Why Did BP’s Browne Resign?

In the September issue of Portfolio, Mimi Swartz has the definitive

account of l’affaire John Browne. Swartz is no fan of Browne,

the former CEO of BP, and accuses him of mismanagement, tight-fistedness, and

an obsession with glossy corporate image over the gritty reality of the oil

industry.

But Swartz also sees Browne’s resignation as "a sacrificial act of love"

for the company within which he lived almost his entire life.

In the end, Browne lied less to save his image than to save the image of

his company. It’s notable, for instance, that there was no talk of resignation

when word first emerged that the press had its hands on Chevalier’s

story. Only after Browne learned that the corporate secrets could leak did

he finally decide to step down.

And what were these corporate secrets which were so damaging?

The first was that BP, like many other companies, had set a value on human

life in the event of a corporate disaster—in BP’s case, $20 million…

The second revelation involved a possible relocation of the firm overseas,

a move that would cost London a substantial number of jobs.

It’s no secret that all multinational companies, especially those in the oil

industry, are constantly thinking about where in the world it makes most sense

to be based. Halliburton recently moved to Dubai, and although there’s little

chance of BP moving, it would have been irresponsible of a chief executive not

to at least consider it.

But I really fail to see the shock value in the fact that BP put a

value on human life; I’d be much more shocked if it didn’t. Indeed,

the $20 million figure seems quite generous to me, and it’s much higher than

the figure used for safety features on roads or cars.

So I’m not convinced that Browne resigned to save BP embarrassment from these

far-from-revelatory revelations. In England, being caught lying to a court or

to parliament is a very big deal indeed. Two high-profile Conservative MPs –

Jeffrey Archer and Jonathan Aitken

even went to jail for it. Once Browne had admitted perjuring himself, he had

to offer his resignation – and as Swartz details, the BP chairman, Peter

Sutherland, was already minded to accept it in any event. Sutherland

even went on

the record as saying that allegations of impropriety at the corporate level

were “unfounded or insubstantive.”

In other words, Browne resigned because the strictures of the closet led him

to lie under oath – not because BP placed a $20 million value on human

life. It was his sexuality which ultimately did him in, not his management style.

Posted in defenestrations | Comments Off on Why Did BP’s Browne Resign?

Quant Fund Pain: Is The Worst Over?

There have been a lot of losses in quant-based hedge funds in recent days.

But the smart money, it seems, is

bullish:

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. announced it and other investors will inject $3

billion into a quantitative fund that has seen its performance "suffer

significantly."

As a result, the company has cut risk and leverage for the Global Equity Opportunities

fund, as well as its Global Alpha internal hedge fund and North American Equities

Opportunities Fund, another quantitative fund.

Global Equity Opportunities, which has both long and short positions, is getting

the funds from Goldman, C.V. Starr & Co., Perry Capital LLC and Eli Broad.

C.V. Starr, an insurance broker, is headed by former American International

Group Inc. Chairman and Chief Executive Hank Greenberg.

"We consider this an attractive investment opportunity," Goldman

said in a statement.

The cash injection comes at a time when quant funds generally, including Global

Alpha and many others, are hurting

badly. The classic "but our models said this could never happen"

quote came

on Saturday, from Matthew Rothman of Lehman Brothers:

"Wednesday is the type of day people will remember in quant-land for

a very long time," said Mr. Rothman, a University of Chicago Ph.D. who

ran a quantitative fund before joining Lehman Brothers. "Events that

models only predicted would happen once in 10,000 years happened every day

for three days."

As Yves Smith says,

It is patently absurd to talk about a "one in 10,000 year event"

for markets and instruments that clearly won’t exist in 10,000 years. It behooves

someone who is dealing in mathematical terms to describe the probabilities

more precisely. And the very fact that this supposed impossibly improbable

event happened three days running says there is something wrong with his,

and the general, assessment of the likelihood of outcomes. What happened this

week wasn’t as extreme as the 1929 crash, and my calendar says that happened

a mere seventy-eight years ago.

How can you judge what would be a "one in every 10,000 year" event,

much the less a "one in every 100 year event" when you have at most

10 or 20 years of data?

Smith, along with Brad DeLong, blames

the quant-fund blowup on "fat tails". But for a more considered view

it’s worth going to the Bearish Hedgie himself, Rick Bookstaber.

Rather than talk vaguely about fat tails, he blames

three factors in particular: the leverage in these funds; the overlap in

strategies between these funds; and the sheer amount of money invested in these

funds, which exceeds the investment opportunities available.

Bookstaber’s view makes more sense than talk of fat tails, at least to me,

if only because there was nothing in the markets last week which was particularly

unusual. The thing which killed the quant funds, it seems, is that their relative-value

plays went the wrong way: they were long large-caps and short small-caps, say,

when large-caps went down and small-caps went up.

But Goldman, along with smart money like CV Starr, sees any short-term dislocation

in prices right now as a buying opportunity – and I can’t say that I blame

it. The markets aren’t behaving irrationally, per se – they’re

just not behaving in the way that the computer models said that they would.

Goldman’s making a bet that the models will still work after today – that

we haven’t entered a new market paradigm where they don’t work at all. I think

they’re probably right, since the forces which led to the quant-fund losses

do seem to have been very short-term in nature.

Posted in hedge funds | Comments Off on Quant Fund Pain: Is The Worst Over?

Admit mistakes!

Clark Hoyt, the NYT’s Public Editor, has a proposal:

How about requiring a personal letter of apology from the person responsible for an error to the person whose name is misspelled?

