Dr Seuss on CDOs

A PDF file entitled “Dr Seuss on CDOs” has been doing the email rounds today. The text can be found over at the WSJ’s economics blog, but it’s worth reading the piece in its the original PDF form, if you can bear a 1.5MB download, so here you go. There are some great bits:

The agencies have been asleep

Their ratings are just like Bo Peep

That is, they’re from a fairy tale

As fiction goes, they’re off the scale

And I do not believe them, Joe

And so your tranche is a no-go

You think at 50 it’s a do

Until it falls to twenty-two

I do not like your CDO,

I will not buy it, Broker Joe!

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Standard & Poor’s: The Other Victim of the MBIA Announcement

David Gaffen has a good round-up of reactions to MBIA’s announcement that it is carrying $8.1 billion of nuclear waste CDO-squared on its balance sheet.

The main puzzle seems to be this: S&P knew all about this when it affirmed MBIA’s triple-A credit rating. But the markets clearly don’t think that MBIA is nearly as creditworthy as S&P does. So while today’s news is undoubtedly hurting MBIA (the stock closed down 25% on the day), it might well have equally nasty medium-term repercussions on S&P, whose main currency is its reliability and trustworthiness. Here’s Gaffen:

While the ratings agencies were able to downgrade ACA, a less important insurer, they seem to be engaging in a “cross this line and you die…ok, this line and you die” Yosemite Sam-style game with MBIA and others.

It really is ridiculous how much stock is placed in credit ratings. It puts the ratings agencies in an impossible condition, and forces them to move in smaller increments and less frequently than they would if they were being completely honest. Maybe a general move towards taking them less seriously would, weirdly enough, make them more reliable.

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Why We Shouldn’t Count on Fiscal Policy to Save the Economy

Mark Thoma today has an excellent (implicit) rebuttal of Larry Summers’s proposal that the US government use fiscal policy to fight impending recession.

Both fiscal and monetary policy are capable of fighting recessions, Thoma says. But the thing about monetary policy is that rates go up as well as down. On the fiscal side, by contrast, taxes are a hell of a lot easier to cut than they are to raise.

If we are going to use tax cuts as a fiscal policy tool to stabilize the economy, we have to be willing to move the tax rate in both directions, up as well as down. We are quite willing, currently, to move the tax rate down but when people like Martin Feldstein call for a temporary tax cut to stimulate the economy, if such a policy were to be enacted does anyone doubt the difficulty of raising taxes again later even with automatic expiration provisions?

Just today, we got another example of this mechanism in action, when Congress passed its annual let’s-duck-the-alternative-minimum-tax-issue bill. In theory, the AMT is going to generate enormous sums of money for the US fisc in future years; in practice, Congress looks as though it’s never going to allow that to happen.

So it looks like it really is down to the Fed to avert recession after all. They’d best get cracking: the latest InTrade odds of a recession in 2008 are 46%.

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New York’s New Subway Math

The NYT has a good article this morning on the “new subway math” – the way in which anybody refilling their MetroCard is going to have to do some rather recondite calculations in order to ensure they don’t end up with random nickels and dimes they can’t spend on transportation.

But the cut-out-and-keep graphic alongside the article (“Save This Chart”, it’s headlined) is pretty useless. As of March 2, it says, if you spend $15.65 on a card you’ll end up with a nice round $18; if you spend $24.35 you’ll end up with $28; and so on.

Never mind that March 2 is so far away that only the most anal NYT readers will manage to keep the graphic until then. The problem is that whoever put this chart together forgot the whole point of it: it’s meant to be designed for people who are refilling their MetroCards – cards which are likely to have some amount of money on them which is not divisible by $2, perhaps because they were used on the PATH or the AirTrain. If the amount on your card is divisible by $2, you don’t really have a problem: you can just swipe it all the way to $0 and/or get one of the standard preset refills.

Much more useful would be a chart which told you how much to put on your card in order to ensure the 15% bonus and get an odd amount of money added. For instance, you have a spare $1 on your card: what should you do?

The answer is that you should add $11.30, which with bonus becomes $13, or else – easier to remember – add $20, which with bonus becomes $23. When you add those sums to the $1 on your card, you have a MetroCard whose balance, once again, is divisible by $2.

The NYT mentions with approval Steven O’Neill’s online MetroCard bonus calculator, but idiotically doesn’t link to it – here’s the link, which is much more worth saving than anything in the newspaper. On the other hand, if you’re looking for an insanely anal and largely obsolete five-year-old guide to MetroCards, written when they were still in their infancy and subway tokens were still accepted, you could try going here.

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The Economics of eBay

Aaron Schiff notes, quite rightly, that eBay uses anticompetitive tactics in order to retain its market share:

One of the things that probably makes it hard to compete with eBay is that eBay ‘owns’ the reputations of its users. If you want to switch to an alternative site, you have to start from scratch with a blank reputation. As various studies have shown, having a good reputation is beneficial to some extent, at least for sellers. However, eBay has resisted attempts to let people either export their reputations to alternative auction sites, or use third-party reputation systems to manage their reputation on eBay (see here, for example).

This raises an interesting question: in the case of eBay in particular, would more competition be good or bad for consumers?

Generally, of course, competition is a good thing from a consumer point of view. And if eBay had more of it, maybe its customer service would be better, or its website would be easier to use, or its fees would be lower.

On the other hand, consumers benefit enormously from eBay’s status as the online auction site. Sellers all go there because that’s where all the buyers are, and vice versa, which means much more liquidity and a much higher probability of a successful sale or finding what you’re looking for.

I have no idea how one would even begin to start measuring such trade-offs. But it’s rare enough just to find such a high-profile situation where increased competition isn’t obviously good for consumers.

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Was Ralph Cioffi Singlehandedly Responsible for Everything Which Went Wrong of Late?

