Bloomberg Buying Bloomberg?

Blind trusts are popular with politicians: the idea is that the politician in question can’t have any conflicts of interest with respect to his investments if he doesn’t know what his investments are. As a result, you’re not going to find blind trusts ever making the headlines: if everybody knows what the trust is investing in, then that defeats the purpose.

Yet:

A blind trust run by Mayor Bloomberg is willing to pay between $4.5 billion and $5 billion to buy Merrill Lynch’s 20 percent stake in Bloomberg LP, sources tell The Post.

Bloomberg’s job is mayor of New York, he’s not a fund manager: the blind trust is run on his behalf, it’s not run by him. But since the whole point of a blind trust is that the politician in question can’t tell it what to invest in, what’s going on here? I simply can’t believe that the people actually running the trust would spend $5 billion on buying a 20% stake in Bloomberg LP without Bloomberg himself being involved in the decision.

It makes sense that decisions related to Bloomberg’s ownership stake in Bloomberg LP might be exempt from the other blind trust rules. After all, since Bloomberg already owns 80% of the company, he’s plenty conflicted on that front already.

But it also makes sense that the amount of money Bloomberg’s willing to pay for the 20% of Bloomberg LP he doesn’t already own would be affected by the amount of money he has at his disposal, the ease with which he can liquidate his assets, and the discount to fair value that he’d have to accept if he wanted to raise $5 billion in cash in a hurry. After all, even if you’re a billionaire, coming up with that kind of money is non-trivial.

The numbers being bandied about by the Post would value Bloomberg LP (and, therefore, Bloomberg himself, if he owns all the company and has no debt to speak of) at somewhere between $22.5 billion and $25 billion. Forbes pegged Bloomberg’s wealth at $11.5 billion this year, up from $5.5 billion last year. Next year, is that number going to double again?

(Of course, Bloomberg could, if he wanted, try to borrow the $5 billion, rather than pay in cash. Hey – maybe he could ask Merrill Lynch for a loan!)

Posted in banking, Media, Politics | 1 Comment

Saving Fannie and Freddie

The WSJ’s front page this morning features an important-sounding 1,500-word article on contingency plans for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, recapitulating Katie Benner’s article in Fortune yesterday. What would the government do if the companies ran into trouble? What could it do? We learn that people in the Bush administration have been asking such questions, which is prudent and sensible. But we don’t learn what kind of answers they might be leaning towards.

What, exactly, is the problem? Well, as William Poole is keen to point out, if Fannie and Freddie were forced to liquidate their assets tomorrow, they couldn’t raise enough money to pay off their liabilities.

Freddie Mac owed $5.2 billion more than its assets were worth in the first quarter, making it insolvent under fair value accounting rules, he said. The fair value of Fannie Mae’s assets fell 66 percent to $12.2 billion, data provided by the Washington-based company show, and may be negative next quarter, Poole said.

Mish is on a similar track:

Fannie Mae holds or guarantees over $5 trillion in mortgages. A mere 1% decline would wipe them out. Is that adequately capitalized? I do not think so.

This is maybe less scary than it seems, since there’s no chance that either entity is going to be entering a forced liquidation of anything. And one look at General Motors is enough to show that a company with negative net worth can continue as a going concern more or less indefinitely, even without taxpayer support. Or, to put it another way, being "wiped out", in Mish’s terms, is interesting from an accounting point of view but doesn’t automatically trigger the need for drastic actions like nationalization or multi-billion-dollar government loans.

What’s more scary is the share-price dynamics. It makes sense that the share prices of these companies have fallen as investors anticipate large and dilutive new equity offerings. But the problem is that the further the share prices fall in advance of the new issues, the more dilutive those issues are going to be. And at some point those issues become effectively impossible:

Egan estimates that Freddie alone will need to raise $7 billion over the next two quarters due to writedowns and losses. But the company’s market capitalization stands at $8.7 billion.

"An investment banker would be hard pressed to raise an amount of money nearly equal to the value of the entire company," Egan says.

On the other hand, the GSEs do still seem to be able to be able to issue a large amount of debt. Issuing 30-year bonds would be much cheaper than issuing equity, and would serve much the same purpose, if regulators were happy to treat the proceeds as equity, at least for, say, the next decade.

My gut feeling is that the government is being prudent, war-gaming worst-case scenarios in terms of fiscal policy just like it does in terms of foreign policy. Ultimately it’s conceivable that Fannie and Freddie might need to be nationalized, which in a way would only make sense since no one ever believed that they were really private companies in the first place. At that point they would stop having to mark their assets to market, and might well never lose money on a cashflow basis. But the effect on the total US national debt would be extremely unpleasant, and I’m sure that no one in any administration would want to go down that route except as a very last resort.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy, housing | Comments Off on Saving Fannie and Freddie

Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Obama proposes bankruptcy changes; Elizabeth Warren comments favorably.

Old Ice and the Northwest Passage: It might be a while until the passage is safe for shipping.

Food Price Inflation: Explanation and Policy Implications: By the CFR’s Karen Johnson.

A GM bankruptcy would be no easy fix: Lou Whiteman explains why my bright idea isn’t actually so bright after all.

Moving Markets With Rumors: A Response: Andrew Ross Sorkin dips his toe into the waters of bylined blog entries; John Carney responds.

MainStreet.com’s Editor Out; Focus Shifting: Expect Dave Kansas to leave FiLife.com too, soon. Starting a popular financial website is harder than it looks!

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Managing Your Online Reputation

Kate Murphy has found a chap called Kent Campbell who, for between $500 and $10,000 per month, will try to make sure that the first page of search results, when someone Googles your name, will include lots of nice positive things, and exclude any bloggers with an ax to grind. One doctor paid Campbell $30,000; it’s unclear if the blogger saying nasty things about the doctor ever did drop off the first page of search results, but it’s certainly clear that Campbell’s on to a good thing here.

"It can take anywhere from four months to a year to repair an online reputation," says Murphy, which immediately set off my antennae. As any blogger knows, Google loves fresh content. If you blog something and then Google it the following day, there’s a good chance – especially if it isn’t breaking news being covered all over the rest of the Web – that your blog entry will be at or near the top of the search results. But do the same Google search four months to a year later, and the chances are your blog entry, now stale, will be nowhere to be found.

In other words, Campbell could show his clients reasonably impressive results if all he did was take their money and spend it on fine wines and exotic cars. Beyond that, his business seems to be a pretty standard SEO (search engine optimization) gig – something which Google, for one, tends to frown upon, and which has never been particularly respectable online.

