Liquidations Update: Is it Time to Panic, Yet?

Should we be worried about collateralized loan obligations liquidating, or rather collateralized debt obligations? Alphaville has a list of liquidating CDOs which looks pretty scary to me, not that I know anything about them other than their names. Probably inchoate and generalized fear is the way to go for the time being.

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Wolfers on New Hampshire and Clemens

I had a long conversation about prediction markets and data-crunching with Justin Wolfers at the Money:Tech conference last week, which continued over the weekend via email. Given that we’re both bloggers, it seems time to bring the debate out into the open. The two main questions: Was Hillary Clinton’s victory in New Hampshire a historic upset? I say: No. And what can we learn about Roger Clemens and doping from looking at his baseball statistics? I say: Very little.

Justin has spent a lot of time looking at political prediction markets, and on the basis of the data, he felt entirely justified in saying that Hillary Clinton’s victory in New Hampshire was extremely improbable.

Election-eve trading had suggested that Sen. Obama had a 92% chance to win in New Hampshire, while Sen. Clinton rated only a 7% chance.

Against this background, it is no exaggeration to term the result truly historic. Not that there haven’t been more dramatic upsets or come-from-behind wins that carried more significance — this was just an early primary, albeit a pivotal one. But in terms of unpredictability, or at least the failure of everyone to predict it, it may have no modern match.

My point, which I made at the time, was that it’s a bit shortsighted to glom onto that single 7% datapoint, without looking at the history of the contract. Clinton was nearly always the favorite in New Hampshire; she only dropped down to underdog status in the crazy final days after Barack Obama won the Iowa caucus.

So my view is that Clinton’s victory was not nearly as improbable as you might think from simply looking at the 7% datapoint. Last-minute polls are unreliable, and last-minute prediction-market trades tend to reflect last-minute polls. So it’s not really true to say that everybody failed to predict the Clinton victory. Rather, lots of people predicted the Clinton victory; they just didn’t do so during the craziness of the final days.

But is this just hindsight talking? Did anybody at the time discount the usefulness of last-minute polls and dismiss them as so much noise? Actually, yes. One such person is Janet Elder, the editor in charge of polling at the NYT. Not only does the NYT not conduct its own polls in immediately before a primary, but it also tends to ignore others’ polls, as well, as Clark Hoyt reports:

The decision looked great before the primary in New Hampshire, where polls suggested that Obama was about to deal Clinton’s campaign a potentially fatal blow. But Clinton won there, and embarrassed news media were left to dissect why the polls were wrong…

Elder said she had no second thoughts about forgoing a poll before last week’s vote. “We don’t want to appear to be projecting results,” she said. “We’ve learned that opinion is in such flux in the last days before people vote that we tend to stand back.”

Justin, by contrast, takes the view that "in

a moderately efficient market today’s market price consolidates not only

today’s wisdom, but also the wisdom of those who traded in the past." I think he’s wrong about that, and that New Hampshire actually proves him wrong. Which do you think is more likely: that Hillary Clinton scored a spectacularly unlikely upset in New Hampshire, or that in the craziness of the post-Iowa polling, markets overshot and started generating some garbage numbers?

I should also mention that Justin had a piece in the sports section of the NYT on Sunday, crunching the numbers of Roger Clemens. I’m not sure how useful this exercise is, since as the piece admits, number-crunching can prove neither innocence nor guilt when it comes to doping. It’s a point made in the same day’s paper by Alan Schwarz:

Mr. Souder and others have called for using baseball statistics as a deviance divining rod, but experts in baseball statistics are far more hesitant. They caution that even more important than knowing what numbers say is knowing what they do not. Perhaps less scientifically, the former major leaguer Toby Harrah compared statistics to bikinis: “They both show a lot,” Mr. Harrah said, “but not everything.”…

Most experts agree that a player’s use of so-called performance-enhancing drugs must in some way affect his numbers and therefore baseball’s entire statistical ecosystem — but they also argue that using them forensically is futile.

Schwarz points out that there are non-doping players who saw freakish late-career surges, as well as lots of alleged dopers whose performance actually declined. Justin’s right to say that the Roger Clemens report can’t prove his innocence. But that’s a statement you can make without crunching any numbers and without even reading the report. In reality, statistics are much less useful when it comes to the doping scandal than either Clemens or Wolfers might have you believe.

Posted in prediction markets, statistics | Comments Off on Wolfers on New Hampshire and Clemens

Deathwatching Mainstreet.com

Today marks the launch of mainstreet.com, a mass-market spinoff from thestreet.com. The idea behind it seems improbable:

When we heard about A-Rod’s new contract with the New York Yankees, the pinstriped fans among us rejoiced and then considered, “Have we chosen careers that will compensate us well for our efforts, too?”

But if that seems a bit of a stretch to you, just check out the lead story right now:

Amy Winehouse won five Grammys last night.

But unlike fellow winners Alicia Keys, Carrie Underwood, and Kanye West, the 24 year-old soul singer was not at the Staples (SPLS) Center in Los Angeles to accept her awards…

Even without an endorsement deal from say Coke (KO) or Nike (NKE), Winehouse will probably be OK as long as she stays somewhat sober and keeps releasing albums that sell more than 3 million copies.

I don’t know much about celebrity gossip, but I do know that throwing in some ticker symbols is not much of a comparitive advantage in what is an extremely crowded marketplace.

According to Keith Kelly, "mainstreet.com is working on a shoestring start-up budget estimated at about $1 million". That sounds like enough money for it to be embarrassing when the site shuts down for lack of traffic, and not enough money for the site to actually break news and thereby attract visitors. Plus, it doesn’t even have an RSS feed – quite a big oversight for a something which has been worked on since the summer. I give it a year, tops.

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Why Personalized Advertising Means a Free WSJ.com

Esther Dyson has a thought-provoking op-ed in the WSJ today, which really ought to be read by the paper’s new owner, Rupert Murdoch. "The Coming Ad Revolution" is the headline, and a close reader of the piece will immediately understand why wsj.com should go free.

