospectively, to a Pennsylvania school board which was being sold swaptions by investment bankers:

Admitting you don’t know is pure alpha; you will not claim to have any edge and this may put you off involvement in the product. If you claim you do know where the fees are, banks want you as a customer. You don’t know. Really, you don’t. Hang on, I hear you shouting that you’re actually smarter than that, so you do know. Read carefully: Listen. Buster. You. Don’t. Know.

It’s not just Pennsylvania school boards, of course. It’s also Alabama sewer systems. If you want all the gory details about what went wrong with Jefferson County’s sewer debt, then Bloomberg has a 3,300-word article explaining the whole thing. But suffice to say that Jefferson County managed to get itself embroiled not only in an interest-rate swap gone, wrong, but also in bond insurance from Financial Guaranty and XL – and, to top it all off, it also managed to issue $2.2 billion in auction-rate securities.

The Bloomberg article talks a lot about the consequent fiscal hardships in Jefferson County, where the $145 million a year available to make interest payments is at least $100 million short of its annual interest bill. The article doesn’t talk about losses elsewhere, which have come as a result of S&P downgrading Jefferson County’s auction-rate securities to CCC.

But those losses can pop up in the most unlikely of places, including Israeli technology companies. Here’s the press release announcing IncrediMail’s latest quarterly results:

Financing expenses for the year and the quarter included a one-time write-down of $4.9 million taken to reflect the revaluation of a $5.0 million Auction Rate Security purchased as an investment in July 2007. Recent volatility in global credit markets has adversely affected the liquidity of this security. As a result, the security was recently downgraded from a AAA to a CCC rating by Standard & Poor’s. Although the Company continues to receive interest payments every 28 days, in light of a valuation of the security recently received from the Company’s banker, the Company has recorded an “other than temporary impairment” charge of $4.9 million on its statement of operations.

It’s certainly hard to value illiquid auction-rate securities, but writing down a still-performing $5 million ARS to just $100,000? That’s quite amazing: IncrediMail should be earning that much in interest alone in just a few months.

Now I don’t know that IncrediMail owns Jefferson County sewer bonds, although they fit the description. But I do know that all the losses here are a function of municipalities and corporations being sold financial instruments they didn’t fully understand, with large profits for investment banks along the way. And when I say large, I mean enormous:

The county paid banks $120 million in fees — six times the prevailing rate — for $5.8 billion in interest-rate swaps. That was supposed to protect the county from rising rates for their bonds. Lending rates went the wrong way, putting the county $277 million deeper into debt.

In February, the county’s interest rate soared to as much as 10 percent, up from 3 percent just weeks earlier. The swaps have now compounded the risk that Jefferson County will file for bankruptcy as it faces its worst financial crisis since it was founded in 1819.

Did Jefferson County know that it was paying $120 million in fees? I doubt it. Even relatively ignorant municipal treasurers know that interest-rate swaps aren’t exactly rocket science, and fees on them should never be that large. But just like capitalized closing costs on a subprime mortgage, fees aren’t always disclosed in an obvious and transparent manner. Especially when the bankers on the deal, such as Charles LeCroy of Raymond James and then JP Morgan, are the kind of people who end up getting fired, convicted on federal fraud charges in Philadelphia, and sentenced to three months in jail.

But it’s not outright fraud which is the problem here, it’s more the culture of greed on Wall Street. Sometimes it can result in genuinely useful innovations; at other times, it can result in poor Alabama counties being forced to declare bankruptcy, with knock-on effects which can reverberate all the way to the other side of the planet.

(HT: Pluris)

Posted in bonds and loans, derivatives | Comments Off on The Sorry Story of Jefferson County’s Sewer Bonds

Yet Another Reason Not to Sell Your Berkshire Hathaway Shares

This is almost certainly the wost investment in Berkshire Hathaway of all time – or, on the flipside, "a pretty unethical way to make a buck". Either unethical or extraordinarily lucky, anyway.

Someone, somewhere, for some reason, had a bid in to buy 50 of Berkshire Hathaway’s B shares at just under half the market price. Obviously, no one expects such a bid to be filled. But filled it was – something which can happen when "the day’s sell orders burn through other, higher, limit orders, and the brokers aren’t actively trading". The result? $115,050 in instant profits for the buyer, and a nasty shock for whomever it was who simply decided to sell his shares without setting a lower limit to the price he was getting.

The really crazy thing is that these are the B shares we’re talking about – the shares which were specifically issued by Berkshire Hathway so that there would be something more liquid and tradeable than the wildly expensive A shares. So much for that idea, it would seem.

(Via Dealbreaker)

Posted in stocks | Comments Off on Yet Another Reason Not to Sell Your Berkshire Hathaway Shares

Just How Big Was Lehman’s Buyback?

Was I too hasty in being nice about the WSJ reporting on Lehman’s stock buyback? I said that in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, one should probably take the WSJ’s assertion that the buyback was "large" at face value. But now Antony Currie of Breaking Views has a column out saying that the buyback was for only "a trifling amount" and "a small sum" – no more than 2 million shares, he tells me. He writes:

The buyback seems to have been done as part of the company’s regular business of minimising the dilutive effect of paying employees with stock and options.

