The Wolfowitz Ouster, Redux

Fox News journalist James Rosen has a long and largely sympathetic account

of Paul

Wolfowitz’s ouster from the World Bank in the November issue of Playboy.

At the beginning of the piece he’s unambiguous:

What happened to Wolfowitz was more akin to a putsch, the work of entrenched

enemies who seized on a false pretext to engineer the overthrow of a flawed

and mistake-prone leader closely identified with an unpopular war.

But the meat of the article shows that both Wolfowitz and his companion, Shaha

Riza, were often their own worst enemies in terms of how they dealt with their

situation. Riza, especially, comes across as someone with no political nous

whatsoever, who systematically alienated just about anybody who could help her

– including Wolfowitz. And Rosen also reveals that Wolfowitz might have

been caught up in even more scandal than people realized at the time.

The whole piece is worth reading (assuming you’re OK with the Playboy ads which

surround it), if only to see the kind of thing that results when a Fox News

journalist ventures into print:

Wolfowitz and Riza, in short, were hardly Brangelina, but they had each other.

And as they prepared for Wolfowitz to assume the World Bank presidency, a

position that carries a five-year term and may be renewed by the bank’s executive

board, they likely envisioned themselves spending the next decade working

together — individually but under the same roof — to advance the passionately

pro-democracy agenda that bound their love.

But Rosen does uncover an older Wolfowitz-Riza scandal, dating back to Wolfowitz’s

tenure at Defense, which was news to me, and is if anything more shocking than

anything alleged to have happened at the World Bank:

A high-ranking State Department official remembered the couple’s relationship

intruding on another national security initiative: Libyan strongman Muammar

al-Qaddafi’s historic secret agreement to disclose and dismantle all his country’s

weapons of mass destruction and ballistic-missile programs in exchange for

the restoration of diplomatic ties with the United States.

Announced in December 2003, the Libyan deal represented one of the most sensitive

and significant projects of the first Bush term. Senior administration officials

repeatedly cited the invasion of Iraq, then just nine months old, as a prime

factor in Qaddafi’s change of heart. During his first debate with Senator

John Kerry, at the University of Miami in September 2004, Bush boasted about

the war’s effects. "By speaking clearly and sending messages that we

mean what we say," Bush said, "we’ve affected the world in a positive

way. Look at Libya. Libya was a threat. Libya is now peacefully dismantling

its weapons programs. Libya understood that America and others will enforce

doctrine, and the world is better for it."

Yet this momentous initiative was almost torpedoed by the Wolfowitz-Riza romance.

"When we were doing Libya," the State Department official recalled,

"we kept on running into all this resistance at OSD [Office of the Secretary

of Defense], and I kept wondering, What’s the problem over there? Finally

someone told me, ‘It’s Wolfowitz. He has a Libyan American girlfriend who

hates Qaddafi.’ And Wolfowitz was adamant that there’d be no deal until Qaddafi

was dead."

I’m quite sure this was not public knowledge when Wolfowitz was being ousted

from the World Bank; if it had been, I doubt he’d have lasted even as long as

he did.

Posted in defenestrations, world bank | Comments Off on The Wolfowitz Ouster, Redux

Home Equity: Down. Home Equity Withdrawals: Still High.

A major driver of the US economy in recent years has been home equity withdrawal

– individuals tapping the equity in their homes to fuel consumption. Obviously,

total home equity rises very quickly when house prices are rising, and it falls

very quickly when home prices are falling. But here’s the thing: total home-equity

extraction was $159 billion in the second quarter of 2007, and $133

billion in the third. As Justin Fox says, that’s a

lot.

Both Fox and Calculated Risk see home equity withdrawals declining sharply

in the quarters and years to come – which would certainly seem to be intuitive.

But before I buy into that scenario completely, I’d like to know how their view

of the relationship between house prices and equity withdrawal squares with

the known facts so far. If they can convincingly explain the $133 billion figure,

then I’ll be much more likely to sign on to their forecasts.

Posted in economics, housing | Comments Off on Home Equity: Down. Home Equity Withdrawals: Still High.

Bonus Watch, Goldman Sachs Edition

At

Goldman, all is sunny:

Many were celebrating Wednesday. “Are people happy? I think broadly

yes. The message was that in a year when the firm has done well, it pays its

people well,” said a delighted banker.

Posted in banking, pay | Comments Off on Bonus Watch, Goldman Sachs Edition

Why is the Fed Discriminating Against Investment Banks?

In ES Browning’s WSJ

stocks report today, he mentions something I haven’t seen anywhere else:

Traders pointed to several culprits for the stock pullback: warnings from

Bank of America and Wachovia of more credit-loss provisions to come, a gloomy-sounding

comment from Canada’s central bank governor, rumors of more write-downs at

other financial institutions, surging oil prices and a comment from

the Federal Reserve that its new bailout program wouldn’t be available to

investment banks.

Let’s not get into the question of whether the Fed’s new facility is a bailout

for the time being. The big question is: why on earth isn’t it available to

investment banks? And where can I find this comment?

The policy certainly seems weird to me, since many of the biggest investment

banks (JPMorgan, UBS, Deutsche, Citi, etc) are also commercial banks and therefore

will have access to the new facility – thereby giving them what seems

to be an unfair advantage over the pure investment banks like Goldman, Lehman,

and Bear. Or am I missing something here?

