Mwenda vs Bono in Tanzania

The great Easterley vs Sachs

debate on whether aid works has now travelled to Tanzania, home of TEDGlobal

2007. William Easterly and Jeff Sachs

weren’t able to make it, it seems, so the conference kicked off with Easterly-by-proxy

Andrew Mwenda. Ethan

Zuckerman was there to hear Mwenda run down the standard Easterly talking

points – but at TED conferences, the points have a way of talking back.

And when Mwenda challenged the audience to name a country where aid had led

to development, Bono, of all people, stood up and named Ireland,

in the days of the potato famine.

Bono was scheduled to speak on Day Two, and he devoted his time not to his

own ideas but to rebutting

Mwenda’s. He came with a video greeting from Angela Merkel,

and said that the Marshall Plan was hugely successful for both the US and Germany.

The same kind of thing can be done in Africa too, he said, getting a standing

ovation. Sachs himself would probably not have done any better.

Posted in development | Comments Off on Mwenda vs Bono in Tanzania

Argentina’s “Intergalactic Dead Cat Bounce”

I spent most of this morning at a panel on Argentina in general, and the repercussions

from its hard-line debt restructuring in particular. It’s a topic I’m rather

fond of, and I saw lots of old friends there; I was sorry I couldn’t stay for

the whole thing. I almost felt nostalgic when Arturo Porzecanski,

of American University, said that he could never have foreseen how strong the

Argentine recovery would be. I think he’s been saying that now for pretty much

the entire duration of the Argentine recovery, which has been nearly as impressive

and miraculous as Porzecanski’s own, from a particularly nasty and rare blood

disorder. So it really was wonderful to see Arturo in such fine fettle today.

Each of the panelists had their own favorite metric of Argentine success: for

Porzecanski it was tax revenues, for Roger Noriega it was the

poverty rate, and for Brad Setser it was the rate of increase

of Argentine central bank reserves, which are now growing at the same pace ($2

billion per month) that money was flowing out of Argentina at the height

of the crisis in 2001. And yet, as ever on such panels, everybody was convinced

that Argentina was going to hit the wall Real Soon Now – a prediction

which president Nestor Kirchner has delighted in proving wrong

so far.

That said, Noriega’s predictions of gloom were more compelling than most, since

they were based not on economics but on the fact that Buenos Aires suffered

serious blackouts last week, after being hit by its coldest May in 45 years.

Everybody has known for a long time that Argentina’s achilles heel is underinvestment

in its energy sector, and the country’s capacity finally seems to have been

reached. Noriega’s second-best line was when he said that "Kirchner’s energy

policy has been to pray for good weather" – it’s a good line because

it’s true.

Noriega’s best line, however, was more self-deprecating: he described the amazing

Argentine recovery as an "intergalactic dead cat bounce". Which is

about right: it’s the only dead cat bounce which has risen higher than the height

from which it fell. But Argentina has already seemingly violated numerous laws

of economics: why shouldn’t it violate the laws of physics, too?

Posted in emerging markets | Comments Off on Argentina’s “Intergalactic Dead Cat Bounce”

Credit Deteriorates, Spreads Stay Tight

Rarely are the markets and the experts more divergent than when it comes to

the issue of credit quality. The premium that investors charge for buying the

riskiest debt is lower

than it has ever been in the past, despite the fact that everybody seems

to think that things are going to get worse, rather than better.

A couple of interesting datapoints came out today. First Euler Hermes, the

world’s largest credit insurer, said that its Global Insolvency index is likely

to rise

by 7% in 2007, after falling by 17% in 2006. Then Kamakura released its

index of troubled companies, saying that it had increased for the third consecutive

month. The low point, 5.4%, was reached in March-May 2006; now 7.1%

of all global public companies are considered troubled, and the trend is

clearly getting worse.

I’m beginning to think that the markets have come to the conclusion that money

is so cheap that even bankruptcy is no big deal any more. Your debtor has run

out of money? No problem – just lend him some more, and he’ll be able

to pay you back! Maybe the reason for the record-tight credit spreads is that

investors are pricing in not a lower default probability, but rather a much

higher recovery rate if and when defaults occur.

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on Credit Deteriorates, Spreads Stay Tight

Globalization Didn’t Bring Down US Prices After All

Can cheap Chinese imports bring down the US inflation rate? It seems intuitively

obvious that they can. After all, if widgets come down in price, and they make

up a certain part of the price index, then the price index must come down too.

Larry Ball, however, in a recent

paper, demolishes the concept, and the high-profile economists such as Ken

Rogoff who seem to believe in it.

The problem is that the prices affected by trade are relative prices.

Imports of Chinese shirts make shirts cheaper compared to other goods and

services. Inflation is the aggregate change in nominal prices. There

is no “natural” or “obvious” connection between inflation

and relative prices, as any pattern of relative-price changes is consistent

with any inflation rate.

One way to appreciate this point is to remember that, for every relative-price

decline, there is by definition a relative-price increase. Instead of focusing

on declines in the relative prices of imports, we could note the rising relative

prices of domestically-produced goods. Should we worry that these price changes

put upward pressure on inflation?

Ball comes with heavyweight

backing from Brad DeLong, so I’m half inclined to believe him. But my economics

isn’t good enough for me to have complete confidence in the argument’s being

watertight. Why are the effects of trade always relative and not nominal?

I do understand that if inflation is "always and everywhere a monetary

phenomenon," then, as Ball puts it, "the accounting theory of inflation

is always and everywhere a fallacy." But at the same time I can’t help

but think that the addition of hundreds of millions of low-cost Chinese workers

to the global labor force has had profound effects on the global economy in

general – effects which must have spilled over somehow into the US inflation

rate.

Still, this is what economics is good at: generating counterintuitive results.

Unless and until I can poke a hole in Ball’s argument, I guess I’ll have to

believe it. But if Ball is right, then, as "Dave" points out in DeLong’s

comments, there are some interesting implications:

Is it obvious that the 1970s inflation was really due to oil shocks, or was

that a convenient scapegoat to avoid having to admit the need to run the presses

overtime once the bills for vietnam started coming due?

After all, if cheaper widgets can’t reduce inflation, then in what way can

more expensive oil increase it?

Posted in economics | Comments Off on Globalization Didn’t Bring Down US Prices After All

The End of Harry Potter

The market is pricing

in Harry Potter’s death. I have only the vaguest knowledge of the Harry

Potter books, but I do have a certain amount of faith in markets. Therefore,

I believe that Harry Potter will indeed be killed off in the final book of the

series.