And CNBC’s Charlie Gasparino has got his hands on an internal Lehman Brothers memo which seems to back up Currie’s position. Here’s what he reported on air:

One of the items had to do with stories that came out yesterday about stock buybacks, were they buying back stock amid the financial crisis to prop up shares. They are saying, in the memo, the firm purchased quote "a small number of shares" as part of what they described as its ongoing and regular purchase program to minimize the dilution related to employee stock awards. This is part of what they do all the time at this point in time. They said they only purchased 1.3 million shares compared to volume, which is larger than that. Also they said in the memo, they are not in the market buying back shares today. So, this is what Lehman Brothers has put out in a memo.

To put those 1.3 million shares in perspective, total volume in Lehman Brothers shares yesterday was over 135 million shares – a hundred times greater. So when the WSJ’s Susanne Craig writes that the buyback "helped the stock pare its losses Tuesday," maybe a little natural skepticism might be in order after all. Could a million-share trade have had such an effect? Maybe, but it’s not exactly probable.

And this is where I wish that journalists were more like bloggers. Yes, they’re more reliable. But at the same time, the WSJ and Breaking Views (which are partners, with BV having a daily column in the WSJ) will never explore their differences in public, as bloggers would, with the WSJ getting specific about just how big they think the buyback was. And so we outside observers don’t have any idea who to believe on this front, or even whether the WSJ still thinks the buyback really was large. But for the time being, if Gasparino’s got an internal memo, I’m inclined to go with that.

Posted in banking, stocks | Comments Off on Just How Big Was Lehman’s Buyback?

Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Why is diesel even more expensive than gas? "Next time we notice that diesel prices are a dollar more a gallon than gas prices, instead of wondering why diesel is so expensive, maybe instead we should breath breathe a sigh of relief, and thank heaven that gas is still so cheap."

The Credit Default Swap (“CDS”) Market – Will It Unravel? "Recent credit events have been straightforward Chapter 11 filings and bankruptcy. For other credit events (failure to pay or restructuring), there may be problems in establishing that the credit event took place. This has a systemic dimension. A CDS protection buyer may have to put the reference entity into bankruptcy or Chapter 11 in order to be able to settle the contract."

Carbon Taxes vs Cap-and-Trade: Mark Thoma reviews the latest spat in the blogosphere. Upshot: the two options are much less different than the likes of Robert Samuelson would have you believe, and in many ways they’re identical.

What the Fed forgot: The dollar.

The Amsterdam urinals: The behavioral economics of public urination. I’ve seen flies at the bottom of urinals in more than one city, not including Amsterdam. This is catching on.

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Trusting the WSJ

Lehman Brothers bought back its own shares yesterday, in a move which shocks Yves Smith and worries Barry Ritholtz. But how do they know that Lehman bought back its own shares? The bank made no public announcement to that effect. All they have to go on is a story in the WSJ, headlined "Lehman Is Seeking Overseas Capital". Towards the bottom of that story (in paragraph eight, to be precise), we find this:

A second rumor, that Lehman was buying back shares, turned out to be true, people familiar with the situation said. Such buying helped the stock pare its losses Tuesday. (Please see Abreast of the Market, and Heard on the Street.)

Still, the stock has fallen 18% in the past three sessions.

It was unclear how much stock Lehman Brothers bought back…

If you see Abreast of the Market, you’re told nothing about buybacks. If you see Heard on the Street, you’re told this:

Following an 8.1% drop Monday, Lehman shares slid 9.5% Tuesday. The latest decline came even though Lehman was buying back large amounts of its own shares.

That’s it.

So, how to read this? Are Smith and Ritholtz right to uncritically believe what the WSJ (and no one else) is saying? Yes.

To be sure, there are a few niggling issues that get raised in the mind of a cynical old hack like me when I read this kind of thing. For one thing, there’s the placement of the news. The WSJ got information which no one else had, and it’s newsworthy: even as Lehman is working on selling its shares, at the same time it’s buying them, which is pretty weird at best. Yet the story doesn’t even hint at its scoop until burying it near the end of a story about Lehman’s negotiations in Korea.

But that’s a question of news judgment, not a question of reliability. The hurdle for printing a fact in the WSJ is the same at the bottom of a story about Korea as it is anywhere else. If you’re sure it’s true, you print it; if you’re not sure it’s true, you don’t print it.

And what about the sourcing? What exactly is the WSJ sure of? Is it sure that Lehman is buying back shares, or is it just sure that "people familiar with the situation said" that Lehman was buying back shares?

It is hard to understand what that clause is doing in the story: if the journalist, Susanne Craig, was really sure of her facts, why did she put it in there, rather than simply stating, as the Heard on the Street column did, that Lehman was buying back shares, and leave it at that?