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on Why is the Fed Discriminating Against Investment Banks?

Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

Greenspan

and Housing Inventory

BofA

Chief Sees More Pain Ahead

The

Magazine Subscription problem: Solved,

in the comments, by Jason Kottke.

How

To Destroy An Analyst by POT

Who

is more independent than whom? John Gapper on ownership structures at the

WSJ and the NYT.

Vikram

Pandit Makes Rockstar Status

Citi’s

Pandit Is an Expert, but Not in Banking

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

Citigroup Should Cut its Dividend Now

Morgan Stanley thinks Citi will cut its dividend. CIBC thinks Citi will cut

its dividend. And according to Alea, the

markets think Citi will cut its dividend, too:

Based on implied forward prices derived from options markets, a 40% dividend

cut is priced in,that would be 32 cents per share down from 54 cents.

Clearly, if Citi is going to cut its dividend, it should do so sooner rather

than later, especially if a dividend cut is already priced in to the markets

and therefore wouldn’t hurt the share price very much.

An early decision by Win Bischoff to cut the dividend (I think such decisions

are made by the board, not by the CEO) would have the added benefit of forcing

the markets to take Citi’s new management team seriously. It would solidify

Bischoff’s reputation as a Citi-saver, too: remember that it was while Bischoff

was CEO that he orchestrated another deal to boost Citi’s capital, the ADIA

investment.

What’s more, the risk of a dividend cut is clearly helping to keep the share

price depressed: with a dividend cut behind them, Bischoff and Pandit could

almost certainly see much more upside to Citi’s stock. They should cut the dividend

once, and cut it by a large enough amount that there’s very little risk they’ll

have to cut it again. Then they can get cracking on internal issues.

Posted in banking, stocks | Comments Off on Citigroup Should Cut its Dividend Now

There’s No Transparency in the Carbon-Offset Market

Adam Piore today profiles

Tom Arnold of TerraPass, a for-profit company selling carbon offsets to

guilty gas-guzzling liberals. TerraPass is very secretive about its "revenue,

profits, or even how much it has invested so far in carbon-offset projects",

which means that no one using TerraPass has any clue how much of their money

goes to carbon offsets and how much goes to amortize the cost of Tom Arnold’s

SUV.

I see no reason to use a for-profit carbon-offset company when there’s no shortage

of non-profits who will do the same thing. But in any case the whole system

of cruising around the web looking for a vaguely reputable carbon-offset company

is hugely inefficient. Already there’s a cacophony of competing standards, each

of which seeks to certify carbon offsets as being kosher: there’s the Voluntary

Carbon Standard, Green-e, CCB

Standards, the Gold Standard,

and, I’m sure, many others too. One could look in detail into all of them, and

then look for a merchant who was certified by as many of them as possible, but

it all seems like a huge onus to place on the consumer.

What’s more, the various different merchants offering carbon offsets differ

not only in how much they charge per ton of carbon offset, but also in terms

of how much carbon they consider a transatlantic flight, for instance, to emit.

Basically, the whole thing’s a mess. If you spend more money offsetting a ton

of carbon than your neighbor did, does that mean you were ripped off, or that

you just invested in a better project? Right now, nobody really knows.

What would be wonderful would be if there could be a genuine market in carbon

credits, rather than the inefficient mix of semi-competition and secretiveness

which characterizes the status quo. Prices have to become much more transparent

than they are now: merchants should sell their carbon offsets not directly to

consumers but rather only through a market with real price transparency. At

the very least, every trade should be reported to a central price recorder,

even if it was sold bilaterally.

If there were different prices for offsets certified by different standards

organizations, that would be fine: many people would be fine paying a little

more to be sure that their offsets were certified by the Gold Standard, for

instance. But right now, many people reasonably shun the carbon-offset industry

because they have no idea whether they’re simply being taken for a ride by the

likes of TerraPass. On the other side of the transaction, people setting up

wind turbines and the like have no way of making sure that they’re selling their

carbon credits to the highest bidder: a transparent market would help there,

too.

There are already big international exchanges for industrial quantities of

carbon being traded under Kyoto-mandated cap-and-trade schemes. Can’t someone

come up with an exchange for much smaller quantities of carbon being traded

in the retail carbon-offset market?

Update: Russell Simon from Carbonfund.org

points me to a very

useful survey of how much different offset providers charge: anywhere, it

seems, from $3.96 to more than $41 per ton of carbon offset. Carbonfund.org

itself would seem to be a good choice: it’s not only significantly cheaper than

TerraPass, but is also a non-profit.

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on There’s No Transparency in the Carbon-Offset Market

The Fed’s Collateral Requirements: It’ll Take Anything

The Fed won’t just lend out $40 billion in an attempt to inject some liquidity

into the banking system, oh no. It requires collateral. But, as jck says in

the comments

to my earlier blog entry, it seems as though "any junk will do" in

terms of the collateral the Fed will accept.

The details can be found on the Fed’s website,

where the margin

tables can be downloaded in Excel or PDF form. But to give you an idea of

what the Fed will lend, consider a AAA-rated subprime-backed CDO – the

kind of thing which is causing billions of dollars in losses all over the financial

system. If the CDO has a market price, the Fed will lend up to 98% of that price

if it’s a short-term CDO, up to 96% if it’s medium-term, and up to 93% if it’s

long-term.

