When Co-CIOs Disagree

Mohamed El-Erian and Bill Gross will, as of January, both hold the title of

chief investment officer at bond giant Pimco. Few firms have as much money as

Pimco tied up in short-term debt instruments like the ones issued by structured

investment vehicles, or SIVs. So what these men think about The Entity (no one’s

calling it a "superconduit" any more) is important. If only they thought

the same thing.

On October

15, Mohamed talked up The Entity, in the WSJ:

The coordinated effort is a good way to help restart stalled debt markets,

said Mohamed El-Erian, who runs Harvard University’s $35 billion endowment

and is set to become co-chief executive and co-chief investment officer of

money-management firm Pacific Investment Management Co. in January. "No

bank would do this on its own."

"The proposal has the potential to restore liquidity to a market,"

he added.

The following day, October 16,

Bill talked down The Entity, on CNBC:

There’s a lot of dead bodies off balance sheets that we still can’t find.

This SIV idea is a little lame, in my opinion. And let me twist an old phrase

and suggest that a SIV by any other name is still a SIV.

There are three possibilities here. The first is that market reaction to The

Entity (no one’s calling it a "superconduit" any more) was decidedly

negative after news of emerged over the weekend. If the market reaction had

been more positive, then it might indeed have been a Good Thing; but given that

the whole point of The Entity is to boost confidence and that nobody’s confidence

seems to have been boosted, it turns out in reality to be "a little lame".

So Mohamed’s quote was reasonable when he gave it, over the weekend, but by

now we’ve moved on to where Bill is at.

The second possibility is that Mohamed and Bill are pretty much on the same

page privately, but that they express their opinions in public in very different

ways. Mohamed, who spent decades in public service, feels more of a responsibility

to be constructive; Bill, who made his billions by being contrarian, is perfectly

happy to take pot-shots at Treasury from time to time.

The third possibility, of course, is that Mohamed and Bill really do disagree

on The Entity. Which would be fine: one can’t expect the two to always be on

the same page, although it’s mildly embarrassing for them to differ in public.

Presumably once Mohamed moves back to California, the Pimco PR machine will

do its best to ensure such things happen as infrequently as possible.

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on When Co-CIOs Disagree

Looking for Carbon Budgets

Many companies and projects, like the documentary Jeff mentioned

a couple of weeks ago, claim to be "carbon neutral" – which

is a worthy thing to be. But obviously it’s a lot easier to say that

you’re carbon-neutral than it is to actually be carbon-neutral. Is

there any generally-accepted entity which audits these things and confirms their

carbon-neutral status? If not, do any of them make their carbon budgets public?

I do understand that both the credit and the debit side of any carbon budget

will be open to endless quibbling. But that doesn’t mean we should just take

companies on trust when they make such claims.

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on Looking for Carbon Budgets

The Risk Disclosure Problem

Taleb

and Greenspan

have gotten all the press, but my nomination for book of the year in the finance/economics

space (with the important proviso that I haven’t got very far into it yet) is

"Plight

of the Fortune Tellers" by Riccardo Rebonato. Like Paul

Kedrosky, I’ll come back to this later, once I’ve finished it. But it seems

to me that Rebonato’s book is a constructive and very important way of changing

the way that we look at risk in the financial world.

While Paul and I are still working our way through this book, Arnold Kling

has already finished it, and Rebonato seems to have sparked some extremely interesting

ideas about the relationship

between liquidity and transparency. I’m not at all sure that these are Rebonato’s

ideas, but they’re fascinating all the same: Kling’s big thesis is basically

that the two generally work against each other.

Kling explains:

Financial intermediation is about enticing investors to buy securities backed

by investments whose risks the investors cannot fully evaluate. The intermediary,

such as a bank, hedge fund, or ordinary corporation, specializes in evaluating

risk. The investor who buys securities from the intermediary looks to the

past performance of the intermediary as well as to concise summaries of the

risk of those securities. The ratings of "AA" or "A+"

by bond rating agencies are just one example of these concise risk summaries.

Modern financial intermediation is multi-layered. The mortgage broker knows

the specific characteristics of the house being purchased, as well as the

borrower’s financial data and credit history. Mortgage funders funnel funds

through brokers, using only summary statistics such as the borrower’s credit

score, the ratio of the loan amount to the appraised value (LTV), and the

broker’s historical performance with the funding agency. Funders then pool

loans together. Firms that buy the pools know only the general characteristics

of the pool — the rangeof credit scores, the range of LTV’s, and so on. These

pools may befurther carved up into "tranches," so that if loans

start to default, some investors will take an immediate loss while others

continue to receive full principal and interest.

At each step in the layering process, some of the detailed information about

the underlying risk is ignored. Instead, investors rely on summary information.

It is this use of summary information that makes these investments liquid

— that is, it enables them to be bought and sold by many investors. As an

intermediary layer is added, while the amount of detailed risk information

is going down, liquidity is going up.

I think this is true, and something that Wall Street is loathe to admit. Much

of finance is predicated on the idea that investors, in aggregate, are in possession

of all the relevant information they need to make investment decisions –

and that therefore since that information is alread "priced in", there’s

often little point in reinventing the wheel and going out and getting all that

information ourselves.

But by the time that structured products go through two or three iterations

of tranching and reconfiguring, there’s really no one who has a clue what the

underlying risk is or how to measure it. Investors in such products are buying

the reputation and history of the entity which structured the product as much

as they’re buying any particular risk. They also tend to place a lot of faith

in statistical models which might not bear as much relation to reality as they

think.

When I raised

questions about the use of Value-at-Risk as a risk management tool, a commenter

replied with the utmost faith in Wall Street:

I presume that [Morgan Stanley], like other investment banks, has other,

more sophisticated, risk controls, but are reluctant to release detail to

the public, because it is part of their IP.