I’m always a bit wary of proposing rules like this one: there are always exceptions, and it gets complicated, and resentments rise, and people will start bickering about who’s “the person responsible,” etc etc.

But, that said, I think it’s a great idea to suggest that journalists personally apologise to anybody they’ve misspelled. I’ve done that myself, and if I’m remotely representative, it actually makes you, as a journalist, feel much better about your mistake. (Most of the time, I’m sure, one gets a gracious reply in return; certainly I did.)

What’s more, a personal note from a journalist to someone they’re writing about is never a bad idea in any event. Few people like admitting mistakes, but when you do it, it nearly always pays dividends.

Posted in Not economics | Comments Off on Admit mistakes!

Counting Ads in the WSJ

One of the big questions facing Rupert Murdoch when he takes over the Wall

Street Journal is going to be what he wants to do with the Saturday version

of the paper. This is my back-of-the-envelope count of ads in each of the non-fluffy

sections of the WSJ over the past 5 days. It’s not 100% accurate, but it’s close

enough.

To get these numbers, I just totted up the ads I could see in the news portions

of the WSJ – I excluded things like Personal Journal, Weekend Journal,

and Pursuits. I also excluded the house ad on the back page of the main section

of the Saturday WSJ.

The big numbers, like the Wednesday Marketplace section, were largely attributable

to job ads; in general, display advertising seems to be very weak indeed in

the WSJ. But the performance of the Saturday Journal is dreadful even by WSJ

standards. One front-page ad in the main section, and one tiny legal notice

buried in the bottom corner of page six of the Money & Investing section.

Is the Weekend Journal a failed experiment? Can the property ads in the fluffy

sections successfully subsidize the entire rest of the newspaper? And in general,

how can the WSJ make itself more attractive to display advertisers? It’ll be

interesting to see whether and how Murdoch addresses these questions.

  Main Marketplace M&I Total Ads per page
Tue 3.3 4.2 2.3 9.8 0.29
  12 10 12 34
Wed 5.2 6.5 2.4 14.1 0.37
  14 10 14 38
Thu 3.8 2.3 0.4 6.5 0.20
  14 8 10 32
Fri 2.7 1.1 1.5 5.3 0.18
  12 6 12 30
Sat 0.1 N/A 0.1 0.2 0.01
  10 N/A 14 24
Posted in Media, publishing | Comments Off on Counting Ads in the WSJ

How The Fed Can Avoid Cutting Interest Rates

Should the Fed cut interest rates? A lot of the market thinks it should, and

even more of the market thinks it will. But there are adverse consequences to

such an action, especially on the inflation front: if the dollar weakens further

on a rate cut, then prices could start rising faster than the Fed is comfortable

with. And keeping inflation in check is much more important, for a central bank,

than rescuing bond investors.

On the other hand, helping out the credit markets is a good idea, and important.

And it just so happens that there’s a good way for the Fed to do that which

doesn’t involve an outright Fed funds rate cut. Here’s

William Polley (my emphasis added):

Today’s intervention was just a ripple in an ocean, but in the event that

something more is on the horizon, the Fed needs to remind banks that the discount

window is always there to meet their emergency liquidity needs. If anything,

the Fed might consider lowering the discount rate to marginally encourage

borrowing from that source rather than putting strain on the fed funds market.

Lowering the fed funds rate should not be the first reaction to this situation

despite the fact that many people will call for it. Lower the fed funds target

only if it looks like this is not going to be contained by the financial markets.

I like the idea of the Fed cutting its discount rate – which is currently

at 6.25% – rather than the Fed funds rate. That would improve liquidity

in the markets, without having an adverse effect on the dollar. What the markets

need right now is abundant money, rather than cheap money.

All this talk of "liquidity" only serves to blur the distinction,

since the word can have either meaning, or both. But the Fed can definitely

provide the former without resorting to the latter.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on How The Fed Can Avoid Cutting Interest Rates

Understanding Investments

Barry Ritholtz has words

of advice for young and old:

1. Advice for Investors: Never buy anything you do not understand.

This is a very simple rule, regularly ignored by all too many people. If you

don’t understand what a company does, DO NOT BUY IT. If an offering doc comes

with a 157 page set of disclosures, unless you understand all the risks it

contains, stay far far away.

The problem is that everything comes with a 157-page set of disclosures,

these days. How

fat was that Blackstone prospectus, again? Any stock, any bond, is likely

to come with an enormous amount of documentation, most of which 99.9% of the

investors in that security will never read. Index funds and mutual funds have

fat disclosures too, but more to the point they also own lots of securities

with even fatter disclosures of their own, so you obviously can’t go there.

Even opening a savings account, these days, involves signing various pages of

small print which nobody reads.

So I have one question for Mr Ritholtz: Can you give a single example

of an investment which the average American really understands, and therefore

is qualified to buy?

Posted in personal finance | Comments Off on Understanding Investments

When Volatility Strikes

All market predictions are foolish, and any prediction in a market as crazy

as this one is right now is particularly foolish. The Epicurean Dealmaker

knows this better than most, but still he ventures a few well-hedged

thoughts.

For what it is worth—not too much, I know—I do not think we are

on the brink of Armageddon. I do think the damage to investor portfolios and

the institutional health of financial entities is far from over, and I think

we will continue to see slow-motion wreckage (some from surprising quarters)

for some time to come. And the contagion is not over, either. (I predict we

will finally see the end of the incredible market-defying levitation of luxury

real estate in New York, London, and other financial hotbeds, as more hedge

funds close their doors and investment banking bonuses get slashed.)

