Why China’s Wealth Fund is Right to Invest Domestically

Keith Bradsher reports that China’s

$200 billion sovereign wealth fund will be investing mainly in China, its

much-ballyhooed stake in Blackstone notwithstanding. This is a smart and sensible

decision. As Sudip Roy says

in this month’s Euromoney, it can often make sense for emerging-market funds

to be more domestically focused:

Unlike Norway, for example, whose economy has matured to the point where

recycling the government fund’s wealth back into the country would probably

do more harm than good, Brazil’s emerging economy would be arguably

better served if its sovereign fund had a bias towards local investments.

That type of policy would provide a boost to economic development, growth

and diversification.

Bradsher concentrates in his article mainly on the political downsides of investing

abroad, rather than the economic upside of investing domestically. Now it’s

true that China, with its enormous domestic savings rate, needs less domestic

investment than does Brazil, whose domestic savings rate is minuscule. But if

the fund can help keep the Chinese banking system solvent, that’s a pretty good

outcome right there.

Posted in economics | Comments Off on Why China’s Wealth Fund is Right to Invest Domestically

Blogonomics: Why Blogs Won’t Make Lots of Money for Millionaires

Scott Adams, the multimillionaire creator of the Dilbert comic strip, doesn’t

like doing anything which doesn’t make him money. This conflicted with his blogging,

the income from which was very small. Yes, we’ve

been here before. But this time it’s not about Adams’s book, it’s about

Adams’s blogging. He has decided to blog

less, and also blog less controversially. Why? Because blogging in general

doesn’t make him much money, and controversial blogging in particular loses

him Dilbert readers and therefore – he thinks – actually loses him

money. He writes:

It’s hard to tell the family I can’t spend time with them because

I need to create free content on the Internet that will lower our income.

The phrase "disingenuous douchebag" comes to mind. If Scott Adams

wants to spend more time with his family and less time blogging, that’s entirely

up to him. But that’s not a financial decision. The fact is that for someone

with Adams’s wealth and income, the marginal dollars made or lost from blogging

are never going to be particularly important.

A successful blog makes the same amount of money whether its author is rich

or poor, and whether he lives in New York or Bangalore. If Scott Adams really

thought his blog would make a significant difference to the income of an internationally-syndicated

cartoonist, he was surely disabused of that notion a very long time ago. But

still he uses it as some kind of crutch, first to justify the removal of old

blog entries (and their comments) so that he can monetize them in book form,

and now to justify his decision to stop saying controversial things and to publish

only truncated RSS feeds.

Normally, I’m the kind of person who celebrates the diversity of the blogosphere:

I don’t see much sense in generalizing about "bloggers" as a group.

But I’m pretty sure that most of us consider it quite wonderful that we can

"create free content on the Internet" whenever we like; we don’t do

it grudgingly, as though every blog entry were some kind of act of charity directed

at our readers. Scott Adams, it seems, is the exception to that rule.

(Via Sennett)

Posted in blogonomics | Comments Off on Blogonomics: Why Blogs Won’t Make Lots of Money for Millionaires

The Strategy of Capital Injection

At the risk of repeating the mistake

I made with the Bank of America – Countrywide deal, I have to say I like

this Citadel

– E*Trade deal a lot. The total cash infusion of $2.5 billion is actually

larger than E*Trade’s market capitalization, yet Citadel will end up with only

20% of the firm; the rest will be made up of E*Trade debt and lots of asset-backed

securities. Citadel should make money on all three legs of the deal –

the cash infusion is big enough that E*Trade’s solvency is no longer in doubt,

which in turn means that bonds paying 12.5% are going to be very valuable over

their lifetime. And Citadel has proved itself an expert in buying distressed

assets, so one assumes they’re getting a good deal on the other bonds they’re

buying.

In fact, if you read Valerie

Bauerlein’s piece on the BofA deal, even that one doesn’t necessarily look

quite as idiotic as some might think given the continued implosion of Countrywide’s

share price.

If Countrywide’s stock goes all the way to zero, then BofA is in a prime position

to convert its debt to equity and acquire the company on the cheap – it

even has an official right of first refusal on the firm.

Bank of America also has the right to meet any competitor’s bid. Some analysts

say Mr. Lewis is prepared to sacrifice some of his initial investment if it

meant he got a better deal on buying Countrywide assets, such as its product

suite and loan-processing technology.

"He did it to plant a flag and keep others away," said bank analyst

Nancy Bush of NAB Research in Aiken, S.C. She compares the Countrywide strategy

to the bank’s snapping up credit-card giant MBNA Corp. in 2005, largely to

keep it out of the hands of competitors such as cross-town rival Wachovia

Corp.

Indeed, BofA has more than pole position in terms of buying Countrywide. Its

deal also acts as a bit of a poison pill for anybody else who might be interested:

Bank of America points out that if Countrywide were to seek bankruptcy-law

protection, the bank would be in line to be repaid behind bondholders but

ahead of common shareholders. If any other party purchased Countrywide, the

new owner would still be on the hook for the full $2 billion obligation.

All the same dynamics are likely to be in place with the Citadel investment.