Journalists, who naturally tend to be the people who cover this issue, have a habit of thinking that they are the creators of the product that newspapers sell. They’re wrong. Newspapers don’t sell news to readers; they sell readers to advertisers. More generally, they monetize their readers (rather than their news), mainly through advertising, but also, sometimes, through subscription sales.

Advertising has until now been a very inexact art. Advertisers know in a vague demographic sense which people they want to reach; they also know in a vague demographic sense which people read which newspapers. When there’s a substantial overlap, they buy advertising in that newspaper, in an attempt to reach the desired readers.

Dyson, by contrast, paints a picture of a future where advertisers know exactly who they want to reach, down to the level of the individual. And with the rise of social networks, individuals are increasingly willing to share their own personal data. As a result, advertisers in future will be able to buy ads which reach certain individuals, rather than simply hoping that a broadly-defined group of individuals will see their ad on a certain site.

Let’s say that I’m a business traveller who flies often to Paris. Many advertisers will be interested in targeting me: airlines, with offers of discounts or extra miles if I fly with them; hotels in Paris; luxury retailers in Paris; and so on. They don’t care which websites I visit, so long as their ad gets served to me. So they buy adspace from a company (Google, or Facebook, or maybe even Murdoch’s MySpace) which knows who I am. Let’s say I’m logged in to my Google, Facebook, and MySpace account, and have elected to share my anonymized information. And let’s say I visit wsj.com, which has sold adspace to Google, which in turn has sold customized advertising to the Ritz in Paris.

When I load a page on wsj.com, I’ll end up seeing an ad for the Ritz. That ad will be customized for me: a different reader will see a different ad. As a result, the Ritz will be willing to pay an enormous amount for serving that ad to me and people like me: quite possibly many hundreds of dollars per thousand impressions.

At this point, the Ritz doesn’t give two hoots whether I’m a wsj.com subscriber or not: it knows exactly who I am, and it wants to reach me. There’s no added value to the Ritz if I’m a wsj.com subscriber, which means that wsj.com can’t charge premium rates for having such an elite subscriber base. But if the WSJ puts up a subscriber firewall, then it’s basically losing the advertising associated with lots of frequent fliers to Paris who live in places like Moscow or Abuja or Sao Paulo. Those people won’t subscribe to wsj.com, but they’ll visit it if it’s free. And Rupert Murdoch really wants them to visit his site, so that he can start monetizing them and selling them to advertisers.

Which is why the WSJ is bound to go free eventually. And if it’s going to go free eventually, it makes all the sense in the world to go free now.

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Beware the Market-Value CLO

The WSJ does a very good job this morning of bringing us all up to speed on the latest developments in the world of the credit crunch. I have a feeling we’ll be hearing more about these "market-value CLOs," creatures which seem, at first glance, designed to add leverage to leverage.

CLOs, remember, are collateralized loan obligations: bundles of loans which are then tranched up and sold off. If the loans in question are leveraged loans currently trading at 80 or 90 cents on the dollar, then the investors in any CLOs, especially in the lower tranches, are going to be hurting a lot right now. But market-value CLOs seem to take those leveraged loans and leverage them further: they "depend heavily on borrowed money," says the WSJ.

As a result, market-value CLOs are subject to what is in essence a margin call when the value of their portfolio drops below a certain level. That’s what’s happening now: the CLOs are being liquidated, which means a forced sale of lots of leveraged loans, which in turn is bringing the price of all leveraged loans down further, which will mean even more liquidation events, and so on and so forth in a vicious cycle.

And to make matters worse, there’s also a beastie known as a total return swap which seems to behave in a very similar manner to the market-value CLO.

The thinking behind all of this exotic fauna – you can throw in SIVs and CDOs as well – was much the same: rather than simply give fixed-income investors extra return for extra risk, create vehicles whose return was based on the difference between the extra return and the risk-free rate. Instead of just going long low-quality debt, investors got to go short high-quality debt as well. And of course now they’ve lost out on both sides of the trade, to disastrous effect.

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Extra Credit, Monday Edition

Does This Profile Make Me Look Fat? The Epicurean Dealmaker on Steve Schwarzman.

Money:Tech and the myth of Open: "Even the SEC, whose purpose of late is solely ensuring that price sensitive information is shared freely to all, takes the same attitude as Yahoo and Google and will shut down any bot that tries to grab data from their site automatically."

The Life Cycle of a Blog Post, From Servers to Spiders to Suits — to You

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Ben Stein Watch: February 10, 2008

One of the more subtly irritating things about Ben Stein’s NYT column is the fact that he seems so cavalier and ungrateful about the fact that he has such an influential pulpit from which to broadcast his biweekly blather. The amount of time and effort he put into this week’s column, for instance, was probably less than he expends on trimming his nose hair on a monthly basis. It’s an incoherent mess which any self-respecting NYT editor would immediately reject out of hand if it came from anybody else.

I’m talking about style, not substance, here: while I normally concentrate on what Stein says, it’s worth mentioning occasionally that how he says it can be truly atrocious as well. This week, Stein’s thesis, insofar as he has one, is so obscured by his inarticulacy that it’s quite difficult to actually object to anything in the column.

Certainly, the standard Stein touchstones are there: Bob Dylan, "this great nation", "fiduciary entities", derivatives which are "subject to manipulation", "the climate of fear the news media have whipped up", "Anyone? Anyone?".

And there are some easy-to-spot falsehoods and silly exaggerations, too. For one thing, the whole column leans upon the fragile conceit that subprime mortgage lending is usury – which it clearly isn’t. Single-digit interest rates can be high, but they can’t be usurious. Stein talks about the high yields on bonds backed by subprime mortgages, when in fact the boom was fuelled by the low yields on those bonds. And in the absence of argument he’s always happy to resort to hyperbole: "the republic teeters", "the near ruin of immense banks".

