Parsing the Global Recession

We all know what a recession is: two consecutive quarters of negative growth. Easy. So a global recession, that’s the same thing, but on a global level, right? Actually, no. Recessions happen, in all countries, but they don’t happen in all countries simultaneously, and it’s pretty much impossible for the entire world to register negative growth in any given quarter.

So don’t be too alarmed when the likes of Andrew Leonard say things like this (italics his):

Today, the International Monetary Fund conceded that there is now a 1-in-4 chance of a global recession occurring in the next 12 months.

The problem here is that he’s not defining his terms. And if you look at the actual document, you’ll see that the IMF’s definition of a "global recession" is global growth of 3% or less. Which suddenly seems much less scary. After all, with the population of the world at 6.6 billion and growing at 77 million per year, that’s a population growth rate of about 1.2%, and 3% growth globally corresponds to significantly positive growth not only on a nominal basis but also on a per capita basis. You can call it a recession if you like, but it’s not really the same animal as what we’re talking about here in the US.

Posted in economics | Comments Off on Parsing the Global Recession

Extra Credit, Friday Edition

July 2008 LHC End of the Universe Puts

I Have the Best Job in the World: Berkeley coffee shops really do have more interesting conversations.

Lehman Deal: ‘Creative’ Financing Rides Again

In times of complexity, common sense must prevail: John Kay on the limits of risk models.

Useful Lessons from California’s Experiment with Congestion Pricing

Adidas claims dominion over the stripe: And not just three stripes, either.

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Friday Edition

Does the World Need Rich Venture Capitalists?

Fred Wilson’s blog entry about "a new path to liquidity" has resulted in a spectacular outpouring of very high-level comments, as well as responses from other bloggers such as Roger Ehrenberg. But I’m not at all convinced that there’s really a problem requiring a solution here.

For one thing, the "liquidity" that Wilson and Ehrenberg are talking about is not the same thing as the liquidity which went so disastrously missing from the financial system over the past few months, or the liquidity that the Fed is trying to inject into banks. No, Fred and Roger’s "liquidity" is really just a euphemism for "selling at a high price and making lots of money". Here’s Wilson:

Here’s the problem. The company/web service creation process needs some kind of end game. The entrepreneurs who spend years and risking a ton need a way to get paid for that effort. And those of us who finance their efforts need to get some return on our investment. We can argue about the magnitude of the return we need and a host of other things, but the fact remains that without a path to liquidity, all the innovation that is being created by the entrepreneur/VC equation will stop happening.

For those of you keeping count at home, the word "need" here appears four times in as many sentences. To Fred Wilson, that’s a lot of need; to me, however, it’s closer to a lot of greed. There’s no doubt that Fred Wilson and many others have made vast amounts of money doing what they do, and all power to them. But I’m less than panicked when Wilson warns that without VC capital, "the services we have come to rely on like Flickr, AIM, Delicious, Yahoo Groups, FeedBurner, etc" might somehow be less successful, or maybe not exist at all.

There will always be innovators, and there will always be entrepeneurs, and there will, most of the time at least, be people willing to risk money in order to help small entrepeneurs become big entrepeneurs, in the hope that they’ll make a fortune by doing so. To be sure, some economies, and some periods of time, are better incubators of such behavior than others. But when Fred Wilson starts painting himself and his profits as a necessary godfather of vital innovation, I get the same feeling I have when I read, say, Sebastian Mallaby on the critical importance of hedge funds. VCs and hedge-fund managers exist to make money, first and foremost. If there is a social upside to what they do, that’s fine, but if there wasn’t, then they would do the same thing anyway. (It’s also worth remembering that rich people seem to be extremely good at finding a social upside to most things, even FeedBurner.)

So I wish Fred luck in finding his "new path to liquidity". But I’m not going to lose any sleep if he gets lost along the way.

Posted in technology | Comments Off on Does the World Need Rich Venture Capitalists?

Judging GDP

Justin Fox defends GDP as a useful indicator:

Over the years, GNP and GDP have proved spectacularly useful in tracking economic change–both short-term fluctuations and long-run growth…

The issue with alternative benchmarks is not whether they have merit (most do) but whether they can be measured with anything like the frequency, reliability and impartiality of GDP.

I think he has a point there, but the argument seems circular to me. How can one judge how good GDP is at tracking economic change? How can one measure how reliable it is?

GDP is at this point such an ingrained concept that it has become the very definition of economic change: GDP can’t track economic change, because it is economic change. And I think that’s what the GDP critics, like Joe Stiglitz and Amartya Sen, are driving at: there’s no particular reason for the hegemony of GDP over all other economic statistics. Let’s have some more very broad indicators, and the result will be a richer view of how the economy is doing.

