Credit Markets Aren’t Liquid Enough for a Mass Selloff

Jon Jacobs wants "an unrestrained, cathartic selloff" in the credit markets. He makes a good point: that banks are holding on to the assets they’ve written down in the hope, basically, that they’re smarter than the markets.

The only way bank executives can be proven right in refusing to dump their bad bets is if they know more than the market. And you don’t have to believe in efficient markets to believe the market is more likely right than some of the players who are caught in what now looks like a losing trade. Remember: Even if the market is wrong, it could be wrong in the opposite direction – high-risk loans and structures could ultimately turn out to be worth less than the market is now paying.

Jacobs quots Meredith Whitney saying that "what we need to see is a true purging to get the system back to a state of restored liquidity". But this doesn’t make a lot of sense to me. Just look at what’s happened to the CDS market as a small-to-middling hedge fund starts liquidiating its holdings, or what happened to wheat prices in the wake of one weird trade. Markets aren’t liquid enough to cope with an unrestrained selloff at the best of times; right now, they’d just seize up altogether and go no-bid.

All the banks can do is mark down their holdings; there simply aren’t enough potential bidders out there at any price to cope with an actual sale – certainly not if, as in the auction-rate market, all the banks seem to come to exactly the same decision at exactly the same time.

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Are Equities Attractive?

Brad DeLong thinks that stocks look attractive over the long run, and has written a paper to that effect:

As of this writing the annual earnings yield on the value-weighted S&P composite index is 5.53%. This is a wedge of 3.22% per year when compared to the annual yield on 10-year Treasury inflation-protected bonds of 2.31%. The existence of the equity return premium in the past offered long-horizon investors a chance to make very large returns in return for bearing little risk. It appears likely that the current configuration of market prices offers a similar opportunity to long-horizon investors today.

One person who doesn’t agree with him is Albert Edwards:

What does it mean if real bond yields fall? It means that expectations of real growth in the economy have declined. And if that is the case, then expectations for profits growth should have fallen in line (since profits cannot, in the long run grow faster than the economy). So lower real yields shouldn’t help equities either.

There is a good practical example of this issue in Japan. Japanese government-bond yields fell steadily through most of the 1990s, bottoming out at 1-2%. The earnings yield has been higher than the government bond yield throughout this decade, but that has not made the Tokyo stockmarket a good buy.

Most people are going to continue to invest their long-term savings in stocks either way, at least in the US. That’s good news if DeLong is right; it could be slowly devastating if Edwards is right.

Posted in stocks | 1 Comment

Municipal Default Alert: Vallejo, California

Do municipal bonds really never default? The Californian town of Vallejo seems to have gotten very close. Portfolio’s Liz Gunnison filled me in on the details of the city’s bonds, from Bond Buyer:

The city government and its related enterprises had about $201.1 million of

outstanding bonds and certificates of participation as of June 30, according

to the city’s most recent comprehensive annual financial report.

All of this debt carries – for the time being – an investment-grade single-A credit rating. I think recovery rates on municipal bonds are normally in the 60% range, which means that bondholders could be in for $80 million or so in losses, if Vallejo’s default isn’t averted.

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Is a Mortgage Like a Marriage?

It’s great to see my friend Christian Menegatti quoted in a front-page NYT article. But what will his wife think?

Christian Menegatti, lead analyst at RGE Monitor, said the firm predicted more homeowners would walk away from their homes if prices continued to drop, regardless of their financial circumstances. If home prices drop an additional 10 percent, Mr. Menegatti said, 20 million households will owe more than the value of their homes.

“Will everyone walk out?” he said. “No. But there’s been a cultural shift. Buying a house used to be like entering a marriage, a commitment for life. Now, if you see something better, you go back into the dating market.”

Jingle mail seems to be in the air; the WSJ has a long article on the subject too. As ever, the most intelligent discussion can be found at Calculated Risk.