Ralph Cioffi must be feeling pretty beleaguered at the moment. A few months ago, he was just a hedge-fund manager whose bets went horribly wrong. Recently, he learned that he’s being investigated to see whether he committed outright fraud. And today, we learn that Barclays seems to be on the same page as the US Attorney:

As the High-Grade funds faltered, the Barclays complaint alleges, their desperate state was concealed from bank officials, whose calls and emails were dodged as they sought performance information. “It is now clear that the BSAM defendants have long known that the Enhanced Fund and its underlying assets were worth far less than their stated values in the early months of 2007,” asserts the complaint, referring to Messrs. Cioffi and Tannin, “and were at great risk for further losses.” (Emphasis added.)

The early months of 2007, of course, were exactly the period during which Cioffi removed $2 million of his own money from the imploding funds.

On top of that, BusinessWeek reports that the $2 million withdrawal isn’t the only thing being investigated. Also under the microscope are entities called Klios which were invented by Cioffi:

Now investigators are trying to determine whether Cioffi and his team crossed legal lines. The Klios provided the Bear hedge funds with a ready, in-house trading partner. Their financial reports, which were reviewed by BusinessWeek, show many months in which the Cioffi-managed Klios traded only with the Cioffi-managed Bear funds. For example, in April, 2006, one Klio CDO bought $114 million worth of securities from one of the Bear funds. Such trades, says Steven B. Caruso, an attorney who represents several Bear hedge fund investors, may be “indicative of an incestuous, self-serving relationship that appears to have been designed to establish a false marketplace.”

But wait, there’s more! Remember the fabled “liquidity puts” which brought Citigroup to its knees? It turns out that they, too, were a Cioffi invention.

The analysis shows Cioffi and his team developed a novel investment product to attract money-market funds–a new class of investor–to the mortgage market. Their innovation, a particularly aggressive form of collateralized debt obligation, or CDO, became the building blocks of the industry’s push to keep growing for longer than it otherwise would have. After the market turned, it became clear the Cioffi money machine contributed to much of the $10 billion-plus in writedowns that Citigroup (C) and Bank of America (BAC) revealed in November.

This actually reflects much more badly on Citi than it does on Cioffi. One can understand how the investors in Cioffi’s hedge funds were burned when those hedge funds collapsed. But the fact that Citi willingly signed on to Cioffi’s schemes – schemes which were ultimately structured for the benefit of Cioffi, not Citi – looks positively amateurish.

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How Negative Earnings Don’t Seem to Matter

When it comes to earnings, Wall Street wants guidance. Here’s the cri de coeur from Societe Generale’s Bill Kavaler Cavalier, during the notorious conference call with Sallie Mae’s Al Lord yesterday:

We’re trying to put together projections here, Al. We’re trying to figure out what your stock is going to be worth, and you have got to give us some guidance, you’ve got to give us some numbers… Can you give us some handle on what your stock is worth?

Lord, of course, told Cavalier to go elsewhere for his guidance; investors voted with their feet, and bid the stock down more than 20%. Most companies deal with such questions with a bit more panache, and their earnings generally arrive more or less in line with the expectations they themselves are largely responsible for creating. Investment banks have a harder time of it – their earnings are necessarily more volatile than those of the average widget manufacturer. And when they take losses, it seems that guidance and expectations are utterly useless.

Yesterday, Morgan Stanley’s quarterly loss was 926% of the expected size; today, Bear Stearns’s quarterly loss of $854 million is 380% of the amount that Wall Street analysts expected.

Remember, Wall Street knew there would be losses. It’s not like no one told them there was a massive cock-up on the Morgan Stanley trading desk. As long ago as early November, Morgan Stanley was making noises about “negative convexity” and saying that its trade-gone-wrong had cost $3.7 billion. It’s just that $3.7 billion looks positively elfin compared to the losses which were finally realized yesterday.

And yet the stock went up, of course. It’s a bit weird, but when a firm’s profits miss expectations by a fairly narrow margin, the effect on the stock price can be large. When a firm’s losses miss expectations by an enormous margin, by contrast, Wall Street is more likely to shrug than panic. For some reason, it seems, the minute that earnings fall below $0, they no longer seem to be treated as a highly-calibrated indicator of a company’s value.

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Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

CIC’s opportunistic deal is lesson learnt: The FT on the mechanics of the Morgan Stanley deal. (Also: Setser, on same.)

Why I’ve Decided To Abandon (Virtually All) Ads On The Simple Dollar

Economics: The Year in Books, 2007

Cerberus’ Feinberg: The Money Shot

Rubenstein Buys Copy of Magna Carta

Ex-Treasury Secretary Calls For Tax Cut, Spending Plan: Larry Summers wants a stronger response on both the fiscal and monetary sides to a looming recession.

High Cost of Living Extremely Well Index

Morgan Stanley Bonus Pool Rises as CEO Forgoes Pay: MS’s bonus pool is up 18% year-on-year.

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The Problem of Artificially Inflated House Prices

Amidst all the breaking news today, you could be forgiven for not having time to notice the big WSJ article on kickbacks from property sellers to buyers – kickbacks which serve to overstate house-price indices and severely damage the balance sheets of mortgage lenders who end up lending on the basis of inflated valuations.

Lenders are being a bit more responsible these days when it comes to LTV ratios: they won’t lend more than the property is worth. As a result, it seems that sellers and buyers are conspiring to pull the wool over the lenders’ eyes by agreeing to a purchase price well above market. Here’s the final anecdote from the WSJ story:

Another transaction that shows signs of price distortion is the sale of a home on Olen Mattingly Road in Avenue, Md. The two-story, 2,158-square-foot home, built within the past two years, was originally listed for sale in February 2005 for $635,000 but languished on the market for more than a year, according to local real-estate agents. The owner, builder Bennett Homes LLC, gradually reduced the price to $469,000 by March 2007. In May, however, the home sold for $600,000, far above the recent asking price. Vangie Williams, a real-estate agent who represented the buyers, says the sale involved a payment by the builder to an organization that collected fees for finding buyers. Officials of Bennett didn’t respond to requests to comment.