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WSJ and FT Buck the Newspaper Trend

These are desperate times for the newspaper industry, and they’re not much better in the world of finance. So it’s interesting to see Jeff Bercovici and Jon Fine lauding impressive growth at the WSJ and the FT respectively. Is this a spike due to the credit crunch, which will prove unsustainable if and when conditions return to something approaching normality in financial markets and headcounts on Wall Street and in the City inevitably decline? Or is there a bigger trend here?

My feeling is that the Murdoch purchase of the WSJ got competitive juices flowing at both newspapers for the first time in a while, and that readers are picking up on that. The internet might be bad for newspapers generally, but competition is nearly always good. And Rupert Murdoch is nothing if not a fearsome competitor.

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Bankruptcies: Still Rare

I’m signed up to the WSJ’s email alert service, which sent me a couple of messages last night. At 12:14 am there was this:

WSJ NEWS ALERT: Linens ‘n Things Is Expected to File For Chapter 11

And at 2:19 am there was this:

WSJ NEWS ALERT: Frontier Airlines Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

I think of this as good news: bankruptcy filings are still rare enough that they require middle-of-the-night news alerts. It’s when they get treated as commonplace that we’ll know the economy’s in serious trouble.

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Blogonomics: Seeking Alpha Plays the Ultimatum Game

The Ultimatum Game, in game theory, has two players. It’s very simple:

The first player proposes how to divide a sum of money between themselves, and the second player can either accept or reject this proposal. If the second player rejects, neither player receives anything. If the second player accepts, the money is split according to the proposal.

When this game is played in real life, the second player tends to reject any offer of less than about 20% or so, even though that means getting nothing rather than something. It might not be economically rational, but it’s human. At the same time, of course, there’s also a very human incentive on the part of the first player to try to maximize his own share of the spoils, rather than simply splitting the pie 50-50. You might even say that he’s Seeking Alpha.

David Jackson, the founder of Seeking Alpha, has a long blog entry today which essentially boils down to "I’m the first player, you’re the second player, and if you were rational, you’d accept any offer I made you." From the point of view of a Seeking Alpha contributor, he says, "while the marginal cost is zero, the marginal return is undoubtedly positive."

And yet a vocal minority of Seeking Alpha contributors think that the benefits are so lopsided that they leave all the same. (Does this minority include Barry Ritholtz? Technically he says he hasn’t left yet, but he’s had nothing on SA for a week now, so my feeling is yes.)

Ritholtz says that Jackson commits a "blogosphere faux pas" by responding to his original post without linking to it (except in the comments); I think it’s actually more serious than that. There’s a pattern here, which can be seen in the comments on Jackson’s post: Seeking Alpha, in the first instance, acts to maximize its own share of the pie; only in the wake of repeated and vocal objections does it give an increasing share of the pie to its contributors.

That’s natural, for a player of the Ultimatum Game, but it’s not something which is going to endear Seeking Alpha to its contributors. SA has never been particularly generous with external links, preferring where possible to keep its visitors to itself. It truncates its RSS feeds, presumably also for selfish (if self-defeating) reasons. And, unsurprisingly for a website which is hesitant even to link to Ritholtz’s criticisms, it certainly never published them itself (although it could have, and it would have been fascinating to see the difference between the comments on Ritholtz’s blog and the comments on the SA repost.)

Clearly there’s an incentives problem here. Every dollar David Jackson doesn’t give to its contributors is a dollar he gets to keep for himself, which means that SA’s incentives are absolutely not aligned with those of his contributors. When Abnormal Returns talks about building "a better aggregator", that’s I think one of the main things they’re talking about: a model where the content providers get the same upside as the republishers.

Jackson, in one of the comments, talks of SA’s "quarterly loss": I’m not sure if this is a public acknowledgement that the site is losing money. Even if it is, however, David Jackson’s net worth is clearly rising quite impressively as the value of his site increases. He’s making money, even if the site is cashflow negative. And he’s trying to keep as much of that money as possible for himself. That’s only rational, of course. But he shouldn’t be surprised if some of his contributors are less than enthusiastic about it.

Update: David Jackson tried to respond in the comments, but there was some kind of problem with them. Here’s what he writes:

Felix, as usual this is a thoughtful and thought-provoking post. But it contains some factual errors, and also I think a deeper mistake. First, the factual errors. We did not have the option to publish Barry’s criticism on Seeking Alpha, because he told us to cease publishing his articles until further notice. I named him but didn’t link to his post not because I’m parsimonious with links, but because I believed his post was grossly unfair and misleading. He mentioned that we violated his editorial requests, but didn’t mention that the "violation" was an error by a new editor which was immediately corrected when we picked up his email alerting us to the mistake, and that our editor in chief personally emailed him to apologize *before* he published his post. He also didn’t mention how we had specifically worked with him to promote his blog and new businesses on his articles (just look at his articles on Seeking Alpha), nor the discussions we had had to bounce around ideas for working together. As a result, many of his readers assumed that we were running some kind of automated bot, intentionally disregarding his wishes and trying to take advantage of him.