Me, I presume no such thing. Morgan Stanley may or may not have other risk

controls; those controls may or may not be more "sophisticated" than

VaR; and that sophistication may or may not make those controls more useful

as a risk management tool. But my gut feeling is that you don’t have sophisticated

risk managers running around Morgan Stanley telling people to take less risk:

rather you have John Mack, at the top of Morgan Stanley, giving strict instructions

to his bankers to take on more risk, and firing them if they don’t.

There is no shortage of mathematical prowess at all levels of Morgan Stanley,

I’m sure. But a lot of that is devoted to looking at securities pricing, as

opposed to real-world sources of potential systemic disruption like the chance

that house prices will fall by 10%. And so securities get built on top of other

securities, which are built on models rather than reality. And liquidity goes

up, and everybody makes lots of money, and no one, really, has the slightest

clue what they’re buying.

Posted in banking, derivatives | Comments Off on The Risk Disclosure Problem

Abstract of the Day

From Case Western’s Erik

Jensen:

Abstract:

Law professors dress scruffily, and we need to do something about that.

The paper itself is surprisingly long, with far too many atrocious puns ("as

you rip, so shall you sew"). But in case you care, Jensen reckons that

a principles-based approach should suffice: "a detailed statutory regime

shouldn’t be necessary". That said, the principles in question do center

on Jensen’s mother.

HT: Larry

Solum, who provides mathematical proof as to "why analytic philosophers

(and similarly mathematicians and cognitive scientists) have a difficult time

dressing themselves".

Posted in law | Comments Off on Abstract of the Day

Paulson Gets it Right on Housing

Hank Paulson’s speech

today about the housing market is spot-on, I think. Let me highlight a few passages,

since most of you aren’t going to read all 4,300 words:

Recent surveys have shown that as many as 50 percent of the borrowers who

have gone into foreclosure never had a prior discussion with a mortgage counselor

or their servicer. That must change.

The 50% number, if true, is ridiculously high: it should – and can –

come down to zero. This is partly a problem with borrowers in denial, but it’s

much more a problem with servicers. As Paulson says later on in his speech,

"not all servicers are staffed for aggressive loss-mitigation". If

banks and private-equity companies are buying up servicers, they should be closely

regulated to make sure that they invest a lot of time and money in loss mitigation.

We must also take steps to make more affordable mortgage products available

for struggling homeowners. In August, the President renewed his call on Congress

to pass FHA modernization to make affordable FHA loans more widely available.

To facilitate mortgage workouts, the President has also called on Congress

to temporarily eliminate taxes on mortgage debt forgiven on a primary residence.

This particular tax break, I think, is eminently justifiable. It’s piling insult

onto injury to charge income tax on the equity that individuals have lost in

their home.

We need simple, clear, and understandable mortgage disclosure. We must identify

what information is most critical for borrowers to have so that they can make

informed decisions. At closing, homebuyers get writer’s cramp from initialing

pages and pages of unintelligible and mostly unread boilerplate that appears

to be designed to insulate the originator or lender from liability rather

than to provide useful information to the borrower. We can and must do better.

The most critical facts, including potential future monthly payments, should

be on a single page in clear, easy-to-understand language, to be signed by

the borrower and the lender. In my judgment, this may have prevented many

of the problems that we are seeing today.

This is self-explanatory, and quite right. Such a development would certainly

help in the quest to keep brokers honest. Which brings me to this:

We need to bring a higher level of integrity to the mortgage origination

process. The development of a uniform national licensing, education, and monitoring

system for all mortgage brokers is worth considering.

This is the one part of the speech where I feel Paulson does not go far enough.

Yes, a national licensing system for brokers would be a good idea. But there

aren’t any teeth to what Paulson is proposing. I say that brokers should be

given a fiduciary duty over their borrowers.

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Paulson Gets it Right on Housing

China Datapoint of the Day

Eight of the 20 biggest public companies in the world, by market capitalization,

are

Chinese. The US has just seven of the top 20.

To put it another way, China Mobile is worth more money than Microsoft, and

China Life Insurance is worth more money than Citigroup.

Is all this a consequence of the Chinese stock-market bubble? Well, yes. But

also: Welcome to the 21st Century.

(Via Abnormal

Returns)

Posted in china, stocks | Comments Off on China Datapoint of the Day

MemeWatch: Superconduit as Treasury Bail-Out

Bloomberg’s Brendan Murray and Simon Kennedy have an article up today headlined

"Paulson

Credit Push Earns Jeers From Free-Marketers". It kicks off like this:

U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s plan to shore up asset-backed commercial

paper is drawing criticism from free-market advocates, who say it risks shielding

banks from the consequences of poor decisions.

It’s not just "free-market advocates", either: it’s also the likes

of Dean Baker, who describes

the proposed superconduit as "a bailout by the nanny state for the big

boys who lack the ability to get by on their own in a free market".

I’m not convinced that this is really a Treasury bailout, if only because anybody

capable of bringing senior bankers together could, in theory, have achieved

exactly the same thing. (Maybe the IIF might have

been able to orchestrate something along these lines, in an alternate universe

where it was, you know, actually relevant.)

Nouriel Roubini, who knows

from bail-outs, has a long

blog entry up today which keeps on hinting that there’s a Treasury bailout

going on but never quite comes out and says it. Instead, Roubini concentrates

his attention not on Treasury and the superconduit, but rather on the Fed and

something called Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act (Reg W). When the Fed

waived that section, says Roubini, that was the real bailout.

So maybe if the "free-marketeers" want to start pointing moral-hazard

fingers, they should swivel a little and aim at Bernanke, rather than Paulson.

