Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

Handicapping the VP Race

Systemic risk rises: correlation hits new highs: Sam Jones is really good on this stuff.

Apple Shares Rolling Downhill: "As of Feb. 12, Apple shares had dropped 36% since the beginning of the year. Research In Motion had lost less than 20%, despite a widespread service outage for its BlackBerry e-mail devices. HP has shed less than 14% this year. Shares of bellwethers Cisco Systems, Intel, and Google have also held up better than Apple since the start of the year. "

Bradford & Bingley’s funny numbers: Their pro-forma results "exclude certain items resulting from strategic decisions". ‘Cos of course investors wouldn’t be interested in how those strategic decisions were working out.

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Eight out of Ten

On a scale from one to ten, how good of a driver are you? About 8, you say?

Have you ever noticed that when you ask someone to rate their proficiency, on a scale of 1-10, in something that they are supposed to know, in order to not seem overly confident and egotistical they usually say 8? That’s when I start from the assumption that they are most likely average when judged against a group of proficient people.

Me, I’m about a 2. But if you ask me how good I am at making a caesar salad, then I’ll say I’m a 9.

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The CBO Prefers a Carbon Tax to Cap-and-Trade

I’m a supporter of a cap-and-trade system over a carbon tax. But I have to say that Terry Dinan, of CBO’s Microeconomic Studies Division, has the best argument in favor of a carbon tax over cap-and-trade that I’ve yet seen. (Her paper is here; the CBO director’s blog entry on the subject is here.)

Analysts generally conclude that a tax would be a more efficient method of

reducing CO2 emissions than an inflexible cap. The efficiency advantage of a tax stems from the contrast between

the long-term cumulative nature of climate change and

the short-term sensitivity of the cost of emission reductions. Climate change results from the buildup of CO2 in

the atmosphere over several decades; emissions in any

given year are only a small portion of that total. As a

result, limiting climate change would require making

substantial reductions in those emissions over many

years, but ensuring that any particular limit was met in

any particular year would result in little, if any, additional

benefit (avoided damage). In contrast, the cost of cutting

emissions by a particular amount in a given year could

vary significantly depending on a host of factors, including the weather, disruptions in energy markets, the level

of economic activity, and the availability of new low-carbon technologies (such as improvements in wind-power technology).

Relative to a cap-and-trade program with prespecified

emission limits each year, a steadily rising tax could better

accommodate cost fluctuations while simultaneously

achieving a long-term target for emissions. Such a tax

would provide firms with an incentive to undertake more

emission reductions when the cost of doing so was relatively low and allow them to reduce emissions less when

the cost of doing so was particularly high. In contrast, an

inflexible cap-and-trade program would require that

annual caps were met regardless of the cost, thereby

failing to take advantage of low-cost opportunities to cut

more emissions than were required by the cap and failing

to provide firms with leeway in years when costs were

higher.

The efficiency advantage of a tax over an inflexible cap

depends on how likely it is that actual costs will differ

from what policymakers anticipated when they set the

level of the cap. Given the uncertainties involved, such

differences are likely to be large–and, therefore, analysts

generally conclude that the efficiency advantage of a tax is

likely to be quite large. Specifically, available research

suggests that in the near term, the net benefits (benefits

minus costs) of a tax could be roughly five times greater

than the net benefits of an inflexible cap. Put another

way, a given long-term emission-reduction target could

be met by a tax at a fraction of the cost of an inflexible

cap-and-trade program.

As I say, this is a good argument. But it’s also a bit weird: in my mind, the whole point of using a cap-and-trade system rather than a carbon tax is that no one knows what the actual costs of carbon emissions reduction are going to be. If those costs turn out to be much higher than anticipated, a carbon tax will simply fail, since it will have been set too low. A cap-and-trade system, by contrast, is dynamic: it can be adjusted in real time to reflect new information about the costs and benefits of certain levels of carbon emissions.

Dinan’s arguments do mitigate in favor of some flexibility in a cap-and-trade system, perhaps by being able to borrow or bank future carbon credits. And if they persuade the US government to implement a carbon tax, that would be wonderful: while I’m a supporter of cap-and-trade, a carbon tax is very nearly as good, and much better than the most likely outcome, which is nothing at all.

Posted in climate change | Comments Off on The CBO Prefers a Carbon Tax to Cap-and-Trade

Barack Obama Datapoint of the Day

1obama.jpg

The 2008.PRES.OBAMA contract last traded at 51 – which means that, at least according to InTrade, and as of right now, Barack Obama is probably going to be the next president of the United States.

