When Fund Managers Change Their Minds

The Swiss fund manager and blogger who calls himself "Baruch" posted

a comment

on Saturday evening about Research in Motion, currently trading at about $105

a share:

I use a standardized DCF approach and have quite a detailed model of my own

of RIMM, both of which tell me it should be worth about USD200-250…

Come Monday afternoon, he’d changed

his mind:

Yes, we sold a bunch of RIMM today and I am not going to be inconsistent

on my blog…. It’s something to do with an ageing consumer portfolio;

at high multiples things have to be pretty perfect, super-duper DCF or not.

He defended this volte-face in his own inimitable manner:

This inconstancy would appear embarrassing to normal people, however it is

in fact the mark of an investing genius, I assure you.

I actually think he’s right. Traders, of course, have to be able to switch

from bullish to bearish on any given asset multiple times per day. But even

relatively long-term investors can and should change their minds every so often,

in much the same way as an actor might play a great Othello one night and then

play an equally great Iago in the same production the next. Even Warren Buffett

is buying

junk bonds and selling

puts – not the kind of behavior one expects from the buy-and-hold

Sage of Omaha. But all investing rules are made to be broken.

Posted in investing | Comments Off on When Fund Managers Change Their Minds

Why is Warren Buffett Buying $2.1 Billion of Super-Junky TXU Debt?

Warren

Buffett just bought a huge chunk of TXU debt at a $125 million discount

to face value:

Berkshire bought into two issues by TXU. It purchased $1.1 billion of 10.25%

bonds at 95 cents on the dollar to give Buffett an effective yield of 11.2%.

And Berkshire bought $1 billion of 10.5% PIK-toggle bonds (bonds whose interest

can be paid out in cash or more bonds) for 93 cents on the dollar, producing

an effective yield of 11.8%.

According to a wire story by Matt Fuller which isn’t online, the 10.25% bonds

mature in 2015 and are rated CCC, while the PIK-toggle bonds mature in 2016

but are callable after 2012, which is also the date at which the PIK toggle

is activated. The issuer is not actually TXU but a subsidiary, Texas Competitive

Electric Holdings.

This is really junky debt. This is what S&P

has to say about what a CCC rating means:

An obligation rated ‘CCC’ is currently vulnerable to nonpayment, and is dependent

upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor

to meet its financial commitment on the obligation. In the event of adverse

business, financial, or economic conditions, the obligor is not likely to

have the capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.

The PIK toggle (which stands for "payment in kind") is particularly

toxic, especially on a deal as junky as this one. (My favorite part of the whole

story comes in Matt Fuller’s wire story, where he refers to the first bond as

a "cash-pay tranche". Now that’s what I call a retronym.)

In any case, it’s fascinating to me that Warren Buffett seems perfectly happy

to buy up $2.1 billion of this paper. Maybe he thinks that TXU is too politcally

well-connected to be allowed to default, and he’s making a moral-hazard play.

Or… maybe he’s making a stealth takeover bid for TXU himself, buying up the

senior debt in the expectation that it will default and that he will be able

to convert it into cheap equity.

Update: The stealth-equity theory gets some support.

DealBook

says CNBC is reporting that Buffett isn’t interested in junk debt generally,

only TXU’s in particular.

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on Why is Warren Buffett Buying $2.1 Billion of Super-Junky TXU Debt?

Can Thain Make Merrill More Collegial?

John Thain wants to know why his new colleagues at Merrill Lynch can’t just

get along:

Mr Thain, whose tenure as Merrill chief executive begins on Monday, said

in an interview that he believed there was insufficient co-operation between

senior Merrill executives, a problem that could have contributed to the bank’s

disastrous $8bn mortgage-related writedown.

“Merrill has a strong culture but they don’t have the same teamwork

at the senior level,” Mr Thain said in the interview last week. “It

needs a more co-operative team approach.”

Goldman, which has been relatively untouched by the subprime mortgage crisis,

has long operated on a consensus basis, a style that dates back to its history

as a private partnership. Mr Thain spent most of his Wall Street career in

the Goldman system, rising to become co-president before leaving in 2003 to

take over the NYSE, which was then mired in the worst crisis in its 215-year

history.

This is a great idea, in theory. But Goldman is the only major US

investment bank run with a "co-operative team approach". Smaller,

private shops, like Rothschild, might have it, but at the big public investment

banks a dog-eat-dog culture has seeped into the corporate bloodstream for years

now and it’s not the kind of thing which can be easily excised.

If Thain does manage to change Merrill’s culture in this manner, then he will

surely have earned his pay

package. But I’m not holding my breath.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Can Thain Make Merrill More Collegial?

Good Ideas on NYC Congestion

Brad Aaron has news of developments

with NYC’s congestion pricing plan. If you recall, the mayor put forward

a proposal which now needs to be ratified by a whole bunch of constituencies,

including the city and state legislatures. But before it gets there, it needs

to go through the Traffic Congestion Mitigation Commission first – a commission

which is charged with reviewing the mayor’s plan and making changes which might

improve it without decreasing the amount of congestion relieved.

And it turns out, to my utter astonishment, that the commission’s ideas, as

reported by Erik Engquist of Crain’s, are actually really good.