I’m not quite sure if my belief is justified or not. While it’s possible that

the bookies were receiving bets from people with inside information, I think

it’s more likely that most of the bets were simply from fans of the series,

who can only guess whether or not Harry will die. Can the sum total of ignorance

be reasonably reliable? Yes, I think. But we will find out for sure on July

21, should we be so inclined.

(Via Cowen)

Posted in Media | Comments Off on The End of Harry Potter

Monday Links

Bloggers don’t like to leave the house much, especially when it’s raining like

this, but couldn’t miss the debate on Argentina’s debt situation this morning

— which means that blogging will be light to nonexistent here until the afternoon.

But in the meantime, some links.

Bluematter

on Tim Haab on why it doesn’t make sense to be holier-than-thou when it

comes to carbon emissions and the like:

When I am asking for higher taxes on gasoline, I want them imposed on everyone,

not just on me. What’s the point of unilaterally deciding to cut my consumption

of gas? The planet will not even notice.*

This principle is very well understood in a different, but analytically equivalent,

setting: general taxation. If I am asking for higher taxes but the government

instead decides to go for a tax cut, will anyone in their right mind ever

blame me for not voluntarily paying more than my fair share into the public

coffers? Is it hypocritical that I pay the universal ‘low’ rate of tax while

I am the most passionate of advocates for higher rates?

* Ah, I hear you say, but what if a sizable minority of conscientious citizens

(for it is a minority, otherwise it would include the all-powerful median

voter) all decide to voluntarily reduce their carbon footprint? Well, that’s

just great: they just reduced the pressure on the not-as-conscientious median

voter to do something about it by imposing a universal pigouvian tax (or other

mechanism to internalise the externality).

Dean

Baker on how people should be listening to him more ‘cos he’s been right

on the economy. I’m not sure about this one: the GDP figure is the sum of many

different parts, and Baker didn’t call the main part of it, which was continued

strong consumption on the part of individuals. But I guess he was indeed more

right on the big-picture GDP number than most of Wall Street.

Andrew

Leonard on Phillip

Killicoat on the AK-47, "the world’s most popular open-source assault

rifle". It might not be the best, but it’s popular because it was never

patented.

Lance

Knobel on a management book for people who hate management books: The

Halo Effect, by Phil Rosenzweig.

Dani

Rodrik on where he and George Borjas agree, and where they disagree.

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Monday Links

How to Sell Equity in Your House

A lot of Americans – and me, for that matter – have substantially

all of their net worth tied up in real estate. This all-your-eggs-in-one-basket

state of affairs is not really prudent, but there’s not much we can do about

it. After all, if I borrow against my house and invest the proceeds in the stock

market, that doesn’t

reduce my real-estate exposure one iota.

Enter the Rex Agreement,

as detailed

by Bob Tedeschi in today’s NYT. The idea is that you convert your home equity

into cash, but you don’t need to make any monthly repayments, and Rex &

Co will take on some of your house-price exposure. If and when you sell your

home, Rex takes some the increase in house price as its profit on the deal.

If your house has gone down in value, then Rex, too, makes a loss on the deal.

For example, let’s say your house is worth $500,000, and you’re willing to

give Rex 30% of its upside. Rex will give you $42,857 today. If you sell for

more than $500,000, then when you close you pay Rex its $42,857 back, plus 30%

of the profits you’ve made. Say you sell for $600,000. Then Rex gets back $72,857.

On the other hand, if you sell for only $400,000, then Rex receives only $12,857.

The Rex Agreement is a long-term agreement: penalties mean that it almost never

makes sense to exit within the first five years. In turn, that means that the

chances of Rex losing money are slim: while house prices can go down in any

given year, the chances of them going down, in nominal terms, over a five-year

period are low. So this is not a good way to solve short- or medium-term cashflow

problems.

It’s also not a good way to upsize your investment portfolio. Here’s Tedeschi:

Rex’s chief executive, Thomas Sponholtz, said homeowners who received

money from Rex and invested that cash in an aggressive financial instrument

would come out ahead in a stagnant housing market.

“If the housing market is flat, and you earn 10 percent a year with

the money you get from Rex, you’ve done well,” Mr. Sponholtz said.

“If the market goes up, you’ll have gained something, and in the

meantime, used the money to meet whatever life needs you’ve had.”

Well yes, if the housing market is flat, then Rex is essentially giving you

an interest-free loan, so of course you’ll have done well. But let’s say that

you earn 10% a year with the money you get from Rex, and that your house appreciates

by 4% a year, on average. Then on an annualized basis, your $42,857 will be

worth $47,143 in a year’s time. Meanwhile, your house will be worth $520,000,

of which you owe $48,857 to Rex. You’re not ahead, you’re behind – despite

the fact that your investments have done two-and-a-half times better than the

housing market. (Remember, too, that capital gains on your house are generally

tax-free, something which can’t necessarily be said for investments –

and that if you use Rex’s money for "life needs", then you’re not

going to be earning 10% on it.)

Now I’m sure that there are some people for whom a Rex agreement does make

sense. But for most people, it doesn’t. It’s uncommon for individuals to be

able to raise equity rather than debt, which is essentially what a Rex Agreement

is. But Rex’s equity, it seems to me, is a much better deal for Rex than it

is for homeowners. Anybody interested in such an agreement should certainly

consider other options instead, including an outright sale of the house with

some kind of provision which allows you to stay in it as long as you want.

Posted in housing | Comments Off on How to Sell Equity in Your House

Q&A: Tom Dichter on Microcredit

Back in April, I raised

the question of whether microcredit works, after Newsweek ran a long

article saying that it doesn’t, which was based largely on the work of Tom

Dichter of the Cato Institute. In the wake of that blog entry, Dichter

graciously agreed to answer a couple of questions of mine via email. Here’s

the first exchange; I’d be interested in what kind of follow-up questions, if

any, you’d like me to ask him.

FS: Tom, you seem convinced that microcredit doesn’t work.

I can see that once someone comes to that conclusion, they will always be able

to pick holes in studies purporting to show otherwise. But can you give me a

bit of background on how you came to that conclusion in the first place?

And while we’re on the subject of academic studies, I’d like to ask your opinion

specifically of the paper

by Shahe Emran, Mahbub Morshed and Joseph Stiglitz. Is there a case to be made

that small loans can have a catalytic effect on women in many countries, allowing

them to enter the workforce and become economically productive?

TD: Your first question is about the background to my conclusion

that microcredit does not work. But first, let’s tackle the question: "does

not work for what?"

This is usually not asked.

My beef is that microcredit does not work as an engine of economic growth,

nor as a business growth tool, nor as a solution to long term poverty reduction.

