WSJ to Lose its Circulation Bragging Rights

Update: I got this wrong. See the correction

here.

Did you see the pretty charts in the NYT NYT and the WSJ WSJ this morning, showing the total paid circulation of America’s biggest newspapers? There are two clear leaders, USA Today and the Wall Street Journal, both with circulation in the 2 million range; the number-three paper is the New York Times, which has roughly half that.

But that.

But note this, buried in the NYT story:

The Journal charges for access to most of its Web site, and the paper said yesterday that online subscriptions, which are included in the paid circulation figures, had topped 1 million.

In other words, when WSJ.com goes free, expect that paid circulation figure to get slashed in half. One can see why publisher Gordon Crovitz might be hesitant to do such a thing: the WSJ’s status as the highest-circulation newspaper in the country is in peril. (Well, the highest-circulation real real newspaper, anyway: I’ve described described USA Today as "the only newspaper in the world about which it can be said that reading it makes you know less than you did before".)

But before".)

But of course it looks increasingly unlikely that WSJ publisher Gordon Crovitz will will do such a thing. Rather, chances are it’ll be WSJ publisher Robert Thomson who makes that decision. Crovitz might still be prattling on prattling on about the future of the WSJ, but his days, it seems, are numbered.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on WSJ to Lose its Circulation Bragging Rights

Mark-to-Model on Wall Street: The Numbers

Nouriel Roubini hoists a

nice piece of detective work from his comments: Bernard has gone down the

list of Wall Street banks, looking at how much they have in the way of level

3 ("mark to model") assets, compared to their total equity. This is

a ratio I haven’t seen before (update: actually it

was in Jesse Eisinger’s November

cover story), but it’s certainly fascinating. Here are the results:

Bank Level 3 assets Equity Ratio
Morgan Stanley $88 billion $35 billion 2.51
Goldman Sachs $72 billion $39 billion 1.85
Lehman Brothers $35 billion $22 billion 1.59
Bear Stearns $20 billion $13 billion 1.54
Citigroup $135 billion $128 billion 1.05
Merrill Lynch $16 billion $42 billion 0.38

Says Bernard:

This becomes very interesting now, doesn’t it?

Looks to me like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are by far in the WORST

situation among the investment banks.

And yet the media is focusing all of their attention on Merrill Lynch—which

actually has by far THE LEAST EXPOSURE of all of them.

Now Merrill Lynch and Citigroup were leaders when it came to structuring CDOs;

Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs were not. So there’s a good chance that the

level-3 assets of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs are not nuclear-waste CDOs

but rather other products which might well have no impairment at all. Indeed,

in the case of Goldman, there’s a good chance that a large chunk of its level-3

assets represent short positions in the mortgage market, rather than

the long positions which scuppered Merrill and Citi.

Meanwhile, if you’re more interested in sheer magnitude than in the ratio,

Citigroup has a crazily enormous total amount of level-3 assets: $135 billion.

Has anybody bothered to chart that number over the past few years? I suspect

it’s much bigger now than it has been historically.

But if you’re looking for the next shoe to drop, I think that it might well

be Bear Stearns. If it wrote down anything like the proportion of level-3 assets

that Merrill Lynch did, it could put a serious debt in its total equity. And

Bear, of course, was a very big player in the mortgage market. Jimmy Cayne might

have dodged a bullet when the WSJ accused him of playing too much golf and occasionally

smoking a joint. But large fictional valuations on mortgage-backed securities?

That’s the kind of thing investors take seriously.

If I was running a Wall Street bank, then, I’d immediately come out and announce

exactly what proportion of my level-3 assets had a mortgage-backed component

to them. Unless and until that happens, questions will continue to surround

these institutions.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Mark-to-Model on Wall Street: The Numbers

Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

CIBC:

Citi’s math doesn’t add up

How

Messed Up is Citi?: "The SIVs may be why Citi held on to this crappy

paper when it should have dumped it. It would have required them to mark the

prices down of any similar paper held in their SIVs, something they would be

loath to do."

A,

B, C, D, E, F, Gphone: "My three-year-old had the best comment the

other day. He asked, "Is there an Hphone too daddy?" For sure — just

wait."

The

10 worst jobs in America: "Last year, models made a median hourly wage

of $11.22."