But if you manage to whack your way through the thickets of Stein’s prose, a relatively simple theme does slowly emerge:

Now who is doing badly? The investment banks that did not sell their whole inventory of subprime — and did not sell short — are suffering badly. The banks, insurers, and hedge funds that bought and held subprime securities are hurt. The stockholders of these are hurt drastically…

The cheerleaders in Washington say, “Now we need even less regulation!” And the Supreme Court, that highest judicial body in the land, just spoke through its cloaks most deep and distinguished, and severely limited the ability of shareholders to file federal class-action suits against investment banks that help a company accused of committing fraud.

Is anyone ever going to wake up to the fact that there is a lot of larceny in the human heart and that there are a lot of sheep waiting to be shorn and that regulation is not a bad thing?

Note the litany of losers: investment banks are "suffering badly", buy-side institutions are "hurt", but it’s shareholders who are "hurt drastically" and who have been "severely limited" in their ability to sue those banks.

Now I thought that the big problem in the US (and world) economy is the credit crunch – the fact that liquidity in debt markets has dried up, with nastly implications for economic growth. But Stein looks at everything from the point of view of a stock-market investor: what’s going on in credit markets really doesn’t matter unless and until it starts dragging down equities. When the credit markets were in turmoil but the stock markets were doing fine, Stein was perfectly happy. Now that the stock markets have followed the credit markets down, he’s mad, and he wants someone, anyone – regulators, judges, he doesn’t mind – to ride to his rescue.

Stein complains of "larceny" among bond investors, that most mild-mannered and risk-averse group, and blames their greed for the current crisis. He neglects to mention that equity investors, pretty much by definition, always take on more risk, and are therefore more greedy, than bond investors. Perhaps, in other words, the person most in need of regulation is Stein himself.

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The Restaurant Pretentiousness Ratio

After flicking through the wine list at Cafe Gray on Friday night, I’ve come up with what I’m calling the Restaurant Pretentiousness Ratio, or RPR. The formula is simple:

RPR=W/E

W is what you might call the quarter-median wine price: take the red wines only (to make things a bit more manageable) and find the price of the wine such that 25% of the wines on the list are cheaper, and 75% of the wines on the list are more expensive.

E is simply the average price of a main course.

At the Mermaid Inn, in the East Village, the average entree is $21; its red wines range from $28 to $74, with the quarter-median wine costing $34. (Three wines are cheaper; nine wines are more expensive.) So the RPR is 1.6.

At Cafe Gray, the average entree is $37. The wine list on the website doesn’t have prices, but I can tell you that the red wines range from $60 to $5,100, and my gut feeling is that the quarter-median price is somewhere around $175. In which case the RPR would be 4.7.

If you point me to restaurant wine lists online,. It should be interesting to see where the typical restaurant lies.

Update: Thanks, Eater! Here’s some more datapoints:

Landmarc: Quarter-Median Wine Price: $42/ Average Entree Price $25 = 1.68 ratio

Balthazar: Quarter-Median Wine Price: $55/ Average Entree Price: $24 = 2.29 ratio

Frankies Spuntino: Quarter-Median Wine Price: $30/ Average Entree Price: $15 = 2.0 ratio

Fiamma: Quarter-Median Wine Price: $110/ Average Entree Price: $35 (estimate) = 3.14 ratio

Le Cirque: Quarter-Median Wine Price: $204 / Average Entree Price $49 = 4.16 ratio

Posted in Not economics | 2 Comments

Extra Credit, Weekend Edition

House introduces ‘Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights’

Social networking traffic growth model: "Examining the empirical evidence on social network traffic, I have formulated a new theory: Social network traffic grows exponentially for about two years, and then follows a random walk."

Looking Gift Cards in the Mouth: It turns out that gift-card revenue is a liability for retailers; they can only book it as revenue when the gift card is redeemed.

C.L.O.se to Disaster: "The average loan in the secondary market trades for just 88 cents on the dollar, which is down 6 cents since the start of this year, and a record low."

Dear John Thain: A new finance blog.

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Credit Card Datapoint of the Day

Jonathan Stempel reports:

Discover Financial Services said on Thursday it agreed to sell its Goldfish credit card unit in Britain to Barclays Plc for $70 million, abandoning a money-losing business it bought two years ago for $1.68 billion, as consumer credit worsens.

Yep, that’s $1.6 billion, or 96% of the original purchase price, up in smoke. In fact, Discover has lost significantly more than its original purchase price, since Goldfish has been losing money hand over fist ever since Discover bought it. And this dreadful announcement actually helped to boost Discover’s shares yesterday, although they’re back down today. Score one for Morgan Stanley, which spun off Discover at $28.50 a share in June: the stock is down more than 45% since then.

Update: Murray says in the comments that Discover’s loss on the sale was actually only £140 million, and that its total loss including operating losses over the course of the two years was about $500 million. Which is a lot of money, but nowhere near $1.6 billion.

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Why Non-Borrowed Reserves Don’t Matter

Caroline Baum does everybody a favor today and explains why you shouldn’t be remotely worried about a deservedly-obscure indicator known as non-borrowed reserves. She talks about the "hysterical emails" she’s been getting on the subject but is too polite to name any names. But I know where I first saw this meme arise: it was Mish, whose blog entry on the subject at the beginning of last week was picked up by everybody from Yves Smith to Metafilter.

The problem was that Mish confused everybody with this statement:

Were it not for the Term Auction Facility, banks would have had to raise $40 billion in capital by selling assets or some other means.

As Baum explains, when the Fed created the Term Auction Facility, sensible banks borrowed their reserves from the TAF instead of from other places, because the rates on offer at the TAF were so attractive. But that’s not how Mish’s readers saw it: they thought that the Fed was bailing out banks with the TAF, which wasn’t really the case at all. If the banks’ reserves hadn’t been available at the TAF window, they wouldn’t have borrowed them there: as simple as that. If the TAF hadn’t existed, would the banks have "had to raise $40 billion in capital" overnight? Of course not, they would just have kept their existing reserves where they were.