A unit of Wells Fargo & Co. provided two loans to finance the purchase, the first for $479,800 and the second for up to $120,000, for a total of just under $600,000. That is about 28% more than the asking price for the home two months before the sale. A spokesman for Wells says the property was appraised at $615,000. He adds that Wells relies on “objective third-party appraisals in making all lending decisions. While we expect that appraised value [will] be close to market value, that may not always be the case.”

The house recently was back on the market. The latest asking price: $499,000.

The problem here is that the entire mortgage industry is already overwhelmed with delinquencies and defaults. Everybody knows that a lender should do lots of due diligence on the valuation front before lending any money – the key is to lend not up to a maximum percentage of the purchase price, but rather up to a maximum percentage of the house’s value. But during the property boom lenders were quite happy using purchase price as a proxy for valuation, and now they simply don’t have the resources to switch back.

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Is Cramer Advocating Index Funds?

One of the most effective ways to sell anything is to tell your mark that he’s special, and that your product isn’t suitable for just anyone, you know. The masses? The great unwashed? They can make do with mass-market products. But youyou’re special. For you, I have something which, frankly, most people couldn’t even handle.

The latest person to attempt this kind of pitch is one James J Cramer. According to Alex Tabarrok Tyler Cowen, he’s now advocating index funds. But it’s really a bit more subtle than that:

Most people actually won’t get rich by buying individual stocks, Cramer says. Unless you do your homework, namely spending an hour a week researching for each stock you own, “You won’t beat the market, and you’ll probably lose money,” he writes.

For Cramerites willing to do the research, the book helps construct a long-term, diversified portfolio. For most people, however, he advises low-fee stock index funds.

This is a little on the disingenuous side, as is made clear a bit later in the article:

Cramer’s critics might prefer he not do the show at all. “There is a component of people who are not going to listen,” but there are many other people who are helped by Mad Money, he says. So the show will go on.

Who are these people who are helped by a show starring a man who makes Steve Ballmer look like a Zen master? Personally, I have no idea. But in Cramer’s mind (or at least in Cramer’s sales pitch) they are the elite – the people who do their homework, the “Cramerites willing to do the research”. For them, Cramer will blurt out buy and sell recommendations a fraction of a second after being given a stock ticker symbol over the telephone. Quite how that’s supposed to “help construct a long-term, diversified portfolio,” I have no idea.

But if you take Cramer literally, he’s entirely correct. Most people won’t get rich buying individual stocks. So don’t. Because “most people” includes you.

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Can a President Delegate the Economics Stuff?

John McCain says

that he’s "really

never understood" economics, and that he might give responsibility

for economy to a more financially-literate vice-president. Is that realistic?

I think that maybe it is. There are certain areas where a president really has

to make the big decisions himself, and those areas center on foreign policy.

But I don’t think that fiscal policy needs a hands-on president: Bill Clinton,

for one, was never better at fiscal policy than when he sat back and let Bob

Rubin make the decisions and do most of the talking.

That said, however, Clinton is no one’s idea of an economic naif,

and you can be sure he knew exactly what he was doing when he signed on to Rubin’s

plan to, say, bail out Mexico from its tequila crisis. I suspect that in order

to make such a decision one needs to understand the issues in some depth: it

would be incredibly hard to simply sign on the dotted line because your vice-president

and treasury secretary told you to do so.

McCain does have a long – a very long – list

of economic advisors, including some pretty illustrious names: John Taylor,

Anne Krueger, Ken Rogoff, Mark Zandi. But there are 36 advisors in

all, which seems ridiculously excessive to me and seems to guarantee a cacophony

of conflicting advice. I don’t think anybody is capable of boiling down the

advice of 36 different advisors into a single coherent economic policy, and

I worry that a McCain White House would suffer from that problem, especially

if the vice-president, the treasury secretary, the chairman of the Federal Reserve,

and the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors all started saying different

things.

McCain does have a man in mind who he might turn to for adjudication, however:

"I would like to have someone I’m close to that really is a good strong

economist. As long as Alan Greenspan is around I would certainly use him for

advice and counsel."

I’m sure Brad DeLong would approve.

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Albert Lord: The Deathwatch Begins

How did Albert Lord become CEO of Sallie Mae? He hardly showered himself in glory during the whole debacle with Chris Flowers, during which time he was so busy refusing to negotiate on the sale price that (a) the entire deal fell through, and (b) SLM’s own profits imploded.

But become CEO he did. His first act as CEO was to sell 97% of his SLM shares; his second act was to start acting up on his first quarterly conference call with analysts. His final words on that call? “There are no more questions, let’s get the fuck out of here.”

What’s the record for shortest-lived CEO tenure? Does anybody want to quote an over/under on Lord’s defenestration?

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ACA Reminds the Markets of the Importance of Counterparty Risk

Here’s the chart of ACA’s share price, from when it went public at the end of 2006 at $13 per share, through to yesterday, when it was delisted at $0.31 per share. Today, S&P finally got around to slashing ACA’s credit rating to CCC. And the ratings agencies wonder why they’re always accused of being behind the curve.

The impending failure of ACA, by the way, is big news: already Canada’s CIBC has said that it has some $3.5 billion in ACA counterparty risk, and I’m sure that’s only the beginning. ACA has been writing a lot of credit derivatives, and the most important thing in any derivatives contract is that your counterparty doesn’t go bust. If it does, you’re buggered. For many years, counterparty risk was not priced in to CDS contracts – a mistake that many traders, I’m sure, are beginning to regret. That, and trusting what the ratings agencies were saying about the degree to which one could rely on ACA being around in future.

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Morgan Stanley: What Did CIC Know, and When Did They Know It?