But what if the CDO is completely illiquid, and you can’t find a price for

it at all? No worries, the Fed will still accept it as collateral, and lend

up to 85% of par value. (There’s an interesting thought experiment here: what

happens if a long-term CDO has a market value of, say, 90 cents on the dollar?

In that case, an illiquid version of that CDO would actually be worth more to

the Fed than the liquid version.)

Do keep on looking down that list, though: it turns out that banks can even

put up as collateral subprime credit-card receivables – they don’t even

need a AAA rating.

Now it’s worth noting that the Fed is going to be repaid on its loans

no matter what happens to the collateral. We’re not talking non-recourse loans

here: there’s really no chance that one of the Fed’s borrowing banks is going

to suddenly go bankrupt and leave the Fed holding some paper of dubious value.

But it certainly seems that any bank sitting on a bunch of nuclear waste and

suffering from liquidity problems has now found its savior in the Federal Reserve.

As Steve

Waldman says, never mind the mortgage plan – this is a bailout.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on The Fed’s Collateral Requirements: It’ll Take Anything

Did Arminio Fraga Turn Down the Harvard Endowment Job?

The Harvard Management Company, under the interim

leadership of Robert Kaplan, is looking for a permanent replacement for

the departing

Mohamed El-Erian. In the meantime, it’s taking a 12.5% stake in Gávea,

the hedge fund run by former Soros fund manager and Brazilian central banker

Armínio Fraga. (I can’t find an English-language report on this, but

here’s

one in Portugese.)

I believe that HMC has been an investor in Fraga’s fund for some time, but

this investment clearly brings the two institutions much closer together. My

guess is that HMC asked Fraga if he’d be interested in taking over from El-Erian

(Fraga would be a magnificent replacement), and Fraga said he wasn’t interested

in leaving Rio and moving to Boston (which is entirely understandable). But

talks were friendly enough that the strategic 12.5% investment ended up being

negotiated instead.

Of course, this is all utter speculation. But what else are blogs for?

Posted in hedge funds | Comments Off on Did Arminio Fraga Turn Down the Harvard Endowment Job?

The Fed’s New Facility, Explained in English

When I said

this morning that more details of the Fed’s Term Auction Facility would surely

emerge over the course of the day, I didn’t expect Steve Waldman to be the person

providing them. But I’m very glad he is. So stop whatever it is you’re doing,

and go read this:

TAF is

a really, really big deal

Waldman here explains in plain English exactly how this facility works, and

why it’s so important.

The only thing which is still a bit unclear is exactly what kind of collateral

the Fed will or will not accept at this new window. Waldman says that it will

be "whatever it is private lenders are eschewing," and I’ve heard

elsewhere that the Fed might even start accepting things like subprime mortgages.

I doubt it will go that far, but I’d love to get some more clarity on just what

kind of collateral the Fed considers to be acceptable these days.

(Also worth reading: Everything

You Want to Know About Today’s Fed Move But Didn’t Know Who to Ask.)

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on The Fed’s New Facility, Explained in English

Still Awaiting In-Flight WiFi

JetBlue launched

a crippled WiFi service yesterday – well ahead of schedule, since it seemed

in July that JetBlue wifi wasn’t going to arrive until 2010. So props to them

for getting this thing off the ground before Row44 and AirCell and Panasonic

are really in business. But really, the idea of limiting WiFi usage to Yahoo

Mail and the Blackberry Curve – that’s just pathetic. I can understand

that JetBlue might have bandwidth issues which means it doesn’t want everybody

surfing the web at the same time. But there should be some way of allowing anybody

to email text-only messages without limiting usage to those passengers with

Yahoo accounts.

Caroline McCarthy describes

the JetBlue offering as "an ultra-low-end mobile browser" –

and it seems to be a pretty

unreliable one at that. I don’t think the Row44 people are going to be at

all worried by this competition, and I’m still looking forward to real

in-flight WiFi early next year.

Posted in technology | Comments Off on Still Awaiting In-Flight WiFi

Greenspan’s Legacy: The Housing Bust

Alan

Greenspan accepts little if any responsibility for fueling the housing boom:

I do not doubt that a low U.S. federal-funds rate in response to the dot-com

crash, and especially the 1% rate set in mid-2003 to counter potential deflation,

lowered interest rates on adjustable-rate mortgages and may have contributed

to the rise in U.S. home prices. In my judgment, however, the impact on demand

for homes financed with ARMs was not major.

Demand in those days was driven by the expectation of rising prices–the dynamic

that fuels most asset-price bubbles. If low adjustable-rate financing had

not been available, most of the demand would have been financed with fixed

rate, long-term mortgages. In fact, home prices continued to rise for two

years subsequent to the peak of ARM originations (seasonally adjusted).

Greenspan comes close, here, to committing the "speculative bubble"

fallacy,

but he does stop just short: he merely says that the bubble was "driven

by the expectation of rising prices". And I am sympathetic to what he says.

The boom in US housing prices was pretty much par for the global course, and

it’s not obvious that a higher Fed funds rate would have prevented it or even

slowed it down noticeably.

That said, however, the main reason why the housing bust seems to

be much worse in the US than elsewhere is surely those ARMs – which, as

Greenspan concedes, were a function of low short-term interest rates.