I faced a dilemma: I didn’t want to focus on the misrepresentative innuendos in Barry’s post that led to the torrent of negative comments, instead of focusing on the core issue of Seeking Alpha’s business model and our partnership with contributors. Not mentioning him wasn’t possible since he’d triggered the debate, but linking to his post without pointing out its inaccuracies also didn’t seem viable. So I chose a middle path: mention him, keep my article focused on real issues, and provide a link to him in the comments below.

I’m explaining this in detail because it’s actually a dilemma that is becoming more frequent as blogs spread: What do you do when someone grossly misrepresents you but triggers a debate which you need to respond to? Should you publicly correct their misrepresentation, or focus on the substantive issue? I’m sure many individuals and companies have faced this issue, and I’d be interested in hearing how others have dealt with that situation.

The core issue is much more important, however: Is Seeking Alpha playing the Ultimatum Game? The answer is categorically "no".

First, your analogy is focused on a single point in time, but our business and contributor relationships are dynamic over time. We’re in investment mode (yup, we’re losing money), and need to grow our audience. If we paid contributors a rev share now, for example, we wouldn’t excite them (who wants to be told their articles generated $5.63 for them this month?) and we’d impede our growth. But investing in growth will allow us to provide even greater benefit for contributors, whether with direct payments, revenue shares or other forms of lead generation and monetization (none of which we rule out). So our current relationship, where we don’t pay rev shares etc, isn’t a zero sum game: our investment in our business will also generate higher future value for our contributors.

Second, your metaphor omits the marginal costs born by the parties — zero to the contributor, but high to Seeking Alpha. We bear the technology, content and editorial costs of developing a platform, but the contributor bears only the cost of an email that says "yes, please republish my articles".

Our lives are full of relationships where we voluntarily participate without payment in something that generates revenue for someone else — because we gain from our participation. Have you ever left a message on a Yahoo Finance messageboard? They made ad revenue from your content. Have you left a comment on someone else’s blog which has ads on it (like I’m doing now)? I’m investing time and effort in this, but Portfolio.com is making the ad revenue. Has Barry appeared on a radio or TV show without getting paid? My guess is yes, frequently; but the stations make money off his appearances. Google, the most extreme example, makes money from placing ads next to searches for your headlines. But that’s fine, becuase someone else has invested in a platform which provides marginal benefit to you with zero marginal cost. We generally don’t regard these relationships as ultimatums; we welcome them.

On the question of whether to link to criticism you’re citing, I think the answer is pretty much always yes. On the question of the Ultimatum Game, I wasn’t actually suggesting that SA pay its contributors; in fact I was quite harsh about that suggestion last month. My point was a bit broader: that incentives aren’t aligned at SA, and that in fact SA has behaved in the past as though it is trying to minimize the benefit to contributors. Looking through the comments on David’s post, I think it’s fair to sum up the attitude of contributors as being cautiously enthusiastic; they don’t seem to think the company is particularly responsive to their concerns, or particularly zealous when it comes to maximizing their non-monetary benefits from contributing.

That said, my own experience with the team at SA has generally been very good. And I do think that they’re undoubtedly the best at what they do. But herding bloggers was never going to be easy, as David is learning.

Posted in blogonomics | 1 Comment

Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

You can’t spell "subprime" without "UBS"

Diamonds are forever: A nicely contrarian take on the concept of "blood diamonds".

Greenspan: "This is really quite unfair": Greenspan never really retracted his statement recommending ARMs.

Beware the ninja Prius

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

The Yahoo Yawn

With all the news about Yahoo that emerged after the market closed yesterday – Google! Microsoft! AOL! Murdoch! – the stock today erupted in a frenzy of highly volatile trading, closing well above Microsoft’s offer price. Or, you know, it didn’t.

YHOO closed up a whopping 82 cents, or 2.95%, at $28.59, and you’ve got to consider that half of that was general market sentiment: the Nasdaq as a whole rose 1.27%. And volume in YHOO today was 32.5 million shares, significantly lower than YHOO’s average volume of 44.3 million shares. Yet more proof, if proof were needed, that stock trading really isn’t driven by news, most of the time.