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ABX Datapoint of the Day

As Peloton implodes, it’s liquidating its long mortgage positions, to nasty effect. The triple-A tranche of the most recent ABX index is now at just 61, while the double-A tranche has crashed all the way to 26. Yeah, that’s the one I thought was a buy at at 45. Turns out, not so much.

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I’d Like to Escalate This Issue to Level Ballmer

It was an experience suffered by millions: people with new PCs, or with newly-installed copies of Vista, finding themselves with peripherals which simply wouldn’t work because there were no drivers available. Aggrieved customer John Shirley decided to write an email to Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer:

Shirley said that he didn’t upgrade one of his PCs because Windows Vista didn’t have the necessary software, known as a driver, to run his top-of-the-line Epson printer and two scanners. "I cannot understand with a product this long in creation why there is such a shortage of drivers," Mr. Shirley wrote.

So far, so normal. Except in this case Mr Shirley happens to be on the board of Microsoft. It’s a situation many of us dream of: finally being able to cut through all the layers of customer service and get a personal response from the CEO.

Not that it did much good. Reports Robert Guth: "Microsoft executives struggled to respond to complaints from a Microsoft board member about technical problems he had encountered."

Sometimes, it really doesn’t matter who you are. That Epson printer ain’t gonna work with Vista, even if you’re on the board.

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It Could Have Been the Trade of a Lifetime

Yesterday, John Carney asked why rogue traders always seem to lose money rather than making it. Today we find out exactly why, at least in the case of MF Global: their rogue trader, Brent Dooley, was trading his own account.

Mr. Dooley, who has spent more than 15 years in the rough-and-tumble business of commodities trading, had just one customer, and that person hadn’t done any trading business with Mr. Dooley in "some time," Mr. Davis said. But the trader was allowed to process trades for his own account through MF Global, which collected commissions on those transactions. Such arrangements are common in futures trading, even though the brokerage firms essentially must use their own capital if traders can’t afford outsize bets that go wrong.

Does this mean that if his bet had gone well, he would have made $141 million in one day?

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Extra Credit, Friday Edition

Narrow victory for battered UBS chief

Opening the windows on Microsoft: "Mr Gates may be leaving the building but persuading his paranoid spirit to depart is something else again."

The War on Error

Oil Wealth Fueling Boom In Islamic Finance

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Transplant surgery

Liesl Gibson: Best doctor ever!

Posted in Not economics | Comments Off on Transplant surgery

Reasons to be Sanguine about CDS Counterparty Risk

I spoke today to Nishul Saperia at Markit about credit default swaps, and I’m very glad I did: he’s cleared a lot of things up for me, especially on the problem of counterparty risk. Here’s one problem, as explained by the NYT’s graphics team when they illustrated an article by Gretchen Morgenson:

counterparty.jpg

I asked Nishul about this. If I own a credit default swap (let’s say I’m Party B in the graphic above), and I want to get out of my position, am I likely to assign that CDS to someone else, or am I likely instead to simply enter into a new insurance contract which is equal and opposite to the first one?

If you’re worried about counterparty risk and the NYT’s problem, then there’s good news and bad news. The bad news is that I am indeed most likely to assign the contract I’ve got, rather then piling up a bunch of nominally-offsetting trades. The good news, however, is that hedge funds and other buyers of CDS almost never trade directly with each other. If I assign the contract, I’m going to be assigning it to a dealer.

What this means is that you’re very unlikely to get a long chain of assignments as illustrated by the NYT. Normally the chain stops at Party C: the dealer that the original counterparty assigned his contract to. This doesn’t increase counterparty risk, it reduces it, since dealers generally don’t worry about each others’ counterparty risk. It’s much more likely a hedge fund will go bust than that a broker-dealer will go bust and be unable to fulfill its commitments, especially since broker-dealer CDS desks generally don’t make big directional bets.

But what about those CDS auctions I was so worried about? Surely anybody can wind up buying a contract in one of those? Actually, no. The auctions held by Markit and Creditex are the auctions which happen after an event of default – they’re called "credit event auctions" – and they exist to set a cash-settlement price on the value of the CDS. The CDS themselves don’t actually change hands.