There are two reasons for the sourcing being there. The first is that it makes it clear that what we’re reading is WSJ reporting, as opposed to simple stenography: this doesn’t come from an official Lehman Brothers announcement. Which is interesting in and of itself: most companies which buy back their own shares make quite a song and dance about it. The second reason is that it’s simple best practice, in US journalism, to back up all your facts with an explanation of where they came from, and that’s what the WSJ does.

That said, the WSJ’s sourcing is regularly as vague as "people familiar with the situation". They’re saying that they’ve talked to someone who knows the facts, that they believe their source to be trustworthy, and that they’re signalling their belief in that trustworthiness by publishing the fact in the newspaper. What they’re not trying to do is wow you with the reliability of their sourcing by stressing how well-informed their source is, in the way that other newspapers might quote a "senior administration official".

And they’re not putting the sourcing in there as a way of covering the WSJ’s ass: they’re reporting the fact, not the statement-of-the-fact by some anonymous source. If it turned out that Lehman wasn’t buying back its own shares, then the WSJ would run a correction, no matter what their source had said, and the story would be considered to have been erroneous.

So, what about the column? As a column, it doesn’t operate under quite the same sourcing rules, and so it simply states, baldly, that Lehman was buying back its own shares. It does, however, operate under the same rules about factual accuracy, so one can assume that the authors of the column, Peter Eavis and David Reilly, are quite sure that they’re right on that front.

Can one assume that they did their own reporting on the matter? Not really. It’s entirely kosher for Eavis and Reilly to talk to Craig, find out the information in her story, and then use it in their column. On the other hand, while Craig said that the size of the buyback was "unknown", Eavis and Reilly said it was "large", without providing any more details. Maybe Craig’s story served to confirm something that Eavis and Reilly hadn’t quite managed to nail down; I’m speculating here. But as a general rule, if the WSJ prints something twice, that doesn’t mean it’s more reliable. And if it fails to print something three times (the buyback news didn’t make it into the market report) that doesn’t make the news less reliable.

Of course, all newspapers, including the WSJ, make mistakes, and I’ve been critical in the past of the way that the WSJ buries its corrections. But unless you have some reason to believe a WSJ story to be false, it’s a reasonably safe assumption that it’s true. I certainly think that something exclusive to the WSJ is significantly more likely to be true than if it was only on CNBC, say. There’s no such thing as a 100% reliable source, but the WSJ comes about as close as anyone.

For that reason, it’s entirely reasonable for Smith and Ritholtz to pick up the story and run with it, without stopping to wonder whether it’s true or not. That’s one of the big advantages of reading the WSJ over reading blogs: you don’t have to be second-guessing the whole time, thinking about who wrote the story, what axes they might have to grind, and whether they might simply be completely wrong. And it’s one of the reasons why Rupert Murdoch was willing to pay billions of dollars to get the Wall Street Journal: that kind of reputation for reliability is extremely hard to earn, and hugely valuable once you’ve earned it.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on Trusting the WSJ

Want a Cheaper Mortgage? Talk to People!

Harvard’s Cassi Pittman has written a heartbreaking paper detailing the results of a series of interviews with black homebuyers in Atlanta. It turns out that if you want to know whether someone’s likely to have taken out an unsuitable or predatory loan, you only really need to ask one question: how many people did you turn to for advice before taking out the loan?

The borrowers who "did not want to bother anybody" and took the advice only of a mortgage broker were generally elderly people talked into multiple subprime refinancings which did a great job of wiping out their home equity. But first-time homebuyers, too, were very unlikely to ask for advice, and less than half of them even consulted the internet.

Those borrowers who did get credit counseling or other advice generally did very well indeed: one great story is that of Gladys, who was astonished and transformed by her quick move from homeless to homeowner. But the most memorable story concerns Ms Park and Ms Smith, two single mothers, both of whom started out with a credit score of about 620, and both of whom were buying a house for about $130,000. Ms Smith used a broker; so did Ms Park, but she also had credit counseling and signed up for a prepurchase homebuyers class. In the end, Ms Park’s 30-year fixed-rate payment of $790 a month was substantially lower than Ms Smith’s two-year teaser rate of $1,000 a month, let alone the 11.5%, $1,278 payments Ms Smith had to start making in year three.

A huge amount of subprime pain could have been avoided, I think, if only there weren’t such an unhealthy taboo surrounding talking about money. That taboo exists in both black and white communities, of course, but I can definitely see a case for Wu Tang Financial. The more sources of information there are, and the more likely they are to reach borrowers, the better for everybody – except the predatory lenders, of course. But failing that, at the very least it’s worth trying to get the word out that mortgage brokers are not your friend. A huge part of the population seems to think they’re working for the borrower, when they’re not.

(Via Miller)

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Want a Cheaper Mortgage? Talk to People!

Who Might Buy Lehman?

Peter Eavis and David Reilly are thinking along the same lines as me: Lehman Brothers should be sold. But then we part company, for the WSJ writers’ shortlist of potential acquirers is deficient in the only think which matters right now: undeniable balance-sheet strength.