On the positive side, the sheer breadth and diversity of hedge fund investment

strategies must mean that there are a bunch of guys out there making a killing

in this market. (It might not be the obvious suspects, though.) Furthermore,

people have been paying hedge fund traders 2-and-20 for years on the assumption

that they are simply better at trading than mere mortals and can deliver better

than market returns in periods of market distress. Now is the time for them

to deliver, or go back to scalping client tickets on the govvie desk. Also,

there was a day when volatility was an investment bank’s friend. We will see

if any of them are able to counteract the carnage in their principal portfolios

and their margin books with healthy trading results.

I’m inclined to agree. We’re not on the brink of Armageddon, as Brad

DeLong explains:

The nightmare scenarios always involved a simultaneous collapse in the dollar

and in consumer demand, and a Fed that couldn’t decide whether to fight the

inflation coming from rising import prices or the unemployment coming from

collapsing consumer spending. Neither of those show any signs of happening.

Yet.

Indeed, the one asset which has emerged relatively unscathed from all this

volatility is the dollar. Maybe the rest of the market is just catching up with

the big collapse in the dollar from mid-June to mid-July, but I’m more minded

to think that the credit crunch was exactly what put an end to that sell-off.

As for New York and London real estate, TED is quite right that it’s very closely

correlated to financial-industry incomes. The question, then, is whether banks

and hedge funds are going to profit from this volatility, or rather get hit

by it, make smaller profits, and start laying people off. It’s the trading desks,

not the loan originators, which have been driving banking-sector profits for

years now, and so it’s possible that the crunch might be less harmful to Wall

Street than some fear.

In the case of the hedge-fund industry in particular, I would actually be very

happy right now if I were a hedge-fund manager. In the present environment,

a good trader can make money the old-fashioned way, through volatility, rather

than having to rely on loads of leverage to eke out painful profits from illiquid

assets. Besides, the whole point of hedge funds is to make money when everybody

else is sinking. This could, and should, be hedge funds’ finest hour. If it

turns out not to be, then I think it could mark the beginning of the end of

the whole asset class.

Posted in banking, bonds and loans, hedge funds | Comments Off on When Volatility Strikes

Gmail limits now upgradable

O frabjous day! Gmail has finally allowed those of us bumping up against its storage limits to buy more. And about time too.

Posted in Not economics | Comments Off on Gmail limits now upgradable

Fed Announces It Will Do Its Job

Over the course of the Great Moderation, a lot of people forgot the difference

between the Fed funds target rate (that’s the number set at FOMC meetings) and

the actual Fed funds rate (the actual, real, interest rate). No one forgot about

that difference this morning, when the Fed funds rate was standing

at 6%.

Then the Fed put out its statement:

The Federal Reserve will provide reserves as necessary through open market

operations to promote trading in the federal funds market at rates close to

the Federal Open Market Committee’s target rate of 5-1/4 percent. In current

circumstances, depository institutions may experience unusual funding needs

because of dislocations in money and credit markets. As always, the discount

window is available as a source of funding.

Let’s backtrack here, for a minute. It wasn’t all that long ago that the Fed

funds target rate wasn’t even public: banks had to work it out in a process

of induction from where the actual Fed funds rate stood. The Fed would essentially

communicate to the market where the target rate was by providing and removing

liquidity until the actual rate got to where it was desired to be.

That mechanism remains, today. The way that the Fed controls interest rates

is by providing extra liquidity when the Fed funds rate rises above the target,

and removing liquidity when the Fed funds rate falls below it. So in that sense

there’s nothing special about the Fed’s statement today: if the Fed funds rate

is at 6% and the target is 5.25%, then it bloody well ought to be injecting

liquidity. And even the Fed, with its slightly snippy "as always"

(Jim Cramer, are you listening?) seems to be communicating

to the market that it’s just doing what it always does.

But the announcement is welcome, all the same. It’s one thing to provide extra

liquidity in theory. When you actually do it in practice in such large amounts,

that’s worth a press release.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on Fed Announces It Will Do Its Job

Profiting From Illiquidity

Nancy Trejos of the Washington Post reports

that the spread between conforming and non-conforming mortgages has now gapped

out to 75bp, from 20bp in mid-July. Tyler Cowen says

in response that

If you think this is only a liquidity event, there is of course a profit

opportunity.

I’m not entirely sure how Tyler expects me to proft from this spread. Can I

buy an RMBS of non-conforming jumbo mortgages while going short a Fannie Mae

bond with a similar duration? That would imply that non-conforming jumbo RMBS

are trading at levels equivalent to where new jumbo mortgages are being priced,

which is not necessarily the case. A lot of the rise in mortgage rates is an

attempt to scare borrowers into not borrowing at all, and we saw

with Bear Stearns that primary-market rates can be well wide of secondary-market

rates.

More generally, you need liquidity to profit from a liquidity event. If illiquid

paper plunges in price, you can buy it up (with cash), hold it to maturity,

and make a tidy sum. But where’s that cash going to come from? That’s the question.

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on Profiting From Illiquidity

Countrywide vs Barclays in the Stock Market

A quick update for those of you keeping track of shares in the finance industry.

Countrywide is trading at $25.64, which looks bad (down 10% on the day!) but

is actually higher than it was trading this

time last week. Meanwhile, Barclays’ Bob Diamond is feeling

a bit sheepish. Remember when he told

the WSJ on July 23 that his bank’s bid for ABN Amro was reliant on the stock

price going up? The bank’s shares were trading at 735p at the time, and the

target was 820p.