Obviously, counterparty risk in the CDS market is non-zero. But the fact that you can assigning your CDS to a third party doesn’t in practice exacerbate it, and neither does the existence of these auctions.

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Lacey Gallagher, RIP

I knew Lacey for many years, she was always vivacious and insightful. This is incredibly sad news, although not unexpected. Here is the memo which went out today from

Mike Ryan and Bunt Gosh at her last employer, Credit Suisse.

CREDIT SUISSE

GLOBAL SECURITIES MEMORANDUM

To: All Global Securities Staff

Date: February 28, 2008

Remembering Lacey Gallagher

It is with deep regret that we have to let you know that Lacey Gallagher passed away on Monday night after a three-year battle with cancer.

Lacey, a Managing Director and co-head of our Emerging Markets Economics team, joined the Bank in 2000 from Standard & Poors where she was head of their Latin American Sovereign Team. Lacey’s career at Credit Suisse was distinguished by an unsurpassed level of energy and dedication that she brought to the job and the Bank. She was singularly responsible for ensuring that we developed an outstanding presence at the annual IMF/IBRD and IADB meetings and was regularly voted as one of the leading Latin American economists by our clients in the various Institutional Investor surveys.

Her passing is a tremendous loss to the Bank and to each of us individually. Her energy and enthusiasm will be missed by everyone who worked with her.

A viewing will be held on Sunday, March 3 from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. at:

Frank E. Campbell

The Funeral Chapel

1076 Madison Avenue @ 81st Street

New York, NY 10028

The funeral service will be held on Monday, March 3 at 11:30 a.m. at the same location.

In lieu of flowers, a donation may be made in Lacey’s name to either of the following organizations:

Ovarian Cancer National Alliance

910 17th Street NW Suite 1190

Washington, DC. 20006

866-399-6262

www.ovariancancer.org

Ovarian Cancer Research Fund

14 Pennsylvania Plaza

Suite 1400

New York, NY 10122

212-268-1002

www.ocrf.org

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Bandwidth Datapoint of the Day

Says Google:

According to the TeleGeography Global Bandwidth Report, 2007, Trans-Pacific bandwidth demand has grown at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 63.7 percent between 2002 and 2007. It is expected to continue to grow strongly from 2008 to 2013, with total demand for capacity doubling roughly every two years.

Buy WorldCom! Buy Global Crossing! Buy Nortel! Oh, they’ve gone bust already? Never mind. Buy Google!

(HT: Justin Fox)

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No Security in Securities

James Stewart is shocked – shocked! – to find out that his ARPS aren’t liquid.

They were sold as a liquid, safe, slightly higher-yielding, tax-exempt alternative to money-market funds. I should know, since I bought some…

What was a ready source of cash is now essentially frozen.

Last year, when some money-market funds turned out to hold some mortgage-backed securities and faced a liquidity crisis, their sponsors stepped in and redeemed the shares at face value. This seemed the only decent course, not to mention a good investment in customer loyalty.

But when I asked a broker at Merrill Lynch if it would do the same for owners of these money-market equivalents, the answer was "no" — not after the multibillion-dollar write-offs Merrill has taken on illiquid assets. Merrill Lynch and the other big banks that sold these shares have stopped making a market in them, which is a major reason the auctions have failed.

Merrill Lynch, when asked for comment, told me: "We are offering our clients loans which can give them liquidity." It wasn’t yet clear whether these would be interest-free loans, which they certainly should be, in my opinion…

In my view, any failure of the big banks to honor what is at least a moral commitment to the people to whom they sold these shares is appalling.

My sympathy for Mr Stewart is, I must admit, limited. ARPS are auction-rate preferred shares: yes, that’s shares, as in stocks, as in equities. When you buy these things, you’re buying equity in a closed-end fund which invests in auction-rate bonds. And any investment in a closed-end fund carries risks: not only liquidity risk, but also the risk that you won’t be able to get a bid near the fund’s net asset value.