With any luck, Baum’s lucid column will put an end to the emails and IMs which I, too, have been receiving on this subject. In a bearish market like this, people will see monsters behind all manner of corners. But non-borrowed reserves are simply a non-issue.

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Exxon Mobil Plays Hardball With Venezuela

Did you have any idea that the bonds of PDVSA, the Venezuelan state oil company, are trading at just 65.7 cents on the dollar? I didn’t, but are now, partly because of an injunction that Exxon Mobil has managed to get in three international courts, freezing as much as $12 billion of PDVSA’s assets.

The size of the asset freeze seems enormous, relative to the size of the dispute between the two oil companies:

Exxon Mobil’s 41.7 percent stake in a heavy oil project in Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt region had a net-book value of about $750 million, according to a September filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

I have a copy of one of the injunctions, but it’s no help at all in terms of working out how the $12 billion figure was arrived at. I have a feeling it’s just an enormous number calculated to be bigger than the sum total of assets which PDVSA has offshore, forcing PDVSA into an arbitration process and preventing the company from simply refusing to follow through on whatever the arbitrator decides.

Still, these kind of hardball tactics are eyebrow-raising in the world of oil companies, given that Exxon Mobil has every incentive to want to have access to many international waters over the long term. Other oil-rich countries might well be following these proceedings very closely, and wondering whether they really need to be doing business with such a litigious firm.

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The Future of the Monolines

Andrew Clavell has a really good blog entry on the monolines today, even as MBIA somehow managed to sell $700 million in new equity in the public markets, over and above the $300 million it sold to Warburg Pincus. (Which is itself over and above the $500 million that Warburg Pincus has already invested and which at the moment is deep underwater.)

This looks like good news for MBIA: there’s appetite for its equity, at a price. But here’s the thing: that price is just $12.15 per share, which could well be significantly below the value of MBIA in run-off mode. If you think that MBIA will get downgraded and stop writing new insurance, but won’t go bankrupt, then the insurer could well be a screaming buy at these levels.

Bill Ackman, of course, is still short MBIA even at these depressed levels. He and his spreadsheet reckon that MBIA has a huge negative number in the equity column; as a result, he’s not only short the stock but he’s very long protection. What he’s waiting for is the stock to go to zero, MBIA to default on an obligation, and his credit-default swaps to pay out massively.

But after crunching Ackman’s spreadsheet, Clavell is a bit more sanguine:

The 700 tabs of gut-wrenchingly dull data funnel up to an estimation of CDO losses for Ambac and MBIA. Oddly enough, these aggregate losses seem unexceptional, particularly since they are expected to be incurred over the remaining life of the guarantees.

All the same, he quotes Pimco’s Bill Gross, in the FT, making an exceptionally good point:

How could Ambac, through the magic of its triple-A rating, with equity capital of less than $5bn, insure the debt of the state of California, the world’s sixth-largest economy? How could an investor in California’s municipal bonds be comforted by a company that during a potential liquidity crisis might find the capital markets closed to it, versus the nation’s largest state with its obvious ongoing taxing authority?

It does seem a bit silly, when put like that. Insurance companies are meant to be much bigger and much more solid than the credits they insure. Up until now, California has issued bonds which were wrapped (insured) by Ambac. The wrap garnered the bonds a triple-A rating, which allowed them to be held by investors who were forced by mandate to invest only in triple-A debt. That’s the key: the triple-A mandate is the important thing, rather than the actual creditworthiness of the bonds.

Pretty soon, anybody with such a mandate is likely to have to sell his wrapped bonds, since if the monolines get downgraded those bonds won’t have a triple-A rating any more. As Clavell notes, "Pimco must be rubbing their hands with glee": it’s a huge buy-side company which isn’t constrained by triple-A mandates and which loves nothing better than a fire sale of cheap debt.

Now this is a profit opportunity for Pimco, and it might result in losses for certain investors who thought they were investing in only the safest instruments. But there’s no tsunami here, the tsunami just kicks in when European banks holding AAA-rated instruments have to suddenly allocate a huge amount of capital against those bonds the day the rating gets downgraded.

Eventually, we’ll find ourselves in a world without a triple-A fetish, the world of the recent past where some investors felt they could outsource their credit-analysis duties to the ratings agencies. That too will be good for Pimco: I’d much rather have Bill Gross doing my credit analysis than Moody’s. And I’m sure that Pimco will have a wide range of capital-guaranteed products for people who want utmost safety.

When that happens, the demand for both ratings agencies and monolines will be much lower than it has been, and the world could cope with a monoline or two in run-off, especially if Berkshire Hathaway steps in to fill some of the gap. But the move from this world to that world might still be a bit unsettling for some.

Posted in insurance | Comments Off on The Future of the Monolines

Monoline Tsunami Aimed at European Banks

If you skim over headlines in your RSS reader, it’s easy to miss this one: "Ackermann warns of monoline ‘tsunami’". Ackman is bearish on monolines? Wake me up when you have something new to – oh. It’s not Bill Ackman but rather Josef Ackermann, the CEO of Deutsche Bank? OK, that’s news.

Yves Smith explains that the huge complicating factor here is Basel II, which is heavily reliant on credit ratings.

Banks (which bought primarily AAA tranches) can treat AAA paper as a risk free asset; the reserve requirements are minimal. A downgrade to AA increases the reserve requirements markedly, and CDOs are generally downgraded more than a mere grade or two when they fall (I wish I could be more crisp here, but Basel II makes matters more complicated). Thus a loss of the bond guarantor AAA has a quick and nasty impact on bank capital adequacy.

This is a big difference between European banks like Deutsche, which have generally embraced Basel II, and US banks, which are a bit behind the curve on that front. So it’s easy to see why Ackermann is worried, and why ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet is trying to tell people not to panic:

"I certainly would not mention anything like waves of tsunami or any other mention of that sort," Trichet said at a press conference in Frankfurt. "The fact that this correction continues along various markets is not something which should surprise us, it’s an ongoing process."