Now, they’re trading at 639p. Oops.

Posted in banking, stocks | Comments Off on Countrywide vs Barclays in the Stock Market

The Commercial Paper Market Gets Perilous

Many thanks to all my commenters

on yesterday’s post about illiquidity in the money market. It turns out that

commercial paper (CP) – which is normally the most boring backwater of

international finance you could possibly imagine – becomes a seriously

important source of systemic risk when liquidity starts to dry up.

Today’s WSJ fronts a long explanation of how

obscure German bank IKB blew up; the short version is, basically, that it

suddenly found itself unable to roll over its CP. Other problems in recent days

have been CP-based, too, such as WestLB Mellon’s Brightwater

vehicle. And commenter Ken Houghton has a long memory:

Drexel didn’t go out of business because their liabilities exceeded their

assets; they went out of business because no one would roll over their CP.

A quick introduction to CP, for those of you unfamiliar with it. Think of a

conversation like this:

A: Can I borrow $10 till tomorrow?

B: Sure.

A: I’m good for it, you know.

B: But you’re not earning any money tomorrow, how will you pay me back?

A: Oh, there’s lots of liquidity at the short end of the yield curve.

B: In English, please?

A: You’re going to lend it to me.

B: Lend what to you?

A: The $10 I need to pay you back.

B: Ah.

This is the kind of scheme which works until it doesn’t. CP is a safe investment,

because it’s maturing very soon – often, literally, tomorrow. On the other

hand, the entire CP edificie – which is mind-bogglingly enormous –

is predicated on CP issuers being able to roll over their debts, and borrow

what they have to repay. When that’s no longer the case, and lenders start shying

away, very nasty consequences indeed can ensue.

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on The Commercial Paper Market Gets Perilous

Universal Uncripples Music, Cripples Music Retailing

The publisher of your favorite book. The studio which made your favorite film.

The record label of your favorite recording artist. These are not things the

average consumer should ever have to know. If you’re in the industry, they’re

crucial. If you’re a big fan, they can be interesting. Every so often, a label

turns into a brand: Penguin books have a following, as do certain record labels,

like Motown, Def Jam, or Deutsche Grammophon. But it’s never something necessary

for enjoyment of the content.

Until

now.

Universal Music has made the eminently sensible decision to start selling its

music online without DRM. There are lots of good reasons for this, but there

also seems to be one overriding not-so-good reason: to try to chip away at the

dominance that the iTunes Music Store has in online music sales.

There seems to be a very good chance that at some point in the near future,

Universal’s music will be available for purchase online, DRM-free. If you buy

it at Amazon or Google or anywhere else, you will be able to put it on your

iPod with only a tiny amount more effort than is involved when you buy music

from the iTunes Music Store. But you won’t be able to buy it at the iTunes Music

Store.

So now consumers, when they’re browsing the iTunes Music Store, will have to

give up and go to some utterly unrelated website if they want to buy Universal’s

music. And of course there’s no easy way of knowing what record label a given

song is on.

I’m very happy that Universal is experimenting with uncrippling its music.

But I do hope it doesn’t cripple online music retailing in doing so. Apple is

perfectly happy to sell DRM-free music on the iTunes Music Store, Let’s hope

that Universal comes to its senses and lets it do so.

Posted in Media, technology | Comments Off on Universal Uncripples Music, Cripples Music Retailing

Counterfeiting Statistic of the Week

Have you noticed something weird happening in the olive oil aisle of your local

supermarket? Over the past few years, has the proportion of oil graded "extra

virgin" gone up substantially, even as the price of that oil has come down

substantially? It certainly feels that way to me, and a quick trip to Amazon

turns up one

gallon of cold pressed Italian extra virgin olive oil selling for $19.99,

or $5.28 per liter.

Enter Tom Mueller of the New Yorker, who in one of those classic

New Yorker stories uncovers the

shady world of fake olive oil. Not only is Tunisian olive oil being sold

as Italian, it seems, but even soy-bean oil and hazelnut oil have been pressed

into service, so to speak, and passed off as extra virgin olive oil.

I do love this story, but being a counterfeiting statistics monomaniac, I also

have to take Mueller to task for this:

In February, 2005, the N.A.S. Carabinieri broke up a criminal ring operating

in several regions of Italy, and confiscated a hundred thousand litres of

fake olive oil, with a street value of six million euros (about eight million

dollars).

The "street value" of this stuff, it seems, was 60 euros a liter,

or $82.60 at current exchange rates. Every wine retailing for less than $60

a bottle is cheaper than that. It certainly seems that the value of the seized

olive oil was exaggerated, quite literally, by an entire order of magnitude.

Which is, I’m sad to say, more or less par for the course when it comes to

counterfeiting statistics.

Posted in statistics | Comments Off on Counterfeiting Statistic of the Week

Is This a Liquidity Crisis or an Insolvency Crisis?

Nouriel Roubini is a genuine expert on the difference between

illiquidity and insolvency: he wrote a whole

book on the subject, at least as it applies to countries. And now he’s attempting

to diagnose the present credit crunch as an

insolvency crisis rather than a liquidity problem. The thing is, telling

the difference is always more of an art than a science. And from my point of

view, a lot of what Roubini considers to be insolvency is reallly "just"

a liquidity problem. Liquidity crunches are bad, of course – but they’re

not as bad as insolvency. So the difference does matter, both in terms of the

severity of the present crisis and in terms of whether injections

of liquidity from the ECB and the Fed will be able to help.