And Campbell’s positively benign compared to the other major character in Murphy’s piece, David Pollack. Pollack’s a lawyer famous for winning an $11.3 million online defamation suit; what’s less well known is that the defendant, destitute, never even turned up, and that none of the money was, to my knowledge, collected.

Siccing lawyers on bloggers is a dangerous strategy which is prone to backfiring just as often as it succeeds. For every blogger who reacts meekly to a cease-and-desist letter, taking down a post or even offering up an apology, there’s another one who reacts angrily and who redoubles their efforts to besmirch the online reputation of the person who’s bullying them. And given the First Amendment, it’s very hard indeed to successfully prosecute someone who’s not making money from their accusations and who is willing to fight back.

Which means that Pollack and his ilk are basically professional bullies: they tend to come on very strong and win by bluster much more than on any real merits.

But what’s most astonishingly missing from this piece about "internet reputation management" is any idea that the best way to deal with negative feedback might be to engage that person, rather than try to somehow make them go away. An angry and ignored blogger can be very destructive to your online reputation, true. But if you reach out with good will and respond helpfully to their complaints, you’ll be astonished at how fast they can change their tune.

According to Murphy’s argument, the blogger writing negative things about the doctor "was a random guy expressing his opinion". In that kind of situation, a little bit of outreach is generallly a much better – not to mention much cheaper – idea than spending many months and $30,000 trying to push the blog onto the second page of Google results, or embarking upon an even more expensive legal strategy. Constructive engagement won’t work all the time. But then again, the alternatives work even less frequently.

Posted in technology | Comments Off on Managing Your Online Reputation

Valuing Investment Banks

Heidi Moore has found a June report breaking down Lehman Brothers on a sum-of-the-parts basis:

Lehman Brothers asset management alone is worth $8 billion if it is valued the same as its peers using a multiple of 20.1 times the share price to trailing-earnings since 2000, wrote David Trone of Fox-Pitt Kelton Cochran Caronia Walker on June 13. That $8 billion is pretty considerable when you consider that all of Lehman had a market value of about $13 billion when the report was written ($11.5 billion as of Tuesday). It means the core Lehman businesses-investment banking, fixed-income and equity-was valued at only about $3 billion. Combined. (The remaining $2 billion in Trone’s valuation of Lehman comes from the high-net-worth brokerage business-the guys who sell Neuberger Berman’s funds, among others.)

Moore doesn’t quite connect the dots: If the asset-management business is worth $8 billion, the high-net-worth brokerage business is worth $2 billion, and the whole shebang is worth $11.5 billion, that means the value of the investment bank has fallen by 50% to just $1.5 billion over the course of the past four weeks. That’s less than JP Morgan paid for Bear Stearns, and it’s simply too small to be viable.

Back in October, Jesse Eisinger said the end was nigh for one or two stand-alone investment banks; maybe even all of them, bar Goldman. Now, with Bear gone and Lehman going, he’s looking prescient. And Merrill Lynch isn’t entirely out of the woods yet, either: we’ll find out more on that front when it reports earnings next week.

If I had to make a bet on one publicly-listed investment bank right now, I’d probably pick Blackstone, precisely because its investment-banking operations are small, not very risky, and profitable. But of course if Lehman’s valuation is dominated by its asset-management operations, Blackstone’s is dominated by its private-equity operations. It’s getting very hard to find a pure investment-banking play these days.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Valuing Investment Banks

The Curious Case of Hernan Arbizu, Part 3

Just a quick note to point out that on Independence Day the NYT finally picked up the Hernan Arbizu story. But not from the Argentine media, and not from me:

Tax Analysts, a trade publication, said Thursday that the Argentine news media had followed the Arbizu story closely, with one Buenos Aires newspaper recently publishing at least 120 names from his client list.

That’s Thursday, July 3; I actually linked to the list in question a full week earlier.

The NYT did have one piece of information which was news to me, however: that the criminal case against Arbizu was filed in Federal District Court in Manhattan way back on May 13.

That surprised me; I thought the criminal case against Arbizu had been filed after JP Morgan’s complaint, which was only filed on June 13. Indeed, I had been given to understand that the reason for any tardiness in JP Morgan filing its complaint was that they were so busy working with the US authorities on the criminal complaint, and might not have wanted to tip their hand.

Obviously, that’s not what happened. And now the timeline is much clearer: JP Morgan discovers the fraudulent wire transfer on May 9, when Arbizu is in Argentina, fires Arbizu, and informs the US authorities. The US authorities file their criminal complaint very quickly, on May 13, and Arbizu sensibly elects to remain in Argentina rather than come back to the US and face arrest. JP Morgan then does very little for the next month, until its offices in Buenos Aires are raided by the Argentine authorities – at which point it files a civil complaint against Arbizu asking for him to return the information he’s already handed over to the Argentine press and police.

What’s more, the June 13 civil complaint, although long, was also a bit hurried – it said that Arbizu had left JP Morgan to work for Morgan Stanley, for instance, and it had to be replaced by an amended complaint on June 16. So it doesn’t seem as though JP Morgan was waiting until it had everything absolutely nailed down before it filed.

So the NYT article if anything raises more questions than it answers; we’ll just have to wait for more information to slowly trickle out in the months ahead.

Posted in fraud | Comments Off on The Curious Case of Hernan Arbizu, Part 3

When Energy Speculators Move the Market

Bethany McLean’s interview with Brian Hunter talks a lot about speculators like Hunter driving prices in the natural gas market. Everybody seems convinced that can happen, although there’s disagreement about whether it’s illegal.

It’s predictable enough that US politicians would blame Hunter for raising gas prices; what’s less predictable is that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) would do so too. And then there’s what McLean calls "the Keystone Kops-like quality to the proceedings against Hunter": the regulators are actually accusing him of illegally driving gas prices down, not up.

In any case, the traders themselves, including Hunter, believe that speculators can and do move prices:

Other traders believed that Hunter’s positions were so large that they were influencing prices. The PSI noted in its report that "many traders were reluctant to take positions opposite Amaranth, regardless of their view on market fundamentals, due to Amaranth’s demonstrated ability to affect natural-gas prices through large trades." …

"The law is clear," [Hunter] says. "You have to have an element of fraud or deceit, because anyone who trades a large position is going to move the price. The price moves because of large sellers and buyers! It’s ridiculous to say that if a person trades believing he’s going to move the price, that’s illegal."