In

theory there is no difference between theory and practice. But in practice…:

A right-wing defense of cap-and-trade over a carbon tax. Not sure I like it,

although I agree with the conclusion.

What’s

behind the Fortress slaughter?

Cory Doctorow: A great

interview at kottke.org. Lots of blogonomics in there.

A

Few Thoughts on "The Plight of the Fortune Tellers"

Roubini’s

Nightmare: "One has to wonder whether this

is really Roubini’s nightmare or whether his real nightmare is that his bearish

forecasts (which I’ve been following/echoing) won’t come true." (By the

way, Nouriel, please stop committing the "ABX price = CDO price" fallacy.)

As

IAC Splits, Who Gets the Gehry?

Why

bankers, talk radio hosts, and baseball pitchers all get paid so much.

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

Citigroup Datapoint of the Day

Floyd

Norris:

We may be approaching a time when Citi’s stock would do better if it

did eliminate the dividend…

Such a cut would save the company $10.8 billion a year. As it happens, that

is just about the amount of the latest writedown.

On the other hand, if Citi abolished its dividend, that might turn the last

remaining bull on the stock bearish. You’ve got to have a bid from somewhere,

right?

Posted in banking, stocks | Comments Off on Citigroup Datapoint of the Day

Skill vs Luck in Investing

Greg Mankiw seems

to think quite highly of a speech

that investor Mark Sellers gave to MBA students at Harvard. But although

I’m a writer and Sellers says very nice things about writers,most of what he

has to say rings false to me. On the other hand, his speech does I think reveal

the prejudices of professional investors.

Sellers’s speech is about the qualities needed for someone to be a very successful

professional investor. He has a pretty clear criterion in mind, too: he uses

the phrase "able to compound money at 20% for your entire career"

three times in three paragraphs. Now in general there are two views about people

who fit that bill. The more common view is Sellers’s: that such people are truly

exceptional, that they almost come into the world that way ("by the time

you’re a teenager, if you don’t already have it, you can’t get it," he

writes), and that they share certain traits (Sellers enumerates seven).

The other view, by no means uncommon, is that if you had as many monkeys throwing

darts at stock tables as you have investors trying to beat the market, then

some small number of those monkeys would end up compounding money at 20% for

their entire career.

My view is that someone who has compounded money at 20% for say 15 years straight

is more likely to compound money by 20% this year than, say, the average monkey

with a dartboard. I also think that there probably is some rare skillset which

makes some people particularly good at investing money. But I think it’s incredibly

easy to overstate both effects, and I think that when it comes to trading (as

opposed to investing) strategies, it’s pretty much impossible for any individual

to consistently outperform.

Where I disagree strongly with Sellers is here:

A lot of you will turn out to be good, above average investors because you

are a skewed sample, the Harvard MBAs. A person can learn to be an above-average

investor. You can learn to do well enough, if youíre smart and hard

working and educated, to keep a good, high-paying job in the investment business

for your entire career. You can make millions without being a great investor.

You can learn to outperform the averages by a couple points a year through

hard work and an above-average IQ and a lot of study.

I simply don’t buy it. I don’t see that a Harvard MBA or a high IQ is either

necessary or sufficient to "outperform the averages by a couple points

a year". In fact, all you need in order to outperform the averages by a

couple of points a year is to buy the index and also sell a bunch of out-of-the-money

puts on it. That strategy will work perfectly for many years, until it doesn’t.

(The really gutsy players, of course, wait until the market is in panic mode,

and then start

selling puts.) At the same time, there are many more very bright people

who have lost millions in the stock market than there are very stupid people

who have lost millions in the stock market. Intelligence can be a double-edged

sword.

As for the idea that great investors are also very good writers, I don’t buy

it. (Do you know anybody who’s actually read an entire book by George Soros,

cover to cover?) And then there’s this, which I think is almost self-evidently

false:

A swing up or down over a relatively short time period is not a loss and

therefore not risk, unless you are prone to panicking at the bottom and locking

in the loss.

If Sellers were running Citi or Merrill, I guess, there wouldn’t have been

any write-downs at all: if you’re not selling at a loss, then there

can’t be any losses!