At the right price, Lehman may make an attractive target for a private-equity firm or hedge-fund group that wants to add brokerage and investment-banking operations. Blackstone Group CEO Stephen Schwarzman is a Lehman alum who has long wanted to add more investment-banking businesses to his firm.

Citadel Group, a money manager with some sales and trading operations, may want to do the same. J.C. Flowers proposed buying Bear Stearns before its collapse, so interest from that buyout group wouldn’t be a surprise.

The problem with any private-equity acquisition is that one an investment bank disappears into private equity’s black box, no one really knows for sure how strong or weak it is. Sure, the SEC will continue to regulate it, but the SEC is an ineffective bank regulator at the best of times. And one might hope that the Fed would continue to keep an eye on things, but they’re not going to be communicating what they know to the market. Which leaves basically the ratings agencies and whatever disclosures the bank still has to make as an issuer of publicly-traded bonds. Neither provide anything like the level of granularity and detail that one gets from a NYSE-listed company.

If there’s one thing that market participants hate right now, it’s uncertainty. Losses they can deal with, but anything unknown has a habit of blowing up. That’s why Lehman CFO Erin Callan’s full-transparency strategy was a good one; its only failure is that it didn’t go far enough. If Lehman was bought by Blackstone or Citadel or Flowers, no one would really know how well or badly it was doing, and the sensible, cautious play would be to simply move all counterparty risk elsewhere. Which of course would effectively kill Lehman.

A large commercial bank, by contrast, would make a much more reassuring acquirer. There’s never a shortage of European banks wanting a greater investment-banking presence in the US, and between the cheap dollar and Lehman’s depressed share price, the bank is looking increasingly affordable right now. RBS? Dresdner? BNP? All could make a case. And then there are the emerging giants: what if ICICI was interested, or Itaú? Lehman’s market capitalization is just $17 billion at this point, and it might even be amenable to a takeunder if things continue to get worse. At that price, there are lots of potential acquirers with deep enough pockets, many of whom might well place a large trophy value on Lehman.

Finally, of course, there are the US banks. Most of them are in more than enough trouble right now without trying to digest a major acquisition, and the strongest of them all, JP Morgan, is unquestionably out of the running now it’s bought Bear Stears. So it’s improbable – but far from impossible. Buying Lehman would not be a sensible decision, necessarily. But bank CEOs don’t always do the sensible thing, as we’ve seen many times over the past year.

Posted in banking, M&A | Comments Off on Who Might Buy Lehman?

Google’s Top 10 Universities

Vanity Fair has a wonderful oral history of the internet, full of real gems. About 11,000 words in, we get to Google’s Larry Page:

One of the first things we did was just understand the relative importance of things. It used to be in the early days when you did a search for, say, a university, if you did that on an early search engine like Alta Vista, you would get pages that just said university like three times in the title. It was based on looking at the text of the documents–that was the traditional way of doing it.

We said, Well, given you have all these documents on the Web, why don’t we try to figure out in general which ones are more important than others, and then return those? Even in the very early days when we were at Stanford, you could type “university” into Google, and you actually got the top 10 universities. I think that basic notion really helped us a lot.

So, of course, I typed "university" into Google, wondering where Stanford would come up. And the answer is: 12th. On the first page, the Wikipedia page for "university" comes top; the rest of the page is five UK universities (Cambridge, Oxford, Leeds, Warwick, and Durham); two Canadians (Toronto and Queen’s); and two Australians (Monash and Sydney). Not necessarily most people’s idea of the top 10 univeristies, but an interesting list all the same.

Update: A reader in the US says that when he tries the same thing, he gets an all-US list. Maybe this is a function of the fact I’m in Germany.

Posted in education, technology | Comments Off on Google’s Top 10 Universities

Return of the SIV

Remember last summer, when everybody got very excited about SIVs? (SIV, if you don’t recall, stands for "borrow short, lend long, move everything off-balance-sheet, and pray liquidity doesn’t dry up".) There was a lot of smoke and noise, and eventually the banks took the assets onto their balance sheets, ate large write-downs, and moved on. Today, the SIV is a thing of the past… um, hang on. According to Paul Davies and Gillian Tett, there’s still $5 trillion in "off-balance sheet vehicles" waiting to be brought back onto banks’ balance sheets. Is this all SIVs? They don’t say. But that’s a ridiculous amount of money.

Meanwhile, it seems Treasury is interested in resuscitating its old "super-SIV" idea in an attempt to unblock the student-loan-backed auction-rate-security market. Please let us not be headed for the Second Summer of SIV. The first was bad enough, the second would surely be worse.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Return of the SIV

Lehman and the Exploding Hedge

According to Susanne Craig, Lehman CFO Erin Callan "receives a slimmer daily financial summary than her predecessors, relying more on data from the trading-floor contacts built during her 13-year Lehman career". I wonder when and how she found out about this?

Lehman Brothers lost about $600m on a single hedging position in the second quarter, adding to what is expected to be a larger than anticipated loss that may lead the bank to raise more capital…

The loss of roughly $600m would be in addition to setbacks Lehman is expected to announce on previously successful hedges on its large exposures to commercial and residential mortgages, people familiar with the matter said. It remains unclear whether Lehman will provide any details on the single $600m hedging loss when it reports earnings this month.