What does this mean for the ongoing argument as to whether speculators are responsible for high oil prices? If one person making big trades can move the market, then surely a large number of speculators all independently betting in the same direction could do the same thing, and possibly more sustainably, to boot.

The way I see it, a trader, or a group of traders, can indeed move the market they’re trading, at least in the short term. But it’s much harder to move the spot market, and no one has managed to demonstrate with any credibility that Hunter did that. And it’s harder still to drive the spot market steadily upwards over the course of months and years. For that, you need fundamentals, not technical factors like futures-market activity.

Posted in commodities | Comments Off on When Energy Speculators Move the Market

The Disastrous Future of the US

The insurance industry is fighting back against the kind of articles which accuse it of price-gouging, especially when it comes to natural disasters in general and hurricanes in particular. Yesterday Munich Re held a webinar for journalists, and wheeled out a lot of statistics relating to natural disasters in the first half of 2008. And they’re pretty compelling when it comes to the hypothesis that natural disasters are getting more frequent and more damaging.

Here, for instance, is a chart of H1 natural disasters in the US going back to 1980. While the number of geophysical disasters has remained very low, the number of climatological disasters has more than doubled. And it’s still growing fast: the number of disasters in just the first half of 2008 was bigger than the number of disasters in any of the full years between 2001 and 2005.

usdisasters1.jpg

The global trend is also clear:

globaldiasters1.jpg

Of course it’s not just the number of disasters which is increasing: it’s also their severity, and the insured losses associated with them. Here’s what’s happened to US thunderstorm losses in the first half of the year, going back to 1980:

usdisasters2.jpg

These losses, it should be noted, do not include any damages from the devastating midwest flooding in June: floods and thunderstorms are two different things, for insurance purposes.

There are similar charts available for wildfires and winter storms too, but clearly by far the biggest natural-disaster risk facing the US is hurricanes, which over the long term have historically accounted for roughly half of total insured losses. It’s hard to find a climate scientist who’ll claim that the risk of severe hurricanes isn’t growing – even as the insured value of property on the US coast is rising fast. Insured coastal exposure in Florida, for instance, was $1.9 trillion in 2004; by 2007, that number had risen to $2.5 trillion, with total coastal exposure in the US reaching $8.9 trillion, largely as a result of the boom in construction activity.

These are enormous numbers, and help put the insurance industry’s policyholder surplus of just over $500 billion into some perspective. Yes, that’s an enormous amount of money. But if a hurricane hit Miami, or Houston, or New York, it’s not hard to imagine how quickly the bills could add up – bills which would be paid overwhelmingly by private insurers.

Does it even make sense for private insurers to take on that kind of hurricane risk? I’m not sure. Certainly attempts to offload the risk onto the capital markets, using catastrophe bonds, seem to be going nowhere any time soon: total cat-bond issuance was less than $8 billion in 2007, and that was by far a record year. But if private insurers are to take on this kind of risk, then I can certainly understand why they’d want to raise insurance premiums in anticipation of increasing hurricane frequency and severity.

Homeowners won’t like it, and regulators won’t like it. But increasingly-severe natural disasters are an inevitability at this point, and they’ll hit the US just as much as they’ll hit the rest of the world. In other respects, the US is actually in a fortunate position with respect to global warming: other, poorer countries are at much greater immediate risk. But when it comes to potential insured losses from hurricanes, the US is by far the world leader.

Posted in climate change, insurance | Comments Off on The Disastrous Future of the US

Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

Annals of Demand Response: "In North Carolina, Triangle Transit carried almost 100,000 bus passengers in June, up 30 percent from the previous year. "

Streetread: A new one-stop shop for reading financial news. Very Ajaxy.

Moonves and Zucker–Goofus and Gallant of American Media

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

Don’t Go To Brazil, Young Man

Paul Kedrosky asks:

Say you were 22-years-old, unattached, and recently graduated and looking for your first job. You want to be part of something big and dynamic, a truly dynamic economy where you’re going to be able to rise up with it.

The U.S. has long been that place, and maybe you think it no longer is — or maybe you do. Whatever. Where in the world — visas aside — would you go?

I got that question the other day from a recent graduate, and I surprised myself with how quickly I could answer it.

Paul chose Brazil. Which is, not to put too fine a point on it, the wrong answer.

Ironically, Paul himself notes that "the world is changing rapidly, and the ‘right’ answer from 1998 isn’t likely the right answer in 2008," without realizing that Brazil is very much the right answer from 1998, just before the commodity boom took off.

But more to the point, Brazil simply isn’t friendly to foreign 22-year-old unattached recent graduates looking for their first job. In fact, it isn’t friendly to foreigners looking for work, period. And I’m not talking about visas, I’m talking about employers.

Brazil is run by a very small group of elite families concentrated within the richest enclaves of Sao Paulo and Rio. Brazil doesn’t have its own domestic equivalent of the American Dream – the meritocratic idea that anybody can make it, with enough moxie and a bit of luck. It’s true that a large middle class is emerging, and that many people are making much more money now than they were ten years ago. It’s also true that Brazil, as a nation, is very entrepeneurial. But the fact is that the biggest entrepeneurs come entirely from the white elite; they’ve known each other all their lives, trust each other, employ each others’ offspring, and see no reason to take a punt on some American 22-year-old kid, even if he or she happens to be fluent in Portugese.

Brazil doesn’t embrace foreigners. Its companies are much less likely to be foreign-owned than those of just about any other country in Latin America, and its executives are a very homogenous bunch. In a country justly celebrated for racial and ethnic diversity, everybody with any real power is white; certainly they’re all Brazilian. While no one batted an eyelid at a first-generation immigrant like Sergey Brin making billions in America, that wouldn’t be possible in Brazil.

This is a problem with many emerging markets, not just Brazil. Developed nations like Canada, Switzerland, or the UK are, like the US, proud to be home to big and vibrant companies staffed, run, and even founded by foreigners. Of how many developing nations can that be said?

Posted in emerging markets | Comments Off on Don’t Go To Brazil, Young Man

What is a Covered Bond?

What is it about covered bonds which makes them so impervious to English? Hank Paulson had nice things to say about them today, but if you didn’t know what they were already, the WSJ explanation would hardly shed much light on the matter:

Covered bonds, which are widely used in Europe, are a mortgage-backed security that usually provides funding to a commercial banks through a secured debt instrument collateralized by a pool of residential mortgage loans that remain on the issuer’s balance sheet. Interest is paid to investors from the issuer’s cash flow, as Mr. Paulson noted.