Now Sellers does make some good points along with the weak ones. An MBA won’t

make you a good investor. There’s a big difference between being a contrarian

in theory and being a contrarian in practice. People find it hard to learn from

their mistakes. But he doesn’t make the biggest and most important point of

all: to make money on the buy side, the most important qualification you can

have is to be lucky. The reason he doesn’t say this is because he’s an investor

himself. And I’m sure he’d rather think of himself as particularly skilled than

particularly lucky.

Posted in investing | Comments Off on Skill vs Luck in Investing

Automotive Datapoint of the Day

Shai

Agassi calculates that "the cost of the average used car in Europe

is now cheaper than the cost of gasoline to drive it for a year":

An average clunker across Europe, and there should be 100M or so cars in

Europe over the age of 8, is probably worth less than $5,000 to buy. Refueling

it for a year at 20 mpg, which is where the European fleet was on performance

10 years ago requires an average of 600+ gallons. As a result the average

used car owner will pay more than $5,000 for car energy supply for one year

– more than the car is worth.

(Via Anderson)

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on Automotive Datapoint of the Day

Name That Stock!

Two years ago, a benefactor donated a slug of stock to the Boys and Girls Club

of Pittsfield, Mass. Back then, it was "basically worthless," according

to John Donna, the club’s president. In December 2006, that stock was

sold for $14

million. Katie Zezima reports that "the club agreed not to disclose

who donated the stock or the company," but does it need to? If we can take

Zezima’s story at face value, we can probably assume that

  • The company was publicly listed at the end of 2005, but basically worthless

    – which probably means it went public at a much higher price some time

    before then.

  • By the end of 2006, the company had skyrocketed in value, quite possibly

    by a factor of more than 1,000.

  • Someone closely connected with the company has some kind of connection with

    Pittsfield, Mass.

There really can’t be many companies which fit this bill. Any ideas?

Posted in stocks | Comments Off on Name That Stock!

Las Vegas vs the Law of Large Numbers

Nassim Taleb likes to use Las Vegas as an example of a mathematical odds-based

business which exists in economic theory much more often than it exists in real

life. If you run a bunch of casinos with hundreds of thousands of punters coming

and and betting hundreds of millions of dollars, then you can predict with some

accuracy the amount of money you’re going to make at the end of the quarter:

it’s called the law of large numbers. Except just look at what’s

happened at Las Vegas Sands Corp:

The company had a very unlucky summer: Its “table games win percentage,”

which is the ratio of revenue from table games to chip purchases for those

games, was just 14.7%. That was down from 23.4% in the year-earlier quarter,

and an average of 22.9% over the prior 15 quarters — when it never dipped

lower than 16.1%…

Its take from table games reached a peak of 36.9% on chips purchased in the

fourth quarter of last year, and have declined each quarter since.

Now of course there’s more than just luck involved in these numbers. The more

time you spend at a table, and the higher your bets at that table, the greater

the percentage of your chips that you’re going to lose there. And a casino can

lose its touch when it comes to persuading punters to stay long and bet large.

Investors will be hoping that Sands is merely unlucky, rather than incompetent.

Posted in statistics | Comments Off on Las Vegas vs the Law of Large Numbers

Warren Buffett, Derivatives Speculator

There are nice safe hedgy options, and then there are dangerous, volatile,

and prone-to-blowing-up options, the kind of things which have a habit of biting

Victor

Niederhoffer in the ass. It’s these kind of options which Warren Buffett

famously referred to as "financial weapons of mass destruction". So

you can imagine my surprise when I read

this, this morning:

This year, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., the Omaha, Neb., holding company headed

by Mr. Buffett, has collected premiums of about $2.5 billion from selling

insurance on stock indexes and bonds in the form of derivative contracts,

which guarantee payment to the buyer in the event of a specific loss in an

underlying entity of the contracts.

Sounds to me like Buffett has been making billions of dollars doing one of

the riskiest derivatives trades there is: selling out-of-the-money puts.

Now this trade does sometimes (often, actually, during market panics) make

sense, and a lot of money. And one can usually make much higher risk-adjusted

returns selling out-of-the-money put options on the stock market than one can

buying structured products from investment banks. What’s more, Warren Buffett

has the first thing that anybody needs if they’re going to play this game: very,

very deep pockets. But still. Buffett? We always thought you nobler

than this.

Posted in derivatives | Comments Off on Warren Buffett, Derivatives Speculator

China Datapoint of the Day

Value of PetroChina on Friday: $456.6 billion.