They allowed many people to buy houses they couldn’t afford, which in turn created

a massive solvency crisis. David Leonhardt, today, explains the dynamic:

As home prices rose ever higher in other parts of Southern California, Paramount

became all the more attractive — and prices eventually soared there

as well. By last year, the typical house sold for almost $500,000, up from

$200,000 in early 2003.

Many of those sales depended on adjustable-rate mortgages with tantalizingly

low initial payments, and now that those mortgages are much harder to get,

there aren’t many buyers willing and able to pay $500,000.

So long as people can afford their mortgage payments, you’re unlikely to have

a massive housing bust. The problem in the US is those ARMs, which are resetting

to levels which people can’t afford. The housing bust (if not the housing boom)

is Greenspan’s legacy, and it would be nice if he were a little more honest

about it.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy, housing | Comments Off on Greenspan’s Legacy: The Housing Bust

Fed: Second Rate Cut in Two Days

Greg Ip has the

first best gloss on the Fed’s liquidity-injection

announcement:

The Fed said today it would create a new "term auction facility"

under which it would lend at least $40 billion and potentially far more, in

four separate auctions starting this week. The loans would be at rates far

below the rate charged on direct loans from the Fed to banks from its so-called

"discount window."…

The new loans will be auctioned off with a minimum rate linked to the expected

actual federal funds rate over the duration of the loan. Since the federal

funds rate is expected to decline over the next two months, when the loans

will be outstanding, the loan rate could end up being close to or even below

the current federal funds rate.

I’m sure that more details of the plan will emerge over the course of the day.

But at first glance it seems as though the Fed has essentially cut its discount

rate to a level at or below the Fed funds rate. After all, I can’t see why anybody

will now use the old discount window, when they can use this new TAF instead.

Posted in fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on Fed: Second Rate Cut in Two Days

Still Underwhelmed by Pandit

Vikram Pandit, it turns out, has something of an online fan club. When I described

him yesterday as "a dull technocrat who has never achieved very much,"

I was immediately slapped down by commenters – most of whom spent much

more energy attacking me than defending Pandit.

The best thing that anybody ever says about Pandit is that he’s a "respected

investment banker" – which basically means that he’s a generally

amiable chap. Pranay Gupte has a good profile

of him which reveals him also to be ambitious – something he shares with,

well, everybody else on Wall Street. And certainly he seems to be very good

at rising up corporate ladders.

But it really is hard to point to much in the way of solid achievements on

Pandit’s resume – besides, of course, his coup in managing to sell his

fair-to-middling hedge fund to Citigroup for $800 million.

I’m not sure that anybody really has the ability to run the sprawling

mess known as Citigroup, so in that sense maybe Pandit is no worse a CEO than

whoever constituted Plan B. But the only person showing any real enthusiasm

for him seems to be Bob Rubin, who now gets to retreat back into his ivory tower,

making vast amounts of money without taking on any real responsibility.

Looking at the team of Pandit and Bischoff, I see two career investment bankers

neither of whom has a fraction of the vision (Sandy Weill’s vision, to be precise)

which created Citigroup in the first place. It’s entirely possible that Citi

was held together by sheer force of Sandy’s forward momentum, if you’ll exclude

the mixed metaphor, and that when Citi stopped growing, it was inevitable that

it would fall apart. Perhaps what the bank needs now is an experienced M&A

dealmaker who can cut up the giant and sell it off at a profit – but as

far as I know Pandit has no M&A experience. Maybe that’s Bischoff’s job.

Posted in banking | Comments Off on Still Underwhelmed by Pandit

How to Test the Accuracy of the ABX

The WSJ takes a look at the notorious

ABX today, and although it’s more polite than me, it still shows

how bad the index is as a gauge of the subprime mortgage market

Wachovia Capital Markets analysts Glenn Schultz and John McElravey say the

price of the ABX that tracks AAA-rated mortgage debt implies losses of around

49% among pools of subprime mortgages issued in 2006. A cumulative loss of

49% would be achieved if all 2006 subprime mortgages were to default and recover

only half their value after foreclosing on the homes, or if half were to default

and recover nothing.

Most Wall Street analysts expect 10% to 15% in cumulative losses for these

loans. As of August, the delinquency rate on all subprime loans was around

20%. For 2006 subprime mortgages, around 27% have already been paid down,

many through refinancing, and 2% have defaulted.

The part of the article which interested me was this:

Critics say the relatively thin trading of the ABX on some days makes it

prone to being moved by a few large trades. Much of the trading in the index

also has leaned in the same direction. Banks use it to hedge against mortgage

risk, and hedge funds use it to bet on further drops in housing; both trades

tend to depress it.

As I understand it, anybody can make a bet on where the ABX will be in the

future. But the ABX index isn’t a security which goes down when a lot of people

want to sell it and few people want to buy it: it’s simply a reflection of where

certain mortgage-backed CDS contracts are trading. In order for bets on the

ABX to move the index, an arbitrageur would have to go out and go long the index

while going short hedging by buying the underlying CDS.

Do such people exist? There’s an easy way to tell: find a bunch of subprime

CDS which aren’t in the ABX index, and compare their prices to those of similar

subprime CDS which are in the ABX index. If the anonymous critics are right

and the ABX is being driven down by hedgers and speculators, you’ll find a big

diffence in price.

Has anybody done that?

Update: Alea

emails to say that it’s basically not possible to arbitrage the ABX against

the underlying CDS.