In an FT article at the end of June, John Murray Brown described Irish covered bonds thusly:

The Irish covered bond – branded as an “asset covered security” or ACS – is a bond underpinned by Irish legislation and backed by a ring-fenced pool of assets on the issuer’s balance sheet.

It is essentially a secured debt instrument that enjoys special status under the European Union’s rules – specifically the directive for undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities, known as Ucits, introduced in 1988…

Maybe the problem is that these things are basically German, and no one can translate German into English:

Mr Parker says it is a well-established funding tool in continental Europe, particularly in Germany where initially it was used to finance public sector loans but later evolved as a means to refinance residential mortgages, as well as for ship financing. The German Pfandbrief bond was the model for the Irish ACS.

Mr Parker, who was a member of the team that drafted the Irish legislation, says there was no English translation of the German code. “It was very difficult to find out how the code actually worked because for many people it was almost an act of faith,” he says.

Since I’m in Germany right now, maybe I can do better.

Banks have assets and liabilities. If the bank borrows money from individuals, the liabilities are called "deposits". Alternatively, the bank can borrow money from other banks, in the interbank market, or from the Federal Reserve. All of those borrowings are unsecured, and more creditworthy banks pay lower interest rates than less creditworthy banks in the interbank market. Banks can also issue bonds, if they want, which are also unsecured, and which can have much longer tenors – sometimes they’re even perpetual.

Recently, the market has been having a lot of concerns about the creditworthiness of banks in general. Interbank borrowing costs have gone up, while the prices of banks’ bonds have gone down. In such a situation, one way of bringing down borrowing costs is to borrow against collateral – secure the debt, rather than issuing unsecured debt.

Now historically, banks haven’t done this. If they have a pool of assets they want to secure, they’ll securitize it – basically, sell the assets outright to an off-balance-sheet special purpose entity for which they have no legal responsibility. In return for the assets they get cash on the barrelhead – they’re not borrowing money they’ll have to pay back in future.

But the securitization market, too, is broken right now. Investors have very little trust in the banks’ assets, which are things like mortgage loans. If the banks try to sell the loans outright, they won’t get much money for them.

Enter covered bonds.

With a covered bond, the bank doesn’t sell its assets (in this case, its mortgages); rather, it continues to own them, and it borrows money against them. If the bank ends up going bust, the lender can take possession of the underlying assets – the mortgages. But until then, the lender doesn’t own the mortgages, it just has a debt obligation of a bank.

There are two good things about covered bonds. The first is that because they’re secured rather than unsecured, they’re less risky than plain vanilla bank debt, which means that they constitute low-cost funding for the bank in question. And the second is that because the mortgages remain on the bank’s balance sheet rather than being securitized and sold off into the market, no one’s trying to sell mortgages in an environment in which the very concept is borderline toxic.

Now it’s true that covered bonds are, technically, mortgage-backed. But all the mortgages could default and go into foreclosure tomorrow, and so long as the bank remains in operation, the covered bond will pay out as normal. Similarly, if the bank blows up for some non-mortgage-related reason, investors in the bond will still get paid back in full. Their main risk is that the bank blows up because the mortgages blow up, and they’ll be left holding a bag of damaged loans – but because two things have to happen rather than just one, that risk is relatively low.

Could covered bonds be part of the solution to the current credit crisis? Paulson thinks so, and so do I. They’re not a panacea, by any means. But they certainly can’t do any harm, and they might be able to do some good.

Posted in banking, bonds and loans | Comments Off on What is a Covered Bond?

A Look at Long-Term Stock Valuations

Rob Bennett emails to tell me about a handy little tool he’s constructed, which looks at stock valuations and calculates what kind of real return you can expect to get from investing in US equities over the next decade or six. The tool is based on one of Robert Shiller’s favorite indicators, P/E10, or price to previous ten years’ average earnings. Here’s how P/E10 evolved between 1881 and 2006:

PE10.jpg

Right now, P/E10 is at about 22, which mean that stocks are expensive, by historical standards: Rob reckons that fair value, for stocks, is about 14 or 15, and that anything above 20 is "truly dangerous":

There have been three occasions when we have gone to

P/E10 levels above 20. On those three occasions, the average loss in the years that followed was

68 percent. So the general rule is to lower your stock allocation when the P/E10 level goes above 20.

Think of Rob as a buy-and-hold kinda guy with very infrequent reallocations, just like most sensible financial advisers. But Rob’s reallocations are really infrequent: only once a decade or so.

The key point is that all investors should be changing their stock allocations a bit when valuations

go through dramatic shifts. There cannot be one rule for all because different investors face

different financial circumstances and have different risk tolerances. But the conventional idea that

investors should stick with a single allocation at all price levels just does not make sense.

I favor Stay-the-Course investing, but I reject Passive Investing. I say that investors should be trying to keep

their risk/reward ratio roughly stable. That does not require lots of allocation shifts. It generally requires

one adjustment every 10 years or so. But it is critical that the long-term investors make those shifts

when valuations go to the sorts of extreme levels that apply today. Investors who try to practice

buy-and-hold when prices are going down by 68 percent are eventually going to become so discouraged

that they abandon stocks altogether, which is the worst possible thing to do.

This plan isn’t really about market timing: it would have had you underweight equities for pretty much all of the big 1990s boom. But Rob’s sure that over the long term looking at valuations does make sense:

Those lowering their stock allocations in the mid-1990s

obviously did not pick the top! It doesn’t matter. If they stick with a valuation-informed strategy,

they will end up ahead of those following Passive Investing in the long run. We have already

reached a point where those who lowered their stock allocations in late 1997 are ahead

of the game. As prices continue downward, those investors will move farther and farther ahead.

Eventually, even investors who lowered their allocations in 1995 will be ahead. It often

takes time for rational prices to reassert themselves, but they always do.

I think Rob’s approach has a lot to be said for it, but I do have a few problems with it. For one thing, I just don’t think that many investors have anything like the requisite amount of patience needed – where you can happily sit back for a decade or two waiting for the P/E10 to come down to the mid-teens before going overweight equities.