(HT: Mankiw)

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Vishing for Credit

Is it possible that, by conducting a telephone survey, one can reliably conclude that identity fraud costs Americans $45 billion per year? I suspect it isn’t. And I’m even more suspicious of enormous jumps like this:

Fraudsters are turning to lower-tech methods by utilizing telephone theft more than ever before. Access through mail and telephone transactions grew from 3 percent of ID theft in 2006 to 40 percent in 2007.

That said, I wasn’t aware of vishing before reading this report, and now I understand what all those weird phone calls are that I have been receiving of late, talking automatedly and cryptically about "your credit card". I thought they were merely telemarketers ignoring the Do Not Call list; turns out they were vishers. In any case, even if the 3%-to-40% figure is overblown, it does seem that fraudsters have finally picked up on Americans’ desperate desire for ever more credit.

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China Datapoint of the Day, Aluminum Edition

Back in 2004, Alcan put together a slide show on China’s role in the aluminum industry. It included this chart, showing Chinese aluminum consumption from 1960 onwards, and anticipating a rise of 82% between 2004 and 2010, to 7.3 kg per capita:

alcan.jpg

Today, Barclays released its 2008 Equity Gilt Study, which has lots of interesting information, including this chart, of per-capita Chinese aluminum consumption from 1960 onwards. Has it reached 7.3 kg yet? Well, yes, it’s reached double that.

barclays.jpg

Sometimes, I guess, bullish just isn’t bullish enough.

Posted in china, commodities | Comments Off on China Datapoint of the Day, Aluminum Edition

UBS: Where Metaphors Collide

Robert Cookson has got his hands on a research note from UBS’s Geraud Charpin. The gist is simple: debt is cheap, and it’s getting cheaper:

We are in value territory. The iTraxx index is close to 110bp when its fair value is around 40bp assuming we are going into recession!

But my favorite bit is the fabulously mixed metaphor with which Charpin signs off.

For now we don’t see anyone with enough dry powder to take a stab at catching the falling knife.

So true, especially when you consider the risk that someone with dry powder stabbing at a falling knife could end up buying a bouncing dead cat.

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Evan Bayh is Worried by Sovereign Wealth Funds

Senator Evan Bayh takes to the op-ed pages of the WSJ today to warn darkly of the threats posed by sovereign wealth funds. Such funds should be allowed to invest in the US he says (so big of him!), but only within pre-set constraints:

Sovereign nations have interests other than maximizing profits and can be expected to pursue them with every tool at their disposal, including financial power. For this reason, Congress must establish standards for transparency and behavior now to prevent unwarranted interference in our economy by foreign governments…

Incentives for compliance and meaningful consequences for sovereign wealth funds that refuse to comply must be adopted…

At a minimum, the U.S. ought to require passive investment by sovereign wealth funds…

The recent change in leadership at America’s largest bank, Citigroup, was brought about in part by a Saudi prince whose ownership interest constitutes just 5%…

Occasionally, foreign governments will have agendas different from our own. They will pursue them using all resources at their disposal, including financial levers. No great nation can permit such interference with its sovereignty.

Bayh is quite right that sovereign wealth funds can and do invest for political reasons. And he’s more realistic than Larry Summers, who would like those funds to unilaterally disarm. In that sense Bayh is right: disarmament won’t happen unless and until the US government forces the issue with legislation.

But I’m a bit irritated by Bayh’s vagueness about exactly what "meaningful consequences" he has in mind for non-compliant SWFs. These funds are not under the jurisdiction of the US, so it’s not obvious what Bayh is talking about. Let’s say that he’s right and a foreign sovereign did indeed help to engineer the ouster of Chuck Prince – and let’s say that he thinks that shouldn’t have happened. How would the US government prevent such a thing, if he doesn’t want to bar the Saudi prince from buying a stake in Citigroup in the first place?

Incidentally, I was tickled by the way that Bayh opened his piece:

Imagine what would happen were a candidate for president to propose that the federal government begin buying up shares of major U.S. banks. Denunciation would be swift.

It reminded me so much of a certain NYT columnist:

The Fed must act decisively to calm these fears by reassuring lenders.

This might even take the form of legislation allowing the Fed to buy stock in large banks on a temporary basis. The banks are already largely socialized through federal deposit insurance. To add the prop of government capital infusions is not such a big step.

Come on, Evan! Join the pile-on!