Posted in derivatives, housing | Comments Off on How to Test the Accuracy of the ABX

Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Morgan

Stanley: Recession Likely: Northern Trust, too, has a recession call.

Realigning

English into gobbledegook

Saving

Banks: How the Mortgage Bailout Strains Accounting

I

Agree With Clinton on Mandates

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

The Best and Worst Bank Deals of 2007

Time’s Bill Saporito says that the takeover of ABN Amro by the RBS-led consortium

was the

4th best business deal of 2007. Wha? RBS overpaid massively: the

consortium decided to pay mainly in cash, but by the time the deal closed, the

credit crunch had devastated the value of financial stocks, including those

in the consortium. Saporito tries to defend the $101 billion price tag by saying

that "for that kind of coin, RBS gets more swagger in the U.S." –

has he forgotten that LaSalle, the US asset RBS desperately wanted, ended up

going in the end to Bank of America?

To compound things, Saporito anoints the ADIA investment in Citigroup as the

8th

worst business deal of 2007. Forgetting the difference between debt and

equity, he complains that "Citi is paying out a stiff 11% coupon to the

Middle Eastern investment fund". Chap should read

more blogs, I think.

Posted in banking, M&A | Comments Off on The Best and Worst Bank Deals of 2007

WSJ.com Having Difficulties Correcting Stories

This is a cock-up, not a conspiracy: it speaks to the WSJ having a crap website,

and not to any conscious attempt to downplay its mistakes. But if you do a search

for Susan Pulliam’s erroneous

front-page article on Merrill Lynch, the

search result has no correction appended. Which is weird, since a

different version of the story on the WSJ website does have a correction

appended.

Even that version, however, puts the correction at the bottom, with just a

simple note saying "see Corrections & Amplifications item below"

at the top. It would be better if the WSJ followed the lead of Factiva, which

puts the correction at the top, and then follows it with the original article.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on WSJ.com Having Difficulties Correcting Stories

How Blogs are Changing Business Journalism for the Better

Herb Greenberg

is asked:

Q: How do you see online business journalism changing in the next 10

to 20 years?

A: More blurring of the line between what is and what isn’t real

journalism. People whose backgrounds and biases haven’t been vetted

can get instant credibility, through sites like Seeking Alpha, which can result

in blog posts that get included under a ticker on Yahoo Finance. This is chipping

away at the value of what we do. Doesn’t mean what they do

isn’t good work. It certainly increases the competition.

God knows there aren’t nearly enough Herb Greenbergs – the kind of journalists

who spend hours poring over SEC filings, trying to make sense of what companies

are reporting. It’s a noble calling, and a skill that the likes of Greenberg

(or Peter Eavis, or Floyd Norris) has honed over the years. But clearly you

don’t need to be a journalist to do it: the people who do it best are the short-sellers

who are the very best sources for such journalists. In any case, anything which

"increases the competition" in terms of the supply of this kind of

material is a decidedly positive development.

I also think that Greenberg is doing himself something of a disservice if he

thinks that people read and trust him because he’s been "vetted" by

his employer. Not at all: I’m quite comfortable saying that people trust Herb

Greenberg more than they trust Marketwatch. Remember that in any kind

of poll, journalists barely beat out politicians in terms of trustworthiness.

So the posters on Seeking Alpha go through exactly the same credibility-building

process that Greenberg and Eavis and Norris did: they publish their analysis,

open it up to public examination, and if their material consistently withstands

scrutiny, people start to trust them. In no way does this chip away at the value

of what journalists do; in fact, it is what journalists do. The difference

between the Seeking Alpha posters and what Greenberg calls "real"

journalists is basically just that "real" journalists get paid by

news organizations, while the Seeking Alpha posters (generally) don’t.

But in these days when there is no shortage of incompetent editors at business

sections throughout the country, I wouldn’t assume that a random journalist

was any more trustworthy than a random financial blogger. In both cases, I would

judge their material on its merits. In that sense, the rise of blogging is helping

the cause of financial journalism, in that it’s creating a generation of engaged

and critical readers. If your readers are sheep who believe whatever you write

just because it’s in the paper, that breeds complacency and laziness. But no

US journalist is in that position today.

Posted in blogonomics, Media | Comments Off on How Blogs are Changing Business Journalism for the Better

Fed, Citi: Mildly Disappointing

It’s obviously a day for mildly-disappointing expected decisions. The

Fed has cut by a quarter point, and Citigroup has decided to appoint

Vikram Pandit its new CEO.

I doubt that many people can gin up much in the way of enthusiasm for either

of these pieces of news. A quarter-point cut isn’t enough to stave off recession,

if indeed we’re headed in that direction, and it’s not even enough to stave

off expectations for another cut at the next meeting. Meanwhile, Pandit is a

dull technocrat who has never achieved very much but who has somehow managed

to maneuver his way into the top job at Citigroup. The best we can hope for

is that he’ll be weak enough not to put up too much of a fight should Jamie

Dimon decide that Citi is ripe for the buying.

It’s weird that the Pandit news was leaked without any news on who Citi’s new

chairman will be, though. Can’t Citi even orchestrate the annoucement of its

new leadership effectively?