And for another thing, I’m far from convinced that the behavior of the stock market a century ago, when both the world and corporate capital structures were very different from how they look now, can really teach us much about stock-market investing. I don’t believe that the stock-market asset class has rules which govern its long-term behavior, and I can easily believe that we will never again see the S&P 500 trading on a P/E10 of less than 15. (It’s already been 20 years, and I certainly don’t believe that discount rates are likely to go back up to their 1988 levels any time soon.)

All the same, for people who like to take a 30,000-foot view of investing, this is a very handy little tool. And it gives me pause, too: I’ve worried for a while that stocks aren’t an attractive asset class any more. The problem, of course, is that there’s not very much in the way of alternatives. And in any case, according to Rob, if I put all my money in stocks today, I can expect a real return of 5.65% over the next 30 years; 4.65% would be unlucky. I’d be happy with that, I think.

(Thanks to Bob’s Financial Website for the historical P/E10 data.)

Posted in investing, stocks | Comments Off on A Look at Long-Term Stock Valuations

Market Rumors: Inevitable

Andrew Ross Sorkin today tackles the issue of market rumors. He’s with Jamie Dimon, and doesn’t like them:

As Schulte Roth said in its note to clients, which include SAC Capital Management and Jana Partners, two big hedge funds, “spreading false rumors in order to induce others to trade in a company’s securities constitutes market manipulation.”

James Dimon, the chairman of JPMorgan, says rumor-mongering is unconscionable. “I think if someone knowingly starts a rumor or passes on a rumor, they should go to jail,” he said on Charlie Rose’s program on Monday night. “This is even worse than insider trading. This is deliberate and malicious destruction of value and people’s lives.”…

There’s no way to quantify whether rumors are more rampant today than they used to be or whether they are just traveling faster. But what is clear is that there seems to be little being done about it. It might be difficult to make a case, but you’d think you’d see subpoenas flying at least as fast as the rumor mill.

The problem is that Dimon and Sorkin have a very specific behavior in mind here: speculators who are short a stock and who knowingly propagate a baseless yet potentially self-fulfilling rumor that the company in question is in trouble. Yes, that’s illegal. But it’s not what Ivan Boesky did (he was more in the business of trading on true insider information, which is an entirely different kettle of fish) – and Boesky’s the only wrongdoer name in Sorkin’s column.

It’s very hard to prosecute this kind of thing. Why? For one thing, simply propagating a rumor is not, contra Dimon, illegal. In order to be breaking the law, you not only need to propagate the rumor and be short, but you also need to know that the rumor is false. Dimon’s "deliberate and malicious" formulation is not so much a description of illegal rumor-mongering as a precondition for it.

If you’re selling Lehman stock because you heard the company might get taken over at $15 a share, that’s legal. If you told someone else what you were doing, that’s legal too. It’s only illegal if you know for a fact that the rumor is false, and you spread it anyway. And the only way to know that for a fact is if you made it up yourself and deliberately started disseminating it in an attempt to drive the price down.

In other words, of the thousands of people through whom the Lehman rumor passed, only one or two could conceivably have been guilty of anything illegal. And rumors are like tornadoes: while it’s possible to try to trace back a chain of causality, they do have a habit of simply appearing out of nowhere when the preconditions are right. Here’s Sorkin again:

Amid the desperation of a bear market — and the pervasion of technology that allows traders to communicate virtually untraceably — the art of the rumor has become increasingly powerful, even democratized. Absurd rumors can have legs, like the Lehman-Barclays one, which Richard Bove, an analyst at Ladenburg Thalmann, said “ranks up there with the moon is made out of green cheese in terms of its validity.”

This is entirely correct, to the point at which it actually explains why we’re not seeing those subpoenas flying. All the preconditions for crazy rumors are in place: the desperation of a bear market, the pervasion of technology, an important precedent in Bear Stearns. Given all those preconditions, rumors are inevitable, and no stern words from Schulte Roth or Jamie Dimon can stop them. Regulators should spend more time thinking about what to do when rumors start, rather than embarking upon a quixotic quest to prevent them from happening in the first place.

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Bad Ideas at the WSJ, Customization Edition

Jon Fine had a long chat with WSJ editor Robert Thomson, and got some interesting statements out of him:

Also coming: extensive customizing tools for readers to find, through search, much more Dow Jones content. (In Thomson’s groan-worthy formulation, "In the contemporary age of content, the customizer is always right.")…

He also says "we’re not there" in terms of figuring out what should or shouldn’t be shortened. He cites Spanish dailies El País and El Mundo as favorites for their "hygienic" look–a description that cracked him up as soon as he voiced it–saying both "understood the relative weight of word and image."

I’m highly suspicious about this whole customization thing. It’s been tried before, many times; it’s never really worked, and it largely defeats what a great newspaper should be all about.

Is it the purpose of the WSJ to provide news to its readers? Maybe, kinda, on the most basic level. But in a world where news is increasingly commoditized, that’s not remotely enough. A newspaper takes the just-the-facts news and adds value in three main areas:

  1. It turns news into stories: well-written, well-edited, not-too-long pieces which provide perspective and context and a bit of analysis too.
  2. It takes those stories and prioritizes them: important stories get big headlines on the front page; less-important stories are relegated to the back. A newspaper provides a crucial editing-down function, providing a way of navigating the sea of news by pointing out the most significant landmarks.
  3. It takes those prioritized stories and turns them into a finely-honed object, a newspaper. That’s what Thomson is talking about when he praises the Spanish newspapers – they’re very good at intuitively guiding the reader around the universe of news, making full use of photography, illustration, typography, white space, and all the other tools at a newspaper designer’s disposal.

Historically, the WSJ has been good at the first, OK at the second, and dreadful at the third. Murdoch papers, by contrast, tend towards the opposite. But it’s hardly surprising that the WSJ is getting a long-overdue redesign, of both the physical paper and the website.

The problem arises when you try to add customization into the mix. Someone customizing their WSJ stories is left with nothing but #1: customization essentially emasculates the editors and designers – and as a result a customized newspaper adds much less value than an un-customized one. This is one reason why readers, given the choice, tend not to customize their news sites very much: not only is it unreliable and unpredictable and quite a lot of work, but it also means you lose a lot of the point of having a one-stop news shop in the first place.

There’s no mention in Fine’s piece of things like external links or embeddable content; we’ll see how many such forward-thinking ideas get incorporated into the wsj.com redesign when it launches. But if Thomson is really thinking along the lines of customization instead, I fear he’s barking up a fruitless tree.