When Stewart bought his ARPS, they were liquid and tax exempt and (ahem) "slightly higher-yielding" than money-market funds. Did he think that excess return carried no risk? There was a lovely merry-go-round, in which the likes of Merrill Lynch would make enough fee income from structuring these products that they were happy to support the auction-rate bonds. But when the monolines started looking fragile and the banks started needing all the liquidity they had for other purposes, they threw in the towel.

Stewart asks what’s safe, these days:

So is any fixed-income security short of U.S. Treasurys and the biggest, most liquid money-market funds safe at this point?

The answer is that if you want your money back on demand, you shouldn’t be buying securities at all, you should be buying demand deposits – placing your money in some kind of interest-bearing checking account. Securities always have a bid-offer spread, and in times of crisis that spread can widen out dramatically. Treasuries are a special and unique case, which is one reason why a lot of risk-averse individuals give up a bit of extra yield and sleep well at night with their money in nothing but Treasury bills.

The minute you diversify out of Treasury bills, you’re taking on risk for the sake of extra returns. If you end up running into a market crisis, it’s a bit rich to start blaming your broker.

Posted in bonds and loans, personal finance | Comments Off on No Security in Securities

When Banks Don’t Manage Their Bankers’ Risks

Dear John Thain has a thought-provoking piece up today about the way that risks and revenues are managed at investment banks. Think of banks as being divided in two: on the one side are the bankers, who generate fee income and need little if any capital; and on the side are the traders, who make money from risk and who do need capital.

Generally speaking, when bankers generate fee income, they also take on a certain amount of risk. But the minute they do that, the risk is shipped over to the trading side of things, whose entire job is to manage risk and make a profit doing so.

The problem is that the trading side isn’t particularly good at managing risk it has been bequeathed by the banking side. Sometimes, as in the case of leveraged super-senior CDO tranches, the trading side was all but unaware that the bank had taken on vast quantities of risk in the first place. And in any case it’s really hard to hedge that kind of risk. As DJT noted yesterday, Goldman Sachs came out of 2007 smelling like roses largely because it was lucky enough not to have much ordure in its stables in the first place:

Goldman wasn’t naturally long sub-prime in the same way everyone else was. If you’re not long, it’s easier to be short. Do you think Merrill could have hedged their exposure by being short a mere few billion of ABX? No.

What this all means is that chief risk officers need to spend much more time away from the trading desk, hanging out with bankers, and worrying about all the tail risk which bankers are particularly bad at worrying about. After all, the more bankers worry about such things, the harder it is for them to make their fee income. Somebody needs to save them from themselves.

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Brazil Datapoint of the Day

From Annelena Lobb:

Brazil edged past China to become the largest emerging market in the world, as measured by Morgan Stanley Capital International’s emerging markets index. Brazil has a free-float market capitalization of $509.10 billion and comprises 14.95% of the index; China, $481.80 billion and 14.15%, respectively, according to MSCI, FactSet and Citi Investment Research.

I suspect this is a function of the fact that many Chinese companies have only sold off a relatively small portion of their capital in the public markets, while big Brazilian companies like Vale and Petrobras have had multiple rounds of equity offerings. But even so, it’s impressive, given that the Chinese stock market is in a bubble phase while the Bovespa isn’t.

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Phibro: Beneficiary of Citi’s Benign Neglect

Sticking with Citi, Ann Davis has a fantastic front-pager in today’s WSJ on Andrew Hill, who runs commodity-trading subsidiary Phibro. Go read it, it’s full of wonderful details, like Hill’s thousand-year-old castle in Germany, which recently housed a massive Schnabel exhibition.

But the most interesting part of the story is Phibro’s relationship with its parent – something which Hall describes as "benign neglect". Phibro clearly is very successful, but the problem seems to be that Citi’s new CEO, Vikram Pandit, wants to fold it into his asset-management arm.

Mr. Pandit and his team see Phibro as an "underleveraged" brand, which, while still a profit center, has fallen off the financial world’s radar, one executive says. Some top executives at Citigroup hope to establish Phibro as a prestigious investment fund for Citigroup clients. That would move Phibro beyond its current role as a commodities shop trading solely on the bank’s behalf, as Phibro has functioned for years.