These things are what most of its proponents promise and the fact is (and by

the way Stiglitz, Morshed and Emran do not dispute this) micro credit is NOT

an engine of economic growth, NOT a tool for enterprise development, nor has

it proved to play a significant role in serious reduction of poverty. (I make

a rigorous distinction between the loose confusion of terms "poverrty

alleviation" and "poverty reduction" – they are not the same).

What then CAN microcredit do? In what sense can it be said to work? It can

provide an additional push to poor people in the informal sector marketplace

so that they can increase their incomes. But these increases are not significant

in terms of moving people over the poverty line, nor are they permanent or reliable

increases. For example, if 25 women are selling rice in a row along the street

side in a Bangladeshi town, the microloan enables them to increase their stock.

But as the market for rice becomes thus more saturated, the initial shot of

gross income increase begins to wear away. Also since selling rice is a low

barrier to entry activity (anyone can do it) more people can come along to do

it and the more microcredit providers enter this marketplace (the more they

become supply driven rather than demand driven) and the more sellers or rice

are attracted to this area.

There is also anecdotal evidence that microcredit for poor women helps to

empower them since they have cash in hand and thus a degree of purchasing power.

This has been shown, but again only in the short term and in anecdotal fashion.

On the other hand, see the work of Feiner

and Barker at the Univ. of Maine, which suggests that microcredit keeps

women in the informal sector, with its lack of regulation, hazardous conditions,

and where low incomes are the norm, and opportunities to really learn a saleable

skill are absent. Moreover, they point to continuing male control of women,

male co-optation of the microloans, increases in women’s workload, no or little

change in violence towards women, continued education biases against women,

and so on. They conclude that microcredit aimed at women is in the end paternalistic

and thus in a sense harmful.

Now to get to your question about the background for my conclusions. First

I have real experience in this field, which Stiglitz et al do not.

That’s to say, I’ve been on the ground (literally, on my haunches sometimes),

under trees, in the hot sun, in the rain on the side of the road where people

are selling things, talking to individual microcredit borrowers and groups;

observing meetings where loans are given out; examining the pass books of borrowers,

looking at the account books of the lending organizations, riding around with

the staff of microcredit orgs; I’ve followed borrowers into their huts in the

slums and in villages and asked to see the things they say they’ve bought with

their money, I’ve talked to folks in the same marketplaces who are not microcredit

bnorrowers to try to see how their activities differ…

And I’ve been doing this for 23 years on three continents in countless projects,

in India, in the Phiippines, in Pakistan, in Kyrgystan, China, central America,

in Malawi, Kenya, South Africa, Guinea, Senegal, Morocco, Togo, Mauritania,

Egypt, etc etc. . Usually my role has been as an evaluator of microcredit projects.

And before this experience I spent 20 more years in development assistance,

beginning with a stint in the Peace Corps in 1964-66. In between I got a PhD

in cultural anthropology at the U of Chicago.

I’ve also followed the literature on microcredit, from its beginnings in the

mid 70s, as well as doing historical research on the role of mass credit in

economic history.

So how do I come to my conclusions? I began to notice and think about problems

in microcredit after seeing the same things over and over again. Especially

the fact that most microcredit clients operate in the "informal sector"

and tend to do things that anyone else can do. As I kept seeing these same activities

in countless projects, it began to be clear that these people are in a default

mode, with little or no potential to move beyond where they are. They are buying

and selling cheap goods as a means of survival – there is little else available

for them because in the poorest areas, they are living in economic environments

that do not provide them with opportunities, that do not offer them the protections

and encouragements of a system of institutions that functions even remotely

well (e.g. property rights, legal and judicial functions, etc.), not to mention

providing them with the basic infrastructure of an articulated economy – roads,

electricity, running water….

Moreover, in many of these environments the marginal boost they get from a

microloan is not enough to really differentiate them from folks on the same

roadside who are not taking microcoans. They’d be pretty much where they are

with or without microcredit.

There are of course, always individuals who do move forward and actually grow

a business – these are the faces on the covers of the annual reports of microcredit

institutions and on their websites. But these exceptions are real entrepreneurs

and they almost surely would have made it anyhow (see my

Cato paper, and people like economic historian Richard Posner of U of Chicago

Law school). But no one is asking the "counterfactual" question –

what would the lives of these people have been like without microcredit?

You ask specifically about the Emran, Morshed and Stiglitz paper. It is true

that the labor market for women is non existant in many of the poorest countries.

But microcredit is not providing a labor market for them. It is enabling them

to undertake what should more accurately be called "income generating activities".

We are wrong to glorify that type of activity as the equivalent of a "labor

market" or of "entering the workforce." (Women in poor countries

are already in the workforce, big time. The problem is that their labor is unpaid.)

But the little money they make doing income generating activity does not move

them out of poverty and is a far cry from a real entry into the workforce, which

would mean real wage employement, which is, by the way, what most people in

the world want. That is not what comes out of microcredit. Nor are their income

gerating activities the equivalent of real businesses. Which is also why I don’t

agree that these activities make such women "ecnonomically productive."

What these activities do, plain and simply is "generate income" but

that income is, again, marginal stuff.

Well, let’s leave it here for now. I can really go on for days on this and

cite examples, studies, and so on. I would call your attention to my new book:

"What’s

Wrong with Microfinance?" co-edited by me and Malcolm Harper, with

contributions by some of the world’s leading practitioners and scholars of microfinance.

There is a lot wrong with microfinance, and especially with microcredit. It’s

time for enthusiasts to examine assumptions and challenge the PR. Can scores

of presidents, prime ministers, monarchs be wrong? Yes. Can the Nobel committee

be wrong? Yes. Can celebrities and the media be wrong? Yes!!! Can Stiglitz and

development gurus like Jeff Sachs be off the mark? Yes.

Posted in development | Comments Off on Q&A: Tom Dichter on Microcredit

Hirst’s Spectacular Skull

What to make of Damien Hirst’s $100

million skull? It will sell, that much is clear: the buyer will

not be the person with the most money, but rather the person with the most art-world

clout. So more likely a reasonably established collector than some nouveau Chinese

or Russian billionaire in it for the insta-cachet and the bling.

Bloomberg’s Linda

Sandler is comparing the skull to the price of a Hamptons estate, of all

things, which seems a little peculiar until you recall that Tobias Meyer of

Sotheby’s once said that the price of a decent Rothko tracks quite closely the

price of a big Park Avenue apartment. Prestige art, like prestige property,

is unique, and the price dynamics can be quite similar.