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Attractive Lenders

If I were a chartist, which I’m not, I’m sure I would consider the chart of KKR Financial to be surpassingly ugly. But I had lunch today with Brian McMahon, the CEO and CIO of Thornburg Investment Management, and he’s much more constructive on the company, which essentially is a lender.

McMahon said that the interest rate on the loans that KKR Financial makes has gone up well over 200bp since the summer, in some cases as much as 300bp, even as KKR Financial’s own cost of funds has only gone up about 75bp. Result: higher earnings! So if you consider the value of the company to be the discounted value of future earnings, that value should in theory be higher than it was when the crunch hit last summer.

Of course, the discount rate you use to value the company will probably have risen too – and, crucially, the expected default rate on KKR Financial’s assets is likely to have gone up substantially, given how property-centric its portfolio is. But is that enough to justify the fact that KKR Financial is trading at less than half the price it was at a year ago?

And McMahon’s bigger point is well taken: lending is a good business right now, as credit spreads have widened and banks start being reintermediated in the wake of the bond markets largely closing down for many issuers. There are bound to be banks out there, and other lenders, who have been battered by the credit crunch but whose loan portfolio is actually reasonably solid. Those stocks could prove to be very attractive over the medium to long term, especially if you think that any recession in the US is likely to be relatively mild and overall default rates are likely to remain subdued.

Posted in banking, bonds and loans, stocks | Comments Off on Attractive Lenders

Are There Low-Risk, Low-Return Hedge Funds?

Megan Barnett reckons that all hedge funds are high-risk investments. Because of their performance fees, she says, they’re incentivized to take greater risks because it’s there that the big money lies.

I like these arguments from incentives, because they do have a habit of cutting through the bullshit. But I also wonder: is there such a thing as a low-risk hedge fund? Apparently Falcon Strategies Two B LLC, founded by one V. Pandit, "promised annual returns of between 7 percent and 10 percent"; it’s unclear whether that’s net of the 2.5% management fee. Are there many hedge funds aiming for single-digit returns? Have any of them done particularly well, in terms of growing their AUM? Maybe Sebastian Mallaby will know.

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Blogonomics: Narrow Blogs

Liquidity Freeze is, in its own words,

A blog following the catastrophic failure in auction rate security markets, concentrating on closed end funds.

The author even adds a note saying that anything not associated with closed end funds is "out of scope". This is why I love the blogosphere: for every blog looking for tens or hundreds of thousands of readers, there’s another so narrow that you wonder if anybody will read it. But that doesn’t mean it’s not a worthwhile endeavor for the writer or for a handful of possible readers.

(Via Cowen)

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Agricultural Subsidies: Still a Bad Idea

If you want proof that the free-market intelligentsia really doesn’t get what it wants, all you need to do is look at agricultural subsidies. The right hates them because, well, they’re subsidies, and the left hates them because the beneficiaries are big agricultural companies while the losers are taxpayers and third-world farmers. Yet the subsidies stubbornly refuse to disappear.

And now, interestingly, the left is starting to have second thoughts on the subject. They’re not coming out and saying that agricultural subsidies shouldn’t be abolished, but they are pointing out that subsidies keep prices down, and that in an environment of rising food prices, now might not be the best time to start pushing them up even further. Dani Rodrik and Dean Baker have both made this point: if you’re looking for solutions to the rising-food-prices problem, then it’s hard in the same breath call for the abolition of agricultural subsidies.

Some of Rodrik’s commenters do make a valiant attempt to square the circle. If you abolish US and EU agricultural subsidies, they say, then that will make developing-market agricultural production more attractive, which will mean more investment in developing-country agriculture, which will mean, ultimately, lower prices. Or something. It’s all a bit vague and hopeful.

My view is that the effects of removing agricultural subsidies on food prices are much like the effects of implementing a carbon tax on gasoline prices: they make a difference at the margin, but that difference is much smaller than the big secular price changes driven by global commodity markets. So if the removal of agricultural subsidies or the implementation of a carbon tax makes sense on a big-picture level, then go ahead and do it and don’t worry too much about first-order price effects.

I do appreciate that the first-order price effects are a large part of the reason to implement such changes in the first place. But the way I see it, these changes make sense as a matter of fiscal policy first and foremost, and the impact on government budgets can actually be quite large. And over the long term, making the changes will help eradicate market inefficiencies, such as rent-seeking behavior in the agricultural industry or negative externalities in the world of carbon emissions. And that’s a good result as well.

Posted in commodities, fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on Agricultural Subsidies: Still a Bad Idea

Why Hedge Funds Lose Money in Volatile Markets

Insight from Baruch:

The strategists at my beloved employer told the punters, correctly, that this year would see a lot of volatility in equities. So, they said, increase allocation to equity long short, which struck me as precisely the wrong thing to do. Paradoxically in times like this it is the dumb, directional money, the long only crowd, who can ride out volatility better.