So it’s worth examining the Roubini list of insolvents, to see which ones ring

true.

First on the list, of course, are homeowners:

You have hundreds of thousands of US households who are insolvents on their

mortgages. And this is not just a subprime problem: the same reckless lending

practices used in subprime – no downpayment, no verification of income

and assets, interest rate only loans, negative amortization, teaser rates

– were used for near prime, Alt-A loans, hybrid prime ARMs, home equity

loans, piggyback loans. More than 50% of all mortgage originations in 2005

and 2006 had this toxic waste characteristics. That is why you will have hundreds

of thousands – perhaps over a million – of subprime, near prime and

prime borrowers who will end up in delinquency, default and foreclosure. Lots

of insolvent borrowers.

No doubt there are insolvent subprime borrowers. They borrowed more than they

could afford, at high interest rates, and their net worth is now negative. What

about the Alt-A and prime borrowers? Delinquency rates are rising there, too,

as Nouriel notes, at least on the ARM front. We haven’t reached the worst of

the resets yet, and so one can’t take much solace in relatively low foreclosure

rates right now, either. But these are individuals with good credit, in an environment

where declaring personal bankruptcy is both very difficult and very harmful.

I have some hope that they will manage to muddle through somehow. Just because

you have a negative net worth doesn’t mean you have to default on your

mortgage. In general, though, I agree with Nouriel on this one: there is a lot

of insolvency among homeowners with recent-vintage mortgages.

Next are the mortgage lenders:

You also have lots of insolvent mortgage lenders – not just the 60

plus subprime ones who have already gone out of business – but also

plenty of near prime and prime ones. AHM – who went bankrupt last week

– was not exposed mostly to subprime; it was exposed to near prime and

prime. Countrywide has reported sharp losses not only on subprime lending

but also on prime ones.

This one I disagree on. There were a few subprime lenders who went bust relatively

early on because the banks put back to them a lot of the nuclear waste that

they underwrote. Yes, those were definitely insolvent. But AHM, and many of

the other mortgage-lender bankruptcies, I’d classify as more of a liquidity

problem than an insolvency problem. If it’s not owned by a big bank, a mortgage

lender is always at the mercy of its own bank lenders. If and when they pull

their credit lines, the lender goes bust, no matter how healthy its fundamentals.

The lender bankruptcies – certainly the more recent ones – are due

to liquidity being pulled, and are not due to insolvency.

Then come the home builders.

You will also have – soon enough – plenty of insolvent home builders.

Many small ones have gone out of business; it is likely that some of the larger

ones will follow in the next few months. Beazer Homes – a major home

builder – last week had to refute rumors of its impending insolvency; but

so did AHM a few weeks its insolvency. With orders for home builders falling

30-40% and cancellation rates above 30% a few will become insolvent over the

next year or so.

Again, I think this is a liquidity problem more than an insolvency problem.

If the homebuilders can simply access enough liquidity to be able to warehouse

their stock of unsold inventory for as long as it takes to sell it, they should

be fine. Insolvency only comes with serious double-digit house-price declines

– and while those do exist in some parts of the country, those are still

the exception rather than the rule.

Next come insolvent hedge funds – and I definitely agree with Nouriel

there. The magic of leverage can and will wipe out more than a couple of Bear

Stearns funds.

Finally comes the biggest and most contentious group of all: in a nutshell,

everybody else. Easy credit has brought default rates down to unnatural levels

in recent years: rather than declare bankruptcy, companies have been able to

refinance. Absent the easy credit, default and bankruptcy rates are going to

have to rise.

On this one, too, I agree with Nouriel. Default rates must rise from present

levels, and even if they only go back to their historical levels, that’s going

to be a big rise. I’m not convinced that a higher-but-still-relatively-low corporate

default rate will necessarily drive the US and the world into an apocalyptic

recession. But I do agree that there are some areas of the economy where an

injection of liquidity is not warranted, and might even be counterproductive

over the medium term. Lenders have been irresponsible of late; they’re going

to have to pay the price at some point, and there’s no reason why it shouldn’t

be a year or two from now when present loans mature and corporate bankruptcies

start rising.

Posted in bonds and loans, economics | Comments Off on Is This a Liquidity Crisis or an Insolvency Crisis?

The Credit Crunch Reaches the Money Market

David Gaffen notes today that a large spread is opening up

between overnight Libor and Fed funds. With overnight Libor now at 5.86%, that’s

61bp

wide of the Fed funds risk-free overnight rate – a spread which, according

to Gaffen at least, is mostly made up of a credit risk premium. That’s scary,

because if banks are requiring a 61bp premium to lend to each other overnight,

the interbank credit market – which is crucial to the smooth functioning

of the financial system – is prone to seizing up entirely.

And the WSJ also reports today that money-market funds – that other important

source of liquidity – are suddenly discovering

nasty bits of subprime where they were least expected. The culprit is something

called asset-backed commercial paper, which is normally backed by bank liquidity.

But right now it’s looking decidedly less liquid than one might hope, if you’re

a money-market fund:

The problems for the asset-backed commercial paper market began earlier this

week when three conduit vehicles said they wouldn’t be able to redeem paper

coming due and instead would have to extend the maturity of the notes…

"This is supposed to be the most highly liquid portion of the market,"

says Jon Thompson, investment officer of structured finance at Advantus Capital

Management, which has $18 billion in assets, including money-market funds.