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American Obesity

obesitystates.jpg

It’s been a long time since I could really be thought of as skinny. I’ve recently put a fair amount of effort into losing about 15 pounds (the end of beer-drinking season, a/k/a Euro 2008, helped a lot), and I’ve managed to come down from "overweight" to "normal weight" on the BMI scale – albeit near the upper end of "normal weight". Still, in order to be "obese" on the BMI scale, I’d need to put on an extra 60 pounds from where I am now. That’s a lot of Hefeweizen.

Which helps, for me, to put this map into perspective. Only one of the 50 states in the union has fewer than one in five obese people; the fattest state, Mississippi, has almost one in three. Overall, more than a quarter of Americans are obese, which makes the USA the fattest nation in the world.

The irony is that with food prices rising, this problem is only likely to get worse, rather than better. As a rule, healthy food is expensive; junk food is cheap.

But although Americans are addicted to beef, they’re also addicted to oil, and they’re managing to cut back on that as the price rises. Might they start moving away from beef, too, if its price goes up enough? For their sake, and the sake of the planet, I hope they do.

If they want an alternative, I’ve recently become a huge proponent of sardines. They’re delicious; they’re pretty cheap; they’re ecologically friendly and in no danger of being over-fished; they don’t eat corn; they have lots of of protein and no carbohydrates; and, of course, they have all those omega-3 fatty acids as well. There’s even a sardine diet!

The problem is that sardines can be hard to find, in the US, certainly in their fresh form. And there does seem to be a general cultural aversion, in the US, to "fishy fish". Which is a great pity, because once you’ve acquired the taste, it’s easy to end up preferring a plate of grilled sardines to the average American steak.

(From frostfirezoo via Strange Maps via Sullivan via Florida)

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The Economic Policy of John McCain

There’s a lot of talk in the blogosphere about John McCain’s pledge to balance the federal budget by the end of his first term in office. The NYT has two articles, by Michael Cooper and Robert Pear, about whether such a thing is possible. Brad DeLong is scathing, of course, saying that " the only proper response is derision and laughter," and adding for good measure that McCain is displaying "the budget policy of an underpants gnome". Mark Thoma has more links.

But here’s the thing: the pledge comes only in a 15-page briefing paper; it’s nowhere to be found in McCain’s actual speech on the subject. James Pethokoukis reports that McCain’s economic advisers haven’t crunched the numbers on the pledge: they can’t say, for instance, what level of economic growth would be necessary, or how much discretionary spending might have to fall. Which prompts Stan Collender to conclude that this is barely a policy, really:

What John McCain announced yesterday isn’t really a plan that holds together to accomplish something; it’s a laundry list the candidate will pull from whenever he needs a talking point…

According to a reporter from a national publication who called me, McCain never mentioned the worrd "deficit" and didn’t talk about deficit reduction. As a result, this paper decided not to publish a story on it. In the reporter’s terms, his editors "took a pass."

So should we. This isn”t a serious budget or economic plan and shouldn’t be treated as one.

Is the national publication in question the Wall Street Journal? I like the WSJ story: it treats the news as politics, rather than economics.

Sen. McCain’s campaign has dusted off some of President George W. Bush’s unfulfilled promises: balancing the federal budget within four years and revamping the nation’s Social Security system. But he left some questions unanswered Monday after a campaign appearance in Denver. Though aides said he pledged to balance the budget within four years, the campaign didn’t say how he plans to do this, beyond cutting pork, which many analysts and government watchdogs say is unlikely to get him there. Moreover, he has promised tax cuts in the past and promised them again Monday — "I will cut them where I can" — which will make it harder to close a spending gap.

Sen. McCain made his budget-balancing promise in the spring before backing off the pledge, saying it might take eight years instead.

Pledging to balance the budget in one term is easy and cost-free: it’s the kind of promise which is so improbable that no one’s going to hold you to it when you fail to meet your goal, especially if you make the promise only in briefing papers, meaning there are no soundbites to be used against you in future.

The more substantive news, in my view, is the list of 300 economists who claim to "enthusiastically support John McCain’s economic plan". Would most of them sign their name to the economic plan of any Republican nominee, no matter how vague it was? Possibly. But there are undoubtedly some very heavy hitters on there, including five Nobel laureates and four former presidents of the American Economic Association. (Gary Becker, for these purposes, counts twice.) An argument from authority can never be particularly convincing, but in this case it’s stronger and more compelling than a promise buried in a position paper. It’s one thing to say that McCain has no idea what he’s talking about: it’s another thing entirely to say that the same thing must go for every economist on the list.

Update: Brad DeLong, who knows a fair amount about economists in Washington, thinks the news isn’t the list of people who did sign, so much as the list of people who didn’t. If you want one of those political appointments in the event of a McCain victory, he hints, you’d do well to be on the list:

There is good news: a lot of economists who you would expect to have signed on–subcabinet appointees in past Republican administrations, et cetera–have not. One would expect, based on political loyalties and willingness to serve in Republican administrations, to see Greg Mankiw, Paul Wonnacott, Dick Schmalensee, Michael Mussa, Thomas Moore, Gary Seevers, Marina von Neumann Whitman, Kristin J. Forbes, Katherine Baicker, Matthew J. Slaughter, Andrew Samwick, and others on the list. They are not there. That is good news.

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Why GM Should Embrace Bankruptcy

Tom Krisher has a good overview of the travails at General Motors, where the stock is trading at a 50-year low, battered by speculation that the company might end up declaring bankruptcy.

Bankruptcy actually seems like a very good idea to me, since it might well be the only way for the company to implement the kind of radical reorganization which is necessary for any possibility of future profitability.

For instance: GM has eight – count ’em – brands, including marques like Pontiac and Buick which were instrumental in giving American cars a bad name, and which today get absolutely nobody excited. Heidi Moore wonders whether they might be for sale, and I’m sure that GM would love to sell them if it could, but the problem is that their value is almost certainly both large and negative. As her colleague Jeff McCracken explains:

The cost of buying out a dealer, given state franchise laws, is prohibitive. In many ways, the legacy costs of too many under-fed or under-invested dealers are as financially painful to Detroitßís auto makers as the legacy costs of its UAW contracts.

Chrysler several years ago paid handsomely to kill off the Plymouth brand. In a widely publicized move, GM pulled the plug on the vaunted Oldsmobile brand in 2000. GM spent $1 billion alone in 2001 to buy out Olds dealers and wind down some plants. Litigation with hundreds of Olds auto dealers drug dragged on for years and the final tally is estimated at close to $2 billion.

