The Rubin-Bernanke Phone Call

Teh internets aren’t happy about the fact that Bob Rubin, Lew Ranieri, and

others got

to speak one-on-one with Ben Bernanke in the wake of the August FOMC meeting.

(See John

Carney (twice),

Kevin Duffy, and

Greg

Newton, for starters.) But the chap who actually got all the details of

the conversations with a FOIA request, Penn’s Kenneth Thomas, thinks the conversations

were a jolly good idea on Bernanke’s part, and evidence that he’s trying to

"get up to date with what is going on". And Larry

Kudlow, who supports Bernanke’s actions, doesn’t deny that Rubin et

al were instrumental in driving monetary policy:

It seems clear that Rubin started a chain reaction on August 8 — only

one day after the Fed’s disappointing, hold-the line policy decision

that so disappointed financial markets and intensified the credit turmoil.

Essentially, the academic Bernanke became a hands-on market participant through

his contacts with Rubin, Paulson, the hedgies, and others. He reached out

to savvy financial-market players who put him in touch with the real world.

He then embarked on a 5-week journey that shook world credit markets out of

their financial panic and started the healing process that continues to this

day.

Now a large part of Bernanke’s mandate is to regulate banks and to keep an

eye on the markets. There would be a lot more complaining if Bernanke hadn’t

talked to private-sector grandees like Rubin and Ranieri. But I’m fascinated

by this part of a Chuck

Prince profile in the NYT:

On Aug. 8, a day after the Federal Reserve decided against lowering interest

rates, Mr. Rubin made a phone call to Ben S. Bernanke, the Fed chairman, to

compliment the decision, according to a person familiar with the call. Although

Mr. Rubin’s interactions with federal regulators have drawn scrutiny

in the past, this person said that Mr. Rubin acted “on his own behalf

and not on behalf of Citigroup.” This person also said Mr. Rubin made

the call out of concern that a rate cut might encourage reckless behavior

on Wall Street.

If the "person familiar with the call" wasn’t Rubin himself (I suspect

that it probably was), then it’s someone expressly authorized, if not outright

instructed, by Rubin to place these talking points in the New York Times. It

seems that Rubin is at pains to point out that (a) it was Rubin personally making

the call, not the chairman of the executive board of Citigroup; and that (b)

Rubin supported the August decision to keep rates on hold, and was not trying

to talk Bernanke into a rate cut.

Methinks that Rubin doth protest a little too much, here. As Deutsche’s Michael

Mayo points out later on in the NYT piece, Rubin has been paid more than $100

million by Citigroup this decade, in return for which he has never talked to

investors and has never taken any managerial responsibility for any Citigroup

businesses. In other words, he got paid $100 million precisely because he has

clout with the likes of Ben Bernanke, and is a master of the well-timed, strategically-placed

phone call. In return for that $100 million, we can assume that Rubin’s phone

calls tend to coincide with Citigroup’s interests.

As for Rubin’s hawkishness, is it a mere coincidence that Bernanke slashed

the discount rate just two days later? I’m with Kudlow on this one: Rubin did

indeed help steer Bernanke into rate-cutting mode. (And there’s no indication

that Rubin disapproves of Bernanke’s decision to cut rates in September.)

So the main thing we can learn from the NYT plant is that Bob Rubin is a little

bit embarrassed about that phone call, now that it has been made public. Which

in turn suggests that Carney et al might have something of a point,

even if it’s probably stretching things to say that Bernanke is responsible

for imparting "inside information" to hand-picked market participants.

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