Hirst’s achievement here, should not be understated. The acres of press that

this skull is receiving is testament to the fact that he has – again –

created an icon which transcends the art world and resonates in the public’s

mind like the art of no other contemporary artist. (Jeff Koons, I’d say, would

come a distant second in that competition: Hirst’s real competitors in this

space are all deceased, from Warhol and Dali all the way back through Pollock

and Picasso to Leonardo.)

My guess is that the next time the skull is on public view, it will be as part

of a major Hirst retrospective at the Tate. At that point, we’ll be better placed

to be able to judge just how well it stands up to — or surpasses — the rest

of Hirst’s art. But for the time being, it’s fun just to sit back and enjoy

the spectacle.

Posted in art | Comments Off on Hirst’s Spectacular Skull

The Economics of Carbon Taxes

Mark

Thoma has a good overview of the economics of the carbon tax vs cap-and-trade

debate. John

Whitehead, it seems, is more or less agnostic, after having run through

the economic

theory; Lynne

Kiesling, on the other hand, says that a cap-and-trade system is superior:

Most importantly, how do we know the right level at which to set the tax?

This is where we get to the Coasian/Hayekian crux of the problems with Pigouvian

taxes that the other commenters did not account for in their analyses. The

most problematic aspect of Pigouvian taxes is that they rely on the assumption

that the policymaker has sufficient knowledge to be able to set the optimal

tax. The knowledge of the optimal level of emissions and the optimal tax rate

is not, in Hayek’s phrase, given to any one mind. That is the knowledge

problem. That means that the policymaker has to have information about

production processes, production costs, the epidemiological and other health

and consumption effects of the product, and the economic value of those epidemiological

and other consumption effects. That is a heroic assumption.

The key point here is that we know exactly where to set the cap, in a cap-and-trade

system, in order to reduce carbon emissions to a desired level. But we have

no idea how big a carbon tax would have to be in order to come up with the same

result.

Jeffrey Miller, in Thoma’s comments, says that a small tax now could be ramped

up every year "somewhat aggressively until actual emissions match the goal"

– a scheme which takes away the price certainty that proponents of a carbon

tax love so much.

Ultimately, it’s just not true "that to pick a quantity is really also

to pick a price, and vice versa", as Thoma’s first commenter claims. That’s

the whole point of a cap-and-trade system: you pick a quantity, and then the

associated price fluctuates, on the market, according to all manner of unforeseeable

variables including consumer behavior and technological advances. Given that

the goal here is to get a certain quantity of carbon emissions, it’s much better

to fix that quantity and to let the price fluctuate than it is to fix a price

and have no certainty at all that carbon emissions will fall as much as required.

Posted in climate change, economics | Comments Off on The Economics of Carbon Taxes

How the Bancrofts Changed Their Mind

The Wall Street Journal proves today that, when pushed, it can do excellent

long-form narrative investigative journalism and turn it around within 24 hours.

Much kudos to Matthew Karnitschnig, Sarah Ellison,

Susan Pulliam and Susan Warren for pulling together

the

definitive story on how the Bancrofts changed their mind, and getting it

out on today’s front page. (And good on the WSJ, too, for making the story free

on its website.)

The full story is rich and subtle and well worth reading. But I do get the

impression that the anti-Murdoch forces in the Bancroft family got a bit too

complacent, and were essentially unaware that Thursday’s headline-grabbing volte-face

was even a possibility.

Meanwhile, the Bancrofts who were more amenable to talking to Murdoch were

increasingly convinced that Dow Jones is too small and cash-poor to survive

as a competitive independent entity. CEO Richard Zannino was

clearly sympathetic to that view, and eventually it seems that the all-important

Michael Elefante came round to it too.

Rupert Murdoch comes off as very smart, quietly sending emissaries

to key Bancroft constituents as long ago as September 2006. Meanwhile, Christopher

Bancroft and William Cox Jr, who are opposed to selling

Dow Jones, seem to have made a serious tactical error by not turning up at a

key family meeting in Boston, with the latter saying he "could care less"

what was discussed.

What happens next is still far from clear, although we know there will be a

meeting on Monday with Rupert Murdoch, which will concentrate on the question

of editorial independence. From reading the WSJ report, my feeling is that the

Bancrofts will be working with Murdoch, rather than against him, in an attempt

to construct some kind of structure which would allow them to sell to him while

not feeling that they’re selling out the paper.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on How the Bancrofts Changed Their Mind

Bush and Rodrik: Immigration Bedfellows

Kim

Strassel has a long interview with George W Bush on his

immigration bill in the WSJ today, as Dani

Rodrik takes over the equivalent NYT real-estate with his own argument in

favor of it. The two men are strange bedfellows indeed, but ultimately it’s

not that surprising that they come down on the same side of this issue. What’s

more interesting is that their arguments barely overlap.

Bush is clearly aiming his arguments at anti-immigration Republicans. A quick

run-down of what he says: there won’t be two Americas, since the country can

and will assimilate Mexican immigrants — many of whom, in Texas, have become

prominent and valuable members of society. Supporters of free markets should

support free labor markets, because immigrants add to economic output, and we

need immigrants to do the jobs American’s can’t or won’t do. At the same time,

we should not encourage a system which exploits them, under which good people

suffer.

These are good reasons to support the immigration bill. But they neglect to

mention the centerpiece of Rodrik’s argument: that the $35 billion or so per

year which would be earned by legal immigrants from poor nations would exceed

the amount that the US spends on foreign aid, and even the amount that those

nations stand to benefit from the current round of multilateral trade talks.

And rather than the benefits accruing mainly for those countries’ elites, the

money would go directly into workers’ pockets.

A system carefully designed with incentives for guest workers to return to

their countries would also help allay fears that this scheme will poach the

most economically productive citizens from nations who can ill afford to lose

them.

In other words, Bush looks at the good this bill will do for the US, while

Rodrik concentrates on the good it will do for the world’s poor workers and

countries. The difference is understandable. Much of the US population does

not have a sophisticated understanding of positive-sum games, which means that

if they’re told that other countries will benefit, they’ll worry that the US

must be losing out in the bargain. What’s more, it is indeed true that US low-skilled

workers do get paid less as a result of low-skill immigration. So Rodrik’s

argument is unlikely to garner many votes, even though on a moral and intellectual

basis it’s probably the stronger one.

Posted in immigration | Comments Off on Bush and Rodrik: Immigration Bedfellows

Rupert Murdoch Suddenly Looks Very Smart Again

So, the Bancrofts are willing to sell

off the family silver after all. But their official

statement is hilarious:

As we have been since 1902, the Bancroft family remains resolute in its commitment

to preserve and protect the editorial independence and integrity of The Wall

Street Journal…

After a detailed review of the business of Dow Jones and the evolving competitive

environment in which it operates, the family has reached consensus that the

mission of Dow Jones may be better accomplished in combination or collaboration

with another organization, which may include News Corporation.