Ford has weighed killing its Mercury brand for years as well, but as a recently retired Ford executive once said: “That could cost close to $2 billion, or you could keep losing a couple hundred million a year. Given how your bonus is paid for this yearßís performance, itßís easier to kick the can to the next person.”

In other words, the dealers hold all the cards, right now, and are preventing GM from slimming down. But if the company were to declare bankruptcy, a lot of the leverage currently held by the dealers would evaporate; they would simply join the long queue of creditors.

Or there’s another option. It might well be the case that the value of Chevrolet alone is significantly greater than the value of GM as a whole. So instead of GM selling off non-core assets like Saturn, why not spin off Chevrolet as a stand-alone company to its present shareholders? That way if rump GM ends up declaring bankruptcy they still have their shares in Chevy. That would surely be a better outcome than taking the meager proceeds from off-brand sales and throwing them into the black hole that is GM today.

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Transparency: Sometimes Even Investment Banks Like It

Gari has a question about the new disclosure rules surrounding credit default swaps. Basically, up until now they’ve been treated, for disclosure purposes, like derivatives, under FAS 133; as of November 15, they’ll be treated like guarantees, which come with a lot more detail, under FIN 45. And Gretchen Morgenson, for one, welcomes the increased transparency.

But Gari notes that the monolines, who have always treated their CDSs like guarantees, are very glad that they’ve been able to do that, rather than having to mark them to market as they would do if they were treated like derivatives. So what does this change mean for the banks? Might they actually like being able "to make predictions of how the instruments will perform to term," he asks, as well as (or alongside) any marking-to-market that they have to do for accounting reasons?

Gari finishes with this:

I’m sure Jack Ciesielski, who’s quoted by Morgenson and weighed in on Schwarzman, would be able to clear it up. But I’m too poor and shallow to pay for his insight.

Well, all you have to do is ask. Which is what I did, and this is what Ciesielski replied:

FIN 45 was "tweaked" only to the extent that it will now require disclosure of the current status of a guarantee’s payment/performance risk. That disclosure could be made by disclosing say, the current external credit rating of the underlying, if it’s available. Or it could be a disclosure of the firm’s own internal assessment/rating of the underlying.

That disclosure hadn’t been made for credit-indexed derivatives that were accounted for under Statement 133. They didn’t have any of the narrower guarantee disclosures in FIN 45 now being extended to them. They were accounted for under 133 @ FV; the FIN 45 disclosures for guarantees, however, were more specific for the kinds of risks entailed in those arrangements. A credit-indexed derivative carries the same kind of risks, but not those specific disclosures because they weren’t required under 133.

So this amendment gets instruments that are doing the same thing to make the same level of disclosures. It seems like a good idea, no?

It does seem like a good idea. Up until now, CDS-as-derivatives have just had mark-to-market disclosures; from November on, they will have CDS-as-guarantees disclosures, which are much fuller, and which can involve things like "the firm’s own internal assessment/rating of the underlying" credit being guaranteed.

But here’s the question: Morgenson quotes Ciesielski as saying that the rule change could cause some volatility in the market, since banks won’t want to reveal all this extra information:

Fearful of how investors will react to the extent of their swap holdings, companies may move to unwind them or offset them when they can.

“This is something that will change behavior,” Mr. Ciesielski said. “If you don’t want to look so bad, you’re going to have to be busy in the next few months to work these down, wriggle out of them or offset them.”

On the other hand, Gari suspects that investment banks might embrace the new rules. Yes, officially, they will still have to mark their CDS to market, just as they have done until now. On the other hand, at the same time they can point to credit ratings and internal assessments saying that the mark-to-market values are massively out of whack with fundamentals, and that they don’t in reality have anything like the kind of liabilities that the market is saying they have.

I suspect the truth will be somewhere in the middle. Just like fund managers like to buy outperforming stocks at the end of the quarter in order to improve their optics (if not their returns), investment banks will want to show that they’ve written protection on reasonably safe-sounding real-world credits, rather than impossible-to-fathom CDOs and the like. So there might be some mildly panicked selling of CDS on CDOs, and other such exotica. But on the other hand the banks might quite like being able to show that the stuff they’re taking writedowns on does not in reality look nearly as dangerous as the mark-to-market losses might suggest.

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Extra Credit, Monday Edition

A Tour Through the Cemetery of 2007’s Busted LBOs

Credit Crisis Timeline: Going back to February 2007.

Parental education and parental time with children: "More educated parents also spend more time with their kids – a result ripe with implications for the inter-generational persistence of income and health inequalities."

Irresponsible Journalism Alert: There’s no reason to believe Barack Obama got a discount on his mortgage.

We Use Frankfurters in Our Hot Dogs! Great moments in branding, Subway edition.

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The Worst Beneficiaries of a Billion-Dollar Will

Christopher Caldwell is appalled by the fact that Leona Helmsley left her entire $5bn+ estate to dogs:

A vast amount of the productive energy of future generations has been pre-allocated to dogs on the say-so of one of the most disreputable public figures of postwar America. Maybe people born a quarter of a century from now will think this was a terrific idea. But if starvation and suffering are not abolished in the interim, they are just as likely to view Helmsley’s will as we view the emperor Caligula’s making a consul of his horse. They may think, to paraphrase Samuel Johnson, that a large fortune is never more innocently employed than when it is being blown at the gambling tables by some feckless heir.

Would it be great if all wills were dedicated solely to the abolition of starvation and suffering? Yes – but they’re not. And in the mean time, an estate devoted to dogs is likely to do at least as much good, societally speaking, as one frittered away at gambling tables: it will go to people in the dog industries, rather than people in the gaming industries, and that’s probably no bad thing.

Thinking about the amounts of harm that people can do in their will, however, I did start wondering at the fact that neither of the two big political parties in the US are particularly well endowed. If someone left either the DNC or the RNC a Helmsley-sized estate, that would transform American politics overnight, and not in a good way.

Back in 2000, Warren Buffett hinted as much in a NYT op-ed supporting radical campaign finance reform:

For five decades, I’ve looked for undervalued stocks. But if I’d been interested in the biggest bargain around, which I wasn’t, I would have bought political influence…

Just suppose some eccentric billionaire (not me, not me!) made the following offer: If the bill was defeated, this person — the E.B. — would donate $1 billion in an allowable manner (soft money makes all possible) to the political party that had delivered the most votes to getting it passed. Given this diabolical application of game theory, the bill would sail through Congress and thus cost our E.B. nothing (establishing him as not so eccentric after all).