Tinbox, in the comments to my last Morgan Stanley post, makes a very good point: that China Investment Corp must have been given lots of material non-public information in advance of Morgan Stanley’s Q4 earnings announcement.

I don’t know how long it takes the Chinese to do due diligence on a bank the size of Morgan Stanley, but if it’s more than four trading days, we have a prima facie problem here. That’s because under SEC regulations, such information must be released on a “rapid and current basis,” which the courts take to mean four days.

Of course it is conceivable that this deal got done in the space of four days. Keith Bradsher says that it’s “an abrupt shift in strategy for the $200 billion fund,” whose chairman said as recently as November 29 that he “would mainly invest in financial instruments like index products”. Bradsher also describes the decision to invest as “sudden”. But given the complexities of Morgan Stanley’s balance sheet – Paul Murphy notes today that its “unallocated economic capital was a negative $4.1 billion” at the end of the latest quarter – it would surely take either enormous guts or an incredible amount of financial sophistication to make a $5 billion investment decision essentially over the course of a long weekend, especially when that decision involved buying in very close to a market price which did not reflect the write-down news.

But given the timing of Zoe Cruz’s defenestration at the end of November, one has to suspect that Morgan Stanley has been sitting on the news of these losses for much more than four days – and that CIC has, as well.

Incidentally, since I’ve ventured far into the land of rampant speculation already, here’s another thought: could the Morgan Stanley bid this morning be coming from the same people who have been buying in to the Chinese stock-market bubble? Given that the Chinese government now owns 10% of Morgan Stanley, some investors might assume that the bank has an inside track in that country – something which could prove to be very valuable indeed, over the long term.

Update: Just to be clear, here, I’m not accusing CIC of doing anything wrong at all. I’m worried about what Morgan Stanley did. If Morgan Stanley had material non-public information about its losses and didn’t divulge it to shareholders in a timely manner, that would violate SEC regulations.

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Ralph Cioffi, Free at Last

On December 3, Roddy Boyd reported that Ralph Cioffi wanted to leave Bear Stearns, but that the bank didn’t want him to leave.

Well, it looks like he got his wish. Cioffi left Bear last week, albeit not in the manner he might have wanted: he’s being investigated by both the U.S. Attorney in Brooklyn and the Securities and Exchange Commission, who reckon that his March withdrawal of $2 million from his doomed Bear Stearns hedge fund looks a little suspicious.

How news of the probe will affect Cioffi’s attempts to set up his own hedge-fund shop is not clear, although it can’t exactly help. But in a world where Peter Bacanovic can become the CEO of a high-profile luxury-goods company, anything is possible.

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Morgan Stanley: Yet More Proof That Stock Moves Make No Sense

I puzzled yesterday over the question of why Goldman Sachs fell in the wake of spectacular earnings. Today, it’s the other way around: how on earth is Morgan Stanley’s stock rising in the wake of losing $3.56 billion last quarter?

The stock-market reports aren’t a huge amount of help. Investors were “pleased to hear that the company got a $5 billion infusion from China’s government-controlled investment vehicle, China Investment Corp,” says Madlen Read of the AP. But by my calculations CIC is buying in at a discount of about $2 a share to where MS is trading right now: the stock is hardly trading up to the latest valuation point.

My feeling is that if anybody tells you that they understand today’s price action in Morgan Stanley, they’re lying. The only thing I can think of is that there was some kind of insider trading going on: a lot of people knew or suspected that the bank would take an enormous loss this quarter, and went massively short ahead of the earnings announcement. But I don’t really believe that: what I do believe is that short-term stock movements are, to all intents and purposes, random – even on the day of an earnings announcement, when there really is new news to move the market.

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Peter Schiff on the Housing Market and the Rescue Plan

I had some harsh

words last week for Peter Schiff, which prompted a comment from Jack:

Taking on Schiff? Get ready for a barrage of hate mail from him and his lackeys!

In fact, I got no hate mail at all, just a polite email from Peter’s brother

Andrew, saying that I should talk through my ideas with Peter. I did, and the

following Q&A is the result. I hope you find it interesting. As always with

these things, my interlocutor gets the last word.

Felix Salmon: You write that "Without question,

the Bush administration’s mortgage rescue plan will exacerbate, not alleviate,

the problems in the housing market," and that "there is no question

that as lenders factor in the added risk of having their contracts re-written

or of being held liable for defaulting borrowers, lending standards for new

loans will become increasingly severe". If these things are really so certain,

why do you think that the Bush administration and the American Securitization

Forum were so happy to sign on to this plan?

Peter Schiff: In the short run the plan will keep

some homes out of foreclosure and appease voters, who will be able to continue

the delusions that they

still have home equity. Also, the plan might create some false hope,

thereby slowing down the adjustment. However, over the long run, which

may happen sooner then many politicians naively believe, the plan will

make mortgages even harder to get, and ultimately lead to even lower

home prices and more foreclosures than might have been the case without

the plan.

The best thing is for the government to stay out and let the lenders

work this out with the borrowers without any outside interference. In

many cases foreclosure is better then keeping people in homes they can

not afford that are worth less then their mortgages. Let investors buy

these properties, put up real cash, have some equity, and rent them out.

FS: Surely though we’ve seen quite clearly that the

loan servicers simply don’t have the capacity to work out every delinquent or

soon-to-be-delinquent loan on a case-by-case basis.

And when you say that foreclosure is "better" in many cases if it

comes sooner rather than later, presumably you don’t mean for the borrower but

rather for the lender. Given that lenders can be trusted to act in their own

self-interest, do you really think that they will put off foreclosures in such

situations just because Hank Paulson had a press conference?

PS: I did not say it would be easy for the lenders

but they should be allowed to work it own without government interference. For

most subprime borrowers, their houses are liabilities not assets. How does it

serve their interests to keep them in huge mortgages they can not afford on

homes that are worth less than the mortgages. Losing these homes means getting

out of debt and a chance at a new start. They can rent something they can afford

or save up to buy a house once they are actually in a position to afford one.