I’m beginning to think that Brad DeLong’s description of my blog entry yesterday ("Felix Salmon Says Bear Stearns–Except for Its CEO–Was Smarter than Lehman Brothers") is looking increasingly astute. Lehman has no room for error right now, and certainly no room for $600 million errors. If it’s capable of making mistakes of this magnitude when the stakes are so very high, then yes it should be talking to strategic investors. But not about a capital infusion; rather about an outright acquisition.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Lehman and the Exploding Hedge

A Year Ago, They Barley Cared

rice.jpg

One of the advantages of living in Europe is you get to read the Wall Street Journal’s much smaller European version. Where, clearly, the headline writers have been thinking rather too much about food inflation. (Click to see a larger version.)

Posted in food | Comments Off on A Year Ago, They Barley Cared

Free Dan Ariely!

I just got around to reading Aditya Chakrabortty’s account of going shopping with Dan Ariely:

Three Chinese-origin boys are motoring down the aisle, their trolley stacked high with cheese-and-tomato spaghetti ready meals. They are engineering students.

"Did your parents teach you this was good to eat?" asks Ariely.

"No," they chorus.

"There must be other things you could have. Of all the instant foods available in the UK, the only option you like is cheese-and-tomato spaghetti value meals?"

There is no reply, only nervous giggling.

It’s a great profile, well worth reading. And it talks about the amazing power of free:

"When you see something for free – for FREE! – it’s like pressing a magic button. You forget about any possible downside and just think: Oh my God, it’s all good!"

Thus does it make sense not to split the tab in restaurants. And also for employers to give their employees free! things, rather than cash – something Oprah Winfrey obviously understands intuitively:

At Harpo Inc. in Chicago, employees are treated to Google-esque office amenities. "There is a cafe on premises as well as Club Harpo, a workout facility, and the Spa at Harpo."

If given the choice, employees would rather have $1,000 in cash rather than a thousand dollar’s worth of free stuff. But if not given the choice, they love the free stuff, partly because it’s the kind of stuff they’d probably not treat themselves to normally, and partly because the cash, being fungible, will just end up being spent on something utterly unglamorous like emergency plumbing or the electricity bill. Which is one reason why all those annual blog entries about the deadweight loss of Christmas always miss the point. Even if you’re paying for presents you give, you’re still getting the ones you receive for free! (That’s the psychology, anyway.) Which is lots of added value right there.

Posted in economics | Comments Off on Free Dan Ariely!

Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

Ahmadinejad Says Oil Is Plentiful, Dollar Artificially Weakened: "Powerful and international capitalists” are working "mendaciously to pursue their political and economic aims". And that’s why oil’s so expensive. On the other hand, I’m pretty sure that Ahmadinejad hasn’t been reading Jeff Matthews.

Remittances: Welcome back to the blogosphere, YouNotSneaky!

Does M&A pay? Jim Surowiecki says no, Steven Davidoff says yes.

Mac hits record 7.8% market share in Net Applications survey

Microsoft Bid $40 for Yahoo, Now at $26, Papers Show

Obama Overwhelms Microsoft

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

Kinko’s, RIP

I guess they’re really serious about this integration thing. When high-end, business-friendly FedEx bought low-end, consumer-unfriendly Kinko’s, it paid $891 million for that hugely valuable (ahem) Kinko’s brand. Which it’s now jettisoning, writing off that $891 million in the process. Henceforth, Kinko’s is FedEx Office. Same surly low-wage, high-turnover employees, different brand. That should make all the difference.

Posted in M&A, stocks | Comments Off on Kinko’s, RIP

Bill Miller Datapoint of the Day

From Evan Newmark:

Miller’s Value Trust Fund, Legg Mason’s flagship, just passed another milestone. As of the end of May, according to Morningstar, the fund is now underperforming the S&P 500 over a 10-year period.

This isn’t (only) a how-the-mighty-are-fallen datapoint. It’s also a wake-up call to anybody feeling smug about how "their" fund manager has managed to consistently outperform their benchmark. Such smugness can evaporate very quickly.

Posted in investing | Comments Off on Bill Miller Datapoint of the Day

Why Young Savers Should Borrow Money to Invest in Stocks

Many thanks to an anonymous commenter on my last blog for pointing me to a very provocative piece of research from Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff, entitled "Life-Cycle Investing and Leverage: Buying Stock on Margin Can Reduce Retirement Risk". They advance the argument for actions like that of Clare College, borrowing money to invest in the stock market, and say that nearly all young people should do likewise:

People should be holding much more stock when young. In fact, their

allocation should be more than 100% in stocks. In their early working years, people

should invest on a leveraged basis in a diversified portfolio of stocks. Over time, they

should decrease their leverage and ultimately become unleveraged as they come closer to

retirement. The lifetime impact of the misallocation is large. The expected gain from this

improved asset allocation relative to traditional life-cycle investments would lead to 90%

higher retirement wealth. This would allow people to retire nearly six years earlier or to

retire at the same age (65) and yet maintain their standard of living through age 112

rather than age 85.