Ken Griffin is not the kind of person who shies away from taking over underperforming

companies, and if E*Trade continues to struggle, he’ll be very well placed to

simply absorb the whole thing.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on The Strategy of Capital Injection

And You Thought Bear Stearns Was Looking Cheap

Ah, those storied names. Dillon Read. SG Warburg. PaineWebber. Pactual. The

reputations, the brands, the cashflow. Priceless. Literally.

According to Credit Suisse (which admittedly might not be the most impartial

arbiter in such matters), the value that the market is putting on all of UBS’s

investment-banking businesses combined is actually negative.

Not even a coupla bucks for that trading floor up in Stamford. I guess the First

Boston guys picked the right Swiss bank to sell to.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on And You Thought Bear Stearns Was Looking Cheap

Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

Wall

Street Rumor: Paulson leaving Treasury to run Citigroup

The

Liquidity Crunch Deepens: 2-month Euribor hits new highs.

Loan

Radar: Syndie loan bankers revert to type: "This month has seen BHP

Billiton informally line up a $70bn loan, Rio Tinto launch $40bn and Nestle

wrap up a €6bn loan. No sign of liquidity problems there."

The

Ultimate Holiday Gift for Anyone in the Financial Industry

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

Blogonomics: How a New Blog is Born

Some of the blogs linking to Andrew

Clavell since I wrote

about his

Citigroup analysis yesterday afternoon: Paul

Kedrosky, FT

Alphaville, Fintag,

peHUB, DealBreaker,

Tim

Price. There’s even a chap

in India.

The main effect of all this attention seems to be that Clavell’s photo has

disappeared from his website, although it’s still there

on Seeking Alpha, where Clavell has received four comments on top of the seven

comments on his own site.

Clavell is not an A-list blogger yet, far from it. But when people tell me

that it’s much harder to break in to the blogging world now than it was a couple

of years ago, I’m not convinced. Even if you’re brand-new

to the blogging scene and unknown, a smart post or two will get you up and

running in no time, and aggregators such as Seeking Alpha and the Huffington

Post will help you get there with if anything even less difficulty than there

was in the past.

Posted in blogonomics | Comments Off on Blogonomics: How a New Blog is Born

RPX: The Housing Futures Market With a Transaction Count

After posting my entry

about house-price futures yesterday, a loyal reader tipped me off to another

entity dealing in such things here in the US: Radar

Logic’s RPX. Again, I have no idea how liquid these things are, but the

one thing they do have is a historical

data section on their website, where you can chart price per square foot

in any of 25 different metropolitan areas from Atlanta to Washington. The price

charts tend to be pretty much what you might expect: a long climb for most of

the decade, and then a turnaround more recently. But underneath the price chart

is something they call the "transaction count", which measures not

the price per square foot but the number of transactions taking place in the

market at that time. Here’s the chart for Miami:

miami.jpg

Miami’s price per square foot hit a high of $207.94 in June 2006; it’s now

retreated almost 10% to $187.40, which is the same as its level in October 2005.

But back in October 2005, as you can see, the market was booming, with the transaction

count up around the 10,000 level; it peaked somewhere over 12,000. Today, the

transaction count is closer to 3,000, and falling. They’re never going to clear

their excess inventory at that rate.

Oh, and in case you find such datapoints useful, the one-year forward average

national house price is about 11.25% lower than the current price of $262.86

per square foot.

Posted in housing | Comments Off on RPX: The Housing Futures Market With a Transaction Count

Thought Experiment of the Day

Ranjan

Bhaduri sets up the "balls in the hat game":

The game consists of a hat that contains 6 black balls and 4 white balls.

The player picks balls from the hat and gains $1 for each white ball, and

loses $1 for each black ball. The selection is done without replacement. At

the end of each pick, the player may choose to stop or continue. The player

has the right to refuse to play (i.e. not pick any balls at all). Given these

rules, and a hat containing 6 black balls and 4 white balls, would you play?

No, I wouldn’t play, even knowing that mathematically speaking there’s a positive

expected value to playing the game. One reason I wouldn’t play is that the positive

EV comes only if you know exactly what you’re doing – and I don’t.

I picked a random easy-to-calculate strategy: keep on picking balls out of

the hat until you reach a black ball, or four white balls, and then stop. With

that strategy, you’ll lose about 13 cents on average. Meanwhile, the optimum

strategy apparently generates a positive yield of less than 7 cents, on average.

I don’t know what it is, but it hardly seems worth it.

(Via Abnormal

Returns)

Posted in economics | Comments Off on Thought Experiment of the Day

Sovereign Wealth Fund Datapoints of the Day

More from the December Euromoney, this time from Sudip

Roy’s cover story on sovereign wealth funds. Two datapoints jumped out at

me:

"For all of the headlines being generated by the investments in the

US and Europe, it’s a fraction of the money that’s going to the

emerging markets," says Michael Philipp, chairman of Europe, Middle East

and Africa at Credit Suisse in London, who estimates that as much as 80% to

90% of sovereign wealth money is being invested in emerging markets…

Many of the funds are attracted to China. Take Industrial and Commercial Bank

of China’s record-breaking $19.1 billion IPO last year, for example.

Several sovereign funds participated in the deal, particularly funds from

the Middle East, including Kuwait Investment Authority, Adia and QIA. Indeed,

more than half of the top 15 allocations for the IPO went to Middle East investors.