This will be a lot easier in a few years anyway when houses are much cheaper.

FS: Do you have any evidence that the lenders resent

the government "interference" which I consider to be little more than

allowing the lenders to get around a table and work something out without risk

of being accused of illegal collusion? It seems to me that the lenders are actually

quite happy about having been able to work out this deal, and would be happy

whether the government chivvied them along or not.

As for the homeowners, of course their houses are assets: it’s their mortgages

which are liabilities. Losing their houses only means getting out of debt in

certain limited circumstances: (a) when the loan is non-recourse — which is

rare in the subprime world, especially since most subprime mortgages were refinances;

(b) when the servicer accepts a short sale; (c) when the homeowner declares

bankruptcy as part of the foreclosure process. If they do declare bankruptcy,

then their ability to even rent a smaller house in the near term, let along

buy a new one in the long term, is definitely diminished.

And in all of these cases, the homeowner is still better off staying

in their own home if the frozen teaser mortgage payments are lower than the

amount the homeowner is going to have to pay in rent. Since the mortgage-freeze

plan is explicitly targeted only at those subprime borrowers who have been making

their teaser-rate mortgage payments in full so far, does it not make sense for

both homeowner and lender to continue that state of affairs? You might be right

that home prices are going to fall a lot in the coming years, in which case

it would make sense for any homeowner — not just subprime borrowers

— to sell their house right now and rent. But I don’t see that anybody’s speculation

about the future direction of housing prices should be enough to start turfing

people out of their homes.

PS: Lenders do not need any help from government

to negotiate deals that are

in their best interests. This plan amounts to coercion, where lenders

are being "asked" to make concession that absent government intervention

that might not otherwise be willing to make. It is possible that in

some cases freezing teaser rates might make sense, but such decisions

should be left to the lenders. It is also possible that in many cases

foreclosure would be a better option for the lender then a freeze, yet

this plan may prevent such an outcome to the detriment of lenders.

Apart from moral and legal issues, such actions are bound to have a

chilling effect on the willingness of lenders to continue extending

credit to American borrowers or cause future rates and terms by which

such credit is extended to be less favorable.

Sure a house is an asset (though despite conventional wisdom a depreciating

one) but you can not separate it from a mortgage that encumbers it. They must

be viewed together, and if the mortgage exceeds the value of the house, then

together they amount to a liability. Most subprime borrowers either put none

of their own money into these properties, or if they did, they extracted any

original down-payments though refinancing. As such they have no right to occupy

properties that rightfully belong to the lenders who actually paid for them.

If a teaser rate is so low that it amounts to less then what "owners"

might otherwise pay in rent, why should lenders be required to provide such

subsidies — especially since these "owner/renters" have no equity

in the properties and will likely not maintain them at all during the period

of the freeze? Therefore not only will lenders suffer below market interest

payments during the freeze, but the houses will be that much less valuable when

they are ultimately sold in foreclosure when the freezes expire.

Why not let lenders foreclose now, cut their losses, and put these homes

in the hands of responsible owners with financial incentives to maintain

their investments? Let current occupants either rent back their houses

from investors, or move elsewhere. There is nothing wrong with being a

renter, I should know as I am one myself. If these overstretched

subprime borrowers actually want to be home owners one day and not

simply real estate speculators with other peoples money, they can save

up a 20% down payment and buy a less expensive house they can actually

afford.

For those subprime borrowers with other assets and good incomes let them

negotiate new mortgages with the banks for lesser amounts but where the

borrower kicks in some new cash back to the lender. This way the owners

will actually have an asset (a house worth more then the mortgage

against it) and a financial incentive to take care of it.

This approach will allow for a far more rapid decline in real estate prices

and therefore a return to a normal housing/mortgage market. However as politicians

would rather voters continue to harbor delusions of phantom home equity, this

market based approach is being resisted by those seeking re-election. However,

in the long run this plan will actually cause real estate prices to fall even

further then what might have been the case without it.

Peter Schiff’s first book is “Crash Proof“.

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Peter Schiff on the Housing Market and the Rescue Plan

Morgan Stanley: Eminently Stoppable

Morgan Stanley’s Q3 earnings were bad. "Mack

Smacked" was the Portfolio headline, reacting to a lower profit (just

$1.54 billion, John Mack’s first quarterly earnings decline) and a nasty $940

million write-down on bad loans.

Ah, those were the days. Just look at the Q4

results: an eye-popping $3.56 billion loss, and an even more enormous

$9.4 billion write-down on bad mortgages. Many on Wall Street suspected Morgan

Stanley’s earnings might be bad, but this is literally an order of magnitude

worse than expectations:

The loss of $3.61 a share in the three months ended Nov. 30 compares with

net income of $1.98 billion, or $1.87 a year earlier. Analysts were estimating

a loss of 39 cents, according to a survey by Bloomberg.

I have to say I’m quite flabbergasted at the size of the write-down. Morgan

Stanley’s meant to be an investment bank, ferchrissakes, not a lender

or a bond investor. It has no business holding that sort of quantity of mortgage-backed

bonds on its books. And indeed its pure investment-banking business seems to

be doing rather well:

Morgan Stanley ranks second after Goldman among the world’s biggest advisers

on mergers and acquisitions announced in 2007, data compiled by Bloomberg

show. The firm advised on $42.2 billion of takeovers completed during the

fiscal fourth quarter, more than double a year earlier.

In equity underwriting, Morgan Stanley managed $14.1 billion of offerings

during the quarter, up from $13.6 billion a year earlier, Bloomberg data show.

John Mack, like Jimmy Cayne, is foregoing his bonus for the year, which is

quite right too. He didn’t leak

the news to the WSJ in advance, maybe because he didn’t see the point in

drawing attention to it. Both Mack and Cayne must now be considered on deathwatch

– the Morgan Stanley buck stops with Mack, remember, not with the ousted

Zoe Cruz.