For one thing, the commission would like to apply the charge to all the cars

from New Jersey which presently clog up New York City’s streets. Those cars

already pay a toll to come through the Holland and Lincoln tunnels, and the

mayor’s plan essentially says that that once they’ve paid that toll they need

not pay a congestion charge on top. That makes New Jersey drivers pretty much

the only drivers who won’t see an increase in charges should the mayor’s

plan come into effect. That’s silly, and the commission’s plan to impose the

congestion charge on New Jersey drivers is a very good one. Reports Engquist:

Hitting toll payers with a congestion fee might discourage so many from driving

that toll revenues would plunge for the Port Authority of New York and New

Jersey, which operates the Holland and Lincoln tunnels, and the Metropolitan

Transportation Authority, which runs other tunnels and bridges. Both authorities

rely on toll money to fund debt obligations.

This sounds very much like an objection that the commission’s proposed scheme

would work too well. Discouraging commuters from driving in from New Jersey

is exactly what the congestion charge is meant to achieve. If that means lower

tunnel tolls, so be it.

The commission also has good ideas on parking:

Much higher fees for on-street parking, and perhaps a new tax on garage parking,

would be imposed to raise revenues and discourage driving in the central business

district.

Again, this is a great idea. At the moment, a large proportion of NYC traffic

is cars driving around in circles, looking for a hugely-valuable Spot. Spots

are so cheap, people will spend an enormous amount of time and effort looking

for them. That’s because they’re mispriced. If Spots are priced more realistically,

that will help reduce some of the most harmful congestion: the slow circling

which is pretty much pure deadweight economic loss.

The commission also wants to make the plan much simpler and much cheaper, by

drastically reducing the number of cameras involved. Rather than placing cameras

only at the periphery of the congestion zone, the mayor’s plan placed them all

over it, so as to catch people driving their cars within the zone. The logistics

were daunting, and administrative costs were projected to eat up 40% of revenues.

The commission has a better idea. Move the northern boundary of the congestion

zone down to 60th Street, from 86th Street. By doing so, you exclude from the

zone the majority of car owners who would otherwise have been in it, which means

that the problem of people living and driving within the zone becomes a tiny

one. You can then basically ignore that problem, and move to a London-style

approach of having cameras only on the periphery.

The one area which remains fraught is the East River crossings. The midtown

tunnel presently has a toll – will that be deductible from the congestion

charge? And should the East River bridges have a charge over and above the congestion

fee? My feeling is that they shouldn’t, since the congestion fee is essentially

going to be a charge for crossing those bridges anyway.

But overall, I like the direction this plan is moving. I only hope that it

has political legs.

Posted in cities | Comments Off on Good Ideas on NYC Congestion

Euro Disney Datapoint of the Day

From Floyd

Norris, all figures split-adjusted:

Share price of Euro Disney in 1992: €2,500

Price per share paid by Prince Walid bin Talal of Saudi Arabia when he rescued

Euro Disney in 1994: €152

Share price of Euro Disney today: €8.66

Posted in stocks | Comments Off on Euro Disney Datapoint of the Day

Blogonomics: Gawker Media

A surprising number of people seem to care that there’s a bunch of turnover

going on at Gawker: the

latest departures have made both the Observer

and the NYT

today. That very fact proves Gawker’s continuing media-goldfish-bowl relevance:

it’s unthinkable that the equivalent news would ever get this kind of coverage

were editors to have left any of the other thirteen Gawker Media blogs, despite

the fact that Gawker gets just 6.6% of all Gawker Media’s pageviews in a good

month.

gawker.jpg

There are two competing stories about the Gawker departures, only one of which

is being told. The first, which is true, is that working for Gawker can be a

soul-destroying

experience. But there’s a second story, which is also true. Gawker boss

Nick Denton has never made any secret of the fact that he lives for growth in

pageviews. When a site has growing pageviews, everybody working for that site

tends to be very happy. When a site has stagnating pageviews, people working

for that site tend to be rather unhappy. And in November, Gawker’s 8,993,124

pageviews represented the site’s worst showing of the year.

So now Gawker’s looking

for new blood, and especially someone who can turn the franchise around.

"This change of the guard does give us the opportunity to accelerate the

transformation of Gawker from cute blog to fully-fledged news site," Denton

told the NYT, and that makes sense, because the old strategy of accelerating

pageviews by concentrating on the social-media aspects of commenting only served

to turn Gawker into an increasingly-hermetic club with a steadily declining

number of unique visitors.

On the other hand, if the transformation into a news site doesn’t work –

and by work, I mean result in increased pageviews – the new editor might

not last long. It’s possible to stay within the Gawker fold while overseeing

declining traffic, as Mark Lisanti has proved at Defamer.

But it’s a bit like being the CEO of a company with a steadily-falling share

price. Sooner or later, you’re likely to find yourself wanting to move on to

new opportunities.

Posted in blogonomics | Comments Off on Blogonomics: Gawker Media

Why Paulson Needn’t Worry About Litigation Risk in his Mortgage Plan

Elizabeth

Warren is worried about the investor lawsuits that Hank

Paulson’s mortgage-relief plan might trigger. "There is no clear legal

basis for doing this kind of wholesale revision of the value of the collateral

and forced revision of the mortgage terms," she writes. "The lawsuits

will fly thick and fast, enriching the lawyers and tangling up the homeowners."