This makes sense to me, and helps explain why volatility is bad for hedge funds. If you’re doing any kind of relative-value play, then volatility works against you in that it increases the chances that you’ll get stopped out before you make any profits. It’s only the noise traders who really make money from volatility, and they’re actually a minority in the hedge-fund world.

No hedge is perfect, and in periods of unusual volatility, hedges are more likely to fail. Hedge funds, it seems, are much more likely to outperform in a low-volatility bear market than in a high-volatility messy market like we have right now. But there isn’t an asset class devoted to making money from volatility, so investors throw their money at hedge funds anyway, generally in the hope that if a fund hasn’t blown up yet, it might somehow avoid blowing up in future.

Update: After four comments saying exactly the same thing, I clearly nead to clarify. Of course there are ways of making money from volatility: you just, well, go long volatility, normally in the options market. But that’s a strategy, not an asset class. For an investor trying to work out where to put his money, the zero-sum game that is the options market is not really investable, let alone a good idea.

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The Fight for Yahoo

The more I think about it, the more I like this idea of a joint bid for Yahoo from Microsoft and News Corp. The bits of Yahoo which Microsoft doesn’t want – call them "content", if you like – are precisely the bits which Murdoch would love. Meanwhile, as Sam Gustin points out, the Yahoo-AOL-Google rival approach seems to have a zero chance of passing regulatory muster.

The whole situation reminds me weirdly of the fight for ABN Amro. The deal that the target company wanted, with Barclays, never worked out, partly because Barclays stock was about as healthy as Time Warner’s. In the end the bank got sold to a consortium of strategic bidders: an approach which managed to multiply synergies.

The biggest winners of all in that deal, of course, were ABN’s shareholders, which means that anybody holding Yahoo on Wednesday night is waking up smiling on Thursday. It’s still conceivable Yahoo will be sold for $31 a share; it’s pretty much unthinkable at this point it will be sold for any less. And it might well now go for significantly more. Expect the risk-arbs to have a lot of fun today.

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The Euro Under Attack

Avi Tiomkin has a provocative article in the latest Forbes on "the demise of the euro". His thesis is not only that the euro will fall against the dollar, but that the entire currency will fall apart, and that Europe will go back to francs and lire and marks.

There’s no doubt that tensions are running high in euroland.

What will undo the euro: the mounting tension between the inflation-obsessed German bloc (including Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and the Latin bloc of France, Italy and Spain…

Spain’s worsening real estate slump dramatically illustrates the problem faced by the Latin bloc. For years Spanish home building and buying outstripped that of Germany, Italy and France combined. Now that the boom has turned to bust, the Spanish central bank cannot lower interest rates. Nor can the treasury devalue the currency. Bound to the euro, Spain can only complain to the ECB, while watching its economy circle the drain.

European heads of state and the European business press are making their discontent public in stark language. "We cannot continue to cope with the autism of some bankers who do not understand that the priority is not fighting inflation, which is nonexistent, but fighting for more growth," declared French President Nicolas Sarkozy last year. In October, in response to German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck’s comment that he "loves a strong euro," leading Italian business newspaper Il Sole ran a headline labeling the remark "a declaration of war." "Italy has lost the ability to grow," the Italian finance minister, himself one of the founding members of the ECB, admitted recently.

I think that Tiomkin overstates his case, however. I don’t know when exactly Sarkozy made his "autism" remark, but I suspect it was while he was campaigning for the presidency rather than after he had won it. And there are many reasons why Italy isn’t growing; frankly the strong euro is far from being the greatest of that country’s problems. Tiomkin also fails to recognise that exiting the euro would be economically and financially disastrous for Italy, which would probably be forced to default on its debt at the same time.

It’s weird too that Tiomkin advises investors to short the euro, since the departure of a Latin state or two from the eurozone would only serve to reinforce the ECB’s ability to fight inflation and maintain a strong currency. Tiomkin seems to think there’s a zero probability that Italy or Spain could leave the euro without the whole currency being abandoned and Germany going back to the Deutschmark. But that’s far from obvious.

Still, the base case is for no exits from the euro, and a continued hawkish stance from the ECB. The central bank might be unpopular, but that doesn’t mean it’s going to be abolished. After all, it’s worth remembering that the ridiculously high interest rate everyone’s complaining about is actually set at just 4%: what’s considered high in Germany would be considered low in Italy. So really there’s no sense in Italy leaving the euro.