Value of PetroChina on Monday: $1.004

trillion.

Posted in china, stocks | Comments Off on China Datapoint of the Day

Citi: Prince’s Ouster Ungags Bartiromo

Maria Bartiromo waited until Chuck Prince had left the building to start criticizing

him on the record for his role in bad-mouthing her earlier this year. (You

might recall no little innuendo about her relationship with the head of Citi’s

wealth-management unit, Todd Thomson.) Now, Bill Carter reports in the NYT:

Ten months later, she has some pointed words for members of the media who

accused her of unethical behavior, and for Citigroup, including, by name,

Mr. Prince…

She said she had been unfairly caught up in a management upheaval at Citigroup.

She suggested that her relationship with Mr. Thomson — which she conceded

was friendly but said was a source-reporter association — was used as

a diversionary tactic by Mr. Prince to cover whatever his underlying reasons

were for ousting Mr. Thomson.

“Something happened between Todd Thomson and Chuck Prince, and somehow

I got wrapped up in it,” Ms. Bartiromo said. “Clearly, there was

another agenda going on.”

It makes perfect sense that Bartiromo refrained from accusing Prince of "diversionary

tactics" while he was still CEO: Citi remains arguably the most important

company in America, from the perspective of a financial journalist, and there’s

no need to needlessly annoy its chief. That said, Bartiromo’s access to the

top tier of Citi executives does seem to be dwindling somewhat:

The Citigroup spokeswoman, Leah Johnson, said the company had no issues with

Ms. Bartiromo’s coverage. She conducted a prominent interview recently

with the Citigroup senior vice chairman, William Rose.

A prominent interview is an interview with a prominent individual. And the

chap in question can’t be that prominent if a NYT financial reporter,

not to mention all of his editors, have no idea who he is. There is no senior

vice chairman called William Rose; I believe that Johnson was probably referring

to Bill

Rhodes.

Posted in banking, Media | Comments Off on Citi: Prince’s Ouster Ungags Bartiromo

Citi: Looking Weak

Never mind the Rubin news; that was all but a given. And the Bischoff news

is not that much of a big deal either: the chap is the classic safe pair of

hands who will be competent enough at managing Citigroup that there isn’t an

unhealthy sense of urgency about finding a new CEO. (Merrill Lynch, by contrast,

sans any CEO at all, is in much more of a rush.) No: the really big

news this morning is Citi’s new losses. The WSJ reports

that

Citigroup also said it will write off between $8 billion and $11 billion

to reflect the declining value of subprime-mortgage-related securities since

Sept. 30.

This is a major problem, and we can expect another lurching drop in Citi shares

today. The new write-offs are just what Citi does not need, given its already-weak

capital position. The last time that Citi announced massive write-offs, the

stock rose, in the hope and expectation that all the bad news was now in the

past. This time, the bank won’t get off so easily.

It’s not hard to see where the write-offs are coming from: Citi, it turns out,

is warehousing

$11.7 billion in subprime-backed securities, just waiting to be able to sell

them. And that’s on top of $43 billion in "super-senior" subprime-backed

notes which it kept on purpose. What all of these illiquid securities are actually

worth is a question which simply can’t be answered with any degree of accuracy;

what’s certain is that a rash of recent ratings-agency downgrades has forced

any model with credit-rating inputs to spit out much lower valuations.

Meanwhile, the official Citi memo quotes

Bob Rubin and Win Bischoff as saying this:

Both of us will work closely with our Board and the talented operating and

executive leadership of Citi to maintain the momentum of our business during

this interim period.

Um. Citi’s momentum, right now, is downwards, and rapid. I really don’t think

they want to maintain it; rather, they want to reverse it.

That said, it’s not all bad at Citi. The bank has much greater global diversification

than any other US bank, which gives it a natural hedge against a weakening dollar

and US economy. Go to Poland or Mexico or Japan and Citi is a feared, not wounded,

giant. And its sheer size is awe-inspiring: there aren’t many companies on the

planet which could take $10 billion of write-downs and still potentially

make a profit in the fourth quarter.

Rubin and Bischoff do say in their memo that they "expect to get back

to our targeted capital ratios by the end of 2Q08, including paying the current

dividend", which is an ambitious target, I think, depending on what those

"targeted capital ratios" might be. If Citi can nurse itself back

into a healthy state by the middle of next year, even in the face of a slowdown

in US economic growth, then there might be cause for optimism. For the time

being, however, the financial markets will be right to treat Citi with great

caution. There’s really no reason that things shouldn’t get worse before they

get worse.