If the CEO of Deutsche Bank says there’s a tsunami coming and the president of the ECB says there’s nothing to worry about, I’d start getting worried.

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Some Things I Learned from James Stewart’s Steve Schwarzman Profile

It’s long, so you might want to skip the whole thing. Here are some juicy bits:

Schwarzman also owns a coastal estate in Saint-Tropez and a beachfront property in Jamaica. He typically spends summer weekends and August in East Hampton; July in Saint-Tropez; and winter weekends in Palm Beach. His children use the house in Jamaica; he rarely goes there. The five properties and their renovations appear to have cost Schwarzman at least a hundred and twenty-five million dollars. “I love houses,” he told me recently. “I’m not sure why.”

Blackstone does not own a corporate jet. Instead, it uses Schwarzman’s private jet. (In 2006, the company paid him $1.54 million for the privilege.)

Blackstone has a long history of opulent anniversary and closing dinners, often at the Four Seasons, which is referred to by some as the Blackstone cafeteria. Still, until recently Schwarzman had trouble getting a prime table in the Grill Room at lunch. According to a friend of both men, when Schwarzman asked Peterson why, his co-founder replied, “It takes more than just money.”

The "I don’t feel like a wealthy person" quote has been widely reported, but this is just classic:

Schwarzman himself says, “I’m thinking through how I want to approach that area of philanthropy. Assuming that Blackstone does well over time, and the credit markets recover, I’ll have significant resources for charitable activities.”

Dude, you’re worth well over $4 billion. Is that less than you were worth? Yes. Does it mean you don’t yet "have significant resources for charitable activities"? Um.

Stewart then introduces a string of Schwarzman anecdotes by saying that "he has a vivid memory for details". It’s up to you to decide which of them to believe; I guess – or are we meant to trust the New Yorker fact-checkers on these ones?

He likes to tell a story about how, early in one cross-country race, he slipped and broke his wrist. Determined to set a record for the course, he got up and kept running, his arm tucked against his side, and set the record. At the finish, his coach asked him what was wrong. “I broke my wrist,” Schwarzman said, then went into shock and was rushed to the hospital.

The summer before his sophomore year, while recovering from a touch-football injury, Schwarzman decided to study classical music, a subject about which he knew almost nothing. He started with Gregorian chants and worked through the repertoire chronologically, listening to recordings and reading related texts. He studied every major work and every major conductor, often spending, he claims, eight to ten hours a day listening to the stereo system. By late summer, he had reached Tchaikovsky. (A bit later on in the profile, we find Schwarzman pulling out his briefcase and working all the way through a concert at Carnegie Hall.)

Schwarzman waited in the reception area [at DLJ] for half an hour, watching as young bankers hurried past in shirtsleeves, followed by secretaries wearing short skirts and big gold earrings. “It seemed fast-moving, intense,” Schwarzman recalled. “Everyone seemed happy.” When Donaldson asked him why he wanted to work at the firm, Schwarzman replied, “Mr. Donaldson, I don’t even know what you do. But if you have such great-looking girls and intense guys then I want to do it.” Schwarzman was hired at a salary of ten thousand five hundred dollars, which, by his account, was “five hundred dollars more than anyone else in my class at Yale.” He quickly realized that he was unqualified. He left after six months, but, before leaving, he had lunch with Donaldson. “I’m sorry I didn’t make more of a contribution,” Schwarzman recalls saying. “If you don’t mind my asking, why did you hire me and waste your money?”

“It’s simple,” Donaldson replied. “One day you’ll be the head of this firm.”

“You must be kidding. Why?”

“It’s my instinct. You have something special and I want to bet on it.”

(Donaldson says that he has no recollection of such an incident, but he does recall telling Schwarzman that if he returned to the firm he would do well.)

Being at Lehman worked to his advantage. As one former Lehman banker describes the firm, “It was survival of the fittest. You produced the business and then you fought over the proceeds. It was every man for himself.” Bruce Wasserstein, then at First Boston, and soon to be regarded as the leading mergers-and-acquisitions banker on Wall Street, said to Eric Gleacher, the head of M. & A. at Lehman, and Schwarzman, “I don’t understand why all of you at Lehman Brothers hate each other. I get along with both of you.” To which Schwarzman replied, “If you were at Lehman Brothers, we’d hate you, too.”

Finally, Schwarzman in nutshell:

“I’m very happy with my life as it is,” his father explained as Schwarzman kept badgering him. “I’ve got enough money to send you and your brothers to college. We’ve got a nice house and two cars. I don’t want any more in life.” Schwarzman found this incomprehensible.

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The Public Side of Gerson Lehrman

Apologies for the late start this morning, I’ve had a combination of digital and meatspace problems (I thought I was taking an aspirin in the middle of the night; it turned out to be an ambien. Oops.) But one thing I’ve learned in the wake of my blog entry is that Gerson Lehrman does have some public and vaguely bloggy content: look here for accounting and finance analysis, or here for energy and industrials, for instance. It’s not particularly user-friendly from a non-subscriber point of view – I still haven’t worked out how to navigate the public pages without running into a subscriber firewall – but it is there, and it’s not hard to find some interesting insights once you get there.

For instance, I didn’t know that the NiMH batteries used in hybrid cars have been soaring in price due to supply constraints on their constituent metals, which seem to be mined only in China.

When Toyota inaugurated the hybrid in 1999 the raw material costs for the nickel metal hydride battery, NiMH, pack used in the compact sized car was around $1000.00. The total cost of the battery’s construction was then around $2,000.00. Toyota made an error of judgement in its marketing plan in 1999; it decided not to list the cost of the battery separately in the invoice and not to make provision to recover the battery at the end of its or the car’s life.

The NiMH battery introduced into a mass production vehicle by Toyota in 1999 was then a proven reliable and safe, long lived, device, which gave the car more than twice the range of the best lead-acid batteries then available. The performance of NiMH batteries has been improved since 1999, and there are credible reports of another advance, which would give 50% more range to a Prius.