Posted in banking, fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on MemeWatch: Superconduit as Treasury Bail-Out

InTrade got the Economics Nobel Right

Barkley

Rosser is unimpressed by the InTrade speculation about the winner of the

Nobel Prize in Economics:

The various betting markets on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize for Economics

in Memory of Alfred Nobel, such as intrade.com, were just way off. The top

bets as of yesterday were in order, Fama, Barro, Tullokck, Helpmann, Grossman,

Dixit, and Tirole. None of the actual winners: Hurwicz, Maskin, or Myerson,

was even in the betting pool. Oooops!

He’s quite wrong, because the "wisdom of crowds" does not extend

to choosing who is in the betting pool – that’s done by some individual

in Ireland. All that the crowds can do is trade on what they’re given –

and indeed the highest-value contract was "field" – the contract

which would expire at 100 if "none of the above" won. Which it did.

In that sense, the InTrade market got the Nobel Prize exactly right.

In terms of the commenters on my last InTrade

post, dsquared gets the Grand Prize:

"Field" is almost always the best bet for the economics Nobel prize.

And Ken Houghton, I’m afraid, loses out with his far more complicated strategy:

The only economist trading over 20 is Barro. And while I would certainly

short the field at 45-48 (last trade/offer), it seems more practical to try

a barbell (say, buy Sargent, Krugman, Lazear, and Romer; short Diamond, Dixit,

Fama, and Sims).

Posted in prediction markets | Comments Off on InTrade got the Economics Nobel Right

2007’s Mortgages Even Uglier than 2006’s

If you thought Citigroup was an unwieldy beast which is hard to turn around,

you should have a look at the subprime mortgage industry. It’s now been well

over a year since people started to get shocked by subprime default rates rising

much more quickly than anybody had anticipated. And the rational response to

such news would be to tighten up underwriting standards significantly, in an

attempt to contain the problem. But did that happen? No. Judging by default

rates on 2007-vintage mortgages, underwriting standards haven’t tightened

up at all – as I suspected,

back in August.

Michael Youngblood of Friedman Billings has crunched the numbers:

“There are $10.6 trillion of mortgage loans outstanding in the U.S.,

and even if the brakes had been slammed, it was going to take a long time

to slow this locomotive down,” said Mr. Youngblood, who has researched

home lending for more than 20 years. “And I don’t see that the

brakes were slammed on or that the engineer had a new track to follow. That

track only now seems to be appearing.”

Dean Baker says that falling

house prices, not resetting mortgages, which are responsible for the ugly

numbers on the 2007-vintage mortgages; I think it’s really, at base, an underwriting

issue. House prices stopped rising a while back; it’s the lenders own fault

if they continued to make loans which could only be repaid in an environment

of continued strong house-price appreciation.

Posted in housing | Comments Off on 2007’s Mortgages Even Uglier than 2006’s

Liquidity and Information

The annoyingly anonymous WSJ economics blog (one assumes it’s Greg Ip, but

can never be sure) talked

to Richmond Fed president Jeffrey Lacker yesterday, and asked him about

this year’s Nobel Prize in Economics. In response, he made an interesting distinction:

Mr. Lacker says mechanism design theory suggests “it’s not clear

that liquidity was an important constraint” in causing the recent turmoil

in financial markets. Rather, it suggests that the problem was more a shortage

of information, a conclusion he deemed “consistent with the lack of

use we’ve seen in the discount window,” the way the Fed lends

directly to bank.

Now Lacker can say this partly because there’s no consensus on what exactly

this curious animal called "liquidity" really is. In a narrow sense,

it just means "cash" – and so yes, if an absence of liquidity

is just the failure of banks to be able to borrow cash at any interest rate,

then what we saw this summer was not a liquidity crisis. (Quite the opposite,

in fact: the Fed funds rate dropped all the way to zero more than once.)

On the other hand, it’s fair to say that all markets are markets in information,

and that a shortage of information really is a shortage of liquidity

in the sense that liquidity is whatever it is that lubricates markets and makes

them transparent and efficient.

Now cutting overnight interest rates is not going to magically inject more

information into the system: the idea is that it’s more of a signal to the markets,

and an attempt to strengthen that diaphanous creature known as "confidence".

It is these second-order effects of rate cuts which are always, in the short

term, much more important than the first-order effects on narrowly-defined liquidity.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on Liquidity and Information

Blogonomics: The Long Tail

Jeff

Bercovici asks:

A question for you, Felix: Are you sure increasing the number of bloggers

increases the value of the site? I think there’s a point of diminishing returns,

and I suspect, with 1,800 bloggers, HuffPo has already passed it. Those bloggers

don’t come at no cost — it requires staffers to recruit and monitor them.

It’d be interesting to see the distribution of HuffPo bloggers’ traffic; I’d

guess there’s a very long tail.

Assuming I’m right and a small fraction of the bloggers are generating most

of the page views, what’s the point? Why keep adding to the ranks? Or am I

totally naive about the economics here?

I would guess that on HuffPo, like on most such sites, there’s an 80/20 rule:

80% of the pageviews come from 20% of the bloggers. So I daresay that Jeff is

right, and that there’s a very long tail. And that yes, at the margin, there

is less of a return from hiring your 1,801st blogger than there was from hiring

your 108th blogger. But that’s not to say that HuffPo shouldn’t keep on hiring

more bloggers.

For one thing, with 1,800 bloggers, you’re naturally going to have a lot of

attrition. Many HuffPo bloggers have never blogged before, and even (especially)

when they start off with vigor and zeal, first-time bloggers do have a tendency,

statistically speaking, to peter out to the point at which they’re really not

blogging at all. I’m sure that a large chunk of those 1,800 bloggers haven’t

updated in quite some time, which means that Arianna has to keep on hiring if

she’s to keep constant the number of active bloggers.