Late last year, Citigroup told Phibro executives that it was interested in broadening the unit’s scope by merging it into Citigroup’s asset-management arm. That would effectively turn Phibro into a hedge fund, managing money for clients but much less of Citigroup’s own capital.

The 57-year-old trader balked. Mr. Hall called the idea "a complete nonstarter," according to a person familiar with the exchange.

Phibro is the one bit of Citi which is working really well and making lots of money – and it’s where Pandit wants to start meddling? Has Pandit never heard of the law of unintended consequences, or what happened to the goose that laid golden eggs?

As for Hall’s compensation, yes, he’s made a lot of money, but that’s because he’s been running an enormously-successful commodity trading operation during a massive commodities boom. He’d’ve made just as much, probably, if Phibro had been independent. (Incidentally, "trading" is maybe the wrong word for what Hall is good at: he made most of his money by placing very large long-term bets and then sitting back over the course of a few years and watching them cash in.)

Hall would very clearly be happiest if Pandit would just leave him alone. Since Hall’s so valuable to Citigroup – he accounted for 10% of the bank’s total net income last year – I don’t see why Pandit doesn’t do just that.

Posted in banking, commodities | Comments Off on Phibro: Beneficiary of Citi’s Benign Neglect

More Musical Chairs at Citi

Michael Grynbaum, it turns out, was prescient back in November, when Citigroup replaced its long-time chief risk officer David Bushnell with safe-pair-of-hands Jorge Bermudez. The move seemed unconvincing, mainly because Bermudez is a commercial banker, not an investment banker:

Mr. Bermudez intends to move to New York, but his lack of familiarity with Wall Street has fueled speculation that he will be an interim head rather than a permanent replacement.

Interim is right. Bermudez is gone already, "retiring at age 56", to be replaced by a long-time Vikram Pandit lieutenant, Brian Leach. In this case, the undertones of favoritism are nothing to worry about: the more that the CRO has the CEO’s ear, and the CEO has the CRO’s back, the better. Bermudez was always a bit of a weird choice for CRO: he was a career Citibank manager and executive much more than he was a finance wonk. Citi will be hoping that with Leach in charge, it won’t suffer 15 days where it loses more than $100 million, as it did in 2007.

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Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

Trade: Leonhardt vs Baker

The Debt Delusion: Thomas Palley on the unsustainability of the business cycle as we’ve come to know it over the past 25 years.

Will Publishers Lose Their Bacon if Ads Are Traded Like Pork Bellies?

Online market for auction-rate securities to launch March 3: A good idea to try to bring some liquidity to this beleaguered market.

Bernanke Warns

Goldman, Lehman May Not Have Dodged Credit Crisis

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When Numbers are Hard to Read

One of the more annoying quirks of New Yorker house style is this kind of thing:

A few weeks ago, the Bureau of Economic Analysis released its figures for 2007. They showed that Americans had collectively amassed ten trillion one hundred and eighty-four billion dollars in disposable income and spent very nearly all of it–ten trillion one hundred and thirty-two billion dollars. This rate of spending was somewhat lower than the rate in 2006, when Americans spent all but thirty-nine billion dollars of their total disposable income.

It’s really hard to read, and if you actually stop to try to digest the numbers before moving on, you’ll find yourself spending an inordinate amount of time reading that one paragraph. Why is that? Well, one of the great things about the New Yorker is that it’ll tell us itself:

If evolution has equipped us with one way of representing number, embodied in the primitive number sense, culture furnishes two more: numerals and number words. These three modes of thinking about number, Dehaene believes, correspond to distinct areas of the brain. The number sense is lodged in the parietal lobe, the part of the brain that relates to space and location; numerals are dealt with by the visual areas; and number words are processed by the language areas.