"Resolute in its commitment"? As Inigo Montoya might say,

"I do not think that word means what you think it means". Or, as Withnail

might say, "that represents a level of hypocrisy that I’d previously suspected,

but not noticed due to highly evasive skills".

I was a fan of the Murdoch bid from the beginning, but lost heart a week ago,

when the News Corp chairman was economical

with the truth in an interview with the FT. I do think, however, that the

Journal will ultimately be a greater and more successful newspaper under Murdoch

than it would be if it continued to be run by a series of incompetent

Dow Jones managers.

The Bancrofts are clearly still holding out some hope for a white knight who

can come along and save them from having to sell to Rupert. And $5 billion is

a low enough price that I’m sure there’s a billionaire or two out there who

might be tempted. But billionaires tend not to be the hands-off type, which

is exactly the sort of person the Bancrofts are looking for. Warren Buffett

would be perfect, but he’s not going to bid. Which means there’s now a very

good chance that Murdoch will end up with his glorious prize.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on Rupert Murdoch Suddenly Looks Very Smart Again

Sudan Versus Coca-Cola

Dana

Milbank has a great column today about John Ukec Lueth Ukec, the Sudanese

ambassador to Washington, who held a news conference at the National Press Club

yesterday to respond to President Bush’s new sanctions against his regime. Never

mind his unhinged performance (see for yourself, in the accompanying video)

— the ambassador made some serious threats to America’s cultural patrimony:

"I want you to know that the gum arabic which runs all the soft drinks

all over the world, including the United States, mainly 80 percent is imported

from my country," the ambassador said after raising a bottle of Coca-Cola.

A reporter asked if Sudan was threatening to "stop the export of gum

arabic and bring down the Western world."

"I can stop that gum arabic and all of us will have lost this,"

Khartoum Karl warned anew, beckoning to the Coke bottle. "But I don’t

want to go that way."

As diplomatic threats go, that one gets high points for creativity: Try to

stop the killings in Darfur, and we’ll take away your Coca-Cola.

In the wake of the press conference, Coca Cola’s shares, er, went

up. Quite a lot. Was the ambassador lying? I think not: although gum arabic

doesn’t appear on the ingredients list of the coke can in my fridge, James Flint

of the Guardian reported

last year that the substance is "the emulsifier used in most soft drinks".

So why didn’t Coke shares react? Maybe the market reckons that Coke has a backup

emulsifier in its back pocket. Or maybe it simply sees no reason to pay any

attention to the lunatic ravings of a genocidal regime.

(Via FP)

Posted in geopolitics, stocks | Comments Off on Sudan Versus Coca-Cola

Europe’s Cap-and-Trade System Did Work, After All

It’s clearly carbon-reduction day here at Market Movers, and I make no apologies

for that, because there’s some very interesting stuff coming out. The latest,

which I’ve just discovered via Alexander

Campbell, comes from the first issue of new journal, Review of Environmental

Economics and Policy. It turns out that the European cap-and-trade scheme has

not at all been the disaster that carbon-tax proponents say that it is, and

that in fact, despite over-allocation of emissions allowances, the scheme has

already brought Europe’s carbon emissions down to about 7%

lower than where they would have been had there been no cap-and-trade scheme

at all.

Now that the exact level of emissions is better known, of course, there’s much

less room for fudging and over-allocation, and the second phase of the scheme,

from 2008-12, is likely to be more impressive still. If the US joins it, or

creates something like it, it could well be the world’s best hope for a significant

reduction in global emissions.

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on Europe’s Cap-and-Trade System Did Work, After All

Okonjo-Iweala and Zoellick on Video

In the short time that Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala was Nigeria’s finance

minister, she not only transformed the government’s finances but also the entire

economy. And she’s great at communicating the opportunities facing Africa as

a whole: find yourself 20 minutes and check out her powerful, unscripted TED

talk from March.

By contrast, what is Robert Zoellick famous for, in terms

of Africa? Getting a signed peace agreement in Darfur. And we all know how that

turned out.

If you want to see a video of what Zoellick is like in person, Slate

has a video of him in a panel discussion with Richard Holbrooke

last month. Let’s just say that he can’t exactly compete with Okonjo-Iweala

on the charisma front.

Posted in world bank | Comments Off on Okonjo-Iweala and Zoellick on Video

Glenn Hubbard: Not Far From a Carbon Tax

Mark

Thoma, tongue only slightly in cheek, wants Glenn Hubbard and Greg Mankiw

to duke it out on carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade:

Looks like it’s time for two former chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisers

for the Bush administration, Glenn Hubbard and Greg Mankiw, to settle this

tradable permit versus carbon taxes issue once and for all. I propose an Econoduel.

Mankiw versus Hubbard, whiteboards only, any theory goes, and you cannot be

saved by the end of period bell. We’ll need a referee, so I’ll suggest John

Whitehead at Environmental Economics as he seems relatively unbiased – he

doesn’t think

there’s much difference between the tradable permits and carbon taxes

and doesn’t really care which one we put into place, as long as we do something.

What neither Thoma nor Mankiw

picks up on, however, is that Hubbard’s

version of a cap-and-trade system is actually very far from optimal. He

does allow the auction of some unspecified portion of the carbon permits in

his (actually the NCEP’s) system, which allows Mankiw to consider it tantamount

to a carbon tax. But he also has a disastrous "safety valve" mechanism:

It is important that the NCEP proposal includes a "safety valve"

mechanism — an upper boundary on the price of tradable permits that limits

the cost of the program to the businesses and individuals. In particular,

the proposed program would not raise the cost of gasoline more than 7%, electricity

10%, and natural gas 8% beyond the amount that would otherwise arise over

the next 20 years.

This defeats the purpose of a cap-and-trade system, which is to cap carbon

emissions. It also guarantees that no one will ever invest in more expensive

forms of reducing carbon emissions, since the government will commit to printing

more permits instead — and those permits would cost much less.

In this sense, Mankiw and Whitehead are right: a cap-and-trade system a

la Hubbard is indeed more or less the same thing as a carbon tax. Rather

than an Econoduel, what we need is a serious examination of whether, in reality,

a carbon tax will achieve the main thing being asked of it: a substantial decrease

in carbon emissions. Unless and until we’re reasonablly sure that it will, it’s

a much better idea to go with a cap-and-trade approach.