Posted in ben stein watch, economics, Politics | Comments Off on Evan Bayh is Worried by Sovereign Wealth Funds

Large Businesses: Still Upbeat

In every major market, the business media generally live and work in the city which acts the country’s financial capital. As a result, it’s easy to misinterpret choppiness in financial markets as real weakness in the broader economy. I’m not saying that the US economy isn’t weak – but that’s the the implication of a long FT piece today, headlined "Full steam ahead?", which features no fewer than seven bylines, and which kicks off "on the placid banks of the Mississippi".

To be sure, the anecdotal evidence from corporate executives does seem to fly in the face of hard statistical data about the US economy. And it’s easy to come up with reasons why the statistics might be right and the executives wrong: they’re relying on overseas sales, for instance, or they’re always the last to know when their businesses turn south, due to the dynamics of pyramid-shaped management structures. Or they made a bet on continued expansion, so now they’re invested in that thesis.

All the same, it can be instructive to leave New York or London or Frankfurt occasionally and talk to large businesses based in the rest of the country. Right now, they do seem to be more upbeat than their financial-center counterparts.

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Gene Sequencing Datapoint of the Day

Cost of sequencing Craig Venter’s an anonymous genome at the human genome project: $3 billion, over 10 years

Cost of sequencing James Watson’s genome: $1 million, over 2 months

Cost of sequencing an anonymous African’s genome: $100,000, over 1 month

David Ewing Duncan calls this "a sort of mega-Moore’s Law", you can see why.

Update: Duncan clarifies:

It did not cost $3 billion to sequence Venter’s genome, as the datapoint says, something got mixed up there. It cost $3 billion to complete the first human genome by the global consortium led by the NIH, and completed in 2003; this consortium was in competition with Venter’s company, Celera, which spent about $500m for its genome. The consortium’s genome was an anonymous compilation of several people. Even Celera’s genome was not entirely Venter’s genome, but a blend of many people and Venter — he later completed his entire genome at his institute, spending about $70 million.

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Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

A climate for old men: Charles Komanoff on the Kheel Plan, the revolutionary proposal to make all public transit in NYC free. It’s actually not nearly as crazy as it sounds.

T-Mobile Loses Starbucks; AT&T Becomes Wi-Fi Hotspot Giant

Tolkien Heirs Sue New Line Over Millions From ‘Rings’: "Charging “unabashed and insatiable greed,” the plaintiffs said in the complaint that New Line, which produced and distributed the “Lord of the Rings” movies, had failed to pay anything despite a nearly 40-year-old contract that entitles the trusts and the publishers to 7.5 percent of the films’ gross revenues."

Looking for Sure Political Bets at Online Prediction Market

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The Arithmetic of the Microsoft-Yahoo Bid

Dan Gross, looking at Yahoo’s share price, says that investors assume the Microsoft-Yahoo deal won’t happen. Which is weird, because Yahoo’s share price has actually been gaining on Microsoft’s bid ever since the announcement was made. I think Gross is wrong, and that a Microsoft takeover of Yahoo is very much priced in to the Yahoo share price. If the deal really did fall apart, Yahoo stock would plunge, quite possibly to below its pre-announcement levels of less than $20 per share.

But that’s all speculation. I know what you really want is arithmetic, so here you go.

On January 31, Yahoo shares closed at $19.18 apiece. The following morning, Microsoft announced its offer to to buy Yahoo for $31 per share, in a half-cash, half-stock deal. By the close of business on February 1, Yahoo stock was at $28.38 per share.

Now this is where things get a little complicated. On January 31, Microsoft shares closed at $32.60. Half of Microsoft’s offer was in the form of $31 per share in cash; the other half was in the form of a swap: each Yahoo share for 0.9509 Microsoft shares. Since 0.9509 times $32.60 is $31, the two halves were equally valuable, and the total value of Microsoft’s offer was $31 per share.

By the close of trade on February 1, however, Microsoft’s stock price had fallen to $30.45 per share. At this point, the stock portion of the bid was worth just $28.95 per share, and the overall bid was therefore worth $29.98 per share. If you look at Yahoo’s share price as a proportion of the value of the bid, then, Yahoo was trading at a 5.4% discount to the value of the Microsoft offer.

Now take a look at where the two stocks are trading today. Microsoft closed at $28.34 per share, which gives its bid a value of $28.97 per share. Meanwhile, Yahoo closed at $29.57 per share. Which means it’s actually trading 2% above the level of the Microsoft offer.