Posted in banking, defenestrations, stocks | Comments Off on Citi: Looking Weak

Paying Readers: The Results

The experiment

is over, and I have paid five of my readers for reading this blog; my total

outlay came to $5.12. The average (mean) bid was $380,952,457.64. The lowest

bid was one Zimbabwean cent; the highest was $8 billion. The highest winning

bid (the fifth-lowest bid) was $4.44.

I sent $0.41 to Riz Din, which is worth 20p. I sent $0.01 to Maio Liu. I didn’t

send one Zimbabwean cent to William Marshall, since PayPal doesn’t do Zimbabwean

cents, and the lowest amount I can send over PayPal would be many orders of

magnitude greater than that. I sent $0.25 to Daniel Naylor. And I sent $4.44

to Nick Lawler, who can pat himself on the back for successfully sending the

fifth-lowest bid.

I could have stopped there, since I paid out to the five lowest bids including

the bid of (essentially) $0, but I felt I should make five actual payments.

So I also paid $0.01 to Joel David Parsons, who bid $5 but had an automatic

rebid at 1 cent if his bid failed (which I thought was a bit sneaky, so I kind

of ignored the rebid in the first go-round).

In the end, then, I made five payments, totalling $5.12, of which Nick Lawler

received the lion’s share: 86.7%. I’m quite glad I didn’t need to choose between

the three different $5 bids. Here’s the full list, in chronological order:

$5 "on the chance you won’t get many replies"

$0.01 "if I am one of the five guys win,then I can get

at least one cent,and if I’m not,that means I must bid 0 cent to win,well,don’t

bother then"

One Zimbabwean cent

20p "equivalent to just over 40 cents"

$540.17 "for me to place a competitive bid, I’d be hoping

to win at most a few dollars (or perhaps pennies), an amount over which I’m

not excited about troubling you to pay me."

$79.97 "I predict you end up paying no more than $1.00

to all five combined"

$37.91

$20

$5 "If that bid fails, I would like to automatically rebid

at 1 cent."

$10 "that will buy me lunch and is the minimum amount

necessary to get me excited about winning"

$540.18 "Alternately, $50.00 donated to Oxfam America"

$30 "a sushi dinner for my wife and I"

$43.94 "Why that amount? Two weeks of venti lattes at

the Starbucks downstairs from my office."

$5 "though the nash equilibrium is 1 cent"

$250

$15

$16.79

$4.44

$6.40

$8 billion "There’s a slight chance that gmail routes

all your emails, except this one, into spam, after all."

$0.25 "I can use that quarter to buy Robert Kiyosaki a

clue."

Posted in blogonomics | Comments Off on Paying Readers: The Results

Extra Credit, Saturday Edition

Paulson

Funds Cut Bets Against Subprime Mortgages

Media

Maneuvers: Meta scoops: "The traditional definition of a scoop is that

you got something first. The new definition is that you were the first in the

neighborhood to yak about it. The O’Neal defenestration featured both."

Subtracting

the "IBM" from the ThinkPad: Three data points on technology,

the U.S. and East Asia.

PR

Shops In Flame War: You really have to read this to believe it.

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Saturday Edition

Art and Architecture at Auction

I’ve been guest-blogging over at Figure Painting today: I have an entry up

defending

auction houses, and another about auctioning

houses. Amazingly, I managed to avoid talking about mechanism design in

either of them.

Posted in architecture, art | Comments Off on Art and Architecture at Auction

Chuck Prince Deathwatch: Keep an Eye on Medina-Mora

The

WSJ is reporting that Citigroup is holding an emergency board meeting this

weekend, and that Chuck Prince’s ouster might be on the agenda:

It wasn’t clear precisely what the meeting would address, but the subject

of further writedowns could come up. The board may also consider the future

of Chief Executive Charles Prince, according to people close to the company.

Robert Rubin, the former Treasury secretary who is the chairman of Citigroup’s

executive committee, is being considered as a possible interim replacement,

but he has balked at taking on the responsibility, those people said.

There’s really very little that Rubin would gain from taking on the job. His

reputation is ironclad right now, and he hardly needs the money: the downside

would be vastly greater than the upside.