There are other reasons to keep on hiring, too. For one thing, if you’re Arianna,

opportunities, in the form of potential new bloggers, present themselves frequently:

there are many people who want to blog for HuffPo, and, if they’re suitable,

it would be downright churlish to refuse them. So I’m not convinced that much

time or effort is spent on recruiting. As for monitoring the content going up,

that’s a function of the number of blog entries, not the number of

bloggers. And since HuffPo is in growth mode right now, I’m sure it can handle

a slow but steady rise in the rate of entries going up on the site.

But the main reason to "keep adding to the ranks" is much the same

as the reason why record labels have A&R departments. While a lot of the

new bloggers will go straight into the long tail, a few of them will break out

and join the 20% at the top of the heap. My guess is that if you compare the

top 20% of Arianna’s bloggers today to the top 20% of Arianna’s bloggers in

two years’ time, the lineup will look very different. The site continues to

grow and evolve; there’s no point in simply deciding that you like what you

have and that’s that.

While I’m at it, I should also address this:

There will come a day when she has to choose between paying someone to keep

him around or losing a chunk of traffic when he sets up shop elsewhere. Without

questioning her sincerity, it’s possible to wonder how thrilled she’ll be

when that day arrives.

I think those days will be very few and far between, because bloggers

simply don’t join HuffPo in the expectation of making money from their blogs.

I can easily see Arianna’s bloggers often losing interest in blogging and not

updating their blogs any more. What I find more difficult to envisage is one

of her bloggers deciding to decamp elsewhere just for the sake of some uncertain

advertising revenue. But as I said

earlier today, if and when that does happen, Arianna will, yes, be thrilled

that she has managed to oversee the transformation of nascent blogger into a

self-sustaining adult.

And one crucial reason why is that I very much doubt that the loss of any one

blogger would occasion even a measurable, let alone a meaningful, reduction

in HuffPo’s pageviews. The franchise as a whole is vastly more valuable and

important than any of its parts. If Nick Denton can easily weather the defection

of Pete Rojas from Gizmodo to Engadget, then Arianna isn’t going to be worried

that any one of her 1,800 bloggers is leaving to blog elsewhere.

As for the PR angle of being called

a "robber baron" – I can assure Jeff that Arianna’s been called

much worse in her time. Consider this hypothetical: what if Arianna charged

her bloggers money for the privilege of being hosted on her site? (I certainly

pay hosting fees for my site, Typepad

charges bloggers on its site, and those sites doesn’t come with any kind of

built-in traffic boost, so it’s not all that unthinkable.) At that point there

would be a simple commercial transaction: Arianna would be providing a valuable

service to her bloggers, and charging for it, and it would be hard to criticise

her, especially since she would still have a full-time staff of employees monitoring

every post. But because Arianna’s giving this service away for free, she’s suddenly

a robber baron? The argument seems weak to me.

Consider the business model of the financial data arm of Reuters. Reuters asks

all of the world’s major banks to give it free access to their pricing data;

it then aggregates that data and sells it back to the very banks who provided

it, charging them a lot of money. HuffPo, by contrast, also gets its "data"

for free, but it doesn’t charge for aggregating or reading it – the whole

operation is based on the idea that neither contributors nor readers ever have

to pay a penny to anyone. The only financial transactions happen off to the

side, between HuffPo and its advertisers. I see nothing wrong with that model

at all.

Posted in blogonomics, Media | Comments Off on Blogonomics: The Long Tail

Speculating over Chuck Prince’s Ouster

Duff McDonald stilettoes

Chuck Prince in this week’s New York, just in time for Citi’s dreadful

earnings. McDonald says that Prince’s CEOship has been "a nightmare"

since shortly after he got the top job, largely because he "regularly violated

a cardinal rule of Wall Street etiquette—he has repeatedly made promises

he has not kept."

McDonald also says that Prince can’t even manage his own senior executives:

Prince is said to have brought a level of distrust into the executive suite

that far exceeds that which existed under Weill, a man who, it should be noted,

threw his own protégé, Jamie Dimon, overboard in a fit of pique.

Can Prince’s job really be safe? Jim Cramer says he’s

out, this week. That would be music to the ears of Deutsche Bank’s Mike

Mayo, who obviously had no interest in trying to get real information out of

Prince when it was his turn to ask questions on Citi’s earnings conference call.

Instead, he just unleashed a series of hard-hitting

punches:

Chuck said this was the year of no excuses. You guys say the results are

disappointing. So what are the repercussions at the level of the office of

the Chairman?…

One of your main targets for this year was to grow revenues faster than expenses;

and that is not going to pan out. This could be the third year in a row where

that doesn’t pan out…

The addition to responsibilities of the risk management head three weeks before

the preannouncement?

Mayo finished off, essentiallly, by asking Prince whether he really thought

he was going to be around for much longer.

In terms of the Five

Levels of CEO Hell, I’d say that Prince has fallen from Level 3 to Level

2 at this point. How much longer until there’s an InTrade contract on Prince’s

successor?

Posted in banking, defenestrations | Comments Off on Speculating over Chuck Prince’s Ouster

Blogonomics: Paying for Content

I do wish that Mark Gimein will start blogging: he’s a natural. He’s provocative,

and interesting, and – at least until the final

entry of his guest-blogging stint at Time – unafraid to write long.

(This is your own place, Mark! If you want to write long, feel free!) But he

has a vision of "online journalism bifurcat[ing] into reporting and commentary",

with blogging in the latter category and serious journalism in the former. What

he misses is the hugely important fact that most bloggers are not journalists,

and have no desire to be journalists. And that as a result, the quality of public

discourse, certainly in the finance and economics space, has improved immeasurably.

I defy Mark to find a single journalist in the next month who will write as

lucidly and as comprehensively about this year’s Nobel

Prize winners in economics as Tyler and Alex over at Marginal Revolution

did in the space of a couple of hours. There aren’t any newspaper or magazine

journalists who are better on international capital flows than Brad

Setser, or the housing market than Capital Calculated

Risk, or urbanism than Streetsblog

– the list is almost endless. If you have a quick look at my econoblogsphere,

you’ll find that journalists are definitely in the minority – and that’s

a very good thing indeed.