When a target company is trading above the level of the hostile offer which has been made for it, you can assume that investors think the deal is going to happen – and, what’s more, happen at a premium to the initial bid. It’s simple arithmetic.

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Are Suburbs the new Inner Cities?

The Atlantic doesn’t have a subcription firewall any more, but it does impose a pretty substantial delay between sending the magazine out to subscribers and putting it up online. As a result, I can’t (yet) link to Christopher Leinberger’s excellent piece on the urbanization and de-suburbanization of America in the March issue of the magazine. It’s full of insights such as this, on the suburban housing boom which has just ended:

Sprawling, large-lot suburbs become less attractive as they become more densely built, but urban areas – especially those well served by public transit – become more appealing as they are filled in and built up.

Leinberger’s thesis is that many (not all) suburbs could become the new inner cities, with high crime rates and failing schools, as the affluent flock increasingly to walkable areas. Do read the whole thing, when it finally appears online.

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When Falling House Prices are a Blessing

In the US, the property bubble was big, but it wasn’t nearly as big as in the UK. Everywhere there was a property bubble in the US, rising house prices were a good thing for the city in question – and falling house prices are a bad thing. Eventually, however, if a property bubble inflates enough, rising house prices can be a bad thing and falling house prices a good thing. Such is the case in London:

Anything that lowers London house prices is probably a blessing from a social point of view. For the quality of life in this city, it is much more important that its key workers (teachers, police, fire fighters, nurses, bus drivers and train drivers etc.) be able to afford a home reasonably close to their places of work than that a few millionaires/billionaires be willing to honour us with their presence.

London house prices have reached the point at which even cabinet ministers can’t afford anything central, and have long since passed the point at which anybody with a blue-collar job could ever hope to afford to buy or even rent a market-rate house. That’s not the case in, say, New York, where there are many pockets of affordability in the outer boroughs; the only US cities I can think of in London’s position are small and economically not-crucial places like Aspen.

While the US bemoans its housing bust, then, many Londoners are keenly awaiting their own, which is showing signs of gathering steam. I have a feeling they might not have to wait long.

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Chart of the Day: Debt Tranche Correlation

correlation.jpg

This is nerdy (the chart’s from Alea, the finance nerd’s blog of choice), but it’s also interesting. Jane Baird reports:

Correlation on the five-year investment-grade Markit iTraxx Europe index — a measure of investor fears of a system-wide crash — reached new highs of 45 percent on Tuesday.

I wouldn’t describe correlation quite that way. Correlation goes up when there’s lots of indiscrimiate selling, but it’s not necessarily a function of fears of a system-wide crash. Still, it certainly looks that way at first glance.

What’s being measured here is the value of the riskiest portion of CDOs (the equity tranche), compared to the safest portion (the super-senior tranche). One might think that in a bear market, the riskiest tranches will sell off first, while there’s a flight to the quality of the super-senior tranches. And if one thought that, at least in this market, one would be wrong.

If the correlation numbers correspond to real-world conditions, then they’re essentially saying that if any companies start defaulting, then all companies are liable to start defaulting. The equity tranche is highly profitable, so long as no one defaults. And right now no one’s defaulting, so people are holding on to their equity tranches and making decent money. On the other hand, a very large number of defaults would wipe out not only the equity tranches, but also much safer tranches too. If you’re risk-averse and scared of a huge wave of corporate defaults, then you will want to be selling your nominally low-risk bonds before the default hits. In this scenario, equity tranches stay reasonably well supported, high-grade tranches sell off, correlation goes up – and journalists feel comfortable talking about "investor fears of a system-wide crash".

On the other hand, I suspect the correlation numbers actually correspond to financial-world conditions, and are a function of much more technical factors – most importantly, the fact that super-senior tranches, long the ugly ducklings of the CDO world, were generally leveraged up to their eyeballs in order to make them vaguely attractive. All that leverage made them if anything more risky than the equity tranches, and so the fire sale of super-senior tranches right now really is a flight to quality.

There’s no shortage of evidence to this effect in Baird’s article:

Over the past six months, the credit crisis and a low corporate default rate have pushed correlation up…

"It’s a matter of leverage," said UBS credit strategist Geraud Charpin…

"In a world where leverage has to come down, the pressure is on the piece that is the most leveraged, and that’s the super-senior tranches," Charpin said.