Instead, if Prince is ousted and the board wants either a temporary or a permanent

CEO, they might end up choosing Manuel

Medina-Mora, the man who took Banamex public and eventually sold it to Citigroup

as the largest and most successful bank in Mexico. The guy has a proven track

record of running a commercial bank, which is more than any of the other potential

candidates can say, and he’s been a senior Citigroup executive for long enough

now that he must know the company reasonably well.

Update: The WSJ now reports that Prince will

resign on Sunday, jumping before he is pushed.

Posted in banking, defenestrations | Comments Off on Chuck Prince Deathwatch: Keep an Eye on Medina-Mora

GDP in Technicolor

Greg Mankw gets

an email from the White House, which says, quite rightly, that GDP figures

are "no fun unless you have a picture". I think it’s very pretty:

gdp%2Bgrowth.jpg

Posted in economics | Comments Off on GDP in Technicolor

Why Wall Street CEOs Get Paid So Much

Robert

Reich thinks that Wall Street CEOs get paid more than their Main Street

counterparts because they’re liars:

There’s no reason to believe Wall Street executives have been smarter

than executives in the real, non-financial economy. They’ve been paid

more because they’ve been smarter at creating schemes that have only

appeared to create value, while keeping investors in the dark.

The first part is probably true: while Wall Street CEOs are generally pretty

smart, Main Street CEOs are pretty smart too. Not that pay should really be

correlated to intelligence anyway: a lot of very clever people have proven themselves

excellent at destroying billions of dollars in value over the years.

And the second part certainly has a large element of truth to it as well. The

profits for which Stan O’Neal got paid $46 million last year were not the kind

of profits any shareholder would, in hindsight, have wanted.

But none of this really explains the enormity of Wall Street pay packages.

After all, there are many non-financial firms which made just as much money

last year as Merrill Lynch, and precious few of them paid their CEOs $46 million.

I think that one of the big reasons why Wall Street CEOs make so much money

is that they actually make much less money than their non-financial

counterparts if their take-home pay is expressed as a mulitple of the firm’s

average salary. On Wall Street, everybody is very highly paid, not just the

CEOs. And in most firms there’s a star trader or two who actually makes more

money than the CEO in any given year.

On Wall Street the measure of success is the size of your pay package, much

more than it is on Main Street – which helps to explain those Brobingnagian

checks at the end of each year.

And then there’s the fact that ultimately the bank’s revenue has to go somewhere

– and if it doesn’t go to the employees, it will go to the shareholders.

But shareholders just aren’t as important on Wall Street as they are elsewhere.

Up until pretty recently, the likes of Goldman Sachs and Lazard Freres and Blackstone

were all privately held; there are still pretty large banks, like Rothschild,

which see no reason to go public and do very well for themselves. And if the

banks don’t really need their sharholders, those shareholders don’t have too

much ability to push for a bigger slice of the pie for themselves.

Posted in banking, pay | Comments Off on Why Wall Street CEOs Get Paid So Much

ABX, RIP

Required reading from

Alea today on the subject of the notorious ABX subprime indices. We’ve been

here before, many times, but no one ever seems to learn: the ABX indices do

not measure bond prices. They do not give an indication of

what subprime-backed bonds are worth in terms of cents on the dollar. If the

triple-A ABX index is at 79, that does

not

mean

that

AAA tranches of CDO trade at, or are worth, 79 cents on the dollar.

What’s more, the ABX tranches always refer to the weakest tranche

of any given bond. They are also much less liquid than you might think: Alea

provides the bid-ask spreads, which are a minimum of 8 points on the

most recent series. (Interestingly, the older, "off-the-run" series

seem to be more liquid, weirdly enough.)

And none of this matters much in any event, since, as Alea tells us:

The ABX

will soon be dead, according to analysts at Wachovia only 3 deals qualify

for the next roll in january (20 are needed).

The ABX remains, for all its faults, the best and most transparent instrument

we have for valuing subprime debt. But its weaknesses are legion, and maybe

its disappearance might help prevent a lot of lazy thinking and journalism.