To be clear, there’s no risk that bond investors are suddenly going to start

suing homeowners. But there is litigation risk to the Paulson plan, as Yves

Smith explains:

This program is a repudiation of contracts. I don’t see how any investor

with an operating brain cell would ever buy an asset-backed security from

a US issuer again, at least one backed by consumer assets…

The Journal states

that:

A bill introduced by Rep. Mike Castle, a Delaware Republican, would temporarily

free servicers from any liability for modifying loan terms. "Investors

are still going to get a return and it’s in their better interest to have

those loans perform rather than fail," Mr. Castle said.

Any lawyers in the readership? How can the Feds indemnify parties against

claims made under state law?

This whole scheme is an act of eminent domain, except the government isn’t

formally seizing property rights, but emboldening private parties to do so.

Why is no one calling a spade a spade?

I’m slightly more sanguine than Warren and Smith on this point: I don’t think

there’s going to be a rash of investor lawsuits if this plan goes through, for

three main reasons.

Firstly, how would the investors show damages? Most loan modifications actually

increase the total amount of money that the investors stand to receive.

In this case, it’s conceivable that might not be true, and that bondholders

might get a bit less money than they would otherwise. But that’s a really

hard calculation to make, and unless you can make that calculation with some

certainty, it’s going to be very hard for you to show damages. And in the absence

of damages, your contract repudiation and a buck fifty will get you a cup of

coffee.

Secondly, how would these lawsuits scale? Let’s assume that an investor in

an RMBS tranche can compellingly show losses of say 5 cents on the dollar as

a result of the Paulson plan. (We’re talking about the difference, remember,

between the present value of what that investor will now receive and the present

value of what that investor would receive were the plan not in place.) Given

the size of individual RMBS tranches, and the number of investors they were

sold to, that investor probably has no more than about $20 million invested

in the tranche. Which means that he’d be suing for $1 million. Not worth it.

What if he put a class action together, and got all the owners of that tranche

to sue? Well, maybe the tranche was $50 million in total. We’re still only talking

$2.5 million in damages here. And since every tranche of every bond is different,

it’s going to be incredibly difficult to try to get a class action certified

which tries to sue a bond servicer on more than one tranche at a time, let alone

more than one bond at a time.

And finally, who would sue? Bond investors tend to be just about the most litigation-averse

people in the financial world. The only bond investors who have any appetite

for litigation risk are vulture funds, and they’re a very special case. In general,

bond funds have extremely low expense ratios and are passive, buy-and-hold investors.

They’re the polar opposite of the activist stockholders who will sue at the

drop of a hat. Many of them are part of enormous international financial-services

firms like Morgan Stanley and Allianz, and I can assure you that their corporate

masters have no appetite at all for the kinds of headlines which would ensue

were their bond-fund managers to start a wave of lawsuits.

A bond-fund manager who sues over an attempt to mitigate the subprime mortgage

mess is going to be someone who calls attention to himself as a dupe of an investor

and also an enemy of homeowners. In return for massive legal costs and uncertainty,

he will get at best a tiny payday relative to the amount he invested. I just

don’t see it happening.

Posted in housing, law | Comments Off on Why Paulson Needn’t Worry About Litigation Risk in his Mortgage Plan

Signs the Housing Bubble Still Hasn’t Really Burst, Bestseller Edition

The most-gifted

book at Amazon.com is Be

a Real Estate Millionaire: Secret Strategies for Lifetime Wealth Today.

Interestingly, although it’s the most-gifted book, it only ranks at #197 on

the overall Books

bestseller list. Weird. Are people buying dozens of copies of this thing

for all of their friends?

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Signs the Housing Bubble Still Hasn’t Really Burst, Bestseller Edition

Ben Stein Watch: December 2, 2007

Ben Stein pops up in a lot of places: Yahoo

columns, Fortune

videos, scientifically-illiterate

movies, brain-dead

TV shows, even Portfolio

features. One place he doesn’t seem to have much presence, however, is the

UK. Which is just as well, because if he wrote anything like this

week’s NYT column in for a UK newspaper, he’d be risking a massive libel

suit.

Stein says that Goldman Sachs’s chief US economist writes research notes which

are "mostly about selling fear" and which are "a device to help

along the goal of success at bearish trades". He says that Goldman was

shorting its own CMO issues, and that it has "the culture of the KGB".

And he concludes:

Doesn’t this bear some slight resemblance to Merrill selling tech stocks

during the bubble while its analyst Henry Blodget was reportedly telling his

friends what garbage they were? How different would it be from selling short

the junky stock that your firm is underwriting? And if a top economist at

Goldman Sachs was saying housing was in trouble, why did Goldman continue

to underwrite junk mortgage issues into the market?

HERE is a query, as we used to say in law school: Should Henry M. Paulson

Jr., who formerly ran a firm that engaged in this kind of conduct, be serving

as Treasury secretary? Should there not be some inquiry into what the invisible

government of Goldman (and the rest of Wall Street) did to create this disaster,

which has caught up with some Wall Street firms but not the nimble Goldman?

The invisible government of Goldman? Do you think they have a secret

handshake, too?