Posted in euro | Comments Off on The Euro Under Attack

Sheila Bair’s Plan B

FDIC chairman Sheila Bair’s Plan A for modifying troubled mortgages is, by her own admission, not working out very well. But never worry, she’s got a Plan B:

One idea is to provide loans directly to troubled borrowers to pay down principal. For example, if you used $50 billion to pay down 20 percent of the principal on troubled mortgages, you could modify 1.1 million loans. So $50 billion, that’s a big number–but I’ve seen a lot bigger numbers. The stimulus package was $150 billion.

I don’t like this idea much. The $50 billion, in this case, is loans, not grants. If you’ve got a mortgage which has reset to a 10% interest rate, and then the government comes along and refinances 20% of it at say 5%, you’ll still be paying 10% on 80% of the former principal, and 5% on the other 20%. Which means that your new total interest payment would be 9% of the former principal. The government will have spent $50 billion, with the aim of shaving 10% off troubled borrowers’ mortgage payments? I don’t see this getting much traction.

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Sebastian Mallaby Still Loves Hedge Funds

Every so often over the past few months, as yet another hedge fund or private-equity legend came unstuck, I wondered how Sebastian Mallaby’s book was doing. After writing an astonishingly upbeat article on hedge funds for Foreign Affairs, he decided to turn it into a book, just before the leveraged-finance bubble burst.

Conveniently, Mallaby’s now popped up, in Foreign Affairs again, to tell us how he’s doing. And the answer is: don’t worry! Nothing’s changed! Hedge funds are still great and wondrous things! "The turmoil since last August has largely vindicated the funds’ virtues," he writes. "The central argument of my 2007 essay holds true today."

How can Mallaby spin this? One way is by making a distinction between hedge funds, on the one hand, and banks, on the other:

The most striking fact about the ongoing financial mayhem is that it is concentrated not in lightly regulated hedge funds but in more heavily regulated commercial and investment banks. It is banks that created subprime mortgage securities. It is banks that mispriced them… The average fund tracked by the Chicago-based firm Hedge Fund Research declined by a mere 2.4 percent in March, bringing the cumulative fall for the first quarter of 2008 to 2.7 percent. By contrast, the bank-heavy financial services component of the S&P 500 fell 12.3 percent in the first quarter.

Ahem. This is a classic apples-to-oranges comparison: he’s comparing the decline in hedge fund assets to the decline in bank stock prices. Did he maybe look to see what had happened to banks’ assets, in order to make a more apples-to-apples comparison? If he had, he would have found, most likely, that they hadn’t fallen at all – and certainly not by 2.7% in one quarter. Alternatively, did he look at listed hedge funds’ stock prices, in order to get an oranges-to-oranges comparison? Well, Fortress Investment Group fell by 20% in the first quarter, and don’t even get me started on Carlyle Capital.

Mallaby continues:

Hedge funds, for the most part, have weathered the storm remarkably well. Their occasional failures have stemmed mainly from errors that were not of their own making. Because banks have mismanaged themselves so thoroughly, they have had to mobilize capital by calling in loans to hedge funds, forcing the funds to sell off positions precipitously. Forced sales have driven down the value of the hedge funds’ remaining holdings, undermining their creditworthiness and triggering a further calling in of loans, further forced sales, and further losses. This vicious circle has caused a few funds to go bust. But the trigger was not reckless behavior in unregulated hedge land. It was subprime losses in the regulated banking system.

No, Sebastian, the trigger wasn’t subprime losses in the banking system, it was excess leverage in the hedge-fund system. If that hadn’t been there, the vicious cycle would never have happened.

Mallaby does concede the leverage point, attributing it to Brad Setser. But he still doesn’t believe in doing anything about it:

A regulatory cap on leverage could do damage, since the proper cap varies depending on a fund’s investment strategy. It would also be hard to enforce: after all, the Basel ratios are notoriously malleable. And starving well-managed hedge funds of credit is likely to reduce the efficiency of markets.

I don’t think anybody’s proposing simply applying Basel ratios willy-nilly to hedge funds, and certainly there would be problems with enforcement. But what is this damage that Mallaby talks of? It’s far from clear. And it’s just funny to see Mallaby talk about lower leverage reducing the efficiency of markets, just after he’s given a detailed explanation of how it’s excess leverage which causes vicious circles and their consequent inefficiencies.

Mallaby also seems to think that hedge funds can affect broad market levels, rather than just arbitrage away inefficiencies:

Hedge funds do not engage only in crowded trades. They have also acted as contrarians, betting against the crowd and so dampening the market’s volatility. When the subprime bubble was inflating, several hedge funds, notably an outfit called Paulson and Co., bet that it would pop. These funds not only made astronomical profits, they also prevented the bubble from growing even bigger than it did.