In order to take the difference between "ten trillion one hundred and eighty-four billion dollars" and "ten trillion one hundred and thirty-two billion dollars", and then compare that difference to "thirty-nine billion dollars", what a reader needs to do is process the words in the language area of their brain, then import the results into the number area of the brain, and go back and forth many times. It’s much easier to see the difference between $10.184 trillion and $10.132 trillion, and compare that to $39 billion.

There’s really only one reason for the New Yorker to continue to stick to this anachronistic house style, and that’s well, that it’s house style. But while house-style idiosyncrasies like "coöperate" are pretty harmless, the spelling-out-names-of-dollar-amounts rule really does make the magazine significantly harder to read.

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Small Feet, Large Footprints

Tyler Cowen explains why those of us without children should be less worried about our carbon footprint:

Your net carbon impact depends far more on the number of children you will have than any other variable; remember good environmentalism uses a zero rate of discount. So people with no biological children should be allowed to fly a lot and people with lots of biological children should not get to fly so much at all.

Does this mean the most environmentally unfriendly thing that any man can do is to donate to a sperm bank?

Posted in climate change | 1 Comment

Blackstone to Banks: We Don’t Need You

Blackstone has decided to disintermediate its banks when it comes to raising money for leveraged loans. Hell, Blackstone is a bank, I’m just surprised it’s taken them this long to take this step.

Yes, it’s easier to just mandate a bank to raise the money than it is to go out and raise it yourself. But Blackstone isn’t about being lazy, it’s about being profitable. And if the banks themselves don’t have the liquidity to take a large chunk of the deal, then really there’s no point in paying them their massive fees.

This is really bad news for Wall Street, which has in recent years relied enormously on private equity for its fee income. If Blackstone et al decide they can do everything themselves (and they can), what role for investment bankers any more? Especially the ones <cough>Citi</cough> which only got to the top of the M&A league tables by bribing attracting clients with their enormous balance sheet.

(Via)

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One Question for John Carney

I don’t want to drag this debate over municipal bonds on too long: I’ve pretty much said my piece. But I would like to ask John Carney just one question. Today, he says this:

Investors in municipal bonds are interested in risk comparisons between different members of the muni asset class and not so much in comparisons to corporate bonds.

This squares with what he said on Monday:

If two-thirds of munis were rated triple-A, investors would lack guidance about real differences between the issuers.

But it seems to me that munis are pretty much the last asset class where investors would be clamoring for finely-grained credit distinctions. Mainly because most municipal bonds are sold into retail. So here’s my question for John:

Who are these municipal bond investors who fully understand that most municipal bonds would be rated triple-A if they were rated on a corporate scale, but who find a lot of value in the ratings agencies providing finer-grained credit distinctions than that? Really, please, name them. Two would be nice, but just one would be a good start.

Carney makes it seem as though the under-rating of municipal bonds is in response to market demand. If the demand is so great as to change ratings-agency actions from the obvious base-case of rating all bonds on the same scale, then surely it shouldn’t be too hard to identify the demanders.

Update: Carney responds, but names no names.

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How I’m Helping Mike Moffatt Lose Weight

Mike Moffatt is trying to lose weight, and has part of his weight-loss plan he’s going to give me $100 if he doesn’t lose at least one percentage point in body fat in March. Which is nice for me: all upside, no downside. Greg Mankiw has already said he’ll donate his $100 to the National Council of Economic Education if he’s given it, while Alex Tabarrok is chivvying Mike along by promising to use the money "to squash the poor, to fight against universal health care, and to gas up our Hummer".

As for me, I didn’t choose anything clever, I just asked Mike to donate the $100 to MSF. Mike’s a graduate student; the prospect of losing $1,200 means a lot to him, and if he fails (which is quite possible, losing weight is hard) I don’t want to make him feel even worse by squashing the poor. But obviously Alex feels he has more influence over the ultimate outcome than I do.

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The Psychology of Google Stock

When do stock investors feel good? Kevin Maney thinks it’s when their holdings have gone up in value:

Google shares are off their highs by so much, the AP writes today that Google’s "once-robust stock is looking haggard." Haggard? Well, only if you were one of the dopes who bought it at $700 a share last fall. If you bought GOOG three years ago at $200, you’re still feeling pretty good. It’s now about $464.