Posted in banking, fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on Fed, Citi: Mildly Disappointing

The Economics of the Harvard Tuition Announcement

Why did Harvard announce

yesterday that its tuition fees, for students whose families earn between $120,000

and $180,000, would be 10% of family income? Frankly, I buy the

official story: that those students were getting less than the maximum benefit

from Harvard due to financial pressures. And the marginal cost of implementing

this policy is only $22 million a year: just 0.06% of the size of the Harvard

endowment. It’s almost a no-brainer, really.

But Zubin

points out there are other possible motivations. One is that lower debt

burdens allow students to follow their dreams and work for the government or

for non-profits rather than feeling compelled to work for McKinsey or Goldman

Sachs. I buy that too. And then there’s the whole question of competition for

"top students":

"It’s a bold move that makes a lot of sense," Jesse Rothstein,

an economist at Princeton told me. "A lot of these schools are competing

really hard to attract a set of students that are not conventionally poor

but are at the lower range of their pools and cost is a big factor for them."

While Harvard is the preeminent school in the country, before the move, if

Student A was accepted to Harvard, Princeton, and M.I.T. and the two latter

schools were offering better financial aid packages, it was no guarantee that

Student A would choose Harvard. But now it’s a nearly no-brainer for others

like Student A and that means Harvard attracts even more top students.

We’ve been

here before: I simply don’t buy this idea that there’s a limited pool of

"top students" which all top universities want. The most qualified

cohort of college applicants every year vastly outnumbers the number of places

at Harvard, Princeton, and MIT combined. The admissions officers at all those

universities have a large and necessarily somewhat subjective set of criteria

which lead them to choose some subset of that cohort for admission. And that

subset, which gets admitted, invariably does very well. But any other subset,

once admitted, would also do very well.

Harvard is – and should be – defined much more by what happens

to students after they’re admitted, than it is by the quality of students, however

defined, on their first day as a freshman. And I think that might explain another

reason for this move. Students from families earning between $120,000 and $180,000

are likely to be quite rich when they grow older, and the fonder their memories

of Harvard the more they’re likely to donate. It’s entirely possible that this

whole scheme is a money-maker for Harvard, once you include the extra donations

these students, especially the ones who make many millions of dollars, are going

to give to the Harvard endowment in decades to come.

Posted in economics | Comments Off on The Economics of the Harvard Tuition Announcement

The SF Chronicle’s Atrocious Mortgage Conspiracy Theorizing

The San Francisco Chronicle published on Sunday a grossly irresponsible opinion

piece from one Sean Olender, headlined "Interest

rate ‘freeze’ – the real story is fraud". I would dearly like to hold

someone at the Chronicle to account for printing this incendiary and meretricious

column: it sheds much more heat than light on the issue, and spreads a lot of

misinformation and outright falsehoods in the process. Mark Thoma today says

that "I don’t know if there’s anything to these accusations or not":

let me assure him (and Tyler

Cowen, for that matter) that there isn’t.

Olender sets the tone for his piece right at the beginning:

New proposals to ease our great mortgage meltdown keep rolling in. First

the Treasury Department urged the creation of a new fund that would buy risky

mortgage bonds as a tactic to hide what those bonds were really worth.

This simply isn’t true. The MLEC, for that is the only thing he can be referring

to here, was specifically designed to buy only high-quality assets: the whole

point of it was that it would not buy any risky mortgage bonds at all.

In any event, the point was not to buy bonds for more than they were worth:

the point was to provide liquidity to a market which was suffering from a major

liquidity shortage.

Olender continues:

Then the idea was to use Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy the risky loans,

even if it was clear that U.S. taxpayers would eventually be stuck with the

bill.

I have no idea which idea Olender thinks he’s talking about here. Fannie and

Freddie buying private-label subprime mortgages on the secondary market? I don’t

recall any plan like that, certainly not anything which was embraced by anybody

in government.

Olender then says that the mortgage-freeze plan is just as bad, if not worse:

"the "freeze" is just another fraud," he writes. Yes, fraud:

he’s saying it’s illegal.

The sole goal of the freeze is to prevent owners of mortgage-backed securities,

many of them foreigners, from suing U.S. banks and forcing them to buy back

worthless mortgage securities at face value – right now almost 10 times their

market worth.

It’s worth noting the "foreigners" hiding out in this sentence: it’s

a good indication that Olender is rather out to lunch. Why on earth would the

nationality of bondholders make any difference either way? But in any case,

we’re beginning to see what Olender’s thesis is here. Apparently he thinks that

(a) US banks might be forced to buy back subprime mortgages at par; and that

(b) the mortgage-freeze plan will somehow prevent that from happening. Neither

of these things is true.

The ticking time bomb in the U.S. banking system is not resetting subprime

mortgage rates. The real problem is the contractual ability of investors in

mortgage bonds to require banks to buy back the loans at face value if there

was fraud in the origination process.

The real problem here is that Olender never makes the crucial distinction between

subprime mortgage originators, on the one hand, most of whom were not banks

at all, and the investment banks, on the other hand, who pooled and tranched

and sold off the subprime mortgages to bond investors. The originators are required

to buy back fraudulent loans, but most of them have gone out of business at

this point. The investment banks are just middlemen: they are not required

to buy back anything.

Despite Thursday’s ballyhooed new deal with mortgage lenders, does anyone

really think that it can ultimately stop fraud lawsuits by mortgage bond investors,

many of them spread out across the globe?