Unfortunately the raw materials for a NiMH battery for a Prius now cost some $6,000.00 and the finished battery pack costs Toyota about $8,000.00 to build. This is entirely due to the explosion of demand from Asia for natural resources and the fact that the production and supply of a key component of NiMH batteries, rare earth metals, is today totally controlled by companies in the People’s republic of China.

Theoretically a lithium-ion battery system is capable of holding more energy per pound than a NiMH battery system. In fact battery developers have been trying to make a safe reliable long lived vehicle size lithium based battery pack for as long as the NiMH battery has been in existence. So far lithium batteries have not proved to have the safety required. Lithium batteries used in laptop computers and portable electronics are regularly reported to have overheating problems including the occasional outright fire.

But I also didn’t know that Gerson Lehrman raises some serious hackles out there in the real world. One econoblogger emailed me:

Someday Gerson is going to get busted. Their whole business model is getting people at companies to sell what amounts to inside information. They protest up one side and down the other that they don’t and claim to have procedures to prevent it, but they are all form. They are the moral equivalent of subprime lenders with no doc loans: they pretend not to know misrepresentation is going on when their processes encourage it. And like the no-docs (if you recall Tanta on this subject) the effect of their procedures is to shift any liability on to the person providing the information to them.

I would never take a dime from them. They make the old Drexel look good.

Of course, morality has gone out the window in America, so my view doubtless seems quaint. But I am still appalled that any legitimate conference would give them a slot.

I’ve never found it particularly easy to get excited about insider-trading, but the fact remains that so long as it’s illegal it shouldn’t be done, and GLG does seem to exist to make it as easy as possible. Now it’s entirely possible that there’s nothing illegal going on, and that all GLG consultants are extremely scrupulous about not divulging non-public information. But it’s also true that those consultants don’t work in the securities industry and don’t have their utterances cleared through layers of compliance officers. And if someone knows important secret information, he doesn’t always have to divulge it directly for his interlocutor to be able to pick up from other things he says – and how he says them – what that information might be.

So I’m sympathetic to my interlocutor’s point: it’s certainly hard to trust a company which is built on secrecy and opacity and non-public information. Later today, I’ll blog about another company, which pays bloggers in a much more transparent (although not entirely transparent) manner.

Update: GLG’s Jonathan Glick responds:

Thanks for mentioning that we do indeed put hundreds of our experts out

on the Web, but your anonymous "econoblogger" clearly doesn’t begin to

understand our platform.

Gerson Lehrman Group not only has the strongest compliance procedures

and systems around expert consulting in the world, and the real story is

that our clients specifically pay us for those features. It’s our key

differentiator, and everybody in our industry knows it.

These include:

  1. Every expert must sign a contract and re-sign once a year. In

    addition to that, Council Members (our experts) go through very clear

    and required training on confidentiality specific to the expert’s

    industry’s issues. (Sign up and try it.)

  2. We require that experts disclose conflicts in writing before

    participating in projects and we use those disclosures to block experts

    from projects for which they have disclosed conflict.

  3. An enormous investment in ‘rules and tools’ around employed experts,

    including:

    • A massive ongoing outreach to the GCs and CEOs of public corporations

      to learn about and implement their companies’ policies around outside

      consulting. These campaigns are conducted by email, FedEx, and through

      loud visible partnerships and appearances with credible organizations,

      including the New York Stock Exchange and NIRI. (Look here for a recent

      event we did — this was

      sent to every investor relations professional of a NYSE listed company!)

      When a company informs GLG about a policy against employees consulting,

      GLG immediately and comprehensively blocks that through the platform,

      including at lesser known subsidiaries and business units.

    • Formal policies that prohibit an employed expert from consulting about

      their company.

    • Systematic limits on what kind of consulting, the amount of consulting

      and the amount employed experts can be paid without a formal consent of

      the company by a senior manager — this is true about public AND private

      company employees. We do not require such consent from CEO’s, CFO’s,

      GC’s, and certain other senior executives.

    • Incidentally, only a small percentage of our experts are employed,

      anyway. The vast majority are independent consultants and academics.

  4. A robust oversight dashboard that lets our clients — including the

    largest and most risk-averse financial and professional services firms

    in the world — implement additional rules, screens and reminders

    surrounding their own use of the GLG platform. With regards to

    transparency, a compliance officer from any of our clients can log into

    a website review every telephone consultation, before or after it’s

    taken place. Imagine you’re a malicious expert looking to sell inside

    information — do you really want a perfect record of when and how long

    you spoke, about what topics, to whom, and how much you got paid?

Once again, our services are used by most of the major investment banks,

private equity firms, and mutual funds — and more broadly by leading

law firms, corporations and not-for-profits. These clients, and our

experts, demand robust compliance systems to manage their interactions,

and those are what we continue to develop.

Posted in Portfolio | Comments Off on The Public Side of Gerson Lehrman

Justin Wolfers is $20 Richer

I found myself in the middle of an interesting debate between Barry Ritholtz and Justin Wolfers this afternoon. Barry was advocating the idea of trend-following, when it comes to stocks, while Justin is more of a believer in the random walk. Justin being one of life’s natural gamblers, it wasn’t long until they agreed on a wager.

I picked a stock at random: I used the first letters of the tabs open in my web browser to generate a ticker symbol. I then picked a person walking past (it turned out to be Gregory Galant of Newsgroper) and asked him to name a date in the past few years: he picked October 10, 2004. I then generated a chart of the stock price for the year to that date. Barry examined the chart, and by looking at the trend, decided on where he thought the stock would close on the first trading day of 2005. Justin simply picked the closing price on October 10, and used that as his prediction for the opening price of 2005.

Who won, the trend-follower or the random-walk guy? Well, maybe it wasn’t fair: the stock I picked turned out to be Petrobras, which has been in a strong upwards trend for many years now. The stock price rose significantly in the months up to October 10, 2004, where it closed at $37.53. Barry’s prediction for January 3, 2005, was $44, although when he realized that Justin was simply going to predict $37.53, he softened his prediction to $42.