Maney’s main point – that "trying to get a sense of what’s actually going on in a company by looking at [short-term fluctuations in] its stock price is like trying to get a sense of a person by looking at his reflection in a funhouse mirror" – is spot-on. But his psychology is off, I think, and in markets like the one we have now, psychology is crucial.

The fact is that most people who bought Google stock three years ago were feeling pretty good all the way through the end of 2007. But insofar as they’ve been watching their net worth erode steadily over the course of the year to date, they’ve been feeling not good but bad. Take someone with 100 shares of Google: they were worth almost $75,000 at the end of last year, and are now worth $47,000. That’s $28,000 which has just evaporated. Now it’s true that those shares might have only cost $20,000 to buy. But the main emotion, on looking at Google’s share price right now, is fear. (How much lower can this thing go?) By contrast, the main emotion for the past few years has been greed. (How much higher can this thing go?) That switch is psychologically tough to make, and it doesn’t make anybody feel pretty good.

The psychological losses are worse than the monetary losses for two other reasons. The first is that when Google was breaking through the $700-per-share level, everybody expected it to just keep on going, through $900, $1000, and beyond. Those shares were worth "only" $75,000 today: just think what they might be worth tomorrow! Individuals don’t mark to market: they consider an appreciating asset to be worth more than a depreciating one – which makes sense if they have no intention of selling. Now, of course, they have no idea how to value their Google stock. They don’t want to sell, but they do have a depreciating asset, so they feel, psychologically, that it’s worth less than the mark-to-market value might suggest.

The second reason is well known: everybody, and stock market investors are no exception, reacts worse to losses than to gains of equal magnitude. The happiness you feel when you win $100 is less than the pain you feel when you lose $100. Remember Malcom Gladwell’s piece on Nassim Taleb?

"We cannot blow up, we can only bleed to death," Taleb says, and bleeding to death, absorbing the pain of steady losses, is precisely what human beings are hardwired to avoid.

That’s how Google investors are feeling right now. And that’s why they’re not "feeling pretty good", even if – for the time being – they’re still comfortably in the money.

Posted in stocks | Comments Off on The Psychology of Google Stock

Brit Art at Rockefeller Center: Disappointing

I popped over to Rockefeller Center this morning to check out the new Electric Fountain by Tim Noble and Sue Webster. Rock Center has a long history of fabulous public-art installations:

Jonathan Borofsky, Louise Bourgeois, Nam June Paik, and Takashi Murakami have all been very warmly received there, and there are millions of New Yorkers and tourists who will never forget Jeff Koons’s Puppy.

For the past couple of years, however, I’m mildly ashamed to say that the Brits haven’t quite managed to live up to Rock Center’s very high standards.

It’s their conceptualist bent, I think, that’s the problem: the ideas are great, but the execution falls down somewhat. I loved the concept of Anish Kapoor’s Sky Mirror, but the actual thing was most disappointing: more of a steel slab than anything transcendent. And in this case the concept is even more wonderful: a fountain of light, with thousands of LEDs mixed with blue neon. But the reality, I’m afraid, is rather mundane. The sculpture is more hulking than light, and the light show, just a few blocks from Times Square, looks positively amateurish compared to the kind of things which New Yorkers are used to. Hell, it’s not even as sophisticated as the lighted snowflakes which Saks Fifth Avenue wheels out every Christmas on the other side of Fifth Avenue.

The enthusiasm that Noble and Webster have for their work is contagious. Tim Noble talks about mixing electricity with (virtual, simulated) water; Sue Webster talks of people wanting "to bathe in the ‘Electric Fountain’ of love". It’s easy to sign on to such dreams – until they become disappointing reality. (I should note, however, that I’ve only seen this piece during daylight; I’m sure it’ll be much better at night.)

With Olafur Eliasson’s waterfalls coming to the East River, Rock Center is falling behind in the spectacular-public-art stakes. Maybe they’ll leave the Brits behind next time, and come up with something great again.

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