Oh, and did I mention? Morgan Stanley is also selling 10% of itself to China

Investment Corp. A lean and mean investment bank, like Morgan Stanley considers

itself, clearly can’t weather a $9 billion write-down without raising new capital

to cover it, so it’s good that these two announcements were made simultaneously.

That said, however, I wouldn’t be at all surprised to hear that Carol Loomis

was now looking into Morgan Stanley in much the same manner in which she investigated

Citigroup last month. Morgan Stanley would seem to have had a pretty clear

notion of the magnitude of these losses back in November, when it fired Cruz.

If that’s true, Morgan Stanley was sitting on this material information for

a good three weeks. Which would not look good.

Posted in banking, stocks | Comments Off on Morgan Stanley: Eminently Stoppable

Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Is

Housing Becoming Disconnected from Income?

On

the hook for £100bn – it’s “business as usual” at Northern

Rock

Very cool global GDP animation

Closing

the mortgage barn door: "Incentives to follow prudent lending procedures

did not ‘erode,’ as Bernanke put it. Incentives to follow imprudent

lending procedures flooded the market."

Goldman’s

Share Count to Continue Its Steady Decline

The

ludicrousness of white cachet: Would you have second thoughts about buying

a Jaguar if the brand were Indian-owned?

Controversy

in the Bread Aisle: "Often, breads with hearty-sounding words like

“7 grains,” “cracked wheat” and “multi-grain”

on the label are made with bleached flour and brown food coloring rather than

healthful whole grains. Some bread packages use terms like “100 percent

wheat,” which gives many shoppers the wrong impression they are buying

100 percent whole wheat bread. And many multigrain varieties contain less than

2 percent of the grains they promise on the front of the package."

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Why David Viniar Didn’t Cause Goldman’s Shares to Fall

"We’re cautious about the near-term outlook for our businesses as

we see dislocation in some of the world’s capital markets has continued."

Goldman

Sachs CFO David Viniar, in a conference call with reporters.

Now, I do appreciate that Viniar was talking to reporters, so what

he had to say must have been very important. But really. Is there a

single stock-market investor anywhere in the world who’s unaware of continued

dislocation in global capital markets? (Hint: the ECB just poured half

a trillion dollars of liquidity into the European financial system. Does

that sound normal to you?)

The fact is that Viniar, like any CFO worth his salt, is a naturally cautious

chap. He’s naturally cautious on every single earnings call he’s ever on.

If there are two things which are absolutely known to investors in GS, it’s

that (a) there’s continued dislocation in global capital markets, and (b) David

Viniar is a cautious chap.

Meanwhile, on the same conference call, Viniar announced that Goldman had made

a record amount of money in its lastest quarter, and also announced that he

was allocating $12.5 billion towards buying back Goldman Sachs stock, even at

its present levels of more than $200 per share.

But here’s the thing: Goldman shares actually fell more than $7 today, even

as the broader market rose. Some reporters simply did their job, and reported

this fact, sometimes using words like "despite"

or "even

though" to make it clear that Goldman’s earnings really

were very good. But it was inevitable that someone was going to write a

lede like this:

Goldman Sachs Group Inc said on Tuesday fourth-quarter earnings rose 2 percent,

beating expectations and capping a record year, but its shares fell after

the investment bank cautioned that markets will remain challenging in the

near future.

Was that really why Goldman shares fell? I very much doubt it. There are other

reasons why Goldman stock might have fallen today, if you’re a believer in stock-market

causality – the Value-at-Risk numbers, especially, seemed to imply that

Goldman’s risk-adjusted profits might actually have fallen, and that any increase

in profit was essentially paid for by taking on a lot of extra risk.

But the fact is that any given stock, on any given day, even if that day sees

the release of an earnings report, moves in an essentially random direction.

If you want to see what’s happened to Goldman Sachs shares, don’t look at where

they closed today compared to where they closed yesterday: look at where they

are now compared to a month, or a quarter, or a year ago.

After all, most of the news in the Goldman Sachs earnings report was largely

expected, and therefore "priced in": it’s not like the fact that Goldman

made lots of money by selling its interest in a bunch of power plants, for instance,

came as any surprise to the markets. So if you want to see how the market has

reacted to the past quarter’s news, look at how the share price has moved over

the past three months; don’t look at how the share price has moved over the

past day.

Now, it would be great for my argument if Goldman shares had actually risen

substantially over the past three months; in fact, they haven’t. They rose to

over $240 at the end of October, but they’ve been falling back since then, and

now they’re pretty much back to where they were in mid-September. Still, if

you’re looking for a decline, that’s the decline you should be explaining. And

if you want to associate that decline with continued dislocation in

global capital markets, go right ahead. It’s just silly to pretend that the

dislocation came as any surprise to Goldman’s shareholders.

Posted in banking, stocks | Comments Off on Why David Viniar Didn’t Cause Goldman’s Shares to Fall

In Praise of Kevin Martin

Very few people have anything nice to say about the FCC’s Kevin Martin. The

WSJ’s Amy Schatz has a

rollicking overview of all the different constituencies he’s managed to

piss off since taking over in 2005 – the latest are the anti-media-consolidation

crowd, who are most upset at today’s

decision to relax cross-ownership rules. But even the people who benefit

from today’s ruling are hardly fans: Martin has gone against them in the past,

especially on the indecency front, and in any case they want much more than

what they’re getting:

If Mr. Martin expected business to show him a little love over his push to

allow more media concentration, he has been disappointed. Big media companies

think the proposal doesn’t go far enough. (News Corp., owner of The Wall Street

Journal, has lobbied the FCC to further relax cross-ownership rules.) The

companies want unlimited rights to own newspapers and TV stations in the same

market, saying the Internet has made the old rules obsolete.