"The fact that some residential mortgage-related conduits have stopped

issuing paper and some are extending past their maturity dates signals you’re

in the first part of some trouble."

This is definitely bad news. Investors in obscure asset-backed instruments

knew, or should have known, that they were taking liquidity risk. But the interbank

market and money-market funds are designed to be as liquid as possible. If they’re

drying up as well, we can be quite sure that this particular credit crunch is

not being "contained".

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on The Credit Crunch Reaches the Money Market

Abolish Mortgage-Interest Tax Deduction, But Not Now

Matt Cooper is 100% right, today, when he says that we should

abolish

the mortgage-interest tax deduction. All his reasons are good, and there

are lots more, to boot: I listed

a few of them back in May 2005. But of all the times to do it, this is probably

the worst. Let’s leave this one to the next administration, when with luck the

housing mess will have settled down a bit.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy, housing, Politics | Comments Off on Abolish Mortgage-Interest Tax Deduction, But Not Now

In Defense of Credit Indices, Part 2

When it comes to derivatives, Gillian Tett is the best-informed

journalist in the mainstream financial press. Like many financial journalists,

she’s prone

to bearishness – but in an important sense it’s her job to warn of

weaknesses in the architecture. So while I’m happy

to dismiss Bob Lezner when he warns of the downside to

credit indices, it’s worth revisiting the issue now that Tett is making

similar noises. (If Tett has disspeared behind the FT firewall, Yves

Smith has

the whole column.)

Tett’s problems with credit indices in general, and the iTraxx index in particular,

are not the same as Lezner’s. And indeed it’s not even obvious that Tett does

have a real problem with them:

The derivatives "tail" to the corporate credit market, in other

words, is now wagging the dog in a manner never seen before. "These credit

derivatives indices are [now] the mainstays of the financial markets,"

says Tim Frost, co-founder of Cairn Capital, a London-based investment fund,

who suggests that without the lubrication of these products, "the engine

of the credit markets would have seized up weeks ago and be belching acrid

smoke"…

This summer, investors have rushed to take a more defensive stance on credit,

partly due to the worsening news from the US mortgage markets. In previous

cycles, the only way they could have done this would have been to sell bonds

or other debt assets. However, during times of stress this avenue is often

closed because of a shortage of buyers. As one investment fund recently wrote

in its weekly letter: "Cash credit markets have virtually ceased to function."

Consequently, asset managers increasingly turn to the arena where they can

still trade – the iTraxx and CDX indices. And this has triggered a self-reinforcing

cycle: precisely because investors now think credit derivatives are more liquid,

they are becoming more wary of cash instruments, which is pushing even more

activity into derivatives. Thus it is the price of credit derivatives indices

– not bonds – which moves first in response to economic news or shifts in

investor sentiment. So when investors in other sectors such as equities want

to track the credit markets, the first place they look is the iTraxx or CDX.

At the margin, it’s undoubtedly true that liquidity has moved out of the bond

market and into the CDS market. But it’s also undoubtedly true that less liquidity

has been lost in the bond market than has been gained in the CDS market. Credit

markets have seized up in the past, and they will seize up again in the future.

The difference now is that even though credit markets have seized up in the

cash market, it’s still possible to put on hedges and otherwise hedge one’s

exposure in the CDS market.

And Smith makes an error when he goes one step further than Tett:

At some point, these derivative trades become self-referential rather than

derivative. Suck enough trading volume out of the cash market and the cash

prices become increasingly dubious reference points for the formation of derivative

prices.

The error is that the formation of iTraxx prices, and those of other CDS indices,

has absolutely nothing to do with cash prices. The iTraxx is an index of individual

CDS prices, not of cash prices.

The point is that when the markets get tough, you can either use the CDS market

to get an idea of where risk is being priced, or you can use nothing at all.

Because with or without the CDS market, the cash market in corporate bonds is

never going to be particularly useful as a pricing mechanism. during a credit

crunch. CDS indices aren’t

perfect. But they’re a darn sight better than the alternative, which is

nothing.

Posted in derivatives | Comments Off on In Defense of Credit Indices, Part 2

BNP Paribas Funds: A Non-Story With Big Consequences

Why all the fuss about these BNP

Paribas funds? They’re long-only funds which own some very illiquid paper,

and as a result they’re impossible to value accurately. If someone wants to

withdraw money from a fund, you first have to know how much the fund is worth.

Since the fund managers don’t know how much the funds are worth, they’re not

letting people withdraw money until they do know how much the funds are worth.

There is no chance of the funds being wiped out, like the Bear Stearns hedge

funds were, since they’re long only.

And yet stock markets around the world are falling in response to this non-news,

there’s a flight to quality, and BNP Paribas stock has dropped over 5% –

despite the fact that it’s other investors’ money we’re talking about, here,

not BNP Paribas’s own. All I can conclude from this is that the market is very,

very nervous, and will sell on just about anything.

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on BNP Paribas Funds: A Non-Story With Big Consequences

Print Bears vs TV Bulls

Brian Wesbury says there are too

many bears on the telly; Barry Ritholtz says there are

too

many bulls. I don’t watch TV, so I can’t say. I read the financial press,

and lots of blogs. And I see there a definite bearish bias. It seems likely,

at least, that financial newspapers and blogs are significantly more bearish

than financial television. If that’s the case, why would it be?

A few ideas:

  • Financial TV tries to make the markets exciting. The way it does so is by

    turning them into a game, where we win when stocks go up, and lose when stocks

    go down. This naturally creates a bullish bias.