Frankly, I don’t believe the first one. Given the size and the risk aversion

of Norway’s sovereign wealth fund alone (not to mention the likes of Alaska’s),

I can’t imagine that more than 80% of all money in sovereign wealth funds is

invested in emerging markets. On a flow level, however, Philipp might be right:

it could well be that the overwhelming majority of new money flowing

into sovereign wealth funds is being invested in EM. And given that these funds

are likely to multiply in size over the next few years, it’s clear where the

wind is blowing.

I’m also fascinated by the ties between a state-owned Chinese bank, on the

one hand, and state-owned Middle Eastern wealth funds, on the other. Once upon

a time, the main qualification needed to play an important role in international

diplomacy was fluency in French. Nowadays, you’re infinitely better off if you

have control over a multi-billion dollar sovereign wealth fund which can buy

equity stakes anywhere in the world.

Posted in geopolitics, investing | Comments Off on Sovereign Wealth Fund Datapoints of the Day

John Reed for Citigroup CEO!

Things are pretty bad at Citigroup right now: its tier 1 capital, while above

the federally-mandated level of 6%, is below its own internal target of 7.5%.

But things were much worse in 1990, when that same ratio was just 3.26%. Back

then, the very existence of Citicorp as a continuing entity was in doubt; now,

with a market capitalization of over $160 billion, the bank remains a giant.

But in the December issue of Euromoney (behind a subscriber firewall, alas),

there’s an interesting

column saying that in terms of leadership, at least, Citi was much better

off then, under John Reed, than it is now.

What did Reed and his board do? They rolled up their sleeves and went to

work…

Reed… set out a two-year turnaround plan to rebuild margins and operating

earnings to absorb credit write-offs; he slashed the expense ratio from 70%

to 55.5% and the bank raised capital, shedding assets, famously placing shares

with Saudi prince Alwaleed Bin Talal, and selling cumulative preferred stock

with a hefty coupon to institutions.

The bank’s top 15 executives met for one full day every month to hammer

through these plans. It was painful and difficult. But, arguably, it was Reed’s

and the bank’s finest hour…

The difference, this time, is that the bank lacks leadership…

Corporate governance, proper management accountability and avoiding payments

for failure are questions Citi and the whole industry must urgently confront.

The sight of senior executives disappearing with their huge pay-offs at the

first signs of trouble, leaving a giant mess for others to clean up, is the

most disgraceful aspect of the whole wretched business.

Clearly, there’s only one thing for it. Bring back John Reed as CEO!

Posted in banking | Comments Off on John Reed for Citigroup CEO!

In Praise of Cutting Dividends

What is the relationship between a stock’s dividend and its price? Complicated,

obviously. The best-performing stocks and companies often have no dividend at

all – Microsoft paid out $0 from the date of its IPO all the way through

to its all-time high at the beginning of 2000. And companies which announce

big changes in their dividend don’t always see much in the way of stock moves:

when Microsoft started paying dividends in 2003, the stock went nowhere.

This all makes intuitive sense. Shareholders generally own stock in any given

company because they believe in management’s ability to get attractive returns

on capital. If a company retains its earnings rather than paying them out in

dividends, that just means there’s more capital for them to get attractive returns

on. Besides, shareholders still own that money, either way.

More generally, there is some optimum level of dividends for any company. The

more that the dividend differs from that level, in either direction,

the more that the share price should fall.

Yet Paul Murphy, today, seems

convinced that the only natural order of the world is that higher dividend

= higher share price.

We’ve been slow to recognise that one aspect of the ongoing credit

malarky, is that amongst both market participants and market observers, many

are increasingly ready to read “down” as “up,” “red”

as “black”, and “bad” as “good.” Witness

Monday’s 215 spike on the Dow. Witness,

even, Portfolio’s Felix Salmon:

…while Citi’s shareholders are by no means guaranteed their

dividend. On the other hand, any cut in the dividend might conceivably result

in a rise in Citi’s share price, if shareholders are convinced it

would put the bank on a much more sustainable footing going forwards.

Yes, cut the divi and the stock’s a ‘buy,’ apparently.

Well, I wouldn’t go that far. But I certainly don’t think that cutting the

dividend is necessarily bad for financial stocks, "credit malarky"

or no. Just look at Freddie Mac today: it cut

its dividend in half – and announced further equity dilution, to boot

– and yet soared by more than 9% at the opening bell as a result.

Might Citi find itself in the same boat? I don’t see why not. Yes, it does

have a good number of shareholders who have come to rely on that dividend and

who would be very unhappy were it to be cut. But what are they going to do,

sell the stock at these depressed levels? That would only compound the injury.

Meanwhile, Citi’s bolstered capitalization would help it regain its lost and

latent strength.

If you went to business school, you might have been taught at some point that

the value of a stock is simply the net present value of future dividends. On

that view, a dividend cut is likely to hurt the share price unless the company

can compellingly persuade shareholders that there will be an offsetting, larger

dividend increase in the future. But no one really believes that model of pricing

equities, especially now that the technology sector has shown that companies

can grow in share price and size more or less indefinitely without paying any

dividends at all. In the real world, cutting back on dividend payments can be

a smart thing for a board to do. Maybe if Freddie’s board had cut the dividend

entirely, its stock would have risen even further.