The argument is very clever, and I’d advise the trustees of Clare College to read it, because it quite clearly doesn’t apply to them:

The insight behind our prescription comes from the central lesson in finance: the

value of diversification. Investors use mutual funds to diversify over stocks and over

geographies. What is missing is diversification over time. The problem for most investors

is that they have too much invested late in their life and not enough early on…

Young people invest only a fraction of their

current savings, not their discounted lifetime savings. For someone in their 30’s,

investing even 100% of current savings is still likely to be less than 10% of their lifetime

savings or less than 1/6th of what the person should be holding in equities if, as is typical,

their risk aversion would have led them to invest at least 60% of their lifetime savings in

stocks.

In the Samuelson framework, all of a person’s wealth for both consumption and

saving was assumed to come at the beginning of the person’s life. Of course that isn’t the

situation for a typical worker who starts with almost no savings. Thus, the advice to

invest 60% of the present value of future savings in stocks would imply an investment

well more than what would be currently available.

This leads to our simple advice: buy stocks using leverage when young.

Most people save money slowly, over time, and they generally both earn more and save more the older they get. In that context, it makes sense that early-career retirement savings carry an extremely high risk profile, since they are so small compared to total lifetime savings, but at the same time can potentially punch well above their weight, thanks to the magic of compounding. If the use of leverage wipes them out, that’s bad, but not disastrous, since there are many more savings to come over the rest of one’s life. But if returns are positive, and magnified by leverage, that can work wonders for one’s total wealth.

How to do this? One way is the Clare College strategy: simply borrow the money. An easier and possibly smarter strategy is to buy deeply in-the-money index call options:

For example, a two-year call option with a strike price of 50 on an index at 100

will cost something close to 50. Thus for $50, the investor can buy exposure to $100 of

the index return. We show below that the implied cost of such 2:1 leverage is quite low

(about 50 basis points above the yield on a one-year Treasury note), which makes the

strategy practical in current markets.

Alternatively, one can invest in a mutual fund which essentially employs the same strategy: conveniently, one exists, and is called UltraBull, and is designed to double the return on the S&P 500. (There are other, even more aggressive leveraged funds: Direxion has the S&P 500 Bull 2.5x Fund, which has exactly as much leverage as you think it does.)

On the other hand, as John Waggoner notes, the UltraBull fund is up only 8.8% over the past five years, while the S&P 500 is up 18.6%. (Or at least those were the figures a couple of months ago, when Waggoner wrote his column.) Those fees can really hurt you.

Ayres and Nalebuff don’t actually recommend buying the UltraBull fund; instead they recommend buying deep-in-the-money LEAP call options. My problem with that strategy is that it’s a bit too active for my liking: you need to know what you’re doing, keep track of expiry dates, pick the right options, and so on. There might well also be big problems with capital gains taxes. But in principle, I do think that this paper has uncovered something quite important – not for entities like Clare College, who can’t expect to save much more in future than they do at present, but rather for young savers in their 20s and 30s who don’t expect to touch their savings until retirement.

(HT: CXO)

Posted in investing, personal finance | Comments Off on Why Young Savers Should Borrow Money to Invest in Stocks

Clare College, Financial Speculator

Cast your mind back, if you will, to those halcyon days of early 2007, when credit was easy and equities looked attractive. Back then, an aggressive investor might well have locked in low long-term borrowing costs and invested the proceeds in the stock market. Today, of course, things are different. While credit is much harder to come by, the stock market hasn’t come down nearly as much as the bond market, and everybody’s still fearful that it’s the next shoe to drop. A leveraged play on the stock market seems much more dangerous – but that’s exactly what Clare College Cambridge has decided to do.

Now it’s true that Clare College’s borrowing costs are relatively low, thanks to its sterling creditworthiness. So if it had a good use for capital – fixing the chapel roof, say, before it fell in and caused an enormous amount of damage – then it would make sense to borrow the money right now.

But Clare doesn’t have any capital needs, and instead it’s investing the proceeds from its debt issue directly into the UK stock market.

For the next 40 years, then, Clare is going to have to make regular interest payments on the money that it’s borrowed – interest payments which almost certainly won’t be covered by the dividend payments on the stocks that it’s bought. Which makes this a negative-carry trade.

But not to worry, Smithers & Co (no, I don’t know who they are, either) have assured Clare that "over a very long horizon of 40 years" those stocks will go up in value so much that the college will, in hindsight, be very happy to have been making all those interest payments over the decades.

Oh, and one other thing: Clare’s debt issue is index-linked, which means that its interest payments are tied to the UK inflation rate. Is its income tied to the UK inflation rate? In fact, what income is it proposing to use, to make its interest payments? That’s not clear at all.

The weirdest bit of all is that Smithers themselves concede that that the UK equity market is overvalued – which means that far from keeping up with inflation for the next 40 years, it’s liable to fall in value, at least over the short to medium term. At that point it will have an even greater task ahead of it if it’s to catch up with Clare’s indebtedness.