I’m no fan of censorship, especially not when it comes to necessarily subjective

grounds such as indecency. But I have to say I think Martin is doing a pretty

good job of pushing smart

reforms, like a la carte cable pricing, in the face of united opposition

from Big Media. As overarching regulatory philosophies go, this is a good one:

"I genuinely believe that we need to be removing legacy regulations,"

Mr. Martin says. "But if you believe that, you also have to recognize

where the government needs to have rules in place to facilitate that competition."

Industries generally evolve much more quickly than their regulators. In the

communications industry, that means that cable operators – who historically

were small enough not to require much in the way of regulation – have

managed to get away with the kind of behavior which would be unthinkable were

they to own TV stations. Martin’s now focusing his regulatory attention on them,

and, predictably, they and their lobbyists are squealing. Good for him.

As for cross-ownership, it’s a non-issue which unfortunately plays extremely

well on the political stage. No one can deny that the sheer variety of voices

and viewpoints available to the public is wider now than it ever has been in

the past, and there really is nothing to worry about when it comes to newspaper

owners owning TV stations or the other way around. It’s the flip-side of regulating

the cable companies: the owners of newspapers and TV stations now have much

less power than they used to, so they should be deregulated somewhat.

It’s a sign of intelligence and flexibility on the part of the regulator, two

things which are generally pretty rare in Washington DC.

Posted in Media | Comments Off on In Praise of Kevin Martin

The WSJ Still Has Editorial Independence

Rupert Murdoch has installed his hand-picked man, Robert Thomson, as the boss

of WSJ editor Marcus Brauchli. That doesn’t violate the letter of the agreement

Murdoch made to preserve the WSJ’s independence: Thomson is nominally the WSJ’s

publisher, and Brauchli has always reported to the WSJ’s publisher. But Jeff

Bercovici asks today whether Murdoch is already violating the spirit of

the agreement. I think that he isn’t – not yet, anyway.

Bercovici’s issue, which is a real one, is that Thomson doesn’t look

like a publisher, at least as far as publishers are normally understood at US

newspapers. Generally, in the US, the publisher runs the business side of the

operation, and has editorial control only insofar as he controls the editorial

purse-strings: it’s the editor who makes substantially all of the editorial

decisions.

But Thomson, by Bercovici’s account, has "no duties to speak of on the

paper’s business side; his job is strictly editorial". That means that

Thomson is essentially the top editor at the WSJ, and that the famous editorial

board, which has “approval rights” over the appointment of the managing

editor, is really only approving the number-two editorial-side executive at

the paper.

But here’s the thing: that’s OK. When people talk about editorial independence,

what they really mean is the ability to write about any company or subject that

the reporters and editors want to write about, without Rupert Murdoch controlling

what can and can’t be written about China, say – or even, for that matter,

about News Corp. Murdoch made it very clear from the beginning that he had big

plans for the paper, and that he would get involved in making strategic decisions

about things like where the paper is published, what sections to keep or discard,

and where to target the money he’s investing for new editorial employees.

With a paper which has suffered under the neglectful eyes of the Bancroft family

for so long, there are many, many such decisions to be made – and Murdoch

himself has other things to worry about, like running the rest of the $30 billion

News Corp empire. So it makes sense that Murdoch would charge a loyal lieutenant

to make such decisions for him, and to give Brauchli instant answers to any

requests he might make. Many important decisions are going to be expensive decisions,

and it’s Murdoch, through Thomson, who has the checkbook – not Brauchli.

So in many ways it’s a good thing that Brauchli has a boss who’s entire job

is dedicated to giving him what he wants and needs to bolster the WSJ brand.

None of this need jeopardize the WSJ’s editorial independence. Now of course

it’s always possible that Murdoch and/or Thomson will start micromanaging the

WSJ’s editorial operations, and asking Brauchli for individual journalists to

be removed from certain beats, or for a less aggressive tone to be taken when

it comes to particular coverage areas. But the mere existence of Thomson doesn’t

make that any more likely. If anything, the notoriously meddlesome Murdoch is

less likely to get involved at that kind of level if he has a hand-picked

man he trusts overseeing all aspects of the WSJ’s editorial operation.

So I agree that "publisher" is maybe a weird title to give Thomson,

given the fact that it’s Les Hinton, not Thomson, who seems really to be in

charge of the WSJ’s ad-sales operation. But I don’t think there’s anything particularly

nefarious going on.

Posted in Media, publishing | Comments Off on The WSJ Still Has Editorial Independence

Why US Airline Service is So Bad

Pico

Iyer wants to know why US airlines are so crap – why "a place

in Northwest’s business class has afforded me less comfort than a seat

in the economy class of the national airlines of Bolivia, Cuba and even North

Korea". John

Gapper thinks it has something to do with "the refusal of airlines

to lie down and die" – certainly I don’t think the big US government

airline bailout in the wake of 9/11 did any favors to the travellling public

in the long term. But I think that the answer to Iyer’s question is actually

hidden in his own post, when he tells us that United’s frequent-flier program

"is more generous than it has to be".

Note that the centerpiece of Iyer’s complaint is an abortive trip from California

to Japan, one where Iyer turns out to be quite happy being rebooked on Japan’s

ANA rather than having to fly on United with his original booking. The question

naturally arises: if United is so crap, why was he booked on them in the first

place? And the answer presents itself: the frequent-flyer program, which, like

most US airlines’ frequent-flier programs, has developed a life of its own.

America, it seems, has been successfully captured by the US airlines, to the

point at which most US residents simply don’t fly on any other planes. If you’re

a Brit, and you’re flying abroad, you’ll generally choose the cheapest and most

convenient flight, no matter what class you’re travelling in and no matter whether

you’re flying for business or pleasure. If you’re an American flying abroad,

by contrast, you’ll almost certainly end up flying an American airline.