Posted in stocks | Comments Off on In Praise of Cutting Dividends

Chart of the Day: Sock Manufacturing in the US

Pie

charts are generally anathema to Tufte-heads and other connoisseurs of chartistry:

they use far too much space to convey far too little information. But I like

the one at the right, from an NPR

story about Fort Payne, Alabama – the former "sock capital of

the world".

As you can see, the US sock-manufacturing industry is a shadow of its former

self. And naturally, its decline is blamed on competition from abroad; Fort

Payne’s sock manufacturers are lobbying for the US to impose a tariff of about

14% on imported socks.

The NPR story does note that the sock jobs lost in Fort Payne have been replaced

by higher-paying ones, leading Tim Schilling to start channeling

Tom Friedman:

This is a classic example of how the dropping of trade barriers works. And

it also provides a classic example of Schumpeter’s idea of "creative

destruction" – how dynamic economies destroy old industries, replacing

them with new industries. The new industries generally provide better paying

jobs, and may require higher skill levels.

Except I can’t help but feel both sides are wrong here. Removing trade tariffs

didn’t cause the decline of the Fort Payne sock industry, nor did it cause that

industry to be replaced by metal tube manufacturers. Here’s the crucial bit

of the story:

Back in 1984, the U.S. wanted to help the poor Central American nation of

Honduras — where democracy had only just replaced a military dictatorship

— by allowing duty-free exports of socks whose toes were seamed there.

Today, Baker wants the U.S. to rescind that deal and re-impose the old sock

tariff of somewhere around 14 percent.

Yep, 1984. Fast-forward 15 years, and you get to the first pie chart, where

the US has a 76% market share of sock manufacturing. I doubt it was the 1984

tariff reduction which was responsible for the move seen between 1999 and 2006.

Maybe it’s just that Fort Payne’s factories could be put to more profitable

use in other industries – and maybe globalization and reduced sock tariffs

have absolutely nothing to do with it.

Posted in charts, economics | Comments Off on Chart of the Day: Sock Manufacturing in the US

And You May Find Yourself in a Beautiful House…

One of my favorite bloggers ventures

into political-economy territory: was the subprime-mortgage bubble responsible

for the re-election of George W Bush in 2004?

I wonder if the mortgage and credit debacle is a clue. Could it reveal one

of the reasons poor or working people voted for Bush last time around? I wonder,

because for working folks voting Republican is usually and traditionally a

vote for Big Business, and therefore against the working man’s self

interest.

<Lucid 770-word explanation of the subprime bubble and bust>

Meanwhile the recipients — the workingmen and women who are barely eking

by — suddenly have loan offers thrown at them by the truckload. They

feel richer, more flush; things are going well it seems, and their situations

improving. It’s not so hard to pay the bills. They worry less and sleep

more. A sense of blissfully ignorant well-being pervades the land. The working

class and the under- and unemployed assume that the Republicans are somewhat

responsible for this new (virtual) wealth — and maybe they were. It

would follow that Mr. Joe Average might vote for the administration seemingly

responsible for his new sense of well-being.

I’d need to go back and look to see how big the subprime mortgage industry

was in November 2004; my feeling is that the era of crazy excess liquidity was

yet to come. The housing bubble predates the subprime-mortgage bubble: in fact,

you need a few years of housing bubble to get the low subprime default rates

necessary to inflate the subprime-mortgage bubble.

But the housing bubble was certainly well established by November 2004, a large

majority of Americans own their own houses, and any home-owning American’s net

worth probably grew substantially during the first George W Bush administration.

Which is not to say that incumbents always win elections if there’s a housing

bubble: look at what just happened in Australia, or at what happened in Spain

in 2004. But at the margin, it makes intuitive sense that a suddenly-wealthier

population might be more inclined to vote for the status quo.

Posted in housing, Politics | Comments Off on And You May Find Yourself in a Beautiful House…

Welcome Andrew Clavell

After writing yesterday’s

post about the coupon on Citi’s mandatory convertible, I stuck around Andrew

Clavell’s new blog, Financial Crookery,

to see what else he’d written. And boy is this guy excellent: I’ve already added

him to the blogroll, despite the fact that he’s only published nine blog entries

so far.

He started off with a wonderful

evisceration of the financial advice given to a friend of his by a UK "independent

financial adviser" – advice which was, essentially, "put all

your money into investments which pay me the highest commission".

He then looked into the sum

total of mortgage-related losses, making this excellent point along the

way:

Whatever the losses really are, this is all there will be. However

many times the risk is sliced and diced in ABSs, CDOs, CDO squareds, CPDOs

will not change the global picture.

He’s also very astute when it comes to John

Thain’s salary as CEO of Merrill Lynch:

I am all for incentivisation. But lets not delude ourselves that this is

what the compensation package achieves. Thain has a number of decisions about

Merrill’s future strategy to consider, admittedly. Yet I simply can’t see

any of those decisions having the fraction of the effect on the stock price

than the effect of the eventual resolution of the credit debacle over the

next 18-24 months. If the crisis is weathered, MER will be up $20 and $40,

even if Thain has sat in his office twiddling his thumbs (apparently he isn’t

a golfer). If things turn even uglier, so will MER. Anyone thinking that Thain’s

pending decisions will materially impact whatever transpires in "the

great credit market resolution" should email me whatever they are smoking.