These bloggers aren’t in it for the money. Every once in a while a blog like

Marginal Revolution

will really take off, and start bringing in non-negligible amounts of cash for

its founders. But Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok are both tenured professors,

and they didn’t found the blog for the money. If you look at Mark Thoma’s hugely

successful Economists’

View blog, you’ll see that it carries no advertising whatsoever. Mark undoubtedly

gets a lot of benefit from it, but not in the form of cashflow.

Which brings me to Jeff Bercovici’s idea that the founders of the Huffington

Post shouldn’t

profit from their writers’ efforts. I disagree: Arianna Huffington and Ken

Lerer are performing a very valuable service, which was funded largely with

venture capital, and there’s no reason why their hard work and vision shouldn’t

be profitable for them and their investors. Jeff seems to think that HuffPo

guards

its bloggers jealously:

The real test of Arianna Huffington’s commitment to digital democracy and

online community and all that jazz is what happens when some no-name HuffPo

blogger breaks out, acquires a following, and decides he wants to migrate

his blog elsewhere on the web so he can own his own traffic and brand. Will

she wish him a gracious fare-thee-well when he goes from serf to neighboring

landholder?

I haven’t asked Arianna about this personally, but yes, of course

she would wish such a blogger a gracious fare-thee-well. If HuffPo can really

help create new bloggy celebrities, then that only serves to emphasize the value

which her site is capable of adding. Of course her bloggers could all host their

own blogs on Typepad or Blogger or WordPress, and the famous ones would probably

get a decent readership in the form of fans. But they get orders of magnitude

more readers on HuffPo – and if there’s one thing that bloggers want,

it’s readers. Mark Thoma’s not blogging for money, but I can guarantee he wouldn’t

blog as assiduously as he does if his only readers were a handful of friends

and family.

The genius of HuffPo is that it’s a real positive-sum game. The bloggers get

much more in the way of readership on HuffPo than they ever would on their own.

That means the "no-name" bloggers have a much greater chance of breaking

out and becoming "name" bloggers if they can get HuffPo to publish

their thoughts. And as those bloggers increase the volume of content on the

HuffPo site, the site itself becomes inceasingly popular and valuable.

The HuffPo business model actually makes more sense than, say, the Gawker Media

business model, where you increase your amount of content by paying people to

work incredibly hard. Vanessa

Grigoriadis reports that even Gawker Media might be moving towards more

of a user-generated-content model:

The success of the comments has even made Denton rethink the compensation

he pays his bloggers, the cows he has to pay for milk. Gawker as an automated

message board, with commenters generating exponentially greater numbers of

page views as they click all over the site to see reactions to their comments,

could be the dream. There would then be no editors to pay, even at the rates

he has to shell out.

For all that blogs are becoming increasingly mainstream, the number of people

who get a regular and predictable paycheck for blogging is still tiny. That

number will rise, but it will never come close to the number of people who get

a regular and predictable paycheck for old-fashioned reporting. In most of the

blogosphere, the incentives and the rewards for generating content are very,

very different from what is found in old-media companies.

Posted in blogonomics, Media | Comments Off on Blogonomics: Paying for Content

Dow Jones: The Murdoch Era Begins

Rupert Murdoch does not, yet, officially own Dow Jones. But he clearly controls

it, all the same. Today, the day that Rupert’s new business channel launches

in head-to-head competition with CNBC, Dow Jones’s websites have decided to

pull

all CNBC’s advertising. As Jeff Bercovici says,

A spokesman for Dow Jones, which owns both sites, declined to comment to

the Times on the decision, but if you suspect Rupert Murdoch of pulling the

levers on this one, award yourself a cookie.

Meanwhile, Brad DeLong is noting signs

of sense on the WSJ editiorial page, and ascribing that to Murdoch, too:

Most of it is Rupert Murdoch signalling that the Wall Street Journal editorial

page can now be rented: that it won’t be the knee-jerk slave of the Republican

extreme anymore, and that people who want its support (within reason) should

start offering him bids.

Brad doesn’t mean this literally, and he’s not talking about corporate lobbying,

he’s talking about politicians. Rupert Murdoch’s newspapers tend to support

those politicians who act in Rupert Murdoch’s best interests, and it’s possible

that the WSJ editorial page will move in that direction from its erstwhile wingnuttery.

Posted in Media, publishing | Comments Off on Dow Jones: The Murdoch Era Begins

For the Record

The wager entered into between me and Jesse Eisinger: that investment banks’

bonus pool this year – in aggregate – will be at least 90% of the

size it was last year. If it is, I win a bottle of Scotch: wish me luck!

Posted in banking | Comments Off on For the Record

Why Environmentalism is Here to Stay

Kevin Maney reckons that environmentalism

is a short-lived fad, and that Americans will keep on upping their consumption

of bottled water and other environmentally-unfriendly products. I’m more optimistic

than he is, however.

Kevin sees environmentally-friendly behavior as making a virtue out of a necessity

– that it’s a function of economic slowdown.

The current green fad will have a nice little run, thanks to subprime-mortgage

reverberations: Breakouts of environmentalism track with economic slowdowns,

according to Gerald Celente, who runs the Trends Research Institute. We conserve

when we must and then tell ourselves our sacrifice is helping to save the

world. The human brain can twist anything.

But empirically speaking, I just don’t see this. Environmentalism is strongest

in the fastest-growing parts of the US, such as California, and weakest in the

most depressed parts, such as Michigan. Environmentalism has become commonplace

in economically-resurgent northern Europe, and is stronger in fast-growing countries

like Germany than in slower-growing countries like France. And in any case,

environmentalism is not always, or not only, about sacrifice. What kind of sacrifice

am I making if I use a cotton bag to carry my groceries, rather than a wasteful

plastic one?