Stein, in this column, is accusing the honest and blameless Goldman economist

Jan Hatzius of much more than mere intellectual dishonesty: he’s saying that

Goldman and Hatzius are using economic research notes to drive down the bond

market and make profits on the firm’s bearish trades. He compares their conduct

to that of Henry Blodget, who was charged

with securities fraud and is now banned from the securities industry for

life. And he says that anyone who used to run such a shop should never have

been considered for the job of Treasury secretary.

It’s not illegal – in this country – for Stein to make such allegations.

But it is quite shocking, and depressing, that the Gray Lady would willingly

allow herself to be used as a vehicle for this kind of yellow journalism –

and would place it on the front page of its business section, no less.

Do I have to slowly explain why Stein’s column is in fact unmitigated garbage?

Thankfully, I don’t, because Dean

Baker and Yves

Smith have got there before me. In a nutshell: Goldman sold the CMO that

Stein complains about in mid-2006; it made its big profit on subprime shorts

a full year later. Stein’s ridiculous assertion that a credit crunch and growth

slowdown "has not happened on any scale in the postwar world" can

be refuted with one word: Japan. And as for Stein’s statement that a correspondent

of his in Florida "may be right, but he’s not", I’m sure that

that will turn out to be false as well, the minute that anybody can work out

what on earth it’s supposed to mean.

More generally, macroeconomic research notes do not move markets. And a mortgage-bond

origination team is hardly likely to disband and retire for a life of sheep

farming just because an economist employed by the same organization is bearish

on the housing market. Is that really what Stein would have had them do? By

all means criticize Goldman for underwriting nuclear waste, as Allan

Sloan did – that’s fine. But there’s an oceanic gulf between that

and securities fraud.

Update: Stein’s NYT stablemate, Paul Krugman, weighs

in.

Maybe I don’t have what it takes to be a serious columnist. I mean,

it would never have occurred to me to suggest that the only way to explain

an economic forecast I don’t agree with is to say that it must be part

of an evil plot to drive down the market, so that Goldman Sachs can make money

off its short position — and to suggest that Goldman should be the subject

of a federal investigation.

Update 2: Ehrenberg

weighs in too, and athenian_abroad

notes that Stein seems to think a bank’s reserves are the same as its capital.

Posted in ben stein watch | Comments Off on Ben Stein Watch: December 2, 2007

Extra Credit, Weekend Edition

Market

Bailouts and the "Fed Put": Mark Thoma deserves some kind of medal

for doing this. Fed speeches are long and dense; Thoma’s worked out a way of

making them much easier to read without losing any of their subtleties. In this

one, William Poole comes to the defense of the "Fed Put" against the

moral-hazard brigade. Well worth reading, or at least skimming.

Climate Change, ethics

and the economics of the global deal: Nick Stern at Vox EU.

Not

a bad bit of rescuing, huh? Accrued Interest says senior noteholders will

benefit from the subprime bailout.

Real

Estate and the Creativity Index

Rap represented in mathematical graphs

and charts

Subprime Series, part 2:

Deposit insurance and the lender of last resort

Laissez-Faire

Marriage

Market

Failure in Christmas

Bumper

stickernomics

And finally (this is one I hadn’t seen before):

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Weekend Edition

Extra Credit, Weekend Edition

Market

Bailouts and the "Fed Put": Mark Thoma deserves some kind of medal

for doing this. Fed speeches are long and dense; Thoma’s worked out a way of

making them much easier to read without losing any of their subtleties. In this

one, William Poole comes to the defense of the "Fed Put" against the

moral-hazard brigade. Well worth reading, or at least skimming.

Climate Change, ethics

and the economics of the global deal: Nick Stern at Vox EU.

Not

a bad bit of rescuing, huh? Accrued Interest says senior noteholders will

benefit from the subprime bailout.

Real

Estate and the Creativity Index

Rap represented in mathematical graphs

and charts

Subprime Series, part 2:

Deposit insurance and the lender of last resort

Laissez-Faire

Marriage

Market

Failure in Christmas

Bumper

stickernomics

And finally (this is one I hadn’t seen before):

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Weekend Edition

How Lucrative Are Repos?

As 130/30 funds and other long-short plays become increasingly popular, the

quantity of short-selling going on in the stock market is only likely to increase.

That, in turn, means that the amount of stock lending (repos) going on is going

to increase as well: before you can sell a stock you don’t own, you have to

borrow it from an institutional investor of some sort.

Early last week, I speculated

that the income from such stock lending might be "the secret to making

money running index funds", but I’m still far from clear on just how profitable

a repo desk can be. One commenter said that "for most straight-up index

funds, stock lending (repo) is the primary method of both covering costs and

potentially exceeding the benchmark," but are we just talking a couple

of basis points here, or could it be by quite some margin?

Veryan Allen, in his

latest post, notes parenthetically that a mutual fund’s holdings "can

be lent out to cover the indexation cost" – which implies that although

repos might make a bit of money, it’s not very much. The actual number shouldn’t

be hard to work out: it’s just the proportion of mutual-fund stocks which are

lent out at any given time, multiplied by the average lending rate on those

securities. Does anybody know what either of those two numbers might be?

Posted in investing, stocks | Comments Off on How Lucrative Are Repos?