I doubt even John Paulson would buy that one. If one hedge fund buys a bunch of credit protection on mortgage-backed bonds, does Mallaby seriously think the entire housing bubble is going to stop growing? And once again it beggars belief to think that the actions of highly-leveraged hedge funds reall act to dampen the market’s volatility. Think back to last summer, when all the quant funds started unwinding their positions simultaneously and volatility spiked even as the broad stock market was largely unscathed. Clearly that was hedge funds causing volatility, not dampening it.

But Mallaby goes even further: not only can hedge funds stop asset prices from rising, he says, they can also stop them from falling.

Now that the bubble has burst, hedge funds will likely serve as opportunistic buyers of distressed assets, putting a floor under their value.

Hm. Did Warburg Pincus put a floor under the value of MBIA when it bought in for $1 billion at $31 a share? It certainly doesn’t seem that way now that MBIA’s stock is trading at $12. (And no, I don’t think there’s much of a difference, for these purposes, between hedge funds and private-equity shops.)

Mallaby does make one good point: that the Fed is now indirectly supporting the entire hedge-fund industry, at least insofar as it’s leveraged. But then he immediately backpedals:

The Fed has now offered to lend investment banks emergency money via its discount window, so it is backstopping these banks’ lending to hedge funds–and hence indirectly underwriting the high-wire acts in hedge land. If it turns out that this policy shift is costing taxpayers’ money, there may be a case for limiting hedge-fund leverage (just as the Basel capital-adequacy ratios are supposed to limit banks’ leverage). But for the moment the argument for regulation looks weaker than the argument for a hands-off approach.

The problem is that Mallaby never really makes the argument for a hands-off approach: he’s very long on bald assertions, and short on empirical evidence. He promises more of the latter in his book; I look forward to reading it. But so far he’s got more of a conclusion than a real argument.

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Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Survey of economics blog readers: If you have a minute, take it!

A Tax Break for Bubble Heads: More problems with the housing bill.

The Bear Stearns Tombstone.

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Blogonomics: Leaving Seeking Alpha

I feel I have to mention Barry Ritholtz’s very public abandonment of Seeking Alpha. After they mistakenly edited a couple of his headlines, he put up an anguished post on his personal blog, asking if he should quit the relationship; the readers of his personal blog, unsurprisingly, said yes. Given that Ritholtz only joined SA "after considerable reluctance", it’s probably not surprising that he’s leaving now.

Since Barry is arguably the top finance blogger in the world, he of all people really doesn’t need Seeking Alpha to bolster his brand – the main reason people join the site. But I’m still not sure that, at the margin, his decision is the right one.

Barry gives three reasons for leaving Seeking Alpha, none of them compelling. The first is that reposts there are a "dilution of brand", which I don’t really understand. If brands get more exposure, does that mean they’re diluted, or does that mean they’re strengthened? More people read Barry’s content if he’s on SA than if he isn’t. For me, that’s a brand strengthening.

There is one source of dilution from SA: comments. One comments feed is, ceteris paribus, better than two: readers shouldn’t have to visit two different websites in order to read all of the comments. But the fact is that the commenters on Barry’s own site are a notch or two smarter than the vast majority of commenters on Seeking Alpha. Which brings me to another of Barry’s reasons for leaving the site: he can’t patrol the comments there. Fine. Leave SA comments for "the usual trolls and asshats", they’re not commenting on your site, and no one holds their comments against you. It actually reflects well on your primary site.

Finally, Barry thinks that "duplicative content weakens a site’s GoogleScore". I just don’t think this is true.

At the same time, Barry doesn’t consider the main reason to stay with SA: he gets more readers that way. Now it’s true that it’s hard for him to directly monetize those readers, as Bill Rempel points out at length. But on the other hand, these readers are pretty much by definition people who don’t visit his site – readers who are impossible for him to monetize.

And while Barry might not like the overall quality of the writers at SA, the quality of the readers (as opposed to the commenters, who are an unrepresentative sample) is pretty high, for one big reason: SA’s email alerts. Most executives simply have no time to surf the web for content, which is one reason why it took a long time for econoblogs to take off. But a lot of them have signed up for SA’s email service, which sends them a bunch of posts on their particular company or industry on a regular basis. And I’m often very surprised at the number of times that high-powered people get in touch with me after I end up in one of those emails.

In my experience, it’s not hard to get the executives at Seeking Alpha to change their ways: it took just one rude email from me, for instance, and suddenly they were linking directly to my RSS feed, which they never did before. If bloggers have issues with SA, I’d recommend they go to SA first, rather than simply picking up their ball in a huff and storming off home – although that is of course their right.