  • Financial TV likes to feature experts, as ratified by the market. That means

    economists and analysts from the sell side, as well as corporate executives.

    It’s well known that sell-side analysts have a bullish bias. Executives, of

    course, are going to be bullish on their own particular field. And sell-side

    economists also tend to the bullish. The blogs and the financial press, on

    the other hand, tend to feature the opinion of journalists and other observers

    who don’t have a dog in the fight, which means that they lack the natural

    bullish bias of the market participants.

  • Journalists are naturally bearish. I’m not entirely sure why this is, but

    I’m pretty sure it’s true. Maybe it’s because all the biggest financial stories

    are about fraud or crashes or other meltdowns. Bull markets are generally

    a long slow grind upwards; big drops can be much more spectacular. Why doesn’t

    this rule carry over into TV? Partly because the pundits in print are journalists,

    while the pundits on TV generally aren’t.

But since I don’t watch TV, I’m a very bad person to be speculating about all

this. Any CNBC-watchers out there who might be able to weigh in?

Posted in Media | Comments Off on Print Bears vs TV Bulls

When Is A Bailout Not A Bailout?

Dean Baker says

it’s bailout – of hedge-fund managers, no less. Tim Worstall

says

it’s a bailout, which raises all manner of moral-hazard issues. Joanna

Ossinger says

it’s a bailout. But it’s not.

They’re talking about the proposal to free up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac so that they can buy

a wider range of mortgages than they’re currently allowed to, which would be

a good first step to addressing some of the problems in the mortgage sector.

Why is it not a bailout? For one thing, no public money is involved. This is

a regulatory change. At the moment, Fannie and Freddie are constrained

from buying certain types of mortgage. If the proposal goes through, they won’t

be as constrained as they are presently. That’s it.

There also isn’t a moral-hazard argument (sorry, Tim). To understand why, it’s

worth looking at how we got to where we are today.

Most mortgages in the US are sold to Fannie and Freddie. But in order to sell

a mortgage to one of those two GSEs, it has to be "conforming". It

can’t be too big ("jumbo", or more than $417,000). It can’t be on

something weird, like a New York City co-op, where you don’t technically own

your apartment, but only shares in a building. And it can’t be subprime.

Now no one thinks that writing mortgages on big homes or New York City apartments

is a bad idea. And although subprime has blown up now, most people don’t think

it’s a good idea to prevent people with weak credit from buying houses altogether.

In other words, all these mortgages must and should exist. But the market in

these mortgages isn’t as clean and efficient as the market in conforming mortgages.

This result has, historically, been bad for borrowers and good for lenders.

Non-conforming mortgages are more expensive for homeowners, which means that

they’re more profitable for lenders. Which meant in turn that lenders were very

happy with the fact that the GSEs didn’t play in this particular sandbox.

It also meant that the lenders didn’t need to ensure that their mortgages conformed

to the GSEs’ underwriting standards. Lenders could – and did – write

all manner of nuclear waste to just about anybody. The paper might have been

palatable to the bond investors who bought RMBS and CDOs, but it would never

have passed muster with the GSEs.

So the GSEs’ absence from the subprime market actually contributed to the weakness

of its underwriting standards. And therefore if the GSEs are allowed to enter

the subprime market, that will strengthen underwriting standards, both

now and going forwards.

So there’s no moral hazard: the next mistake is not more likely, as a result

of this change, it’s less likely.

So can we stop calling this a bailout, already?

Posted in housing | Comments Off on When Is A Bailout Not A Bailout?

Looking for a Risk-Constant Mutual Fund

Jeff Matthews has another

great post up today, tearing into companies who borrowed money to buy back

their own stock. (All the leverage of going private, with all the downside of

remaining public!) It got me thinking about how investment strategies, certainly

for individuals, don’t take account of dynamically changing risk profiles.

The moral of Matthews’ story is that shareholders haven’t done well by holding

onto their stock in newly-leveraged companies like Cracker Barrel, Scott’s Miracle-Gro,

Health Management Associates, and Dean Foods: they would have done much better

to sell their stock back to the company itself when it was on its buyback spree.

But here’s the thing: equity is permanent capital. Stock is meant to be something

you buy and then leave to your grandchildren, who wonder at your investment

prowess. (Look! Grandpa bought Google at the IPO price!) It’s the ultimate buy-and-hold

investment, something which should consistently produce decent real returns

over the long term. Shareholders are not meant to be one half of a

trading game, constantly trying to work out which bits of their company’s capital

structure are most attractive and whether they should rotate out of equity and

into junior debt. There’s meant to be a distinction between owners and lenders.

But that distinction is slowly disappearing. Distressed-debt funds sometimes

make their money buy buying debt low and selling the same debt high. But more

often they make their money buy buying debt low, taking control of the company

in bankruptcy, and then selling their equity in the restructured company for

a massive profit. Ever since the invention of convertible bonds, liquidity has

had a tendency to slosh back and forth between debt and equity, and sophisticated

financiers have appreciated the advantages of being agnostic as to where in

the capital structure they like to invest.

Yet individual investors, and their advisers, still very much think in terms

of stocks (long-term investments, higher-risk) and bonds (lower-risk investments

for individuals who don’t want to run much of a risk of losing money in the

market). Meanwhile, companies have been levering up and capital structures are

much more complex than the old stock-bond distinction. Preferred stock, mandatory

convertibles, mezzanine finance, payment-in-kind notes, subordinated bonds –

there’s an asset class now for any risk appetite, but none of this is easily

accessible to the retail investor.