Brad DeLong Solves the Balls in the Hat Game

Brad DeLong has solved the

balls in the hat game, and in his comments section provides

the solution, which is a psychologically horrible one: you basically have

to run your losses and cut your winnings.

Keep playing until you get to (0,1) or (1,2) or (1,3) or (2,4) or (3,5) or

(3,6). At those points the game is no longer worthwhile.

If you recall, there are 4 white balls and 6 black balls in the hat, which

means the initial state is (4,6). You get $1 for every white ball you pick out,

and lose $1 for every black ball you pick out. You can stop picking out balls

at any time, and you want to play the game so as to have a positive expected

value.

The interesting thing about this solution is that there’s no chance of getting

the best-case scenario (picking out four white balls in a row and then stoppping,

for a profit of $4) but there is a chance of getting the worst-case scenario

(picking out six black balls in a row and then recouping some of your losses

with the remaining white balls, for a loss of $2). In fact, if the first ball

out of the hat is white, then you stop then and there: you cash in your $1 and

you’re happy.

And I think I’m right in saying that’s the only way you actually walk

away with a profit in this game. If the first ball out of the hat is black,

then your best-case scenario is to break even.

So your maximum upside is $1, your maximum downside is $2, and most of the

time the game consists of a desperate struggle to get back up to $0 after picking

out a black ball initially. You can take your +$0.07 EV, I’m not playing this

game.

Posted in economics | 1 Comment

The Broken State of US White-Collar Criminal Prosecutions

The case of the "NatWest 3" has been all a staple of the UK press

all year, but never seems to have got much traction on this side of the pond.

In a nutshell, three UK bankers were extradited to the US to face Enron-related

charges, despite the fact that the US showed no evidence of any crime. They’ve

now taken

a plea bargain, and Martin

Wolf is on top form:

To my mind, this system is tantamount to extracting confessions of guilt

under a form of psychological torture. That torture consists of the reasonable

fear of being found guilty and fear of the length of time one might then serve

in prison and of what might happen while one was there. All but exceptionally

brave people will confess to almost anything to escape even the possibility

of torture. In the same way, the majority of people would surely confess to

almost anything to avoid the possibility of spending the rest of their lives

in prison. Recognition of the meaninglessness of confessions extracted under

threat of torture was the main reason civilised jurisdictions abandoned its

use. The same objection applies to pleas of guilty made under the kind of

plea bargaining employed in the case of the NatWest three.

If the US legal system receives no respect even in the UK, then it is surely

badly broken. I am generally less opposed to harsh sentences for white-collar

criminals than most, on the grounds that most white-collar crimes go undetected,

most detected white-collar crimes go unprosecuted, and many prosecuted white-collar

crimes end in acquittal. Which means that punishments have to be harsh

if they’re to have any deterrent effect at all. But even I find it impossible

to justify the US prosecutors’ behavior in the NatWest 3 case.

Posted in law | Comments Off on The Broken State of US White-Collar Criminal Prosecutions

Fed Rate Cuts Might be Here to Stay

Ben Bernanke speaks pretty clearly, for a Fed chairman, and what

he said yesterday left few people in any doubt that he’s minded to cut interest

rates again at the next FOMC meeting. This is fabulous for equity markets, since

the Fed concentrates on what Bernanke called "tightening in financial conditions".

Basically, so long as Libor remains well above Fed funds, you can expect rate

cuts no matter where the stock market might be trading. And as for inflation,

well, we’ll worry about that when we’re not in a crisis.

Is there a limit to how often this argument can be made? Not imminently. Rates

are still high enough that the Bernanke Put will exist for a while yet, even

after two or three more cuts. What’s more, long-term rates still show no long-term

inflation worries. And credibility? Markets seem to have forgotten about that

one, so maybe it’s not so important any more.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on Fed Rate Cuts Might be Here to Stay

Trade the FX Markets for Fun and Losses!

Online poker, it’s a bitch, what with being illegal and all. What we really

need is a legal way to lose lots of money online, using an addictive

videogame-style interface. Enter eToro:

where Reuters 3000 meets Nintendo Wii!

There’s some kind of genius here. FX trading has historically been practiced

by a combination of well-paid sell-side professionals and a few delusional stay-at-home

day-traders who think they can beat the market. What’s been missing from the

market is inveterate gamblers who don’t particularly mind losing money so long

as they think there’s a chance they can win.

Until now. With eToro, you can see a screen where three or four different currencies

compete in a footrace. Or play a different game, where two currencies have a

tug-of-war match. Whatever game you choose, your commissions are guaranteed

to be stratospheric:

When a user registers for a real money account, that account is actually

opened at one of two foreign exchange trading brokers, RetailFX or IFX Markets.

eToro decides which broker based on where it expects to make the most commissions

on trades the user makes.

Remember, that’s a good thing, because if you sign up your friends

for eToro, you can get 25% of their revenues! Hurry! Before this utterly ridiculous

idea inevitably goes belly-up!

(HT: Lance Knobel, who pointed me

to Infosthetics)

Posted in foreign exchange | Comments Off on Trade the FX Markets for Fun and Losses!