As it happens, the strong trend in Petrobras shares notwithstanding, Petrobras shares closed at $38.70 on January 3, 2005: Justin won the bet, and is now $20 richer. But as I take another look at the data now, I realize it was very close: Petrobras opened on January 3 at $40.10, and if we’d used that figure, Barry would have been the winner.

Barry, of course, wants a hundred or so rematches: he reckons he’ll win in the long run. But for the time being, it’s Wolfers 1-0 Ritholtz.

Posted in stocks | Comments Off on Justin Wolfers is $20 Richer

Blogonomics: How Gerson Lehrman Pays Bloggers

Call it the monetization of opacity. One of the biggest buzz topics of the Money:Tech conference is dark pools: the way that stock trades are migrating away from open and transparent public exchanges, and into black boxes which don’t make their trade data public. Today, up popped Jonathan Glick of Gerson Lehrman on the blog panel of all places. Which on its face is weird: blogs are all about being free and public and transparent, while Gerson Lehrman makes its money from expensive and private and opaque information: putting investors in touch, one-on-one, with experts in their field.

Glick said, on the panel, that GLG’s clients – the investors looking for specific information – do read blogs, and often approach GLG to ask if they can be put in touch with specific bloggers. GLG then approaches those bloggers, who then become not only bloggers but private consultants.

Once that’s happened, the bloggers get an incentive to join in what is essentially a private GLG blogging system. GLG consultants, about 1,100 times per month, will write posts about their area of expertise, which are then distributed to GLG clients. If the idea in that post piques a client’s interest, he can set up a phone call with the consultant, and have a conversation with the consultant.

Now in theory, there’s no reason that those posts shouldn’t appear on a public blog, instead of (or as well as) on the GLG system. But GLG’s clients value non-public information: that’s the driving force behind GLG. So if a blogger thinks that his insight might have value to a GLG client, he has an incentive to keep that insight relatively private, within the GLG network, rather than blogging it in public.

This is exciting and worrying in equal measure. It’s exciting, because it’s a compelling way in which bloggers can monetize their content without having to venture into the world of advertising. But it’s worrying, because it gives bloggers (or some bloggers, anyway) an incentive not to blog their ideas in public.

Ultimately, though, I think it’s more exciting than worrying. Consider the GLG client who is intrigued enough by a posted entry to want to set up a phone call. Would he prefer it if that entry were private rather than public? Yes. But if the entry is cross-posted on a public blog, I suspect the client will still end up ordering that phone call. If the original entry is public, it makes the value of a conversation maybe slightly less valuable, at the margin. But that public entry also makes the value of the blogger slightly more valuable, at the margin: it could end up with that blogger getting more clients down the road. So I have faith that GLG will be a good thing, not a bad thing, for the econoblogosphere.

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Explaining the Bank of England’s High Interest Rates

bubbleIn its front-page curtain-raiser for the Bank of England’s rate cut today, the WSJ prints a chart with the headline "Banking Bubble?". It shows that the financial sector now accounts for more than a fifth of all jobs in the UK – compared to just 6% in the US.

So how is it that the UK, with an enormous financial sector and a rapidly-imploding housing market, has interest rates far above those in the US and the euro zone? After today’s cut, the UK base rate is 5.25%, compared to 4% in Europe and 3% in the US. Inflation is a bit of a worry in all three areas, but I don’t think that inflation on its own can account for the differential.

Rather, I suspect that the Bank of England is quietly not at all unhappy that the housing-and-finance boom seems finally to have come to an end. It was always unsustainable, and while there’s no pleasant way for any bubble to burst, a slow deflation, like we’re seeing in the UK, is always preferable to a nasty crash. If the Bank cut rates aggressively, it would risk reinflating the bubble, which would only make an eventual crash more likely and more painful. So it’s happy to let the air out slowly, and if panic does break out, it has much more room to cut than the Fed or the ECB.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on Explaining the Bank of England’s High Interest Rates

The NYT Moves to Hammer-Price Reporting

The doyenne of art-auction reporters is Carol Vogel of the NYT: she sets the benchmark. And, it seems, the benchmark has changed, which makes for some weird comparisons as the changeover occurs. Here she is today, with a piece headlined "Triptych by Francis Bacon Is Sold for $46.1 Million":

A mysterious three-part painting that is viewed as a Francis Bacon masterpiece sold for $46.1 million Wednesday night at a Christie’s auction here, countering expectations of a record price for his work…

The hammer price was slightly below the auction’s presale estimate of $50 million to $70 million for the painting as well as Bacon’s previous record. In May his “Study From Innocent X” (1962) was sold for a record $52.6 million at Sotheby’s in New York.

The final price for this towering triptych, including Christie’s commission, was $51.6 million, the auction house said.

A reader could certainly be forgiven for thinking that the $46.1 million price for the Bacon was $6.5 million short of the $52.6 million record for the artist. In fact, however, the $52.6 million figure includes the Sotheby’s commission, which means that the final price of $51.6 million fell only $1 million short of breaking the record.

The practice of leading with the hammer price and relegating the price including commission to a low-down "the auction house said" sentence is new. When Vogel reported on the Bacon record being broken in May, she didn’t even mention the hammer price:

Another record price was paid last night for Francis Bacon’s “Study From Innocent X” (1962)… It was estimated at $30 million, more than the record $27.5 million for a Bacon paid at Christie’s in London in February. That record nearly doubled when another unidentified telephone bidder paid $52.6 million.

(Final prices include Sotheby’s commission: 20 percent of the first $500,000 and 12 percent of the rest. Estimates do not reflect commissions.)

