A Closer Look at Cov-Lite Loans

Catherine

Craig has a great, in-depth look today at the "cov-lite" phenomenon

whereby loans are increasingly being syndicated without the restrictive covenants

of yesteryear.

Craig’s piece is excellent because she doesn’t go down the lazy

knee-jerk route of automatically saying that cov-lite loans are toxic and

dangerous and something which pose a massive systemic risk to the international

financial architecture. Instead, she looks at the development in an impartial

manner, and although she doesn’t make any explicit conclusions, it’s clear that

there are quite a few reasons to consider cov-lite loans a good thing.

It’s certainly true that banks with cov-lite loans will have less power over

borrowers than they had in the past. But this is not necessarily a bad thing.

For one thing, many recent cov-lite loans, such as the $16

billion in acquisition financing that KKR is lining up for First Data, or

the same amount that it might borrow to acquire Alliance Boots, are huge. As

a result, any bank creditors committee would be enormous, unwieldy, and would

probably cause more harm than good.

What’s more, many banks with these loans will hedge their exposure in the CDS

market, which means that the real default risk is being borne not by the creditor

of record but rather by any number of hedge funds, CDOs, and the like. In such

a situation, it makes little sense for the bank in question to have serious

control over the debtor company.

It’s also worth noting that if a company doesn’t have restrictive covenants

on its loan, that gives it an extra couple of degrees of freedom should it ever

run into difficulties. The company’s owners can repay its bank debt however

they like, without being second-guessed by their creditors. Most importantly,

volatile financial results are much less likely, in and of themselves, to lead

to receivership or bankruptcy.

Many firms with cov-lite loans are highly leveraged, which means their financial

results are naturally going to be much more volatile. Cov-lite loans simply

make that volatility less likely to result in technical default on the part

of the company, with all the nasty consequences that implies.

And there’s also evidence that banks are receiving a premium for agreeing to

cov-lite loans:

At the riskier end of the spectrum, where more highly leveraged deals are

using deferred repayment instruments such as second lien instead of senior

debt, banks are cautious and likely to demand a higher price for the privilege

of covenant-lite terms.

This is great for all concerned: banks get the yields they’re looking for,

while sponsors get the freedom of action that they’re looking for.

The fact is that cov-lite loans are all negotiated, as it were, between consenting

adults. Maybe the banks, looking at the history of the likes of KKR, have decided

that KKR is actually better at running companies and working out what the smart

moves are than their own loan officers are. Or maybe they just think that they

can boost their total returns by lending cov-lite.

So does this mean there’s no systemic risk associated with cov-lite loans?

I’m not sure. No one seems to think that there’s major systemic risk associated

with bonds, and cov-lite loans are essentially loans which behave quite similarly

to bonds. But the collapse of a bondholder is a lot easier to cope with than

the collapse of a bank. So really it probably all comes down to the question

of how much of this debt is being retained by banks, as opposed to being sold

off or hedged. And that’s something which nobody knows.

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