Treasury’s Subprime Plan and the Danger of Tactical Delinquencies

Of all the ideas floated to help solve the subprime mess, I never really believed

that Sheila Bair’s plan to simply lock in teaser rates would be the

one to gain traction. As I

said when it was first mooted, it has some major weaknesses:

This is far from being a perfect solution. It rewards the foolhardy borrowers

who plumped for the lowest teaser rates over those who ensured that they could

afford their mortgage payments indefinitely. It also encourages pretty much

anybody with a subprime ARM to default on a mortgage payment or two, which

can’t be a good idea.

But that was well over a month ago. Since then, the plan has obviously been

refined to take those obvious objections into account, right? Right? Er, not

so much. In fact, in an echo of the still-not-launched Superconduit, this idea

seems to have found its way into the press with most of its details still to

be worked out.

I trust that someone, somewhere, is looking into the effect that this might

have on securities prices. The WSJ treats bondholders as some kind of homogenous

mass:

Among the holdouts have been investors, who typically hold securities backed

by mortgages. If interest rates are frozen, they would lose the potential

benefit of higher payments. But investors have cautiously moved toward cooperation,

likely on the grounds that it’s better to get some interest than none at all.

In reality, it’s almost certain that some bondholders would benefit from this

scheme, while others would lose out. My intuition is that the plan would help

out junior bondholders at the expense of senior bondholders, although it probably

differs on a case-by-case basis.

I also hope that Treasury has looked in some detail at the qualification mechanism

for this scheme, which could carry a host of unintended consequences. That said,

something very similar has already been launched

in California, so I hold out a tiny hope that someone, somewhere, has done some

degree of due diligence on the way these plans are constructed. The last thing

anybody needs right now is a whole new wave of tactical delinquencies designed

to bring loans into the qualification zone.

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Treasury’s Subprime Plan and the Danger of Tactical Delinquencies

The Real Problem with Securitization

One of the more annoying memes spreading virulently during this subprime-mortgage

crisis is the idea that securitization itself is a ridiculous idea. Subprime

borrowers have higher default rates, that’s obvious, and so anybody who honestly

thought he owned a AAA-rated bond backed by such loans had to have been deluding

himself.

The problem with this line of thinking is that it has a tiny kernel of truth:

at the height of the subprime boom it’s far from clear that investors were

actually modelling higher default rates on subprime than they were on prime

mortgages. Nevertheless, if Wall Street got the default rate right, it would

have been trivial for bankers to structure a genuinely AAA subprime product.

There is a big problem with securitization, however; it’s just got nothing

to do with things like default rates. Rather, it’s our old friend information

asymmetry. And who better to explain it than the guy who more or less invented

the economics of asymmetric information, Joe

Stiglitz?

I totally predicted this. Securitisation was pushed because of its advantages

in risk diversification. But I emphasised in some of my work on securitisation

that you have to offset that advantage with the awareness that you are creating

an agency problem. And you are creating a potential for asymmetries of information.

In the old days, it was the banks that originated loans and kept the loans.

But once you went to securitisation you created the possibility of the originator

having different information from the buyer. Not only is there information

asymmetry but in this context there are perverse incentives. The originator

has an incentive to provide distorted information. The buyers should have

been aware of this, but it’s quite apparent that they weren’t

as aware of this as they should have been.

This was partly because they bought into the notion of risk diversification

– they thought they didn’t need to worry about it because of the

law of large numbers. But the law of large numbers says only that you don’t

need to worry about a single one; you do need to worry about systemic risks.

And securitisation helped create systemic risks.

The lesson here is one of the oldest lessons in the history of investing. If

you’re lending money, know your borrower, even – especially – if

that borrower is a special-purpose vehicle. And don’t trust bankers or ratings

agencies to do that work for you, because your incentives are not aligned.

(HT: Alea)

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on The Real Problem with Securitization

Chandelier Bidding in Padua

The New Yorker’s Mary Norris went to Padua for an auction run by Coys of Kensington,

auctioneers of vintage motorcars. She accompanied Giuseppe Favia, who was selling

a 1959 Mercedes-Benz 190 D with literally sainted provenance. The auction itself,

however, was not

quite as blessed.

Bidding began at a hundred and fifty thousand euros, with the auctioneer

under pressure to push the price up. (It had been widely reported that a Volkswagen

Golf said to have been owned by the Pope had sold on eBay for a hundred and

eighty-nine thousand euros.) By the end, three bidders were contending, one

of them on the phone from Belgium. The final bid of two hundred and forty

thousand euros seemed to come from a bidder in the hall. When it was all over,

Signor Favia tried to find the bidder, but he was not in the crowd.

Coys not only protected the anonymity of the buyer but maintained, despite

the throng of witnesses, that the car had not been sold. David Barzilay, of

Coys, invoked a technicality: “The auctioneer never said ‘Sold.’

” When pressed, he added that the reserve of three hundred thousand

euros had not been met. Apparently, it is not unusual for negotiations to

continue after an auction; the auctioneers had their commission to consider,

and they might not have heard the last of the Belgian. This left Signor Favia

in a state of limbo.

This is more than a little confusing, but it does give me the opportunity to

clear something up which I’ve been meaning to get to for a while. I talked a

bit about reserve prices and the pratice of "taking bids off the chandelier"

in my guide

to deciphering auction results earlier this month. But (as ever) there’s

more to be said – and the key point is that if an item ever fails to sell

at auction, the final bid is always fictional. Is that a bad thing?