Cutting back on bottled water also entails little sacrifice: in fact, it saves

a lot of money – and carbon. That’s a real savings, by the way: Kevin

is wrong when he says that "if gas prices fall as a result of a drop in

demand for PET, Americans will only buy more S.U.V.’s and suck up the

difference". For one thing, gas prices don’t necessarily track oil prices:

right now, oil is hitting new record highs, but gas prices are still substantially

lower than their peaks. But in any case there’s no indication at all that oil

prices will fall at all as a result of lower demand for PET. The oil will simply

go into more economically-productive uses, such as manufacturing in China, rather

than something pointless like a container for filtered tap water.

The Nobel Prize for Al Gore is just the latest sign that environmental consciousness

is here to stay. If you look at any advanced economy in the world over the past

few decades, it’s clear that green thinking has been getting slowly but steadily

stronger and increasingly mainstream; the US might be behind the curve, but

it’s no exception to that rule. The US now emits less carbon per dollar of GDP

than it ever has in the past, and that number will continue to fall for decades

to come. And one way that’s going to happen is that people are going to buy

fewer bottles of water.

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on Why Environmentalism is Here to Stay

Investment Banks: Not Dead Yet

Jesse Eisinger has the cover story of the November issue of Portfolio with

an obituary

for Wall Street. I wonder what Barry Ritholtz thinks about this: Barry is

structurally bearish, and might be inclined to agree with Jesse’s thesis, but

he’s also fond of the magazine cover indicator, which says that bearish magazine

covers are a buying signal and bullish covers are a sell signal.

My feeling is that investment banking, as an industry, will survive. And although

it’s possible that Bear Stearns will end up being sold to a big universal bank,

it’s equally possible that it will simply get bought by someone else entirely,

and remain an independent investment bank. And of course so long as Jimmy Cayne

is in charge, there has to be a very good chance that it won’t get sold at all.

Meanwhile, it’s entirely possible that a major shake-up at Citigroup will see

Vikram Pandit’s investment-banking and hedge-fund arm spun off to become a semi-independent

entity. That would increase, rather than decrease, the total number of investment

banks.

But Jesse has been right about a lot of things in the past, and he makes a

bold prediction at the end of his article: "Bonus season this year,"

he says, "will make Montgomery Burns look generous." If he’s right

on that front, then I’ll concede that he was much more right than I presently

think.

But I think that bonuses this year will be nearly as astronomical as they were

last year – and in many cases will actually rise. To be sure, there will

be some areas of structured finance where bonuses will be slim-to-nonexistent.

But in aggregate, I reckon that Wall Street will pay out an astonishing sum

in bonuses this year – a sign that even when it loses money in some areas,

it always seems to find a way to make money in others.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Investment Banks: Not Dead Yet

Mechanism Design Theory for Dummies

This

Nobel prize is exactly the sort of thing that journalists have nightmares

about. They wake up early, and read a citation

from the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences giving the Economics prize to three

economists they’ve never heard of, for helping to develop an entire discipline

– mechanism design theory – that they’ve also never heard of. And

so if I were you I’d leave the MSM alone and head straight over to Marginal

Revolution, where Tyler and Alex are doing a great job of bringing us all up

to speed. Start

here, and then read more on Eric

Maskin, Roger

Myerson, and Leonid

Hurwicz. Or alternatively, you can try my own 98-word explanation of what

mechanism design theory is:

A mechanism is a framework, basically, within which one finds a market. Some

markets don’t need a mechanism to work well, but others do. For instance, let’s

say that you have a monopoly, and a regulator. The regulator sets up a framework

so that the monopoly doesn’t overcharge. Or let’s say you want to sell a very

illiquid asset like a rare and unique painting. An auction house will set up

a framework so that your painting can be monetized in a transparent manner.

Mechanism design theory is the science of structuring such frameworks in an

optimal manner.

Posted in economics | Comments Off on Mechanism Design Theory for Dummies

How the Superconduit Just Might Work

Yves

Smith is pessimistic about the prospects for this proposed superconduit.

(The press is all over the story this morning: you can start with the NYT,

FT,

WSJ,

and Bloomberg,

although there’s much more where that came from; that said, however, real details

are still very hard to come by.)

Smith is no exception as far as the blogosphere goes, where the reaction seems

to range from this-won’t-work all the way to this-is-illegal. Certainly there

are huge obstacles, mainly on the asset-pricing front, to getting this thing

off the ground, and if the NYT is right that the superconduit won’t hold any

subprime-backed paper, then the participating banks are going to be left holding

significantly more toxic SIVs than they have right now.

But I hold out a tiny glimmer of optimism. A large amount of SIV debt is

being rolled over: the short-term credit markets haven’t seized up completely.

But some of the most risk-averse buyers of commercial paper have, reasonably

enough, decided that SIVs are simply too opaque to trust, and are investing

instead in CP that is more transparent. I see the superconduit as an attempt

to regain the trust (and capital) of those very cautious and risk-averse investors:

it will be backed not by one bank but by many, and it carries too the imprimatur

of Treasury, which implicitly will not allow it to fail.

This plan, then, wouldn’t work in the midst of a fully-blown crisis of confidence

where no one was buying any CP at all – but that’s not what we have. And

the superconduit just might, at the margin, bring a few players back into the

CP game who got a bit wobbly-kneed back in August.

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on How the Superconduit Just Might Work

Ben Stein Watch: October 14, 2007

Ben Stein had an intimation of mortality about a week ago, and before he dies,

he wants to share with us, his readers, his "best

possible thoughts". And, amazingly, it turns out that Ben Stein’s best

possible thoughts are, mostly, rather sensible. Don’t smoke, he says; don’t

drink too much; kittens make you happy; buy and hold index funds; speculation

has a nasty habit of backfiring. The most dubious advice in the whole column

is to let your dog sleep in your bed, and I have neither the expertise nor the

inclination to quarrel with that.