The seeds have already been sown and the game will play out automatically,

if you pardon the mixed metaphor.

He can take well-aimed

digs at hedge fund managers (which is why it’s a bit weird that he seems

to like one-note hedge-fund apologist Veryan

Allen), as well as take a very sophisticated look at the

impact of loan covenants on share prices.

So Clavell is well ensconced in my feed reader, as he should be in yours.

And a very big tip of the hat to Seeking

Alpha, without whom I would never have found Clavell’s site.

Posted in Media | 1 Comment

Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Simons

at Renaissance Cracks Code, Doubling Assets: Jim Simons grants an interview

to Bloomberg’s Richard Teitelbaum.

CPDOs Bloodbath

[continued]

Subprime

Near a Bottom? Most bonds have a natural recovery value of at least 20 cents

or so. Low-tranche subprime RMBS? Not so much. I reckon if they’re trading at

20 (which they’re not, but the ABX BBB index is at 20) then that just means

they have 20 points of downside to go.

Ode

to a giant saltstick

Builders

of masterpieces: The Compagnons.

"Cyber

Scholars": A short profile of Mark Thoma. When will journalists

stop writing that blog is "short for web log"?

Bleg:

Survey of econ bloggers: Help Aaron Schiff design a survey for econobloggers.

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Why Citi’s 11% Coupon Doesn’t Mean it’s Paying Junk Rates

I didn’t actually post my first entry of the day at 10:20 this morning, honest:

Movable Type seems to have eaten my real first post, about the Abu

Dhabi investment in Citigroup. My blog entry compared the 11% coupon on

that deal to the 7.5% coupon that Bank of America is getting on its Countrywide

investment. It was cheap and snarky, but hey, what do you expect first thing

in the morning.

In any case, I didn’t really need to go there: everybody else, it turns out,

had the same idea. Most journalists, however, alighted on 9% junk-bond yields

as the proper comparison.

Alphaville has a blog entry, headlined "Junk

Citi", which quotes the WSJ:

Citi is paying a higher interest rate than companies that borrow on the high-yield,

or junk-bond, market; currently they pay roughly 9% for straight bonds. Typically,

convertible bonds pay lower interest rates than straight bonds, although a

particular bond’s structure could affect the interest rate paid.

Meanwhile, David

Wighton in the FT talks about "the high cost of the new funds",

and Dana

Cimilluca says it’s "stunning" that the coupon "is nearly

2 percentage points more than the average U.S. junk bond yield". Oh, and

in case you hadn’t got the message yet, a Bloomberg headline this morning said

"Citigroup Pays Junk Rate to Keep Dividend After Mortgage Losses",

and although the word "junk" has now been dropped

from the headline, it’s still there in the first sentence, and there’s even

some attempt at analysis:

The 11 percent interest rate on $7.5 billion of convertible shares that Citigroup

sold to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority is almost double the rate it offers

bond investors. Countrywide Financial Corp. paid 7.25 percent to Bank of America

Corp., the second-biggest U.S. bank by assets, for bailout financing three

months ago. Citigroup’s common stock pays a dividend equivalent to a 7.1 percent

yield.

So give me nul points for originality: maybe Movable Type has some

kind of bullshit filter I should be thankful for. Because if you actually bother

to look a little deeper into the deal, it starts making rather more sense.

Andrew Clavell has done

a bunch of legwork on this one and come to a less newsworthy conclusion:

Citi has raised tax deductible, upper tier capital funds for 4 years at a

cost equivalent to another financing source of Libor+150. Smart business.

Clavell’s post can be hard to follow, however, for people who aren’t comfortable

with the mechanics of callspreads. (Er, me.) So let me try to explain in English

what’s going on.

Abu Dhabi is buying a $7.5 billion stake in Citigroup. But it’s not buying

the stake at the current Citi share price. For the time being, and indeed until

March 2010, Abu Dhabi will own no Citi equity at all as part of this deal. Instead,

it gets debt instruments paying that 11% coupon. Then, from March 2010 until

September 2011, those debt instruments automagically become Citigroup shares

in a process known as a "mandatory convert". But here’s the rub: the

higher the Citi share price, the fewer shares that Abu Dhabi will end up with.

Abu Dhabi will receive a maximum of 235 million shares, if the share price

at the time of conversion is less than $31.83. It will receive a minimum of

201 million shares, if the share price at the time of conversion is greater

than $37.24. But as a result, Abu Dhabi essentially loses out on a very large

part of that 17% share price appreciation from $31.83 up to $37.24.

Now remember too that if Abu Dhabi had bought 235 million shares outright at

$31.83, it would be receiving a dividend yield on those shares of 7.4%. So the

coupon on the bonds has to be at least 7.4% to make up for lost dividends. Then,

on top of that, there needs to be a bit of extra coupon to make up for the fact

that Abu Dhabi is not going to participate in most of the first 17% of any price

appreciation in the stock.

All this can be modelled using puts and calls, which is what Clavell has done,

and he’s come to the conclusion that the value to Citigroup of all those implicit

puts and calls means that the 11% coupon is really rather reasonable. I’m not

nearly sophisticated enough to double-check his math, but it seems like the

man knows what he’s talking about.