Er, no, nobody thinks that, Sean. In fact, you’re the only person who thinks

the deal was even designed to prevent such lawsuits in the first place. But

never mind, you’re about to wax apocalyptic:

The catastrophic consequences of bond investors forcing originators to buy

back loans at face value are beyond the current media discussion. The loans

at issue dwarf the capital available at the largest U.S. banks combined, and

investor lawsuits would raise stunning liability sufficient to cause even

the largest U.S. banks to fail, resulting in massive taxpayer-funded bailouts

of Fannie and Freddie, and even FDIC.

Olender uses the term "originators" here, rather than "banks",

originally, but immediately elides that into "banks". The fact is

that "the largest U.S. banks combined" really didn’t originate much

in the way of fraudulent subprime loans. Most of that origination happened at

companies like Ameriquest, which have long since closed their doors. The US

banking system simply doesn’t bear the liability that Olender thinks it does.

And I think that Olender is saying that not only the originators but also the

investment banks have criminal liability here:

What would be prudent and logical is for the banks that sold this toxic waste

to buy it back and for a lot of people to go to prison. If they knew about

the fraud, they should have to buy the bonds back.

It seems as though he’s talking about investment banks here, not about

originators. But investment banks were just the middlemen, funneling subprime

mortgages from originators to investors who were desperate for yield. I don’t

see how they should suddenly be forced to buy back all those mortgages at par,

and I’m quite sure that they have no legal obligation to do so. But Olender

isn’t finished yet:

The goal of the freeze may be to delay bond investors from suing by putting

off the big foreclosure wave for several years. But it may also be to stop

bond investors from suing. If the investors agreed to loan modifications with

the "real" wage and asset information from refinancing borrowers,

mortgage originators and bundlers would have an excuse once the foreclosure

occurred. They could say, "Fraud? What fraud?! You knew the borrower’s

real income and asset information later when he refinanced!"

The key is to refinance borrowers whose current loans involved fraud in the

origination process.

This is where Olender reveals that he’s really living in cloud-cuckoo land:

he simply doesn’t grok the difference between a loan modification – which

is the centerpiece of the mortgage-freeze plan – and a refinance. The

whole point of the mortgage freeze is that it does not involve refinancing

any loan – the loan is simply modified, and the bondholders retain all

their legal rights.

But wait – Olender isn’t done yet. No column as crazy as this one would

be complete without taking a page from Ben Stein’s book and drawing out the

Paulson-Goldman connection:

Ultimately, the people in these secret Paulson meetings were probably less

worried about saving the mortgage market than with saving themselves. Some

might be looking at prison time.

As chief of Goldman Sachs, Paulson was involved, to degrees as yet unrevealed,

in the mortgage securitization process during the halcyon days of mortgage

fraud from 2004 to 2006…

If a mortgage bond investor sues Goldman Sachs to force the institution to

buy back loans, could Paulson be forced to testify as to whether Goldman Sachs

knew or had reason to know about fraud in the origination process of the loans

it was bundling?

At this point it’s clear that Olender is operating under the delusion that

investment banks, rather than originators, can be forced to buy back loans.

After all, Goldman never originated any subprime mortgages itself. In any case,

Olender finishes with a flourish:

We’re talking about criminal fraud here. We are on the cusp of a mammoth

financial crisis, and the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury are trying

to limit the liability of their banking friends under the guise of trying

to help borrowers. At stake is nothing short of the continued existence of

the U.S. banking system.

I honestly think that Olender is accusing Hank Paulson of criminal fraud. And

I’m really unclear as to what Olender thinks should be done to ensure

"the continued existence of the US banking system" – should

we force banks to buy back subprime mortgage bonds at par, or not?

The whole piece suffers from an acute case of conspiracytheoryitis, shot through

with some very damaging misunderstandings about where legal liability lies in

the securitization process. It’s the kind of thing which would be easily ignorable

on a blog somewhere, and I’m not surprised that something along these lines

has been written. But I am extremely surprised that the editors of the San Francisco

Chronicle, whose job is to filter out the nutcases, somehow let this one through

and printed it on the front page of the C section on Sunday. Shame on them.

Posted in housing, Media | Comments Off on The SF Chronicle’s Atrocious Mortgage Conspiracy Theorizing

How Citi is Solving its SIV Problems

Citigroup was always understood to be the prime beneficiary of the SuperSIV

plan. But yesterday, Eric Dash dropped

hints that Citi had been working on a Plan B, saying that "Citigroup,

the financial giant that first proposed the initiative, is devising a separate

rescue plan".

Today, the FT fills

in more of the blanks:

Citigroup has slashed the size of its struggling off-balance-sheet investment

funds by more than $15bn in two months through quiet side deals with some

junior investors, according to people familiar with the business…

Citi on Monday refused to comment on asset sales by its seven SIVs –

all of which have been put on watch for downgrades by the rating agencies

– but people familiar with the vehicles say their size has been cut

from $83bn at the end of September to about $66bn largely by selling pro-rata

portions of a SIV’s portfolio of assets to investors in the most junior

notes at market values. Citi is also talking to some investors about directly

swapping their holdings for underlying assets.