When I used to fly from the US to Latin America every so often, I’d generally

fly the local airlines to get down there: Lan, Aerolineas, Varig. None of them

were spectacularly good, I must say. But one thing which jumped out at me was

the fact that there were almost no Americans on those flights – the Americans

always ended up flying on American or Continental. Maybe part of that was fear

of the unknown, but I suspect a much bigger part was those frequent-flyer accounts.

Americans have been conditioned to expect to either earn or spend frequent-flyer

miles on every flight they take – something which mitigates strongly against

taking any foreign airline. Even sophisticated cosmopolitan New Yorkers, well

aware that Virgin and BA are extremely competitive with American and Continental

to Heathrow, still nearly always end up taking a US carrier.

One can understand how the US ended up in this position. If you’re a country

like the UK or Germany, where most people travel to many different countries

quite regularly and have a wide choice of airlines, any one airline has a relatively

small chance of locking in frequent fliers. If you’re an airline in a small

country where the citizens don’t travel a lot, then those citizens

who do travel are largely captive, and your best bet is to compete

on quality against the airlines of the countries you’re flying to.

The US, by contrast, is unique in that most US airline passengers spend most

of their time on domestic flights, racking up domestic miles. When they do occasionally

fly abroad, they simply stick with the plan they’re in. Is there another country

where most flights are domestic, and where the big domestic airlines are also

the big international airlines? I don’t think so, but that seems like it could

be a recipe for reliance on frequent-flyer plans rather than high-quality service.

Posted in economics, travel | Comments Off on Why US Airline Service is So Bad

Will the ECB Start Buying CDOs?

We know that the Fed has pretty

low standards when it comes to the collateral it will accept. But that doesn’t

really matter, since the Fed is mainly relying on getting its money back from

the banks it’s lending money to: the collateral remains on the bank’s balance

sheet, not on the Fed’s. And that’s a problem for the banks, says

John Dizard:

The discount window, the no-longer-purposely-unattractive alternative means

for banks to obtain liquidity, does not provide the necessary relief because

the credit risk for the loans or bonds discounted there remains with the discounters.

You can get cash from the Fed, if you are a bank, but you effectively retain

the risk on your balance sheet. That means that under the capital guidelines,

you have not solved your fundamental problem.

So if a bank wants to get an illiquid CDO off its balance sheet, where can

it turn? The markets certainly don’t seem to be interested in such paper right

now. How about the European Central Bank?

Let’s say a subsidiary (not a branch) of a US bank, bank holding company,

or dealer operating in Europe has a CDO (collateralised debt obligation) or

two, with which it would be willing to part.

The ECB could buy them, freeing up the subsidiary’s balance sheet for some

much needed market making. Obviously this works just as well for a European

bank with dollar paper.

Interesting idea – although I have to admit I’m not holding my breath

for this to happen. I have no doubt that the ECB could, were it so

inclined, get into the buying-CDOs business. But I’m also pretty sure that it

won’t. The ECB has no particular expertise in valuing such paper, and if it

entered the market it might well find itself holding the worst of the worst

issues.

Every once in a blue moon it can make sense for central banks to start buying

up securities directly, but this is not one of those times. Central banks are

lenders of last resort; they shouldn’t be bag-holders of last resort as well.

Update: It turns out that investors

bought $63 billion of CDOs in the third quarter, over and above any purchases

they made in the secondary market. Looks like there is market demand for CDOs

after all, if the price is right.

(Via Smith)

Posted in banking, bonds and loans, fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on Will the ECB Start Buying CDOs?

US Government Finally Getting Serious About Mortgage Reforms

Tyler Cowen thinks that the

Fed should not have a consumer-protection function. I’m largely sympathetic

– it’s not as though there’s any shortage of other regulators in Washington

who could pick up the slack – but in reality the Fed does more for consumers

than Cowen gives it credit for. Look at this

Ned Gramlich speech, for instance: the Fed was always at the forefront of

efforts to ensure that (a) banks lent to blacks as well as whites, and that

(b) banks lent to blacks at the same risk-adjusted interest rates at which they

lent to whites. In this era of abundant credit, people sometimes forget about

the redlining problem, but it was a big one, and we can thank the Fed, in part,

for helping to solve it.

All that said, Edmund Andrews’s front-page NYT article today, "Fed

Shrugged as Subprime Crisis Spread," does compellingly describe a central

bank which at best was committed to laissez-faire policies, or which at worst

was trying to shore up the post-dot-com-crash economy by deliberately allowing

the property bubble to inflate.

So I’m glad that the Fed has finally

gotten around to responding, with policies designed, in the words

of the AP’s Jeannine Aversa, to "give people taking out home mortgages

new protections against shady lending practices".

Most prepayment penalties would be banned on subprime loans: I like that. Underwriting

standards would be tightened up on no-doc loans: I don’t quite see the point

of that one, but it certainly can’t do much harm. And lenders would have to

include tax and insurance payments along with mortgage repayments when making

their underwriting decisions: well, duh. (Update:

Tanta

reckons this is an escrow thing, not an underwriting thing. Which, as she rightly

points out, could be more problematic.)

The big change is that lenders would have to underwrite subprime loans based

on the borrower’s ability to repay over the duration of the mortgage, rather

than just for the initial teaser period. This could well affect younger borrowers

with a very good chance of seeing their income rise significantly by the time

the reset comes, although without seeing the details of the proposal it’s hard

to know for sure. It will certainly serve to dampen the amount of property speculation

going on among subprime borrowers, which must be a good thing.

Meanwhile, it’s also worth noting that Hank

Paulson has come out in favor of Fannie and Freddie being able to buy jumbo

mortgages. It seems that the Federal government is – finally –

getting serious about addressing problems in the mortgage industry. It’s too

late, of course. But better late than never, I suppose.

Posted in housing, regulation | Comments Off on US Government Finally Getting Serious About Mortgage Reforms