Of course, a Ben Stein column wouldn’t be a Ben Stein column without at least

one minor economic fallacy, and Stein doesn’t fail us in this one. In talking

about down markets he says this:

It is painful to have to sell stocks into one of these down slopes. It is

much better to be able to live off your cash reserves.

This is what is known as the sunk

cost fallacy: the idea that if you bought a security high, you should avoid

selling it low. But the fact is that for every investor who has held on, in

such situations, until the price of the security recovered to above the price

he paid, there is another who held on until the price of the security cratered

all the way to zero. If you have investments and you need cash, then sell those

investments to raise cash. The price at which you bought those investments is

a sunk cost, and should not, if you’re being economically rational, affect your

decision. (Stein ignores tax considerations here, so I shall too.)

Stein’s approach to risk management is to be sit at all times on a comfy pile

of someting cashlike, and then to invest the rest of your money in index funds.

Which is not a bad one-size-fits-all piece of advice, although it’s easy to

envisage situations where it’s not a good idea.

But while I’m being charitable towards Ben Stein, let me just clarify one thing

for him. He writes this:

Just for my own bad self, I suggest the Fidelity Spartan Total Market Index

fund (FSTVX), a very broad index fund of domestic stocks; the iShares MSCI

Emerging Markets Index fund (EEM), an exchange-traded fund that invests mostly

in developing countries’ markets, and the iShares MSCI EAFE Index fund,

for Europe, Australasia and the Far East (EFA),which invests mostly in highly

developed in Europe, Japan and Australia. This has allowed the rank amateur

to take advantage of the long fall of the dollar because the stocks are priced

in foreign currencies that have appreciated against the dollar.

This is very close to the denomination

fallacy that we’ve seen Stein make in the past. In fact the great thing

about ETFs like EEM and EFA is precisely that they’re not denominted

in foreign currencies: they’re denominated in dollars, and trade in dollars

on the New York Stock Exchange. They buy stocks of companies which are headquartered

all over the world, and some of those stocks might well be ADRs, which are also

denominated in dollars and trade in New York. The important thing is that the

companies do business in countries whose currencies are doing well against the

dollar. When that happens, the value of those companies, in dollar terms, will

tend to rise. But that happens whether you’re talking about an Australian company

whose stock is quoted in Aussie dollars, or whether you’re talking about an

American company which does business mainly outside the US.

In any case, one wouldn’t want to start making big macro bets on the future

direction of the dollar. After all, that’s speculation, and we retail investors

shouldn’t be doing that. Stein himself says so – and he’s right.

Posted in ben stein watch | Comments Off on Ben Stein Watch: October 14, 2007

Is it a Bird? Is it a Plane? No, it’s Superconduit!

There’s a certain amount of sense to this

idea: as Citigroup and other banks find themselves at the mercy of their

off-balance sheet structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, they should just

create one enormous pool with $100 billion or so in really hard-to-value structured

debt, which would be too big to fail, which could roll over its own short-term

obligations relatively easily, and which could act as a buyer of stuff which

no one else seems to want right now.

But boy is it going to be hard to work this one out in practice. For one thing,

there are going to be very tough negotiations on the subject of how best to

value the SIVs which will be rolled up into the new "superconduit":

Bank-affiliated SIVs selling assets into the superconduit will have to agree

on how to price those assets. Some SIVs may value the securities differently.

There have been several meetings since the initial Sunday meeting, both at

Treasury and in New York.

And then there’s the question of how to account for what sounds like explicit

guarantees from the banks creating it.

Because the superconduit would be backed by the big banks themselves, it’s

expected this would reassure investors and make them more willing to buy its

short-term debt, or commercial paper…

Two banks in the discussions with Citigroup, Bank of America Corp. and J.P.

Morgan Chase & Co., would participate not because they have SIVs — they

don’t — but because they would earn fees for helping arrange the superconduit,

according to people briefed on the discussions. The superconduit’s debt would

be fully backed by participating banks, they said.

How much capital would the Federal Reserve require that the banks set aside

to cover these guarantees? This could end up being a very expensive operation,

in terms of eating up shareholders’ equity, just as the banks are being increasingly

reintermediated and see big balance-sheet demands looming in the future.

If all these issues can be hammered out, however, with the help of some "moral

suasion" from Treasury, then this would be a great example of the banking

sector coming up with its own solution to a problem ultimately of its own making.

And if it costs enough to hurt then, frankly, so much the better.

Posted in banking, bonds and loans | Comments Off on Is it a Bird? Is it a Plane? No, it’s Superconduit!

Adventures in Personal Finance, APR Edition

I just got my Mastercard statement from Citibank, and found this:

mccrop.jpg

Apparently the ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE on purchases is 36%, corresponding to

a "Nominal APR" of 17.74%, while the two are the same on advances.

(Click on the image for the full scan.) The percentage rate I’m more interested

in is the proportion of Citibank customers to whom this kind of thing makes

any sense at all. I know I’m not among them.

Posted in personal finance | Comments Off on Adventures in Personal Finance, APR Edition

International Capital Flows, Swiss Border Edition

Mark

Gimein is puzzled by the lack of attention that the news media is paying

to the story

of a man who was stopped at a Swiss border crossing in possession of a $500

million check. I can think of three reasons:

  • He was driving into Switzerland, not out of Switzerland.
  • The check was for $500 million, rather than a combination of checks and

    credit notes worth $8 billion.

  • He never

    starred in Miami Vice.