But Barry, like most fund managers, is an aggressive and competitive guy, and so it’s always going to be hard for him not to consider SA to be competition. As I say, he’s popular enough already that taking his stuff from SA isn’t going to make much of a difference – after all, he’s a regular pundit on financial TV, which is even better for brand-building. Frankly the best thing that Barry could do to boost his brand and pageviews is buy thebigpicture.com: at the moment, potential readers are forced to Google him before they find him.

All that said, I would certainly welcome any alternative to Seeking Alpha which may or may not be launched by the people behind Abnormal Returns. The more blogs the better, and the more aggregators the better. Let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend!

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Apollo’s Discount IPO

One thing the stock market has in common with the art market is a very strong allergy against primary-market offerings which have fallen in price from the last time round. It’s one of the reasons why gallerists invariably sell their artists’ work well below the secondary-market price: they want to leave enough room so that they can be sure to be able to raise that artist’s prices at her next show. And the same thing goes for companies: each round of fundraising, from angel to VC to IPO to secondary offering, is generally priced at a significant premium to the last, and it’s a sign of desperation and/or distress when a company raises equity at a lower price than it has in the past.

None of which, it seems, is something which keeps Apollo’s Leon Black up at night. He’s going public, despite having privately listed his stock at a higher price:

Apollo had already broadcast its intentions to list publicly, having traded on a private Goldman Sachs Group Inc. exchange since last summer. Those shares are down more than 40%.

Since it’s inconceivable that the IPO price will come at a 67% premium to the price at which Apollo is trading on the Goldman exchange, investors who bought in early are going to look a little foolish, or at best unlucky.

But I’m glad that Apollo has made this decision, if only because the convention that each equity round has to be priced higher than the last serves no useful purpose. Leon Black is rich and powerful enough to be able to ignore it; with any luck, other corporate executives will increasingly follow suit.

Posted in private equity | Comments Off on Apollo’s Discount IPO

Petrochemical Datapoint of the Day

Darren Rovell is on the baseball-cap beat:

New Era raised prices on its 59Fifty hats by $4 last year because of a change in material from wool to polyester.

No, that’s not a misprint. Polyester, it seems, is now more expensive than wool.

Posted in commodities, sports | Comments Off on Petrochemical Datapoint of the Day

Wall Street Euphemism Watch

At Citigroup, the guy in charge of firing people is known as the "head of productivity". Someone give Vikram Pandit a bloody shovel already.

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Hedge Fund Losses Blamed on Volatility

There’s more than a little schadenfreude doing the rounds at the news that one of Jim Simons’s funds is down 12% from its peak last May – especially since it’s meant to provide "lower, yet steadier, returns" than your average quant fund.

But there’s a lot more to Katherine Burton’s long Bloomberg article than that one factoid, and the bit which jumped out at me was this:

Much of the problem this year has come from extreme price movements in different markets. The S&P 500 has moved by 1 percent or more on about half of all trading days this year, according to New York-based Standard & Poor’s. The last time the percentage hovered at that level was in 1938.

Commodities prices have also gyrated. This year, crude oil has fallen below $90 a barrel twice and jumped to a high of $110 a barrel. It closed yesterday at almost $109 a barrel. The U.S. dollar has lost 4.13 percent this year against a trade-weighted basket of currencies tracked by the Federal Reserve.

I have to say I don’t get it. Aren’t hedge funds precisely the asset class which is meant to benefit from volatility?

On the other hand, if hedge funds are losing money, is that good news for the rest of us, who aren’t rushing in and out of markets trying and failing to pick tops and bottoms? Are the hedge funds’ losses in some respect our gains? I doubt it, somehow, but a blogger can dream.

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Where Private Equity Meets Public Debt

Back in October, things were so much smaller. The idea then was that KKR would put up $2 billion of equity, leverage it up to a total of $10 billion by borrowing $8 billion from Citigroup, and then use the total to buy leveraged loans from Citigroup. It was enough to make one’s head spin, but it almost happened: Citi CEO Chuck Prince famously paid a visit to Henry Kravis’s offices on 57th Street to talk about the deal.

In the event, six months later, and with a new CEO at Citi, there’s now a deal for the bank to sell $12 billion of leveraged loans to a consortium of private-equity companies which doesn’t include KKR at all. This, too, is a little bit headspinny: isn’t public debt pretty much the by-definition opposite of private equity? But hey, they’re paying 90 cents on the dollar for what is probably largely their own debt, so it’s got to be a reasonably good deal for them. I wonder if Citigroup will let me buy back my debt at 90 cents on the dollar? Maybe if I borrow another billion or two it might.

Posted in banking, bonds and loans, private equity | Comments Off on Where Private Equity Meets Public Debt