Next Rate Move: Up And Down at the Same Time?

Steve

Waldman, provocative as ever, resuscitates a 2002 speech

by Ben Bernanke, wherein the future Fed chairman notes that the central bank

has more tools at its disposal than simply raising or lowering the Fed funds

rate. Specifically, he says, when liquidity premiums start to spike, as is happening

right now, the Fed can "offer fixed-term loans to banks at low or zero

interest, with a wide range of private assets (including, among others, corporate

bonds, commercial paper, bank loans, and mortgages) deemed eligible as collateral."

Steve takes this argument to its logical conclusion. Why does the Fed’s discount

rate always have to be higher than the Fed funds rate? "Suppose the Fed

were to offer to lend against specific sorts of collateral at a negative spread

to Federal Funds," he writes, and suppose that collateral were the nasty

products presently stinking up the banking system – RMBS, CDOs, that kind

of thing. To all intents and purposes, the Fed would be offering to buy those

assets from the beleaguered banks, which would help address the credit crunch

and the financial-sector problems which have driven the Fed’s last two rate

cuts. And if those problems were addressed, then the Fed could actually raise

the Fed funds rate in order to help contain inflation.

The Fed would have its cake and eat it too. It would promote full employment

by stopping a dangerous financial crisis in its tracks. It would promote price

stability by hiking interest rates to support the purchasing power (and FX

value, and commodity value) of the dollar.

There would be some danger that, even with the banks bailed out, interest

rate hikes would slow the economy. But that hazard is unusually small now,

because the binding constraint on lending is not the Fed-set interest rate,

but concerns about creditworthiness and quality of collateral… a bad situation

would be made very little worse by a moderate rate hike, if the financial

sector could withstand it.

Steve does note that there are very good moral-hazard reasons not

to do this. But once a house is burning, it’s a bit late for lectures about

not smoking in bed: the important thing is to put out the fire. In terms of

monetary policy, one way of doing that would be to bring the discount rate down

for certain types of collateral, even as the Fed funds rate could be raised

upwards. As a result, the unwise banks would be rewarded, while the better-run

banks would be punished. But the financial system and the economy more generally

might still benefit.

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