Somehow, Smithers has convinced Clare that it’s OK for a venerable Cambridge college to take these kind of risks, because it has a strong "current wealth position". (Which, it’s worth mentioning, probably derives from the fact that it didn’t take much in the way of unnecessary risks in the past.)

But it’s easy to think of other investors with a strong wealth position and a long time horizon: consider, for instance, someone with a grand and valuable family house, who wants to create a trust fund not only for his children but also for his grandchildren. Would it make sense for such a person to mortgage his house (after all, mortgage rates are low right now) and invest the proceeds in the stock market? That’s essentially what Clare College has done.

The answer, of course, is that no, it wouldn’t make sense, because assets aren’t the same thing as wealth: you have to subtract your liabilities first. Borrowing money to take a punt on the stock market isn’t sensible long-term financial planning, it’s outright speculation. And if you don’t consider yourself a financial speculator, you shouldn’t do it.

Update: I’ve now seen the original 36-page report which Helen Thomas was writing about. It only says that Clare is "considering" this strategy, not that it’s actually implementing it. And it includes a lot of mathematics, with these conclusions:

When there are no withdrawals from the fund at all, the average (as

measured by the median) value of the portfolio after 40 years will be nearly three

times the value of the initial amount borrowed. This figure implies a median

compound average growth rate of the portfolio of 3.2%… The probability of losing money on the strategy in this

base case (i.e. not being able to repay the bond entirely out of the equity portfolio)

is around 9%.

Conspicuous by its absence in the report is any consideration of the opportunity costs of borrowing this money now. What happens if Clare finds itself wanting or needing to raise a substantial sum of money in the next 40 years? Might the existence of this debt make such an exercise more difficult? What is the option value of doing nothing now and waiting to see if stock prices or borrowing costs fall further? Such questions aren’t even asked, let alone answered.

Posted in investing | Comments Off on Clare College, Financial Speculator

Annals of Dubious Branding, Audi Edition

Kit Roane doesn’t belabor the irony, but I can’t resist:

Tanya Mastoloni went a step further, buying a 49cc scooter to replace her Audi Allroad Wagon. "It goes about 150 miles on one gallon of gas," she says, noting that the scooter has given her an added benefit: "I cut my commute in half because now I can take the back roads."

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on Annals of Dubious Branding, Audi Edition

Is Libor Dead?

It’s time to hoist Henri Tournyol Du Clos from the comments; he’s always insightful, but what he said about Libor last night is particularly spot-on:

The problem is that unsecured fixed rate interbank lending is an activity that firmly belongs to the past, not the present and – most probably – not to the future of financial markets. Its volume, respective to other financial instruments, has been dwindling for the last 20 years and there is not a sufficient level of activity any more for prices to reflect anything except, well, the level at which bank treasurers do not want to trade.

Unsecured interbank fixed rate lending is a remnant of a world where derivatives markets were small and where cash financial markets were roamed by thousands of mid-sized commercial banks with a small exposure to financial markets. Thanks to the banking sector’s consolidation, we now have

a) liquid derivatives markets, traded by everyone (bank ALMs, market-makers, asset managers, insurers, commercial firms, Tallahassee widows, you, me, my dog if I had one, etc)

b)a few big financial supermarkets, like Citi, JP Morgan Bear Chase, etc, that do not need to borrow or lend unsecured from each other. In fact, they try to collateralize as much as possible a portion of what they trade together, whatever the product, and make it subject to margin calls.

The only unsecured lending that banks have to do is overnight reserve management: effective Fed funds in the US, Eonia in Europe and Sonia somewhere in-between. So forget about those 4 or 11 month Euribor or Libor or Whereverbor rates that have been only a fiction kept alive everyday like some ancient custom; base all derivatives on the effective overnight rate now; and let us stop wasting time on trying to measure precisely something that is not traded and does not exist in the real, transaction-based, financial world.

This is certainly true of fictions like 6-month Libor and 1-year Libor, which are often used as benchmarks but which are all but unused IRL. Take an adjustable-rate mortgage which resets every year, at, say, Libor plus 400bp. The fiction underlying the mortgage is that the bank in question can borrow at Libor, lend at 400bp more than that, and lock in a very nice spread. But that hasn’t happened in years.

Does that mean that we should stop using Libor as a benchmark, and start pegging mortgages and corporate loans to overnight interest rates, a bit like we already do with credit cards? That seems dangerous to me. But I do think that it’s time to stop talking about "fixing" Libor, as though there’s some Platonic ideal of "the" interbank lending rate which a well-designed survey could somehow reveal. There isn’t.

Posted in banking, bonds and loans | Comments Off on Is Libor Dead?

Lehman and the Failed Hedges

It looks as though Lehman Brothers is going to lose money in the second quarter. That’s partly because the second quarter, for banks, includes March, which was a particularly brutal month in the capital markets. But it’s also because the finance wizards at Lehman seem to be incapable of hedging their positions:

During the second quarter, Lehman was stung by hedges used to offset losses in real estate and other securities, according to people familiar with the matter. The firm bet that indexes tracking markets such as real-estate securities and leveraged loans would fall. If that happened, it would book profits that would make up some of its losses from holding these securities and loans.