Posted in fraud | Comments Off on International Capital Flows, Swiss Border Edition

US Inequality Hits New Record Highs

Greg Ip is all over the inequality beat today, with a whole series of datapoints

from the IRS:

  • New data from the Internal Revenue Service shows that in 2005, the richest

    1% of tax filers earned 21.2% of all income, exceeding

    the previous high set in 2000, at the peak of the stock market boom.

  • The IRS data show that the median tax filer’s income — half earn less than

    the median, half earn more — fell

    2% between 2000 and 2005 when adjusted for inflation, to $30,881.

  • Taxes fell far more relative to income for the top 1%: Their average tax

    rate dropped

    to 23% in 2005 from 27.5% in 2000.

There’s no doubt that all of these trends were extended in 2006, and might

yet get even more extreme in 2007, as well, depending on this year’s Wall Street

bonuses. But don’t worry, President Bush is on the case:

In an interview yesterday with The Wall Street Journal, President Bush said,

"First of all, our society has had income inequality for a long time.

Secondly, skills gaps yield income gaps. And what needs to be done about the

inequality of income is to make sure people have got good education, starting

with young kids."

No, George, it’s

not about education. It’s about your tax cuts for the rich, which, incidentally,

have helped add

another $550 billion to the total Federal debt over the past 12 months.

The inequality at the height of the dot-com bubble was unsustainable and not

deliberate. The inequality today is only getting worse, and it’s the result

of a fiscal policy targeted squarely at the ultrarich. Although this kind of

inequality, too, is unsustainable in the long term. If you continue to tell

people who are getting poorer that in fact they’re getting richer, eventually

they realise that you’re bullshitting them. And the consequences are not generally

pretty.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy, pay, Politics | Comments Off on US Inequality Hits New Record Highs

Madonna Math, Revisited

I still can’t quite believe the supine nature in which a throwaway clause in

a rushed

WSJ article – "people in the music industry estimate that at

current recorded-music prices, the promoter would have to sell about 15 million

copies of each of its three albums to make back its investment" –

has rapidly become conventional

wisdom.

For one thing, the WSJ scooped everybody else on this story, so I can guarantee

you that they didn’t spend a huge amount of time phoning up "people in

the music industry" before they ran with it. Those "people" are

in fact almost certainly just one person, who probably came up with the number

off the top of his head.

I talked some numbers yesterday with Peter Kafka, who’s been running Silicon

Alley Insider’s coverage

of this deal. He’s also been hitting the phones, and has come to this conclusion:

After talking to industry sources, we think the breakeven per album is closer

to high single digit millions per album — this assumes that 1) Madonna is

getting as much as $45 million in advance for all three albums upon the deal’s

close and that 2) Live Nation will have to pay onerous distribution fees to

get the discs in stores.

There is a debate about how many albums Madonna sells: The only audited numbers

available are from SoundScan, which only counts U.S. sales. Some websites

provide unsourced numbers that claim her last album sold 11 million copies

worldwide; music industry sources say the number is closer to 6 or 7 million.

I’m much more upbeat on the Live Nation deal than Peter is, for many reasons.

For one thing, Madonna is not getting $45 million for all three albums upon

the deal’s close. More likely only half of the deal is upfront, and a large

chunk of that will be in stock, not in cash.

But let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that Madonna is getting a $45 million

advance against royalties for three albums. And let’s say she gets $3 in royalties

per album. Then Live Nation basically gets to keep Madonna’s royalties for the

first 15 million albums sold before paying Madonna any extra. But Live Nation,

as the music label, makes its own profit on every album sold as well. Yes, it

will have to pay larger-than-usual distribution costs, since it’s not a major

record label, and it will also have to pay marketing costs and the like. But

after all that it’s reasonable to assume that Live Nation’s profit per album

will be at least $2.50.

In order to recoup the up-front $45 million advance, then, Live Nation would

have to sell just over 8 million copies of all three albums combined. Which

is not far off Kafka’s low estimate of the global sales of Madonna’s last album

alone.

If Madonna sells 7 million copies of each of her next three albums globally,

then that’s 21 million albums moved in all. Live Nation’s profit on those albums

would be $52.5 million, while Madonna’s royalties would be $63 million. In other

words, even if Live Nation pays Madonna a total advance of $60 million –

at the top end of estimates – it’s quite easy to get to a point where

she earns that out over three albums, and makes a lot of money for Live Nation

on top.

But that’s not all. On top of album sales there are single sales, which are

increasingly popular in the age of iTunes. And on top of single sales there

are ringtone sales, which are huge in Europe and getting big in the US as well.

And then on top of ringtone sales there are all the licensing fees that Madonna

will charge people who want to use her latest song in their TV advertising or

whatever. And then on top of the licensing fees are the videos sold on iTunes

and the expensive remixes and "special edition" CDs and DVDs sold

to completists, etc etc… It all adds up.

Live Nation is a concert promoter, so one assumes that they know what they’re

doing with the $50 million advance for the right to promote her concert tours:

certainly concert-ticket price inflation doesn’t show any signs of slowing down.

And the $17.5 million for everything else – think merchandising, which

has insanely enormous profit margins – seems pretty low, especially given

that Live Nation is divorcing Ticketmaster and will henceforth pocket for itself

all those exorbitant "convenience" and "handling" and "shipping"

fees which get tacked onto every ticket sale.

And the bigger picture is even better for Live Nation, which is using this

deal to get out of the razor-thin margins of the concert-promotion business

and into the world of music-industry home runs. It’s conceivable that Live Nation

will lose money on this deal, although I doubt it. But it’s equally conceivable

that they will make a fortune on it, if the stars align. Live Nation has very

few opportunities to make that kind of money, and it makes sense to grab this

one. Warner, by contrast, has hundreds of artists who might break out into megastardom

and make them the same kind of fortune – so they’re less concerned about

the loss of Madonna, especially given that they retain all the rights to her

enormously profitable back catalogue.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on Madonna Math, Revisited