Daniel Grant would have

you believe it is, when he complains about "phantom (or ‘chandelier’)

bids that the auctioneer announces and records to get the bidding up to the

reserve". But in fact it’s not a bad thing at all: in fact, it’s a necessary

thing if the auction, as designed, is to work..

Remember that an auction, like any market, is an exercise in matching buyers

with sellers. The buyers, naturally, have a price above which they will not

buy; the seller, equally naturally, has a price below which he will not sell.

If those two prices don’t overlap, there’s no deal: the item can’t be sold.

If they do overlap, then the auction mechanism is designed to discover

which buyer is willing to pay the most money.

That’s done with the bidding system: each would-be buyer outbids the last,

until there’s only one left. The system works well, when there are multiple

buyers. But it doesn’t work very well when there’s only one would-be buyer,

even if he’s willing to pay more than the reserve, because there is no one else

to bid him up to the reserve level at which a deal can be struck.

That’s where the auctioneer comes in. He tells everybody, at the beginning

of the auction, that he "may continue to bid on behalf of the seller up

to the amount of the reserve either by placing consecutive bids or by placing

bids in response to other bidders". That way, even if there’s only one

real bidder, the auctioneer can take bids off the chandelier up to the reserve

price and keep that one bidder bidding. The purpose of this is exactly what

Daniel Grant complains that it is: it’s to get the bidding up to the reserve

price. But remember, that’s exactly what both the buyer and

the seller want: they both want a deal acceptable to them. If there were no

phantom bids, then the item for sale would simply not get sold.

Even if there are three real bidders, if only one of them is willing to go

over the reserve price, then it might well be necessary to invent a chandelier

bid or two in order to discover that fact. And there’s simply no way that an

auctioneer will let an item to "pass" unsold without bidding one more

time, on behalf of the seller, to see whether that final bidder might be willing

to go a bit higher and get the deal done. There is no harm done when that happens:

if the deal does get done then everybody’s happy, and if it doesn’t then that’s

the same outcome as if no phantom bid had been made.

In Padua, then, the bidding reached some level below the reserve level of €300,000,

and the auctioneer put in a final chandelier bid of €240,000 to see if

the mysterious Belgian – or someone else – might be willing to go

higher. When that was not the case, the vehicle was passed – something

which auctioneers normally say quickly and quietly, since they don’t like to

admit that the sale didn’t get done.

If Signor Favia was trying to find the bidder, then, it wasn’t because he thought

he had just sold his car for €240,000 – he knew full well what the

reserve was; indeed, he certainly set that reserve price himself. The auctioneers

do indeed have their commission to consider – which is why, given their

druthers, they’d more than happily sell the car for €240,000 and pocket

that certain commission. Norris’s implication – that the auctioneers could

have sold the car but didn’t because they wanted a bigger commission –

simply makes no sense. People who regularly attend auctions soon begin to understand

all of this intutitively. But to the rest of us – including, it would

seem, the New Yorker’s fact-checkers – it can all get a bit confusing.

Posted in art | 1 Comment

When Corporate Treasury is a Profit Center

Two newspapers, two countries, two industries, one story. In the NYT, it’s

Southwest,

whose oil-price hedges are now worth $2 billion. In the FT, it’s Porsche,

whose currency hedges have made $371 million this year, and whose stock-market

hedges, linked to its attempt to buy Volkswagen, might have made it as much

as $10 billion.

Both articles are laudatory, but John Gapper sounds

a note of caution:

Hedging is a zero sum game and I shudder when I hear of creative Treasury

management at industrial companies or public institutions.

Mr Härter should recall the debacle in Orange County. Or, for that matter,

take a look at Norway where four towns have suffered from investing in complex

US-linked debt securities sold to them by Terra Securities. When big banks

offer you innovative financial instruments, beware.

There is a difference here between Southwest and Porsche. Southwest really

only needed to lock in forward oil prices – an incredibly simple transaction.

Porsche, by contrast, boasts of its "options on options on options",

which is not the kind of thing to put an investor at ease, especially when billions

of dollars are at stake.

Nevertheless, there’s a reason that options are known as treasury products:

they basically exist to allow corporate treasurers to hedge market risk and

concentrate on their own business. All companies have natural exposures which

need hedging, and it’s up to individual treasurers to decide just how sophisticated

they’re willing to get. As long as it’s them telling the investment banks what

to do, things normally go OK. But Gapper’s right: if an investment bank offers

you a complex structured product which you don’t really understand, it might

be a great deal. But don’t buy it.

Posted in derivatives | Comments Off on When Corporate Treasury is a Profit Center

Extra Credit, Friday Edition

Speech by SEC

director Erik Sirri: "In retrospect, the super senior ABS CDO was nearly

a perfect structure to lull even sophisticated traders and risk managers into

a state approaching complacency — and blind them at least temporarily

to fundamental principles of risk management that would not have been new to

them and which they could surely recite from memory."

The myth

of competing mobile standards

Should

Wall Street Turn Over Bonuses to Subprime Victims?

African fractals: Ron

Eglash on TED.com

A-list

investment blogging

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Friday Edition

Do Stock Prices Reflect Economic Growth?