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on Glenn Hubbard: Not Far From a Carbon Tax

How Car Mileage Demonstrates Problems With a Carbon Tax

The Wall Street journal has a powerful

infographic on the front page of the Personal Journal section today, showing

the 1986 Honda Civic CRX and the 2007 Honda Civic DX Sedan. The former got 52

miles per gallon in the city; the latter gets just 30 mpg.

The accompanying article shows how small cars are much bigger than they used

to be, with more powerful engines – and therefore much lower fuel economy.

"Even the smaller Honda Fit, considered almost impossibly small today,

is larger than the mid-1980s Civic CRX," notes Jonathan Welsh. And Toyota’s

Scion xB, which had vaguely acceptable fuel economy of 30mpg in the city (and

it’s very much a city car) has now been retooled all the way down to a dreadful

22mpg. Even the Smart car, hugely popular in Europe and now being introduced

in the US, gets nowhere near the mileage of that old Honda Civic.

I wonder what all this means for proponents of a carbon tax like Greg

Mankiw, who cites

with approval an article

by Robert Samuelson on gas prices. Samuelson notes that demand

for gasoline is very high, its record price notwithstanding, but adds that "steep

prices, imposed by the market or by taxes, will encourage energy conservation".

Which is as may be, but I think the WSJ article does point up just how difficult

that energy conservation will be to implement, at least in terms of gas mileage.

It’s been a long time since new cars have had any difficulty making it up steep

hills, and the general reaction of Americans who visit Europe seems to be utter

astonishment that families could possibly manage with such small cars. In other

words, a gasoline tax might be much better at raising revenues than at reducing

consumption.

Which is one of the reasons why I prefer a cap-and-trade system to a carbon

tax: the former guarantees lower carbon emissions, while the latter merely hopes

for them, with relatively little data about the elasticity of demand for energy.

Posted in cities, climate change | Comments Off on How Car Mileage Demonstrates Problems With a Carbon Tax

Where Does the US Economy Go From Here?

First-quarter GDP growth in the US was a pathetic 0.6%, it

turns out. This is great news, says Justin

Lahart: it shows that companies were running down their inventories at the

beginning of the year, and so will be increasing their production substantially

for the rest of it.

The numbers are certainly consistent with this view. With consumer spending

rising at a 4.4% rate and business spending rising at a 2.9% rate in the quarter,

the main

drag on growth was in inventories.

Companies reduced stockpiles at a $4.5 billion rate last quarter compared

with initial estimates of a $14.8 billion gain at an annual rate. The figures

subtracted another percentage point from growth.

Certainly the wise men at the Fed seem to think that the

worst is now behind us:

The pace of economic expansion had slowed in the first part of this year,

but the recent sub-par performance probably exaggerated the weakness of underlying

demand, and the rate of economic growth was expected to pick up in coming

quarters. Meeting participants anticipated that real GDP would advance at

a pace a little below the economy’s trend rate of growth through the remainder

of this year and then pick up to a rate broadly in line with the economy’s

trend rate in 2008.

But when the consensus is that the only way to go is up, it’s worth paying

attention to the contrarians. Nouriel

Roubini reckons that second-quarter growth will also be less than 1%, for

instance, and says that the consumer growth propping up the Q1 figure is going

to fall substantially in Q2:

In Q1 private consumption grew at a whopping annual rate of 4.4%. In spite

of that – given the weakness of housing, net exports and inventories – GDP

growth was only 0.6%. Now move forward to Q2: we know that Q2 started on a

weak note for private consumption as April retail sales actually fell. Most

analysts are now expecting that consumption may grow in Q2 at an annual rate

of about 2% (down from the 4.4% in Q1). So, unless there is a massive recovery

of net exports, capital spending by the corporate sector, inventory rebuilding,

Q2 growth will remain in the growth recession range.

I guess the key question, as ever, is whether and how the US consumer is going

to be able to keep on spending. During the tech boom, we spent our paper profits

from the stock market. During the housing boom, we withdrew equity from our

properties. Where’s the money going to come from now? Credit cards? That stock-market

wealth effect (again)? Certainly it’s not going to come from savings.

I’m no economic forecaster, and if I was an economic forecaster I would –

like most economic forecasters – be more wrong than right. My rule of

thumb is simply to trust the market on such things, because the market is generally

more right than wrong. With the S&P 500 hitting all-time highs, I’m sanguine.

Posted in economics | Comments Off on Where Does the US Economy Go From Here?

How to Reduce Congestion: Build More Roads?

Where would you go for serious analysis of a subject like road congestion?

A blog dedicated to such matters?

Of course. The home pages of university professors who write on the subject?

Naturally. Amazon.com? Um, yes, it turns out. I received an email from one Peter

Schaeffer today, pointing me to the

Amazon page for a book entitled "The Road More Traveled: Why the Congestion

Crisis Matters More Than You Think, and What We Can Do About It".

The thing to do is to scroll down and read the two reviews, by Eric

Wigginton of Jersey City and Rob Shearer of Mt. Juliet.

Both of them do an excellent job of summarizing the book’s main arguments, and

especially the argument that the single best thing one can do to reduce congestion

is to build more roads.

Now, I’m a Londoner, and having seen what happened when the UK government built

the M25 motorway, I’m going to take a bit of convincing on this front. On the

other hand, it’s does seem to be true that cities with low pavement-to-population

ratios, like Los Angeles, have worse congestion than cities with high pavement-to-population

ratios, like Houston. Indeed, we’re told that Houston is a prime example of

a city which "built its way out of congestion".

Schaeffer was responding to an old

blog post of mine, in which I said, essentially, that traffic expands to

fill the roads available. I still think that’s true – up to a point. Eventually,

if land is very cheap (as it is in Texas), it might be possible to build so

many roads that everybody can drive around in a car to their heart’s content

without causing any congestion. But I’m not sure that most cities want to end

up like Houston, which I’ve visited a couple of times and which strikes me as

one big parking lot.

It’s certainly important to reduce congestion. But the reason people are keen

on doing so through mass transit rather than road building is not (or not only)

because mass transit is a more effective solution to the congestion problem.

The other big reason is that mass transit allows much higher population densities,

and a city with a high population density will be more vibrant, more economically

productive, and more environmentally friendly.

Posted in cities | Comments Off on How to Reduce Congestion: Build More Roads?

Unpacking Mohamed El-Erian’s Investment Strategy

Almost immediately after posting my blog

entry on Mohamed El-Erian earlier today I received two emails asking me

if I could translate the final paragraph of his

FT column into something a little easier to understand. Here it is:

Therefore, the basic challenge for investors is an outlook that is inherently

fluid and potentially dualistic. The solution may well have three principal

components: a strategic asset allocation that emphasises secular themes and

a long-term destination; portfolio overlays that recognise the reality of

an historically unusual journey; and a risk management process that is sensitive

to the nature and evolution of the underlying market distortions.