High correlation is one of those weird things which pops out of the financial markets when you get strange bedfellows such as a credit crisis combined with a very low corporate default rate. Just as currency futures don’t predict the future movement of currencies (they’re entirely a function of interest rates), the correlation figure doesn’t really measure how likely a massively-correlated simultaneous wave of defaults is. Instead, it just kind of pops out when you get forced liquidations, like we’re seeing in the CLO and CDO markets, where Everything Must Go.

In fact, if and when recession hits and corporates actually start defaulting, I fully expect the correlation percentage to plunge. Right now we’re still in generalized-fear mode, and there’s relatively little worry about specific credits defaulting. If there are a couple of defaults and the sun still rises the following morning, we might even have a substantial relief rally. But that day could be a ways off yet.

Posted in bonds and loans, charts | Comments Off on Chart of the Day: Debt Tranche Correlation

Why Does Google Oppose the Microsoft-Yahoo Deal?

Sam Gustin reckons that Google, for all its protestations, could actually benefit from a Yahoo-Microsoft merger. I’m more likely to take Google at its word, but Sam says that Google is playing a sophisticated game: trying to delay the merger in order to maximize the amount of time and effort that the companies spend merging as opposed to competing with Google. Once they’ve actually merged, he says, Google has little to fear and quite a lot to look forward to: there’s a very good chance that the two companies will spend years trying to mesh their disparate cultures, while Google goes on a tear and sews up all manner of fast-growing web-based opportunities.

I think it’s possible that we’re both right, or partly right: that it might make sense for Google to oppose the merger on straight-up, non-devious grounds while at the same time having every reason to believe that it could benefit were a merger to happen.

Here’s the scenario: Google is comfortable that it can compete effectively against Yahoo and Microsoft separately. It also thinks that a combined Microhoo would have such trouble consolidating and competing that Google could extend its current lead. But – and this is key – it sees what Microsoft sees: that buying Yahoo is Microsoft’s only opportunity to effectively compete with Google. Will the merged company be a competitive threat? Probably not. Might the merged company be a competitive threat? Yes.

Looked at this way, Google sees only one entity which can possibly compete with it: Microhoo. And it doesn’t want to take the risk that Microhoo will succeed, even if that risk is substantially less than 50%. So it opposes the deal. There’s a good chance that if the deal goes through, Google will benefit. But there’s a small chance that if the deal goes through, Google will be hurt. And so a risk-averse Google opposes the deal. Simple, really.

Posted in M&A, technology | Comments Off on Why Does Google Oppose the Microsoft-Yahoo Deal?

The Muni Insurance Racket

In the March issue of Portfolio, Jesse Eisinger says that the municipal bond-insurance business is a racket. Back in December I noted that US municipalities pay $2 billion a year to the monolines for the dubious privilege of receiving a triple-A credit rating which most of them should properly have in the first place anyway. Jesse moves the story forwards by noting that this isn’t only a racket for the monolines (who insure something which really needn’t be insured in the first place) but also a racket for the ratings agencies. They do much less work rating wrapped bonds, but get the same fee; they also charge clients for what Jesse calls the "secret decoder ring" which converts muni ratings into the equivalent corporate rating.

Right now, Warren Buffett is making a concerted attempt to muscle in on the muni-insurance racket, both by setting up shop as an insurer himself, and also by trying to reinsure the obligations of the existing municipal monolines. That’s great for Warren Buffett, but it’s not particularly great for the system as a whole, which would be much better off if credit ratings were genuinely horizontally comparable, and a double-A issuer had the same creditworthiness whether it was a sovereign, a muni, a corporate, or a structured product.

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Emerging Markets: Safer than Banks

I’m at the Fitch Latin America Sovereign Hotspots conference at the technologically-challenged Warwick Hotel this morning, where the irrepressibly quotable David Rolley, of Loomis Sayles, just appeared on a panel. Rolley’s always interesting, partly because he doesn’t confine himself to emerging markets: he sees them in the context of credit opportunities across the globe.

Recently, one of Rolley’s top picks was about as far away from emerging markets as it’s possible to get: the new 10-year bonds recently issued by Bear Stears. In a sign of how much the world has changed over the past year those bonds had a higher interest rate than the EMBI Global yield – the standard benchmark for emerging-market sovereign bonds. If you want to be safe these days, don’t take your money to the bank: take it to Mexico or Russia, instead.