Of course, Abu Dhabi is guaranteed its 11% coupon for the next few years, while

Citi’s shareholders are by no means guaranteed their dividend. On the other

hand, any cut in the dividend might conceivably result in a rise in Citi’s share

price, if shareholders are convinced it would put the bank on a much more sustainable

footing going forwards. No one really knows. What does seem clear, however,

is that a simplistic comparison of the 11% coupon to junk-bond yields of 9%

is not really kosher.

Posted in banking | 1 Comment

The Future(s) of House Prices

The UK has a new tradeable derivatives contract on house prices, which shows

house prices falling by 7% next year. That has

Tim Harford worried: futures markets are "better than cheap-talk forecasts"

in terms of being right, he says.

But is that true? It’s certainly not true in terms of currency futures, which

are atrocious as predictions of future currency moves at all – they’re

governed overwhelmingly by differences in interest rates. I think that Harford

might be confusing futures markets with prediction markets, which can be very

accurate. But even prediction markets wouldn’t do so well when it comes to housing,

as Harford’s commenter "Joe Bloggs" explains:

Property investors (whether professionals or just Joe Bloggs with a mortgage)

are structurally long a somewhat illiquid asset: it’s impossible to sell houses

short. Consequently, everyone has the same risk, and it follows that hedging

that risk is expensive. It could be that at least some of that perceived 7%

is a premium that investors are prepared to pay just on grounds of general

nervousness. Markets of this sort have been available in spread betting markets

and have often been oversold in times of uncertainty.

Interestingly, the UK has had a prediction market in housing prices since 2002,

when Nick Denton recommended

going short as prices were "teetering on the edge of an ugly correction".

(How did that trade work out, Nick?)

It’s also worth noting that the US version of this market, the futures

contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, are so

illiquid as to be utterly useless. And it’s also worth noting that all the

cognoscenti were spectacularly wrong about the future direction of house prices

for most of the past decade. Show me a housing futures market with any kind

of track record of being right, and I might pay attention to it. For the time

being, I’ll stick to my conviction that nobody knows anything.

Posted in derivatives, housing, prediction markets | Comments Off on The Future(s) of House Prices

Meme of the Day: The Sudden Stop

Brad

Setser started it, back on November 19:

Bottom line: private demand for US financial assets has disappeared. In emerging

market terms, the US has experienced a sudden stop.

Yves Smith picked

up the ball, as did Wolfgang

Munchau: "financial flows back into the US appear to have come to a

sudden stop this summer".

Paul

Krugman explains that this is not a term to be used by the economically

unsophisticated: it refers to a famous theory of emerging-market economic crises

developed by Inter-American Development Bank chief economist Guillermo Calvo,

a theory which is emphatically not applicable to the US.

But the bigger datapoint is clear: while the US used to be the happy recipient

of tens of billions of dollars in cheap foreign capital every week, now those

flows have reversed. Back to Brad for the numbers:

Consider the change in (net) demand for US financial assets between q2 and

q3. In q2, net inflows were, according to the TIC data, $237.4b, or about

$950b annualized ($194.1b in recorded private inflows and $43.4b in recorded

official inflows). In q3, net inflows were negative $82b, or negative $328b

annualized (negative $112.2b in private flows and positive $30.2b in official

flows).

The overall swing was rather large. Net inflows — really net non-FDI flows

— fell by $320b between q2 and q3. Annualized that is a huge number, $1280b.

Is this sustainable? By definition, no. And Brad himself has been known to

wonder of late whether the current fall in the dollar might be coming to an

end. But it does seem that one of the weirder imbalances in the global financial

system has finally unwound itself.

Posted in economics | Comments Off on Meme of the Day: The Sudden Stop

Countrywide’s FHLB Bailout

I agree with Chuck

Schumer and Nouriel

Roubini that the $51 billion lent to Countrywide by the Federal Home Loan

Bank of Atlanta smells very fishy. Yes, it’s collateralized by $62 billion in

mortgages, and it’s entirely possible that FHLB Atlanta has the sophistication

necessary to determine that $51 billion is a reasonable lower bound for the

value of those mortgages. But $51 billion is an enormous sum of money in anybody’s

books, and FHLB Atlanta’s exposure to Countrywide is now a whopping 37% of its

total outstanding advances. (Actually, it was 37% at the end of September; it

might be even more than that today, we just don’t know.) No reasonable lender

would put so many of its eggs in one basket – especially a basket as fragile

as Countrywide.

Schumer and Roubini are also right to be pointing fingers at the Federal Housing

Finance Board, FHLB’s regulator. You haven’t heard of FHFB? Neither had I, until

now. There are way too many regulators in Washington, and it’s virtually

impossible even to keep track of them all – let alone to hope that they

all have a level of competence necessary to keep up with all the recent developments

in structured finance and credit products. The answer to this problem is not

to beef up FHLB, but to merge it – and most of the other underfunded Washington

regulators – into one super-regulator like the Financial Services Authority

in the UK.

A similar lack-of-effective-regulation problem applies to Countrywide itself,

which, being a lender and not a bank, is regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision.

Again, it’s not – or not only – that the OTS should have been more

on the ball. Rather, it shouldn’t exist in the first place: it, and the FHFB,

and OFHEO, and the OCC, and the FDIC, and the NCUA, and all the other financial-services

regulators, should all get bundled up and put under the aegis of, say, the Federal

Reserve, which does at least seem to have a reasonably good idea what’s going

on at any given time.