Anybody upset at Helmsley’s billions going to dogs might do well to stop, pause, and breathe a sigh of relief it isn’t going to a political party instead. Some causes make pets seem positively noble.

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Carl Icahn’s Communication Problem: Solved!

May 20:

So far, Mr. Icahn hasn’t been in touch with Microsoft — though he tried to call the company’s chief executive, Steven Ballmer, through the main switchboard at Microsoft’s headquarters and was turned away, according to a person briefed on the call.

July 7:

Dear Yahoo! Shareholders:

During the past week I have spoken frequently with Steve Ballmer, CEO of

Microsoft. Several of our conversations have lasted as long as an hour.

Guess it only took six weeks for Carl Icahn to get Steve Ballmer’s phone number. Well done, Carl!

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Manhattan Housing Datapoint of the Day

My latest column at Spectator Business is up online:

New York, one would think, is being hit by a double whammy: monster job losses on Wall Street, combined with the deepest nationwide housing recession since the Great Depression. Given that Wall Street professionals tend to be the marginal price-setters in the Manhattan housing market (everybody else has been priced out to Brooklyn or beyond), how can New York real estate still be setting new records?

I also do some back-of-the-envelope calculations about this apartment:

You can fit seven £50 notes into a square foot, which means that at current exchange rates a square foot of £50 notes is worth $690, and that the asking price for Dr Rosenwald’s apartment is equivalent to covering its floors in 22-deep wads of £50 notes.

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How Risk is Like Religion

Religion is, generally, inherited: the chances are overwhelming that a person of any given religion will have parents of that religion. On the other hand, if your parents are complete religious nutcases, there’s a higher-than-normal chance that you’ll reject their beliefs.

Risk, it seems, is much like religion in this respect:

huffman-fig-1.jpg

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According to Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde, there is an extremely strong correlation between parents’ risk attitudes and those of their children:

We find that parents who are more trusting and parents who are risk tolerant have children with similar attitudes… Parents also tend to marry individuals with similar trust and risk attitudes. This reinforces the impact on the child; having one parent with a given attitude means that the child is likely to have a second parent with that attitude as well.

This could help explain why rich families tend to remain rich, and poor families tend to remain poor, across many generations, just as religion tends to stick around within families:

Evidence of transmission of attitudes from parents to children is also highly relevant for understanding why there is a strong persistence in economic outcomes across generations for individual families. There is a large literature studying social mobility with countries, which documents substantial correlations between parents and children in terms of wealth, education, and occupation. Transmission of attitudes could be one mechanism underlying such correlations: one reason that children may end up with similar outcomes to their parents may be that they inherit similar attitudes and thus make similar economic choices. Trust and risk attitudes are both relevant for the types of outcomes that are typically correlated between parents and children, such as wealth accumulation and occupational choice.

But the datapoints which fascinate me are the ones at the far right hand edge of the graphs, where the children of parents (especially mothers) with extremely high risk tolerance turn out to be unusually risk-averse. It’s as though kids will accept just about anything which seems remotely reasonable, but are still quite good at rejecting the obviously unreasonable. Which seems reasonable to me.

(HT: Thoma)

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The WSJ’s Last-Man-Standing Play

Nat Ives talks to WSJ publisher Les Hinton, who explains the paper’s move into general news. Is it driven by Rupert Murdoch’s desire to compete head-on with the the NYT? Quite possibly, yes. But Hinton’s on-the-record justification also makes sense:

"I’ve read the Journal for 30 years — more," Mr. Hinton said. "When a big story happened, you’d immediately feel the need to buy another paper. Well, if there’s a major earthquake in China, as a recent example, our view is that you should not need to buy another newspaper to know what’s going on." As the Journal becomes more comprehensive, Mr. Hinton can imagine 30,000 or 40,000 people deciding every year that it’s the only newspaper they need.

I see this as a last-man-standing play: if newspapers are dying, then second newspapers are the walking dead. Which means that the WSJ has no interest in ever being a second newspaper (to get business news which can’t be obtained in a primary newspaper) or being a newspaper which forces the reader to buy another paper as well, just to round things out. It’s a sensible strategy, even without any pre-existing animus towards the NYT.

But Hinton’s explanation for why wsj.com didn’t go free makes much less sense to me.

Why they dropped the idea of making wsj.com free:

"It was hasty of us. You’ve got to understand that the value of what the Journal does at its heart is something that people are more than happy to pay for, because it powers their business, it powers their careers, it powers their jobs."

This isn’t a reason why people should pay, it’s a reason why (some) people can pay, and will pay.

I suspect the real reasons why wsj.com isn’t free are rather different:

  1. The site is already growing so fast that it’s having difficulty selling out its inventory. If it got a lot more pageviews from going free, Hinton fears that the ad sales team wouldn’t be able to sell the inventory without the kind of discounting which would severely dilute wsj.com’s branding with advertisers.
  2. Advertisers are behind the curve, and still value pay sites more than free sites.
  3. Hinton fears that online financial-services advertising, which constitutes the overwhelming majority of ad sales on wsj.com, could be cut back severely if and as the current recession in financial services gets longer and more severe. Expanding your inventory at such a point in time is simply bad business.

These are temporary reasons, not permanent ones. Which is why I still think wsj.com will go free, if not in the immediate future.

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InBev Goes Hostile

InBev has gone hostile, to no one’s great surprise, seeking to replace Anheuser-Busch’s current board with a new slate of nominees including Adolphus A. Busch IV, who is not to be confused with the current CEO, August A. Busch IV.

This development was an entirely predictable consequence of A-B refusing to enter any kind of talks or negotiations with InBev, while quietly encouraging the likes of Missouri senator Claire McCaskill and other opponents of the deal. It’s very hard to see how that kind of response could possibly be the consequence of a genuine attempt to get the best possible outcome for A-B’s shareholders – and as a result it’s very easy to see how InBev could win a proxy battle, should it come to that.

Incidentally, if you’re interested in the NYT vs WSJ war, the latter timestamps its story "July 7, 2008 6:59am", while the NYT makes itself appear massively behind the curve with a dateline saying "Published: July 8, 2008". Given that the story was published on the NYT website at 6:51am on July 7 (according to my RSS reader, which might not be entirely accurate), one would think that ought to count as Monday rather than Tuesday.

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