Indeed, says Rolley, the main emerging-market credits at risk these days are those countries reliant on bank debt to finance their current-account deficits: Latvia, for instance. In general, if a country is big enough to issue bonds rather than borrowing from banks, it’s likely to be in pretty good shape. Emerging markets are now something of a safe haven, and in countries like Mexico domestic local-currency interest rates go down when when the economy slows, rather than going up as international investors require a higher risk premium on their bonds. "That’s counter-cyclical," says Rolley. "That’s what an OECD country does, and Mexico is an OECD country."

I used to write a great deal about Latin America in a previous life, and some things never change, primarily the perennial discussion about whether and when Brazil might ever get itself an investment-grade credit rating. Rolley, tongue only slightly in cheek, has an elegant solution to that problem which kills two birds with one stone:

If we could get Vale to build the new locks on the canal instead of buying Xstrata, we could upgrade Panama and Brazil simultaneously.

The problem with Panama getting itself an investment-grade rating, you see, is the fact that it has just embarked upon a $5 billion plan to upgrade the Canal. And as Rolley, who comes from Boston, well knows, $5 billion construction projects have a nasty habit of becoming $15 billion construction projects. Unless they’re run by a super-efficient private corporation like Brazil’s Vale, of course. Clearly Rolley, a bond investor, would much prefer Vale to stick to its extremely-profitable strengths rather than embark upon risky $76 billion hostile takeover bids.

Posted in bonds and loans, emerging markets | Comments Off on Emerging Markets: Safer than Banks

Credit Suisse: Not a Team Player, but Profitable

Credit Suisse reported reasonably good results, by bank standards and especially by UBS standards, this morning. But its reputation in the loan markets is taking a beating in the wake of the behavior detailed by Heidi Moore yesterday. Every time that CS finds itself on a loan syndicate, it seems, it hedges or dumps its allocation in advance of the rest of the syndicate, souring the turf for everybody else.

Equity Private is unimpressed:

Some rather uncivilized behaviors by certain banks (ahem, Credit Suisse) that have gone to market with their share of Harrah’s debt before the schedule agreed upon by their fellow underwriters (very bad form, that) will cause the always astute Going Private reader to draw many conclusions about the "desperation quotient" these kind of balance sheet lodestones can create. This event also generates my favorite debt-related quote of the year so far from a Credit Suisse banker on the subject of front-running their underwriting colleagues:

"There is no contractual obligation. We cannot concede control over our own capital."

Dear John Thain goes one further, crunching the numbers to work out whether CS isn’t hurting itself along with everybody else. Since the bank has some $300 billion of syndicated loans on its own balance sheet, the mark-to-market losses caused by its own front-running could be greater than its savings on getting out ahead of the syndicate. He concludes:

Because this situation has wreaked such havoc, perhaps other shops will actually take a stand and block C.S. from future syndicated deals. Their actions seem to show they can be relied upon neither to mitigate risk nor aid in distributing any.

But none of this is going to worry CS executives. After all, they’re popping Champagne corks right now: CS is earning more than UBS for the first time in 10 years. That, to them, matters much more than the loan market.

Posted in banking, bonds and loans | Comments Off on Credit Suisse: Not a Team Player, but Profitable

CLOs: Yes, Let’s Panic

Sam Jones has a good report on the CLO situation over at Alphaville. It’s bad: "80 is the new 90," he says, in terms of loan prices – which is bringing the triple-A tranches of market-value CLOs down into liquidation territory. And the effect on that is essentially as much as $35 billion of new supply hitting the market just as banks are in the middle of trying to offload the leveraged loans on their own books. All of which can’t help but keep loan prices pressured downwards.

And it gets worse. Banks never really sold the triple-A tranches of CLOs, preferring to keep them on their own balance sheets. So when those CLOs are liquidated, banks – rather than buy-side investors – will take the brunt of the losses.

Why haven’t the banks warned about this? You almost couldn’t make it up:

Hitherto, banks haven’t really mentioned their CLO exposures, because they have been, in net terms, erased from balance sheets using negative basis trades. So while banks may have huge gross exposures to CLO paper, it hasn’t been an issue, because these positions were, from the outset, fully hedged.

Hedges with monolines.

So, yes, we probably should be worried.

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Buffett’s Offer Won’t Save the Monolines

Warren Buffett: A mensch with a triple-A rating. Just as the monoline bond insurers are melting down, he offers to ride to the rescue – for an undisclosed fee, of course – and reinsure their liabilities, solving their problems at a stroke. How could one of those monolines have turned him down already?