As a result, the riskiness inherent in a simple strategy of owning stocks waxes

and wanes quite substantially. If the stock market is full of money-losing technology

stocks with massive valuations but no cashflows, it’s going to be a much riskier

place than if it isn’t. Similarly, if the amount of leverage underpinning the

stock market rises dramatically as companies borrow money to buy back their

own shares, the riskiness of the remaining shares will, necessarily, rise.

So let’s say I’m an investor in 2002, who decides that my risk profile mandates

a certain mix of stocks, bonds, and cash. If my risk profile doesn’t change

over the following five years, and my investment mix stays the same, then I’ll

end up in a much riskier place than I really want to be. As stocks lever up

and bonds tighten in, I should be selling stocks for bonds and selling bonds

for cash, just to keep the amount of risk in my portfolio constant.

But mutual funds and ETFs and the like tend not to work that way. I can buy

funds which speclize in certain types of stock, or certain types of bond –

but it’s much harder for me to buy a fund which targets not a certain asset

class (the means to an end) but rather a certain degree of risk (which is what

I want).

The financial markets have outgrown their retail investors. When will those

investors be given the tools to catch up?

Posted in personal finance | Comments Off on Looking for a Risk-Constant Mutual Fund

Bush and the Dollar

It’s not often that Greg Mankiw and Dean Baker

both attack the same New York Times editorial – and on the same grounds,

no less – but today is one of those days. The Times says

this morning that the Fed has its hands tied when it comes to cutting interest

rates, because cutting rates would weaken the dollar further, exacerbating the

Bush Administration’s weak-dollar policy. Rather than choosing a weak dollar,

it concludes, the Bush Administration should have opted to raise the US savings

rate.

But a higher savings rate causes a weaker dollar, says

Mankiw. And a weaker dollar is an excellent way of boosting the savings

rate, says

Baker. Basically, the NYT has no idea what it’s talking about.

Which is all enjoyable enough – except for the fact that no one seems

to take issue with the very idea that exchange rates are something the White

House can realistically hope to control.

The NYT complains that "the administration has gone for a quicker fix

— letting the dollar slide". Baker, on, the other hand, criticises

the strong-dollar policy of Clinton and Rubin, which he says was responsible

for unsustainably large trade deficits.

But the fact is that Bush hasn’t somehow successfully executed on a cunning

plan to weaken the dollar, any more than Rubin, through endless repetition of

the mantra that "a strong dollar is in the national interest", made

his own prediction come true. Fiscal policy has much less influence over the

dollar than monetary policy does, and monetary policy is set by the Fed, not

the White House. Ultimately, however, it’s the markets, and the flow of international

capital, which determine exchange rates.

A weak dollar is neither a bad idea nor a good idea: it’s just a fact of life,

imposed on the US by the international currency markets. Policymakers don’t

cause it; rather, they just have to respond to it.

Posted in foreign exchange | Comments Off on Bush and the Dollar

Analyzing Bear Stearns’s Credit Portfolio

Bullish noises from Citigroup analyst Prashant Bhatia this morning, via DealJournal’s

Dana Cimilluca: apparently Bear Stearns is going to have to end up owning "only"

$9 billion of the debt it’s underwritten in LBOs announced but not yet paid

for.

Bhatia estimates a reduction in earnings per share this year of 2% to 5%

for the five firms. If the analysis is on the mark, the securities firms’

stocks may have been oversold. Each has fallen 7% (Merrill) to 16% (Bear)

in the past month.

Roddy Boyd has the

bearish view: it’s not just about the LBO debt.

According to Bear’s most recent quarterly filing, with a capital base of

$13.3 billion, Bear has to support over $423 billion in assets – $200 billion

of which is securities and so-called mortgage- and asset- backed special purpose

entities.

In other words, never mind the prospect that $423 billion in assets is going

to become $432 billion in assets. That we can live with. The real problem is

what happens when the $200 billion in credit-based securities gets marked down

by, oh, 5%. Suddenly that’s a loss of $10 billion, which all but wipes out Bear’s

equity. And at the same time, Bear’s revenue stream – which was always

very dependent on mortgages – is drying up to a trickle.

I find the bearish case more persuasive than the bullish, I must say. Which

is probably a buy signal. When Salmon capitulates, you know we must be reaching

bottom.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Analyzing Bear Stearns’s Credit Portfolio

Credit Market Datapoint of the Day

Serena Ng says that Bear Stearns paid

"a heavy price" when it issued $2.25 billion of five-year bonds

at 245bp over Treasuries on Monday. She doesn’t actually do the math, so I’ll

do it for you: the typical single-A corporate bond yields 125bp over, so let’s

say that Bear Stearns was forced to pay a premium of 120bp. On $2.25 billion

of bonds, that works out to $27 million per year, or an extra $135 million in

total. Which, weirdly enough, is more or less the same amount of money that

Jimmy Cayne was planning on paying Warren Spector

over that time.

More interesting to me is the fact that the new bonds priced 50bp wide to Bear’s

existing 2012 debt. That’s a big spread, and that’s the datapoint which really

encapsulates the severity of the present credit crunch. If the market was remotely

efficient, the two 2012 bonds would trade pretty much on top of each other.

But when a bond window shuts, it shuts, and a would-be issuer is forced to pay

through the nose if investors are going to be enticed to spend their money in

the primary rather than the secondary market. Which I’m sure made for some difficult

conversations between Bear’s syndicate desk and its buy-side clients.

Posted in banking, bonds and loans | Comments Off on Credit Market Datapoint of the Day