What Mohamed’s getting at here is actually reasonably simple, I think: he has

a pretty good idea where markets are going over the long term, but he’s also

quite sure that they’re not going to get there from here by moving in a straight

line. If something is going to go up before it goes down, then you don’t want

to simply go short now, even if you’re quite sure that eventually you’ll make

money on the trade. In fact, you might want to go long, to capture the short-term

upside, even if your big-picture investment strategy is telling you to be short

over the long term.

And so to Mohamed’s approach to investing, which one might say rests on three

pillars.*

The first pillar is "strategic asset allocation," which is a long-term

view of where the world is headed. This might take the form of buying Indian

equities, say, in the expectation that India is on track to become a global

superpower eventually. The asset allocation will also reflect how the world

will look after today’s macroeconomic imbalances have shaken out. "If something

cannot go on forever, it will stop," as Herb Stein used

to say, and sooner or later the US will stop borrowing billions of dollars

a day at very low interest rates from the rest of the world in general and from

emerging-market central banks in particular. A long-term investor has to be

prepared for that day, when it come, and position himself to benefit from the

consequences.

The second pillar is more short term. We know where we’re going (that’s the

first pillar), and we also know that we’re not going to get there in a straight

line. In fact, the journey to there from here is going to be "unusual"

– which means that we have to be alert to where markets are moving now.

So we put on trades which make money from short-term moves in the market (or

"underlying market distortions") even if they point in the opposite

direction to our long-term vision.

The third pillar is crucial: risk management. It’s also the reason why Mohamed

El-Erian can get away with this kind of strategy, but you, dear reader, really

shouldn’t be trying it at home. The problem with trying to come to some kind

of synthesis out of contradictory short-term and long-term visions is that you

come very close to being that most failure-prone of investors, a market timer.

You don’t want to be the kind of person who thinks he’s smarter than everybody

else and therefore can get out right at the top of the bubble. Rather, you want

to have a deep understanding of exactly what’s driving asset prices –

and protections in place which will make sure that you neither panic when things

aren’t going wrong (for instance: the little swoon we saw in February), nor

stay stubborn after things have genuinely turned. This is the hardest part of

all, and requires a gut-level understanding not only of the global macroeconomic

picture but also of capital flows and other drivers of markets.

So far, El-Erian’s gut calls have been spectacular. In his old job, at Pimco,

he made a big long-term bet in 2002 that Brazil would do very well when the

rest of the market was extremely bearish on the country. He made a big medium-term

bet in 1999 that Argentina would do very badly. And in his new job, he made

a big short-term

bet in January this year that there would be a correction in global stock

markets. All of the bets paid off. Whether they were the logical result of a

rigorous investment process, however, or whether El-Erian is simply finding

a way to put an intellectual spin on smart investment decisions he would have

made anyway, no one can really know for sure.

*This is a bit of an in-joke: both Mohamed and I have sat through

one too many Powerpoint presentations from emerging-market finance ministry

or central bank officials where they explain their economic policy by explaining

the "three pillars" it’s based on.

Posted in investing | Comments Off on Unpacking Mohamed El-Erian’s Investment Strategy

Three Answers from Charles Komanoff on Carbon Taxes

I’d like to thank Charles Komanoff of the Carbon Tax Center

for graciously and intelligently responding to my three

questions for him from last week. He makes some good and strong points,

I think. And so I hand my blog over to Charles:

FS: Please explain how a carbon tax would be simple, transparent,

or equitable, compared to a cap-and-trade system.

CTC: Simple: The carbon tax would be one number

— so many dollars per ton of carbon (though increasing over time) —

levied at the most-upstream point where the fuel is extracted or imported. Since

fuels’ heat and carbon content are already contractually recorded, no

additional measuring would be required. Yes, provisions would be made for possible

carbon sequestration, border tariffs and the like, but overall, a carbon tax

stands in contrast to cap-and-trade as a Mozart sonata to a Wagnerian opera.

We challenge cap-and-traders to come up with a 25-words-or-less description

that a majority of Americans can understand.

Transparent: The carbon tax level would be chosen by Congress and written

in the tax code. No mystery. Cap-and-trade will require a big book of rules,

not to mention an army of auditors, to cover such fortune-making (and breaking)

matters as: Which emissions get grandfathered? Can allowances be banked for

future use? Can they be traded internationally?

Equitable: Across the demographic spectrum, spending on energy declines

as household incomes fall, but the percent of income spent on energy rises.

Either method for putting a price on carbon will be regressive unless tax-shifting

or rebating is built in. The likelihood that revenues will be used to ameliorate

regressive impacts is far greater with a tax, since the magnitudes will be known

in advance and the process will be more public.

FS: What’s wrong with having cap-and-trade “dollars

flow to market participants”? And surely the market knows better than

the government how best to spend money to reduce emissions — wasn’t that

proved by the market in sulfur trading?

CTC: We agree that an economy-wide carbon price, whether

delivered via a tax or cap-and-trade, will be far more efficient at reducing

emissions than the usual jumble of government entitlements. Our characterization

should have referred to market insiders, not participants. The bevy of consultants,

financiers, traders and lawyers fillings those $2,500-a-day seminars on carbon

trading expect to be well-compensated, and not just while the market rules are

being formulated but on an ongoing basis. Cap-and-trade requires lubrication

with generous trading fees, which will siphon off much of the carbon revenues

and intensify the potential for an anti-carbon-pricing backlash. Analogizing

to the successful sulfur-trading market is dubious, as the necessary carbon

market will be up to 100 times larger and entail price pain to consumers. Without

compensatory tax-shifts and/or rebates, we can kiss the whole enterprise —

carbon-pricing and climate stability — goodbye.

FS: You say that a carbon tax would provide certainty about

energy prices. Energy prices aren’t certain now, with no tax; why should

they be certain when there is a tax? And why would energy prices be more volatile

under a cap-and-trade system? I understand that the market in emissions rights

might be volatile, but once an emitter has bought a certain number of rights,

his prices are just as certain as if he was paying a tax, no?