Where I part company with Roubini is when he says that Countrywide should have

been nationalized. Since Countrywide is not a bank, the government can and should

simply let it fail, if it becomes insolvent. If it’s wrong to bail out Countrywide

by stealth, through the FHLB, it’s equally wrong to bail it out by nationalizing

it. There are no depositors at Countrywide who would lose money if it closed;

its borrowers, meanwhile, have mostly been securitized and parcelled out across

the globe and across many different servicing companies already. Nationalizing

Countrywide wouldn’t help them, so there’s no reason to do it.

Update: As shadow says in the comments, Countrywide

does actually own a bank, which really only serves to complicate things further.

As to the question of whether a loan constitutes a bail-out, well, most bail-outs

come in the form of loans. The question is really whether the borrower could

have raised as much money as cheaply elsewhere. And the answer, in this case,

I think, is clearly no.

Posted in housing, regulation | Comments Off on Countrywide’s FHLB Bailout

The Really Big Picture

You wait years for a magisterial overview of the entire global economy on a

thousand-year timescale, and then two come along within a week of each other.

Angus Maddison’s Contours

of the World Economy 1-2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History was released

on November 5. Power

and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium,

by Ron Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke, was released on November 12, and has already

prompted a gushing

blog entry by Dani Rodrik (as well as blurbs from the likes of Niall Ferguson

and Barry Eichengreen).

Between them, they weigh in at 1,072 pages. I don’t think either is likely

to unseat Jared Diamond’s Guns,

Germs, and Steel in the bestseller stakes, but it’s great in any event to

see more books of this nature being released.

Posted in economics | Comments Off on The Really Big Picture

Cybershoppers Bring Down Yahoo

The WSJ tells

us today that "Yahoo’s popular e-commerce system buckled under the

strain of a surge in online shopping" starting at the ridiculously early

hour of 5:30 a.m. EDT yesterday. Help me out here: isn’t the point of "cyber

Monday" that people do shopping from their work computers? What kind of

person does shopping from a work computer at 5:30 in the morning Eastern time?

And how can there possibly be so many of those people as to overwhelm Yahoo’s

Merchant Solutions business?

There are also two broader lessons, here, I think. The first is that the internet

continues to build small, long-tail businesses – which means that even

if consumer spending remains robust this holiday season, the proportion of that

spending going to the big retail chains is likely to fall.

The second is the one made

by Dan Gross on Saturday:

The American consumer, exhausted, pinched, indebted, and fearful, is

likely to slow down and may eventually collapse—just not in the next

few weeks.

Posted in technology | Comments Off on Cybershoppers Bring Down Yahoo

Capital Infusion Datapoint of the Day

Coupon on the convertible bonds Bank

of America bought to help shore up Countrywide: 7.5%

Coupon on the convertible bonds Abu

Dhabi bought to help shore up Citigroup: 11%

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Capital Infusion Datapoint of the Day

Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

InTrade

fee structure discourages selling the tails?

Sweatshops,

sweatshops everywhere

CDO

Dumping Ground Still Sinking

Where Is the Fed? "Way,

way behind the curve."

The

end of the world’s nastiest democratic politician: "I wondered

when Gordon Brown became prime minister whether he’d be a good test case

for whether true intellectuals can actually succeed in political leadership.

In Rudd, we have another clear test."

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

Consumers Should be Able to Choose Their TV Channels

Joe Nocera had a provocative column in the NYT on Saturday, headlined "Bland

Menu if Cable Goes à la Carte". We shouldn’t be allowed to pick

and choose the TV channels we want to watch, he says: that would be no less

than "a consumer disaster".

Now I’m no expert on the economics of cable TV. But I’m not in the slightest

bit convinced by Nocera’s argument, and I don’t even understand what he means

when he says that "when we pay for the cable bundle we are, in effect,

subsidizing those channels for everybody — including ourselves."

To his credit, Nocera does a reasonably good job at laying out the case for

the prosecution: that it’s unreasonable to ask people to pay for cable channels

they don’t want. (Or, in the case of many on the religious right, actively want

not to receive.) And he quotes a number of grandees coming out in defense

of a la carte pricing, including Gene Kimmelman, of the Consumers Union,

and Kevin Martin, the chairman of the FCC.

Nocera’s weaker when it comes to defending the status quo. His main argument

is that the cost per channel would go up, sometimes by a very great deal:

Unmoored from the cable bundle, individual networks would have to charge

vastly more money per subscriber…

Take, for instance, ESPN, which charges the highest amount of any cable network:

$3 per subscriber per month. (I’m borrowing this example from a recent

research note by Craig Moffett, the Sanford C. Bernstein cable analyst.) Suppose

in an à la carte world, 25 percent of the nation’s cable subscribers

take ESPN. If that were the case, the network would have to charge each subscriber

not $3, but $12 a month to keep its revenue the same. (And don’t forget:

with its $1.1 billion annual bill to the National Football League alone, ESPN

is hardly in a position to tolerate declining revenues.)