Posted in derivatives, housing | Comments Off on ABX, RIP

Bloomberg Pushes a Carbon Tax

Mike Bloomberg today has a very

important speech advocating a carbon tax; he explicitly prefers it to a

cap-and-trade approach. I’m very glad that Bloomberg and other civic leaders

are pushing hard on this, even as I disagree with him on the subject of cap-and-trade.

The NYT’s Sewell Chan tries to get to the nub of the argument, but fails:

Most economists consider a carbon tax a more effective instrument for reducing

greenhouse gas emissions than the other major policy alternative, a cap-and-trade

system that would require plant-by-plant emission measurements and could prompt

companies to cheat.

This is just silly. You can’t tax something without measuring it; both a carbon

tax and a cap-and-trade system can be implemented as far upstream or downstream

as you like. So the measurement and incentive-to-cheat problems are the same

in both cases.

Now the vast majority of Bloomberg’s speech makes a great deal of sense. He

comes out strongly against subsidizing corn-based ethanol, for instance –

something he has the luxury of being able to do because he’s not worried about

Iowa primaries. And his arguments against a cap-and-trade system are certainly

eloquent:

If all industries are going to be affected, and the worst polluters are going

to pay more, why not simplify matters for companies by charging a direct pollution

fee? It’s like making one right turn instead of three left turns. You

end up going in the same direction, but without going around in a circle first…

The costs will be the same under either plan — and if anything, they

will be higher under cap-and-trade, because middlemen will be making money

off the trades. (I happen to love middlemen. They use Bloomberg terminals

and support my daughters. But what’s right is right!)

I do understand this argument: a carbon tax is simple, whereas a cap-and-trade

system has a lot more moving parts and therefore has a greater chance of underperforming

its potential. But Bloomberg does set up a bit of a straw man when he attacks

cap-and-trade: he seems to believe that a cap-and-trade system would generate

no revenue for the government, while any good cap-and-trade system would in

fact auction off emissions permits for many billions of dollars.

And when Bloomberg says that a carbon tax would result in "greater carbon

reductions for the environment," I’m not convinced. It seems to me that

if you want to guarantee carbon reductions, you should cap them, rather than

simply taxing them. But I’m still open

to persuasion. Can someone show me the argument which compellingly demonstrates

that a carbon tax would reduce carbon emissions more than a cap-and-trade system?

(Via Komanoff)

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on Bloomberg Pushes a Carbon Tax

How Mark Zuckerberg is Like Howard Dean

Facebook saw its valuation skyrocket back in May, when it announced it was

opening up its platform to third-party developers. Except… the Facebook platform

isn’t really open, as Marc Andreessen explained

shortly after its launch. Now, Andreessen’s

Ning and Rupert

Murdoch’s Myspace have both signed on to the new de facto standard

for social networking applications, Google’s Open Social. It does everything

that the Facebook platform does, and a little bit more, and it reaches an order

of magnitude more potential users.

I’m reminded of when Vermont started allowing civil unions for gay couples

– at the time, it was considered a great and brave and controversial thing

to do. Nowadays, civil unions are the cop-out, weak-assed compromise: it’s gay

marriage which is the real issue. Similarly, the Facebook platform has gone

from ahead of the curve to behind the curve pretty much overnight. My guess

is that Facebook will (be forced to) join Open Social sooner rather than later.

Its first-mover advantage has now become a liability.

Posted in technology | Comments Off on How Mark Zuckerberg is Like Howard Dean

TV vs Blogs, Jargon Edition

The lack of interactivity on television seems to be haunting Bloomberg. Paul

Kedrosky is watching TV:

Bloomberg TV is apparently watching Fox Business News. The same way that

Fox is making a point of trying to force guests and host to avoid biz jargon,

or at least define it, in the last few minutes I have seen a Bloomberg host

ask a guest to explain backwardation, contango, and a steepening yield curve.

It’s all good, but the guests should be warned beforehand. Both guests looked

like they had been unexpectedly asked why they breathe regularly.

Note that Kedrosky himself, writing in an interactive medium (a blog) feels

no need to define these terms. Maybe he’s just trying to make his readers feel

smart, a la Tyler

Cowen, but in fact he knows full well that if anybody wants to know what

any of these terms means, they’re by definition online, if they’re reading his

blog, and it’s the work of seconds to find out. Someone watching TV, by contrast,

has no easy way of remembering which is which when it comes to backwardation

and contango, which puts Bloomberg TV in an impossible situation. Do they not

define the terms, and risk confusing their viewers, or do they take time to

define the terms, and risk patronising them?