Well, for one thing, Buffett isn’t offering to reinsure all their liabilities: he’s only offering to reinsure their municipal books. Bloomberg quotes Robert Haines nailing it:

"If you gave up your entire municipal business, that’s the book of business where the value in the companies is right now,” said CreditSights Inc. analyst Robert Haines. "You’d essentially be ceding that whole book to Buffett and what you’d be left with would be the book of business where all the troubles are."

So why are the monolines’ share prices rising? Beats me, since their solvency situation hasn’t changed at all. My feeling is that this uptick won’t last.

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Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

Capital One offers five horrendous ideas for spending borrowed money: "What Capital One is doing here is equivalent to Anheuser-Busch sending out mailings encouraging customers to drink till they puke."

Can we STOP with the Predictions? "Try and predict the market while trading and you will go broke, that I can predict with certainty."

You Are What You Spend: Michael Cox vs Dean Baker, Floyd Norris, and Matthew Turner.

Why the Fed raised rates too fast: Mike Mandel vs me.

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Blogonomics: Even Great Commenters Can’t Generate Wall Street Salaries

On Saturday, Tyler Cowen posted a 62-word blog entry, of which 29 words constituted a quote from Dan Ariely’s Predictably Irrational. It was a throwaway "fact of the day" post, comparing the cost of robberies in the United States ($525 million) to the cost of employees’ theft and fraud ($600 billion).

Cowen probably didn’t think twice about posting that entry. But it’s one of the ironclad rules of blogging that you never know which blog entries are going to turn out to be great. This one is fantastic, entirely because of the comments thread, which is sharp and fascinating and entirely on-topic, and features not only Cowen but also Ariely himself.

I have to admit that I’m bad at reading comment threads: because I consume most of my blogs through an RSS reader, I often miss the great conversations that can result. I followed this one because I was a participant in it: I jumped in relatively early on to pour scorn on the $600 billion figure (it reminded me very much of those counterfeiting statistics).

It turns out that the $600 billion figure came from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, which polled its members and asked them what percentage of revenue they thought was lost to fraud. A few of them answered, and then the ACFE applied that percentage to the entire GDP of the USA to come up with a number of $638 billion. As Cowen himself pointed out, that’s ridiculous: it fails to make the incredibly important distinction between gross and value added.

But there were lots of other astute insights as well. Bernard Yomotov did the math to work out that $600 billion is $2,000 per capita, he also looked at the ACFE’s methodology and discovered not only that only 10% of members responded to the questionnaire, but that they were asking their examiners to report on the largest fraud they investigated over a two-year period.

PK tried to defend Ariely by saying that the difference would be huge "even if the fraud number is off by an order of magnitude" – which seems to me to be a good argument that the fraud number might be off by even more than that.

Rob brought up the concept of comparing dead-weight losses by measuring how much is spent each year to prevent fraud and/or theft.

DanC made the excellent point that the low cost of theft reflects a system working successfully to prevent theft, while businesses can be seen as maximizing their net profits and being agnostic on how much fraud that entails.

Van jumped in to talk about the non-monetary costs of theft, and Vincent Clement added uncounted monetary costs, too, such as repairing damaged property or repeatedly checking credit to safeguard against identity theft. He also pointed out that the original comparison was apples-to-oranges: theft should be compared to theft, and employee fraud to non-employee fraud.

And all through the thread winds a lighter-hearted sub-plot, if you will, about employees stealing ballpoint pens.

I go into some detail about this discussion because it’s relevant to a point that Yves Smith makes today. "Very high traffic blogs enjoy network effects," he says. "Readers come to chat among themselves." If what you want is a lot of pageviews, then comment threads are wonderful: they bring people back again and again, with no extra work from the blogger at all.

But Smith’s post is also instructive in that it provides a finance professional’s view of the money to be made from blogging:

A top blogger makes a teeny fraction of what J.K. Rowling or Tom Cruise earns. The oft-repeated example of a successful blog is mongabay.com, which reportedly earns $15,000-$18,000 a month, which is a nice level of income for a stay-at-home job that one could pursue out of a low-cost location. But if that is as good as it gets, it is hardly an exciting number.

It’s worth revisiting the WSJ article that number comes from:

"The rainforest has always been my passion, but I never expected to make a living off of it," says Mr. Butler, who quit his job as a product manager in 2003 when he realized he could make a living off his site.

The key point here is that $15,000 a month for blogging, or even half that, is great money compared to the life and salary of a product manager. If someone with a remotely normal job finds himself with a very popular blog, then it’s entirely conceivable that the blog might be able to pay more than the job.