What would Nouriel Roubini do if he was faced with the choice between writing

something short and writing something bullish? Today he spends almost 5,000

words wondering

what will happen to stocks if the US economy goes into a recession. (You’ll

never guess what direction he thinks they’re headed in.) Along the way he revisits

what happened to the stock market during the third quarter of this year:

The August liquidity and credit shock severely tested the stock market downward;

then you had a first sucker’s rally on August 16th when the Fed announced

the switch from a tightening bias towards an easing bias. A second phase of

this sucker’s rally occurred on September 18th when the Fed surprised the

markets with a 50bps Fed Funds rate cut rather than the 25bps that the market

expected. Then equities kept on rising, in spite of worsening economic and

credit news, all the way until October 9th.

I wonder if Nouriel might get out his charts and tell us what he’d expect stocks

to do during a quarter in which the economy grows

at a 4.9% rate.

Posted in economics, stocks | Comments Off on Do Stock Prices Reflect Economic Growth?

Happy Daniel Davies Day!

Brad DeLong has

declared

today

to be Daniel Davies Day (dcubed, I guess), and the most entertaining celebration

thereof is happening over in the comments section of Marginal

Revolution, where Tyler Cowen attacks Davies’s attack

on Milton Friedman.

Cowen’s commenters and Davies himself are doing a magnificent job of debating

the question as to whether Milton Friedman was or was not a Republican hack,

so I shan’t enter that debate. But much less attention has been focused on the

meat of Cowen’s argument, which is essentially that Davies never knew Friedman,

and therefore can’t claim to speak with much authority on his views.

Davies presents Friedman as a shill for the Republican Party; I’d like to

know how many (public or non-public) conversations he has had with Friedman

about the topic of the Republican Party. I’ve been present for a few, and

while I’m open to feedback from Davies, my guess reading his post is that

he hasn’t been there for any. Yet he writes with a tone of certitude: "it’s

clearly not intellectual honesty that makes American liberals act pretend

that Milton Friedman wasn’t a party line Republican hack."

Of course the problem with Republican hacks (regardless of whether Friedman

was one) is that they toe the Republican party line in public statements for

mass consumption even when they can be very critical of the Republican party

in private. (The corollary, naturally, is also true of Democratic party hacks,

although the Democratic "party line" is a much less well-defined concept.)

But I’d also like to point out that the Daniel Davies of D-squared

Digest is a rather different animal to the Daniel

Davies of Crooked Timber, who in turn is a rather different animal to the

Daniel Davies of

Comment is Free. D-squared Digest is the place where Davies allows himself

to go off half-cocked, or to get really econonerdy should he be so inclined.

His well-formed arguments are more likely to be found at Comment is Free or

Crooked Timber; his screeds, meanwhile, land at D-squared Digest. So when Cowen

attacks Davies for something he wrote on his "this is where I vent"

blog, and says that Davies should list his "personal anthropological experience

with the subjects under consideration" whenever he posts there, I feel

he’s kinda picking on the wrong blog, as it were.

In any event, and regardless of what you think of his views on Milton Friedman,

Davies is a hugely entertaining writer who is much more right than wrong on

most things, and especially on matters relating to finance (about which he doesn’t

blog nearly enough, probably because that’s his day job). So enjoy Daniel Davies

Day!

Posted in Media | Comments Off on Happy Daniel Davies Day!

The X Factor in Terra Firma’s EMI Acquisition

Terra Firma’s investment in EMI doesn’t

seem to be working out so well, according to Lina Saigol. But why did Terra

Firma’s Guy Hands make the "impulsive acquisition" in the first place?

Saigol has a normal-and-boring explanation:

Mr Hands wanted EMI because he underbid on both Thames Water and Alliance

Boots and it was becoming embarrassing to keep losing to the big boys such

as Macquarie and KKR.

I, on the other hand, prefer Gumby’s

take:

I remember a colleague pointing out that Hands was an absolutely huge metal

fan, particularly Judas Priest and Iron Maiden…

Why would Hands embark on such a quixotic project? Answer: EMI has released,

since 1980 and 2006, pretty much every single Iron Maiden album ever recorded.

Incidentally, Gumby is quite right about Hands being "a friendly, approachable

human being". I met him back in 1996, when he was a relatively unknown

merchant banker at Nomura, and spoke to him at length about his part in the

UK’s rail privatization process. He couldn’t have been more helpful, even when

he was on holiday in Hawaii.

Posted in private equity | Comments Off on The X Factor in Terra Firma’s EMI Acquisition

At Google, Shareholders Have No Clout

Robert Cyran

is unimpressed with Google’s

push into clean energy:

The company risks spreading itself too thin — chasing everything from personalized

biotechnology to space flight. Its shareholders probably don’t want Mr. Page

and other executives spending their time, or Google’s cash, on a spate of

questionable pet projects that may accomplish little more than satisfying

its founders’ hubris.

This is exactly the kind of thing that Google was very explicit about

when it went public. We will not give public shareholders any kind of useful

voting rights, they said, nor will we give quarterly earnings guidance. We will

spend our money on pet projects that shareholders might not like or want. If

you don’t like that, don’t buy the stock. Google’s executives are, quite explicitly,

not answerable to their public shareholders. So it seems a bit rich

to criticise them for doing just what they said they were going to do all along.

Posted in governance, stocks, technology | Comments Off on At Google, Shareholders Have No Clout