However, in an unexpected twist, some of the indexes rose, even as the assets they were supposed to hedge against continued to lose value or stayed relatively flat.

We’ve seen this movie before, most memorably at Bear Stearns. The fact is that during a credit crunch, when you’re stuck with illiquid assets, you can’t hedge them. You can sell them, at a loss. But just as short positions in CDO equity tranches turned out to be a really bad hedge for long positions in super-senior tranches, short positions in broad credit indices are not a great hedge for specific loans which have turned sour.

Ironically, it was Bear Stearns who had at least some people, led by mortgage head Tom Marano, who understood this. They knew that the big risk to the firm was chaos in the financial markets, so they put on a "chaos trade" which would make lots of money in such an event, and very broadly hedge the risks the bank faced. But CEO Alan Schwartz, in a fateful decision, reversed that trade. As Kate Kelly reported,

he wanted specific pessimistic plays that would offset specific optimistic bets, rather than the broader hedges Mr. Marano had employed.

Explains Dear John Thain:

Matching your hedges to your positions one-to-one is fine, until you realize that it’s impossible to do this in a liquidity-challenged market.

It seems that Schwartz, an investment banker by trade rather than a trader, didn’t understand this:

Clearly this requires a deeper understanding of how interconnected markets are and exactly how they work together-potentially a leap of faith or a layer of complexity the firm wasn’t willing to bet on.

Could it be that Lehman, even after seeing what happened at Bear, is making the same mistakes? That it’s trying to hedge its positions discretely, even in market which has systematically slaughtered anybody who’s tried to do that for the past year? If so, the firm truly faces some rocky times ahead.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Lehman and the Failed Hedges

Extra Credit, Monday Edition

In Escondido: Buy one (house), get one free

Looking for Wachovia’s Next Chief Executive: Unfortunately, it’s probably not going to be the magnificently-named Benjamin P. Jenkins III.

The Human Hands Behind the Google Money Machine

The gods of greed: A Guardian-flavored take on international finance, from a new book with some truly atrocious cover and website design. Sam Jones responds.

It’s Not So Easy Being Less Rich: Service journalism of the first order from the NYT. If you’re feeling strapped and don’t want your peers to know about it, just sell $2 million of diamonds!

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Monday Edition

Credit Crunch Silver Linings, Student Loan Edition

Apparently Citibank, along with many other lenders, is moving out of the student-lending business, at least for some smaller schools. Good. Let’s move student lending back into the hands of the government, where it belongs.

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on Credit Crunch Silver Linings, Student Loan Edition

Cap-and-Trade vs Fuel Efficiency Requirements

This is one of the silliest arguments I’ve yet seen against cap-and-trade:

Although the transportation sector represents around 35 percent of the nation’s carbon emissions, oil companies and refiners — which fuel that sector — would be granted just 4 percent of total allowances. That would force them to buy carbon credits, which would drive up the price of gasoline and diesel fuels.

At a time of sharply rising prices, oil executives say this is not the best way to reduce carbon emissions. Better, they argue, to raise fuel efficiency requirements directly or set up a low-carbon fuel standard.

Let’s say that raising fuel efficiency requirements would successfully reduce carbon emissions by the same amount as a certain cap-and-trade system. Then under that system, the market could, if it wanted, simply raise fuel efficiency and reduce its carbon emissions that way. A cap-and-trade system in no way precludes higher fuel efficiency: indeed, higher fuel efficiency, and many other things like it, are baked in to cap-and-trade assumptions. But under cap-and-trade, if something else is a smarter or more efficient way of reducing carbon emissions, the market can do that instead. Why do these anonymous oil executives suddenly think that Uncle Sam knows best in such matters?

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on Cap-and-Trade vs Fuel Efficiency Requirements

Chart of the Day: Rail Freight

us_eu_rail.jpg

Paul Krugman notes one way in which the US seems to be well ahead of the EU: it moves much more of its freight by rail. He gives a lot of good reasons for this (Europe’s got more coastline and more borders; America has more coal), but does say that "maybe other factors" might play a part.

The most obvious one is the passenger rail system on which Krugman sped from Barcelona to Madrid. There’s a big difference between today’s industry and that of the 1950s, when more than half Europe’s freight travelled by rail: the customers are much more urgent now, and want their freight in a specific place, and just in time.

That’s fine in the US, where freight pays much better than passengers, and Krugman’s market forces give freight trains priority over people. But that’s also why Amtrak is so plagued by delays: its trains tend to be bottom of the priority list.

In Europe, passenger trains have priority over freight trains, which makes freight much less attractive. Yes, there are a few dedicated freight lines. But whenever freight trains join the passenger rail system, their journey is likely to be slow and unpredictable. It’s good for passengers, but the result is the blue line in the chart above.

Posted in charts | Comments Off on Chart of the Day: Rail Freight