But on Wall Street $15,000 a month is a rounding error; as Smith says, it’s certainly nothing that anybody’s likely to get excited about. Not, that is, unless they want to leave their Wall Street life anyway. In that case, blogging might be a nice addition to the income from their savings, or might allow those savings to be tied up in longer-term, more illiquid investments.

There are certainly examples of Wall Streeters who have quit their jobs to become full-time bloggers: Brownstoner, who used to work at Merrill Lynch, is a prime example. His philosophy seems reasonable:

“If your goal in life is to do something you love and to get, hopefully, reasonably well-compensated at some point for it, it’s great. I didn’t pick it as a profit-maximizing decision.”

If Yves Smith were to ask for my advice on making money blogging, my answer would be simple: if you’re not going to be happy making $15,000 a month, just quit. Some bloggers might get there; the vast majority do not. In the econoblog space specifically, I think there is only one blog which has made anything like that kind of money: Freakonomics, which was bought by nytimes.com. Marginal Revolution and the Big Picture probably bring in a nice marginal income, but I doubt that their authors could live on their blogging income alone.

Blogging remains a labor of love for nearly everyone who does it. There are lots of possible ancillary benefits, most of which are not available to bloggers who wish to remain anonymous. But if all you’re interested in is potential income, and you’re used to earning Wall Street money, blogging will never be for you.

Posted in blogonomics | 1 Comment

AIG’s Arbitrary Write-Down

The news seems to be reasonably clear: according to an 8-K it filed today, AIG has suddenly discovered that the value of its credit default swaps is $4.88 billion lower than it had previously indicated. That’s Bloomberg’s number, and the WSJ’s too, and they both cite the same 8-K. But in reality it’s incredibly arbitrary, even if you take the 8-K as gospel truth.

The $4.88 billion number is made up of three inputs. You start with $5.964 billion, which is the gross decline in valuation of AIG’s CDSs. You then subtract $352 million, which is the losses that AIG already took in September. And then you subtract another $732 million, which is the benefit of "structural mitigants" which AIG has now started calculating. Apparently these are things like "triggers that accelerate amortization of the more senior CDO tranches"; despite the fact that they’re apparently worth almost three quarters of a billion dollars, AIG hadn’t bothered to account for them up until now.

It gets better: AIG has also discovered $3.628 billion of "spread differential benefits" (don’t ask), which would bring that $4.88 billion number down to a more manageable $1.25 billion, but those benefits won’t even make it as far as the next quarterly results:

As a result of current difficult market conditions, AIG is not able to reliably quantify the differential between spreads implied from cash CDO prices and credit spreads implied from the pricing of credit default swaps on the CDOs, and therefore AIG will not include any adjustment to reflect the spread differential (negative basis adjustment) in determining the fair value of AIGFP’s super senior credit default swap portfolio at December 31, 2007.

In other words, there’s something on our books which we’re pretty sure is worth $3.628 billion, or was worth $3.628 billion at the end of November, but we’re going to ignore that when we release results as of the end of December.

Does this all seem incredibly arbitary to you? Chris Whalen would certainly seem to agree.

One of these days, we hope somebody explains to us why these "fair value" adjustments are useful to investors, especially when applied to illiquid assets and liabilities. If corporate managers made such adjustments without a mandate from the Financial Accounting Standards Board and SEC, we’d be prosecuting them for securities fraud.

Indeed, if you go back and read the academic literature on fair value accounting, you see that, as with more general theoretical discussions of market efficiency, a high level of transparency and thus market liquidity was assumed in the utopian world where fair value accounting rules were to operate.

Applying the rules now mandated by FAS 157 to illiquid assets strikes us as a really bad idea, in large part because such an exercise is entirely subjective and violates the basic rules of forensic investigation.

AIG has lost $15 billion of market cap today, thanks to this 8-K filing which desperately tries to put hard figures (to the nearest million dollars) on extremely illiquid and untraded instruments. Who is helped by all this noise? It’s not clear. The "fair value accounting" that AIG is using certainly seems to be generating more noise than signal. Surely there’s a better way.

Posted in accounting | Comments Off on AIG’s Arbitrary Write-Down

Banking: Words To Live By

A Credit Suisse banker explains how his bank avoided monster losses:

"All of us [banks] are really in the moving, not the storage, business."

Maybe Chuck Prince and Stan O’Neal never got the memo.

Posted in banking, bonds and loans | Comments Off on Banking: Words To Live By