And that’s one of the most popular channels on cable. What percentage

of cable subscribers would take Discovery, or the Food Network, or Oxygen,

or Hallmark — or the many, many more obscure networks that you can now

find up and down your cable box? Five percent? Ten percent? According to Mr.

Moffett’s analysis, if every African- American family in the country

subscribed to the Black Entertainment Network, it would still have to raise

its fees by 588 percent. He adds, “If just half opted in — still

a wildly optimistic scenario — the price would rise by 1,200 percent.”

Now I haven’t seen the Moffett research note, but those percentage figures

seem silly to me. If BET currently receives, say, 15 cents per subscriber per

month, then a 1200% rise would still come to less than $2 a month per subscriber.

Which is not very much. Scary four-figure percentage increases are a way of

hiding charges which are still low on an absolute level.

And why on earth should cable TV’s subscription structure be set up so as to

ensure that ESPN’s subscription revenue is unchanged? There’s no ironclad rule

of television saying that ESPN has to receive billions of dollars in subscriptions

only to turn around and pay them straight out again to the NFL for television

rights. If ESPN’s subscription revenues fell, NFL games would still appear on

the television – either on ESPN (for less than $1.1 billion, if it could

no longer afford that much money) or elsewhere. Either way, the consumer would

still be able to see the same game on the same television set connected to the

same cable box. Is it possible that the NFL would lose some revenue? Yes. Is

anybody going to lose sleep over that? No.

Nocera also says that the present system encourages channel-flipping:

One of the nice things about the current system is that once a station gets

on extended basic, it can be discovered by viewers — and that wouldn’t

happen in an à la carte world.

It wouldn’t? I don’t see why not. In the a la carte world, all you’d

need to do is mandate that cable providers give free access to any channel willing

to waive subscription revenues. If there were a problem with that model, it

would be that there would be too many channels wanting to go free,

not too few. When Fox News launched, it paid cable providers $10 per subscriber

in order to get into as many homes as it could as quickly as possible. At 15

cents per subscriber per month, it would take well over 5 years just to recoup

that initial investment. Much better for all concerned that the channel just

be free from the get-go. Any individual subscriber, of course, should also be

allowed to ban channels he doesn’t want in his home – technologically,

that can’t be too hard.

Indeed, it should be pretty easy, technologically speaking, to implement a

fully-fledged pay-as-you-go system, where consumers pay only for those cable

channels they actually watch. Cable providers could provide all the channels

they like, from the networks through to HBO and other premium channels, omitting

only those that the consumer specifically elects to bar. Consumers could then

channel-flip to their heart’s content, and if they watched more than say half

an hour of any given channel in a month, they would be charged the subscription

rate for that channel – or the pay-as-you-go rate for the individual programmes

they watched, if that turned out to be cheaper. Any consumer who didn’t want

to risk running up a big cable bill by watching expensive channels could just

bar those channels from being provided in the first place.

Would that system cost consumers more than the present system? It would cost

me more, that’s for sure: I’d actually sign up for television service

if I didn’t need to pay through the nose for channels I don’t want and never

watch. And I’d be happy to do so. The big question isn’t whether an a la

carte system would be cheaper: it’s whether an a la carte system

would make consumers happier. And the answer to that, I think, is an unqualified

yes.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on Consumers Should be Able to Choose Their TV Channels

Why Starbucks is Good for Small Coffee Shops

Yesterday’s NYT ran two almost idential "little coffee shop versus Starbucks"

stories. Peter Applebome was in Little

Falls:

Mrs. Mallek was a bit taken aback when she saw two of the regulars —

the regulars! — near her shop, Starbucks cups in hand, not long after

the new one opened last summer. And so came the idea of the billboard, about

a half block from the Starbucks — as close as they could get —

reading: “We may not be Big … but we’re not Bitter!”

Meanwhile, Alex Mindlin was in Washington

Heights:

He says his profits dropped about 15 percent in the ensuing months, and he

has been mortified to glimpse some of his former regulars in Starbucks…

Lately, Mr. Musabegovic and Starbucks have been conducting a kind of low-intensity

feud. Shortly after Starbucks opened, Mr. Musabegovic planted a sandwich board

bearing an advertisement for Jou Jou on the corner of Broadway, just outside

Starbucks.

Musabegovic even complains that he "made the neighborhood safe for coffeehouses";

at least Mallek is big enough to concede that "if not for Starbucks turning

everyone in America into a coffee addict, it would have been very difficult

to build a business essentially trying to be a smaller, friendlier alternative

to Starbucks with better coffee".

For the fact is that Starbucks is the best thing that ever happened to small,

mom-and-pop coffee shops: it ratified their product and gave them a huge market

of gourmet coffee drinkers which had previously barely existed. What’s more,

given that the smaller shops nearly always are much friendlier and more pleasant

than Starbucks – not to mention much more likely to serve their coffee

in china, rather than in paper cups – the mom-and-pops have a built-in

advantage over any Starbuck’s.

Starbucks itself has demonstrated time and time again that opening a new location

very close to an existing location does no noticeable damage to the sales of

the older store. The big green Starbucks signage works these days essentially

as a reminder to "drink coffee now" – in that, it actually helps

drive traffic to the smaller place next door or possibly down the road. The

NYT stories, I think, get it exactly the wrong way around.

Posted in economics | Comments Off on Why Starbucks is Good for Small Coffee Shops