I’m not sure why the NYT has made this switch. The cost of the painting to the buyer is the total price paid; the hammer price is just a mechanism for working out how much of the total goes to the seller and how much goes to the auction house. If a gallery sells a painting for $1 million, Vogel would never strip out the gallery’s commission and report only on the amount being pocketed by the artist. And in any case it’s not clear how much money the seller of a painting at auction will actually receive, since the auction houses (usually) charge sellers commission on top of the buyer’s commission. Maybe if Vogel is reading this, she might leave a comment to explain what’s going on.

Update: Has Vogel switched back already? Today she reports that the "Francis Bacon triptych fetched $51.6 million". Curiouser and curiouser.

Posted in art | Comments Off on The NYT Moves to Hammer-Price Reporting

Blogonomics: Prizes for Finance Bloggers

Eddy Elfenbein has a very good idea, which fits quite neatly into my worries about everybody but the bloggers themselves making money from finance blogs. The presenters at the Money:Tech conference

are unanimous that there’s alpha to be found in them thar blogs, but they’re curiously silent on the subject of whether and how the bloggers might be compensated for their insights.

Elfenbein points them to the Global Settlement:

The settlement required funding of “independent research.”

The result has been a disaster and few people will admit it. Basically, nobody wants this research…

Here’s my proposal: Instead of wasting money on political ads or over-paid consultants that nobody reads, let’s fund something that’s already working. Each year, the trustees of the of independent research funds should award prizes of, say, $10,000 each, to the best finance bloggers…

The Global Settlement was for $1.4 billion so I think they could scrape together a little cash to fund some worthy blogs. It would be a small slice of what’s already being spent and it would certainly have a much greater impact on research that is truly independent.

He’s right. If you love the bloggers when they write for free, just imagine what they’ll do if you incentivize them with a million dollars or so! That sum is tiny: big buy-side shops spend many multiples of that on directed commissions for sell-side research they usually disdain. This is exactly the same idea: investors should pay, ex post, for good ideas that they are shown for "free".

And what about the ideas that come from data-miners and blog aggregators who don’t so much look for individual ideas but rather look for bigger-picture signals from the mass of blogs as a whole? Collective Intellect generates authority scores for a broad mass of financial bloggers, maybe those scores could weight a lottery system, where a few lucky bloggers end up with a surprise check for $10,000 every so often.

All this wouldn’t cost much, in comparison to the sums currently spent on research by the buy side. And it could have a transformative effect on the quality of ideas the buy side receives.

(Via Abnormal Returns)

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Tech Salary Datapoint of the Day

Jeff Bewkes is cutting back:

Time Warner, seeking to cut costs and streamline operations, plans to split off AOL’s Internet access business from its Web site and online advertising business and cut 100 jobs at its corporate unit, the company’s new chief executive, Jeffrey L. Bewkes, said Wednesday…

Mr. Bewkes’s plan to lay off 100 people is expected to save $50 million at the corporate unit.

It seems that the net cost of those 100 people at the "corporate unit", whatever that might be, is half a million bucks apiece; one assumes most of that is salary, and possibly substantially more, if those people provide any value at all. What’s more, "corporate unit" executives generally come with support staff; if support staff are included in the 100-people headcount, then one can assume that pretty much all the laid-off executives were making seven-figure salaries.

Posted in pay, technology | Comments Off on Tech Salary Datapoint of the Day

Warren Buffett can Still Borrow Money

Wojtek Dabrowski reports that Warren Buffett is reasonably sanguine:

"I wouldn’t quite call it a credit crunch. Funds are available," Buffett said during a question and answer session at a business event. "Money is available, and it’s really quite cheap because of the lowering of rates that has taken place."

He added: "What has happened is a repricing of risk and an unavailability of what I might call ‘dumb money,’ of which there was plenty around a year ago."

This is true, although it’s not the whole truth. The problem is that there was so much ‘dumb money’ around a year ago that it was propelling not only Wall Street profits but also a large chunk of the entire US economy. Every disaster we’ve seen over the course of the present crisis was the result of too much dumb money flowing into mispriced debt. And all that money helped drive economic growth, largely but not only in the housing and finance industries. When the dumb-money trades get unwound, so does the economic growth which came with them. And what that means (p=65%, according to InTrade) is a recession in 2008.

Buffett’s happy to say that the US economy will "do very well over time". But note that he’s not making any promises about how it’s going to do over 2008.

Posted in bonds and loans, economics | Comments Off on Warren Buffett can Still Borrow Money

Monolines: Resigned to Downgrades

The WSJ puts an uncommonly-forthright forward-looking headline on its monoline story today: "Rescue Plans

Won’t Prevent

Downgrades". And it’s right. If the monolines’ plans for shoring up their capital bases come to fruition, they’re still likely to suffer the loss of their triple-A ratings. Most of the story talks about the bank consortia looking to shore up Ambac and FGIC:

The banks, then, would share in the proceeds that the bond insurers would make as they collect premiums and wait for their existing portfolio of policies to expire, or "run off." In this scenario, the most the banks are hoping for is that the bond insurers’ credit ratings don’t fall below double-A, but they aren’t getting their hopes up for a return to triple-A glory.

One could excuse the monolines in question for being less than thrilled about this particular prospect. The loss of their triple-A ratings is one thing; "run-off", by contrast, is something else entirely, and implies that the companies will essentially become shells, collecting insurance premiums but writing no new business.

The proposed bank plan indeed looks much better from the point of view of the banks involved, which get to unwind their suddenly-toxic credit default swaps even though the documentation in them clearly says that can’t be done without the consent of the insurer. Their plan, then, is essentially to take over the insurer, and rescue themselves first.

An interesting open question is whether the monolines could continue as a going concern, writing new insurance, with only a double-A rather than a triple-A credit rating. I’ve heard noises that such an outcome is indeed possible, although no one knows for sure. But if the downgrades are to single-A or lower, it’s hard to see how the monolines will continue to write new business.

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Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

You have failed me for the last time, Auction Rate Municipals! Accrued Interest explains that it’s all a storm in a teacup really.

Societe Generale – behavioral economics at work

The Strait of Messina: The Epicurean Dealmaker explains big stock-market moves on seemingly small reasons.

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