CTC: Yes, once an emitter has bought carbon allowances his

price is locked in, but so what? Ahead of that purchase, the price he pays will

be extremely variable due to fluctuations in demand resulting from the economy

and the weather. Far more importantly for Earth’s climate (and for climate-dependent

humans and other beings), a graduated carbon tax will lend increased predictability

to the future price path of fuels and energy, thus making it possible —

finally! — for millions of carbon-critical decisions (my home purchase,

your car purchase, his factory location, her airframe design) to be both economically

rational and climate-protecting. As Heisenberg might have appreciated, carbon-pricing

lets either the future carbon level or the future carbon price, but not both,

to be fixed in advance. Contrary to Environmental Defense and other cap-and-trade

adherents, it’s the latter that matters more. A recent L.A.

Times editorial said it all: “Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists

prefer stable prices so they can calculate whether they can make enough money

by building a solar-powered mousetrap to make up for the cost of producing it.”

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on Three Answers from Charles Komanoff on Carbon Taxes

Is Google-DoubleClick a Monopoly?

The US government is increasingly

toothless when it comes to regulating monopolies, or preventing their formation.

So Google doesn’t

have much to worry about from the Federal Trade Commission’s inevitable

decision to investigate its acqiusition of DoubleClick. The only time that mergers

get blocked these days, it seems, is when there’s ex ante legislation

banning them, as in the Sirius-XM deal.

Should the US be worried about Google-DoubleClick? That’s a very different

question, and I think the answer is yes – although maybe not to the point

of banning it altogether. The key monopoly here is the one on information about

users’ web-browsing habits: what they search for, what sites they visit, what

ads they click on. That information is hugely valuable to Google, and gives

it a serious competitive edge. And it’s going to be very hard for any of Google’s

competitors to compete with it in terms of the quality of their databases of

such information.

On the other hand, it’s not clear that the DoubleClick aquisition greatly strengthens

Google’s hand, since, as Catherine Holahan reports, "DoubleClick has stressed

that the Web surfing data belongs to its advertiser and publisher clients—and

thus cannot be turned over to Google". So long as Google signs some kind

of consent agreement with the FTC saying that it won’t incorporate DoubleClick’s

web surfing data into its existing user-behavior database, it makes sense to

allow this merger to happen.

Posted in M&A, technology | Comments Off on Is Google-DoubleClick a Monopoly?

Mohamed El-Erian Solves the Economics of Investing

The career of Mohamed El-Erian has been an interesting one. He started off

at the IMF, moved briefly into the world of banking, and then became the single

most important emerging-market bond investor in the world. Expectations were

that eventually he would end up either in charge of bond giant Pimco, or else

he’d take over the top job at the IMF. Instead, he took the job of running the

$30 billion Harvard endowment. With the IMF and World Bank evidently

still being carved up between Europe and the US, there’s a good chance that

the Egyptian El-Erian will stay in Cambridge indefinitely. And judging from

his FT

column today, he’s doing all the right things while he’s there.

To understand El-Erian’s sophistication, it’s worth comparing his outlook to

that of his Harvard colleague Larry Summers. Summers is an economist who has

a tendency to privilege theory over reality. In a recent

talk, he called himself a "chastened prophet" with regard to his

doom-mongering over the US current-account deficit — but then went straight

ahead and reiterated all his old warnings, saying that things were likely to

go very bad very quickly at some unspecified point in the future. Other economists

such as Robert

Reich take the same approach, talking about bubbles and how they’re destined

to burst.

El-Erian, on the other hand, is more nuanced in his outlook. He’s

not a bubble-spotter: you can’t be, in his job, since worrying too much about

bubbles bursting is exactly the kind of bearishness which prevents money managers

from outperforming. On the other hand, he’s not some kind of short-term momentum

trader, either, who will do very well until one day he blows up. Rather, he

takes a more sophisticated and layered approach to investing, which has served

him very well.

El-Erian sees one main factor driving up asset prices: the economically inefficient

allocation of capital by develping countries’ central banks. There’s no sign

at all of that coming to an end any time soon, which means, he says, that it’s

a sensible trade to be in for the time being:

In the short term, the phenomenon has significant momentum that can only

be derailed by a series of economic and technical dislocations. A single dislocation

will not suffice as illustrated by the temporary setbacks of May-June 2006

and February 2007.

El-Erian then puts on longer-term trades as well: what he calls "a strategic

asset allocation that emphasises secular themes". But he’s well aware that

he wants to make money on the way to his "long-term destination,"

and not just upon his arrival there. His proven ability to do so is what sets

him apart from his fellow economists, and makes him a first-rate investor.

Posted in economics, geopolitics | Comments Off on Mohamed El-Erian Solves the Economics of Investing

Doing the Woolworth Building Math

Seven years ago, when the New York residential real-estate market was positively

depressed by today’s standards, plans were announced to convert the top 25 floors

of the iconic Woolworth Building into magnificent full-floor apartments with

360-degree views and amenities including a cigar lounge and a screening room.

Those plans have now been scrapped. "In another sign that the office market

is hotter than the condo market, the Woolworth tower is being converted back

to commercial space," says Kate

Pickert.

Alison

Gregor has some numbers. The highest rents in midtown can reach $150 per

square foot, she says, in boutique office buildings such as 712 Fifth Avenue

(amazing views) or the Seagram Building (iconic status). The Woolworth Building

has both of those, but it’s downtown, which means it lacks easy access to "fashionable

shops, luxury hotels and Fifth Avenue residences".

So how much might the Woolworth Building’s boutique offices go for? After all,

increasing numbers of hedge-fund managers now live in Tribeca rather than on

Fifth Avenue, and might value a downtown location more highly.

The top floors of the building, with 360-degree views that include the Empire

State Building, the Statue of Liberty and more distant landmarks, may achieve

initial rents of $60 to $75 a square foot, said Peter Riguardi, president

of the New York region of Jones Lang LaSalle…

Currently, the most expensive office space downtown is in the newly built

7 World Trade Center, which is achieving rents as high as $80 a square foot,

brokers said.

It’s not clear that rents in the $75 range are a better bet than luxury residences.

If you can sell an apartment for $2,000 per square foot, and you invest the

proceeds in Treasury bonds yielding 4.86%, that’s an income of $97 per square

foot right there. And $2,000 per square foot is positively cheap compared to

the prices being paid for Richard Meier’s buildings in the West Village, or

the proposed Santiago Calatrava residences on the East River.

The difference, of course, is that if you’re renting out an office, you

still own it – which means that you get all the benefit of capital

appreciation, rather than selling it to a condo owner. So I see the developers’

plans as a bet that property prices will continue to rise, especially in the

neighborhood of the new World Trade Center. The switch from residential to commercial,

I think, is less about the latter being more attractive than the former. It’s

more of a way of keeping ownership of a prime downtown property which, by midtown

standards, has a lot of possible upside.

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Doing the Woolworth Building Math