I can see how this deal makes some sense on both sides. If I own the short-term

junior debt of an SIV, I really have nowhere to turn. But if I swap that debt

for long-dated, higher-yielding assets, there is maybe some light at the end

of the tunnel. Meanwhile, Citi gets to effectively unwind the SIV without relying

on The Entity – something which still hasn’t got off the ground,

and which no one is placing an enormous amount of faith in.

If Citi can carve off some large chunks of its SIVs, it might be able to reduce

the rump vehicles to something digestible – at which point Citi’s brand-new

CEO can take them onto the bank’s balance sheet as part of his fresh new strategy

or somesuch. But there’s still a fair amount of pruning to go before that happens:

I don’t think Citi can really afford to take anything like $66 billion of SIV

assets onto its balance sheet right now. Maybe that’s where The Entity can step

in, taking on maybe half of what’s left and leaving the remainder for Citi to

mop up.

Posted in banking, bonds and loans | Comments Off on How Citi is Solving its SIV Problems

The Upside of Sloppy Drafting

Good lawyers draft contracts in clear English. Bad lawyers draft contracts

in dense legalese. But here’s the thing: sometimes dense legalese gets the job

done, where clear English would serve only to clarify the fact that the parties

to an agreement don’t actually agree.

Lee Buchheit, in his book

How to Negotiate Eurocurrency Loan Agreements, explains what the problem

is:

Exceptionally poor contract drafting can actually convey an unfair negotiating

advantage to the proponent of a document. Rather than set out plainly what

is intended and engage, if necessary, in a candid defence of that proposition,

the truly inept drafter can suppress all meaningful discussion about his work

product. Defined terms are scattered throughout the agreement. Each defined

term incestuously references four other defined terms, with the result that

even the diligent reader quickly runs out of page-marking fingers. The number

and obscurity of the cross-references to other sections of this (or some other)

agreement would bring a crimson blush of shame to the authors of the US Internal

Revenue Code. Each sentence is clogged with the arteriosclerosis of unnecessary

words and distracting parentheticals, provisos and exceptions. In short, only

counterparties and their counsel willing to acknowledge the painful limitations

of their own reading comprehension will have much to say about the document.

In the specific case of M&A deals, Steven Davidoff is quite explicit about

what

this means:

Avoid complex drafting. If any section of your agreement has one

or more "to the extent applicables", "Notwithstanding",

or otherwise has too many caveats redraft it to make it clearer and unambiguous.

Stay awake the extra two hours to do this.

The Epicurean Dealmaker has an

interesting take on all this:

Surely, a great deal of such poor drafting can indeed be attributed to laziness,

haste, or sheer incompetence, as Professor Davidoff implies. But I have another

theory for you. Based on my experience, I believe a non-trivial amount of

such obscure legal drafting is in fact intentional. I believe some lawyers

draft clotted legalese or do not attempt to clarify others’ scribblings because

they realize, at a conscious or subconscious level, that the confusion in

the text reflects a fundamental disagreement or misunderstanding between the

parties to the agreement in question. Haste, pressure of time or events, or

sheer wishful thinking encourages such lawyers to whistle past a particular

graveyard, or let a particular sleeping dog lie. After all, virtually no-one—not

even most lawyers—actually wants or expects an agreement to end up in

litigation, and that is usually where the parties’ differing intent and interpretations

of sloppy contractual language is aired and ultimately resolved.

You can see this as cowardly, or lazy, but I prefer to view it as reasonably

pragmatic. After all, the great majority of merger agreements do not end up

in court, and you can bet that is not because they are all drafted to an ABA-approved

level of clarity and precision. Furthermore, lawyers understand that they

work for businessmen, who want to strike deals, but who themselves may not

have a good understanding of all the risks and issues involved in a particular

M&A transaction, much less how they feel about them. In such circumstances,

is it really so bad to cross your fingers and whistle past that nasty contractual

briar patch wherein lie all sorts of differing intentions and interpretations

of, e.g., specific performance? Not only is the perfect the enemy of the good

in contractual law, but arguably the bad is not necessarily the enemy of the

good, either. The intent of M&A dealmaking, after all, is to make deals.

The upshot from all of this is that sloppy drafting can be used, in practice,

to advance the interests of one of the parties under cover of utter incomprehensibility.

Any good lawyer who has removed that weapon from his arsenal has every right

to feel aggrieved that others might use it against him.

But at the margin, it is certain that deals have been done only by means of

expediently sweeping intractable issues under a rug of impenetrable prose. And

from the point of view of many bankers and even some lawyers, a done deal is

nearly always better than the alternative. It’s inelegant, but it’s hard to

deny that it can be effective. And TED would have you believe that if the agreement

doesn’t end up in litigation, then no harm, no foul.

My take on this is that it’s not a lawyer’s job to sweep anything under a rug

– that has to be a decision made by the principals involved. Lawyers work

for the principals, and if the principals are happy with sloppy drafting, then

so be it. Still, I wouldn’t employ a law firm which used this tactic. You end

up on public shit-lists like Davidoff’s. If a potential client sees a respected

lawyer writing "do not retain Wilson Sonsini," they’re unlikely to

retain Wilson Sonsini. And the one thing lawyers want even more than getting

a deal done is getting more retainers in future.

Posted in law | Comments Off on The Upside of Sloppy Drafting

Who Says the Mortgage-Freeze Plan Doesn’t Benefit Investors?

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(HT: Alea)

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Who Says the Mortgage-Freeze Plan Doesn’t Benefit Investors?