Posted in Media | Comments Off on TV vs Blogs, Jargon Edition

Adventures in Alternative Investments, Medallion Edition

“This is one of the best investments — better than Merrill Lynch,

which is going down the drain,” said a driver, Mahmoud Sadakah, 42.

“This is a guaranteed investment, because it will never go down.”

The market in NYC taxi medallions is a weird one, to be sure: it seems to only

ever go up, no matter what happens to interest rates. A corporate medallion

– one where the owner is not required to drive the car – sold

last month for

$426,000. Which makes the medallions sold yesterday to drivers – at

prices from $278,000 to $385,000 – almost seem cheap.

Posted in cities | Comments Off on Adventures in Alternative Investments, Medallion Edition

Investment Banks: Much Room to Fall Further

Floyd

Norris has a chart today which puts the recent share-price drops at Merrill,

Citi, Bear and the like in context. Yes, they’re down from their highs, but

the broker-dealers in general have massively outperformed the rest of the stock

market over the past few years. It’s easy to see why investors – including

Jim Rogers – think there’s a lot more room left on the downside for

these stocks, and why it’s going to be hard to attract a new CEO for Merrill

Lynch if his compensation is based on the share price going up from here.

Posted in banking, stocks | Comments Off on Investment Banks: Much Room to Fall Further

Merrill: The Latest Victim of a WSJ Attack

There’s definitely a sensationalist edge to the WSJ these days. It’s banging

the Jimmy Cayne drum for the second day running, with a story misleadingly headlined

"CEO

of Crisis-Hit Bear Denies He Used Marijuana": for one thing, the Bear

Stearns crisis has passed, and for another thing its CEO said nothing about

marijuana use specifically.

Meanwhile, the paper is also setting its sights on Merrill Lynch, with a lead

story by Susan Pulliam on deals

that Merrill Lynch is doing with hedge funds. It kicks off like this:

Merrill Lynch & Co., in a bid to slash its exposure to risky mortgage-backed

securities, has engaged in deals with hedge funds that may have been designed

to delay the day of reckoning on losses, people close to the situation said.

Pulliam spends a lot of time explaining that the deals – where Merrill

promises to buy back mortgage-backed securities at prices higher than it paid

for them – do not reduce the bank’s exposure to those securities. So why

on earth does she say at the very beginning of the article that the move is

"a bid to slash its exposure to risky mortgage-backed securities"

when it clearly isn’t?

These deals are clearly about liquidity, not solvency. If I sell $1 billion

of mortgage-backed bonds today, and promise to buy them back at a slightly higher

price in a year’s time, I haven’t reduced my exposure to those bonds. But I

have got myself $1 billion of cash to play with for the next 365 days,

which is a hell of a lot more useful than a billionish of illiquid RMBS.

If you haven’t read it yet, do go check out Eric

Dash’s piece on The Entity which appeared in the NYT yesterday. It’s a "stopgap",

he explains:

The fund is not a rescue plan. Rather, it is intended to give the SIVs breathing

room so they can avoid selling their assets all at once, and perhaps enable

a few of them, largely those sponsored by big banks, to work out a survival

strategy.

“People get the idea that this is a total solution or a complete rescue,”

a person involved in the plan said. “But the goal is actually much less

ambitious: it is really to provide an orderly unwind or promote a restructuring.”

If you look at the Merrill deals in this light, they’re unexceptionable. But

the WSJ seems to be hell-bent on putting anything that a bank does into the

worst possible light.

Update: Murray has more detail in the comments, saying

that these deals don’t improve the liquidity of the bank, since they’re

confined to off-balance-sheet entities.

Update 2: Merrill has released a formal

response to the WSJ article.

This morning, an article in the Wall Street Journal about Merrill Lynch &

Co., Inc., relying on unidentified sources, speculated about inappropriate

transactions that “may have been designed” to avoid write-downs

that “might have been” required earlier in the year. The story

is non-specific and relies on unidentified sources. We have no reason to believe

that any such inappropriate transactions occurred. Such transactions would

clearly violate Merrill Lynch policy.

Update 3: The WSJ belatedly

corrects its article.

Posted in banking, Media | Comments Off on Merrill: The Latest Victim of a WSJ Attack